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This dissertation is intended to answer the question of whether it is possible 
for a developing nation to achieve economic prosperity without compromising 
equality and liberty. Theories of socio-economic development must often deal with 
conflicting demands of economic efficiency, political freedom, and socio-economic 
equality, as well as the frequently-contradictory aims of material prosperity and 
spiritual happiness. I argue that an analysis of the political, economic, and religious 
thought of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, a leader of the Masyumi Islamic political party 
in Indonesia and a neglected liberal-modernist Muslim thinker, allows us to explore 
how these seemingly conflicting demands may be harmonized into an integrated 
concept of development. An examination of Sjafruddin’s works—reports, books, 
articles, speeches, and interviews from 1946 to 1983, as well as other scholars’ 
observations, judgments and reports—reveals a prescription for Indonesian 
economic problems based on two key guiding principles of development: social 
justice and human development. The basis of Sjafruddin’s economic rationality is the 
prioritization of human development before capital. This ensures sustainable 
economic development and nurtures a spiritually and morally-oriented population 
to withstand the consumption practices and lifestyles of modern capitalism. This 
study also suggests that economic development will be most successful if it occurs 
within the framework of a modern conception of social justice predicated on a 
democratic political system with a system of checks and balances between 
executive, legislative and judicative branches of government, equal opportunities, 
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human rights, and universal political participation. In the context of the Muslim 
world, this concept of development requires the re-interpretation of Islamic 
teachings. The present study seeks to contribute to the field of religious studies by 
highlighting the systematic thought of an independently-minded Muslim modernist 
thinker whose contributions are underappreciated in academic circles even in 
Indonesia. Sjafruddin’s unique historical involvement during the 1950s as a 
politician who was directly involved in the conception and implementation of 
economic policies, as well as his career as a well-respected public intellectual, 
provide insight into both the promises and the realities of development and social 





Islam, justice sociale, et développement économique: Une etude de l’oeuvre de 
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Cette thèse vise à répondre à la question suivante : une nation en 
développement peut-elle réaliser la prospérité économique sans toutefois 
compromettre l’égalité et la liberté? Les théories de développement socio-
économique doivent souvent prendre en compte les demandes conflictuelles de 
l’efficacité économique, la liberté politique et l’égalité socio-économique, en plus des 
aspirations fréquemment contradictoires de la prospérité matérielle et du bonheur 
spirituel. Je soutiendrai qu’une analyse de la pensée politique, économique, et 
religieuse de Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, leader du parti politique islamique Masyumi 
en Indonésie et penseur musulman libéral-moderniste peu étudié, nous permettra 
d’explorer la manière par laquelle ces demandes, bien qu’elles puissent sembler en 
conflit, pourraient être harmonisées à fin de créer un concept de développement 
intégré. L’examen des œuvres de Sjafruddin, dont les rapports, articles, discours et 
entrevues des années 1946 à 1983, ainsi que les observations et les avis d’autres 
érudits, révèle une prescription pour les problèmes économiques indonésiens Le 
raisonnement économique de Sjafruddin fait primer le développement humain sur 
l’avancement du capital. Cette approche s’assure que le développement économique 
soit durable, tout en incitant la population à résister aux habitudes de 
consommation du capitalisme moderne en la nourrissant aux plans spirituels, 
éthiques, et moraux. Cette étude laisse aussi entendre que le développement 
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économique serait le plus réussi s’il prenait place dans le cadre d’une conception 
moderne de la justice sociale, établie sur un système politique démocratique qui 
favorise l’équilibre entre les branches exécutive, législative, et judiciaire du 
gouvernement ; l’égalité des opportunités ; les droits de l’homme ; et la souveraineté 
populaire. Dans un contexte islamique, ce concept du développement exige une 
réinterprétation des enseignements religieux. La présente étude vise à contribuer au 
domaine des études religieuses en mettant en lumière la pensée systématique d’un 
penseur moderniste musulman d’esprit indépendant dont les contributions restent 
sous-estimées dans des cercles académiques, et cela même en Indonésie.  La 
participation de Sjafruddin à la conception et à la mise en application d’une  
politique économique, autant que sa carrière d’intellectuel très reconnu, nous 
donnent une idée des promesses ainsi que des réalités du développement et de la 
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NOTES ON SPELLING AND TRANSLITERATION 
 
After 1972 Indonesian spelling was no longer based upon the rules of the 
Dutch language. The letters ch, dj, j, nj, sj, tj, and oe (old spelling) are now spelled 
respectively as kh, j, y, ny, sy, c, and u. So, for instance, “Masjumi” is now spelled 
“Masyumi”, and “Pantjasila” is now “Pancasila”. I use this new spelling for all 
Indonesian terms with the exception of most personal names.  
As for the transliteration system for Arabic or Persian words, I use the 
Library of Congress system recommended by the Institute of Islamic Studies. 
However, I do not always use exact transliteration for words that have made it into 
the English language, such as Qur’an and Hadith, or for Anglicized personal names 
such as Fazlur Rahman or Khurshid Ahmad.  
All translations, unless otherwise noted, are the author’s. Full translations for 






PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 
In July 2011, twenty-two years after the death of Mr. Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara, the government of Indonesia issued a Centennial Stamp 
commemorating his services to the country. On November 7 of the same year, the 
government conferred upon him the status of national hero. This move was initiated 
earlier that year, amidst much public support, by the Committee of the Centennial 
Commemoration of Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, which also proposed—more 
controversially—that Sjafruddin be recognized as the Second President of the 
Republic of Indonesia.1 These two proposals were advanced with particular 
reference to his services in leading the Emergency Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia (PDRI) in Sumatra from 1948-1949, during which time the Dutch 
occupied Indonesian territories in Java and Sumatra and captured the leadership of 
the new Republic, including President Sukarno and Vice President Mohammad 
Hatta. The Sjafruddin-led Emergency Government managed to preserve the 
existence of Indonesia as a country with a functioning government by continuing to 
conduct guerrilla warfare and establishing communication with various civilian and 
military forces of the Republic government in Sumatra, Java, and abroad.2  
This recognition is very significant with respect to the history and politics of 
Indonesia during the past fifty years. Both during the Guided Democracy period and 
                                                          
1 Dr. (H. C.) A. M. Fatwa, Sekilas Catatan Satu Abad Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 1911-2011 
(Jakarta: Panitia Peringatan Satu Abad Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara: 1911-2011, 2011), 2-4; 
Akmal Nasery Basral, Presiden Prawiranegara: Kisah 207 Hari Syafruddin Prawiranegara 
Memimpin Indonesia [President Prawiranegara: A Story of 207 Days of Syafruddin 
Prawiranegara Leading Indonesia] (Bandung: Mizan, 2011); Iwan Satyanegara Kamah, 
“Sjafruddin Prawiranegara dan Dato Muda Assaat: Dua Presiden Indonesia yang Menjaga 
Proklamasi” [Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Dato Muda Assaat: Two Indonesian Presidents 
Guarding Proclamation] in George McTurnan Kahin et al, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara: Penyelamat 
Republik [Sjafruddin Prawiranegara: Saviour of the Republic] (Jakarta: Yayasan Asrama dan 
Pendidikan Islam “YAPI” in cooperation with Panitia Peringatan Satu Abad Mr. Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara, 1911-2011, 2011).    
2 Mestika Zed, Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia: Sebuah Mata Rantai Sejarah yang 
Terlupakan [The Emergency Government of Republic of Indonesia: A Forgotten Chain of History] 
(Jakarta: Grafiti, 1997), 72-105.  
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no less during the New Order era, Sjafruddin’s name was associated primarily with 
rebellion and, more regrettably, with Islamic fanaticism.3 The reasons for this were 
political. Sjafruddin was involved with and even became Prime Minister of the 
Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI), the Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia, a movement that demanded regional 
autonomy and held a staunchly anti-Communist bent (1958-1961). A powerful 
image of Sjafruddin as a rebel leader thus emerged in the public realm, while his 
services during the struggle of independence—especially his role in defending the 
existence of the Republic between 1948 and 1949—faded from public 
consciousness. Even during the New Order government, this image of Sjafruddin 
persisted.4 Though he and other political prisoners were released in 1966, the army-
dominated New Order government denied him and other former leaders of Masyumi 
and the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) their full political rights as citizens.5 
                                                          
3 See, for example, Ward’s analysis of the policy of the Suharto Government towards the leaders 
of the former (now dismantled) Masyumi Party and the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian 
Muslim Party) in the late 1960s. K. E. Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia 
(Ithaca, NY: Modern Indonesia Project Southeast Asia Program Cornell University, 1970), 24 and 
57-63. For many who knew Sjafruddin closely or understood his character and thinking, such as 
the late Prof. George McTurnan Kahin of Cornell University, Dr. John O. Sutter, the Asia 
Foundation's Representative for Indonesia, 1982-1984, the late Canadian economist Dr. 
Benjamin Higgins, the late Prof. Herbert Feith, the late Professor Syed Hussein Alatas, Vice 
Chancellor of Malay University, Kuala Lumpur, the late Indonesian political scientist Prof. Deliar 
Noer, Sjafruddin’s biographer Ajip Rosidi, and last but not least well-known Indonesian 
economist and social thinker Prof. M. Dawam Rahardjo, such an image is far from reality.  
4 R. Z. Leirissa, PRRI PERMESTA: Strategi Membangun Indonesia tanpa Komunis (Jakarta: Grafiti, 
1991/1997), 193.  
5 Leirissa, PRRI PERMESTA, 207. In actuality, Suharto, then Acting President said on July 27, 
1967: “Regarding those who were involved in the PRRI, and have received amnesty, the 
government wants to assert that as citizens they [have equal rights] as other citizens of 
Indonesia. Those who were previously exposed to legal action should be treated in accordance 
with civil service rules in agreement with the existing law, which upholds human rights.” But 
worried about the influence of the former Masyumi and PSI leaders, the New Order government 
rejected the rehabilitation of the two parties. The regime also restricted their participation in 
political activities, banning them from taking part in aspects of political life such as assuming 
senior positions in central party leadership and moreover, in the case of former Masyumi 
members, depriving around 2.500.00 of them their right to vote in the general election of 1971. 
See also Ajip Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara: Lebih Takut kepada Allah SWT, Sebuah Biografi 
(Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1986), 242; Ward, Foundation, 57-59. 
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Consequently, his contributions were largely forgotten.6 Furthermore, on a larger 
scale, the PRRI-Permesta7 movement had not yet received a full and fair assessment 
by historians of the Republic. This was indeed a case where prevailing 
interpretations of “truth” and “history” belonged to the victors and reflected the 
viewpoint of those in power. 
Broadly speaking, the purpose of this thesis is to bring into light two salient 
features of Sjafruddin’s political and intellectual career: his religious and socio-
economic thought as these are integrated within his concept of social justice. These 
constitute his most important and relevant contributions to the Indonesian people 
but have been largely neglected.   
In addition to the historical amnesia of the significance of Sjafruddin’s role in 
ensuring the survival of the Republic, no less regrettable is his neglect as an Islamic 
thinker. He was recognized as one of the prominent members of a progressive left-
wing group within the Masyumi Party called the religious socialists that formed a 
formidable alliance with Sutan Sjahrir’s PSI and other progressive leaders, including 
Dr. Johannes Leimena from the Christian Party and I.J. Kasimo from the Catholic 
Party.8 Moreover, Sjafruddin was among former Masyumi leaders who continued—
                                                          
6 Fatwa, Sekilas Catatan, 6-7. Many Indonesians who because of their status, job or position 
should be familiar with Sjafruddin instead know of him only vaguely or not at all. Among these 
are a high ranking government official, a PhD in political science, two students of a department of 
social sciences in a prestigious university in Indonesia, a former Indonesian ambassador to a 
country in the Middle East, and—most ironic—a former Secretary General of Ministry of Finance, 
in which Sjafruddin served three times as Minister.  
7 Barbara S. Harvey, Permesta: Half a Rebellion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 
Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1977), 1. PRRI was proclaimed at Bukit Tinggi, West 
Sumatra on February 15, 1958. Permesta (Perjuangan Semesta, Inclusive, Overall or Universal 
Struggle) was the name of a charter issued in Makassar, South Sulawesi on March 2, 1957. One of 
its demands was for provincial autonomy. Not all of its signatories, however, joined with the 
PRRI. Some, especially those who came from South Sulawesi, were persuaded or successfully 
neutralized by the central government. The name continued to be used by those who joined with 
the Sumatra-based movement in opposition to the central government. They came largely from 
Christian majority area of North Sulawesi.  
8 The group included, among others, Mohammad Natsir, Mohammad Roem (Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 1950-1951), Prawoto Mangkusasmito (General Chairman of Masjumi 1959-1960 and 
Deputy Prime Minister 1952-1953), and Dr. Abu Hanifah (Minister of Education 1949-1950). Dr. 
Sukiman Wirjosandjojo (General Chairman of Masyumi 1945-1949 and Prime Minister 1951-
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since the period of Independence and the 1950s through the 1980s—to write on 
Islam in the context of contemporary problems that arose in Indonesia. In his 
writings he commented on political, economic, social and international affairs of the 
nation and recommended courses of actions for Muslims and Indonesians.9 He also 
reflected on problems of religion and philosophy, especially while he was in prison 
(1961-1966).10 Through these writings, and his prior involvement in the revolution 
and subsequent republican governments, Sjafruddin became known as one of 
Indonesia’s foremost public intellectuals and Muslim leaders. He had a reputation 
for level-headed and rational analysis of the issues, at times to the detriment of his 
own personal safety.11 Sjafruddin not only addressed and criticized the New Order 
regime’s policies but also argued critically for many innovative, progressive and 
controversial ideas among Muslims.12 Despite this, however, it would seem that only 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1952) and Jusuf Wibisono (Minister of Finance 1951-1952) represented a more “nationalistic” 
orientation but shared many similar views with the group. Other groups within Masyumi 
included its right wing, consisting of Nahḍat al-ʿUlamā’ (NU) and more conservative elements of 
the Muhammadiyah, as well as fundamentalist-reformist groups such as Persatuan Islam (Islamic 
Unity), which Kahin probably included in his classification of the right-wing. See George 
McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Studies on Southeast Asia no. 35, ed. 
Benedict R. O’G. Anderson et al. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952; reprint, Ithaca: Cornell 
Southeast Asia Program, 2003), 157-158, 194, 309-311; Herbert Feith, The Decline of 
Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia ( Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962; reprint, 1978), 
45, 137 and 145. Allan Samson classified Masyumi into three factions: reformist, 
accommodationist, and fundamentalist. Although Samson did not mention Sjafruddin, it would 
seem from Samson’s description that the latter would fall within the reformist faction. See Allan 
A. Samson, “Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesian Islamic Modernism,” in Political 
Participation in Modern Indonesia, Monograph Series No. 19, ed. R. William Liddle, (New Haven: 
Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1973), 118-120.     
9 Sjafrudin Prawiranegara, Islam Sebagai Pedoman Hidup, vol. 1 of Kumpulan Karangan Terpilih, 
ed. Ajip Rosidi (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1986). 
10 Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 224-231. 
11 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “Pancasila as the Sole Foundation,” Indonesia 38 (October 1984): 
74-83; Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Human Development: Pola Pembangunan yang sesuai dengan 
Ajaran-ajaran Islam dan UUD ’45 (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1977), 14-17. 
12 See, for example, Sjafruddin’s proposal to reconsider the existence of Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, due to his fear that it would become a means for the commercialization of religion for 
political gain or an instrument serving the interest of the government and Ministry officials.  See 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Al-ʿAqabah, Pendakian yang Tinggi: Beberapa Pikiran tentang 
Pembangunan  (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1971), 10.  
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a few people today, first and foremost Mohammad Dawam Rahardjo, truly 
understand the liberal orientation of Sjafruddin’s thinking.13   
There are several factors that have contributed to the enormous lack of 
discussion of Sjafruddin’s religious thinking within Islamic discourse in general, not 
to mention within liberal Islamic philosophy and the renewal of Islamic thought in 
Indonesia. Many have assumed that Sjafruddin’s thinking on Islamic issues, 
especially Islam and politics in Indonesia in the New Order period, is synonymous 
with that of Mohammad Natsir, the most prominent and influential Masyumi leader. 
This assumption is not unfounded, given Sjafruddin’s deep rapport with Natsir 
during his involvement with Masyumi and with the Dewan Dawah Islamiyah 
Indonesia (DDII), the Council of Indonesian Islamic Mission, an Islamic missionary 
organization established by Natsir and other former Masyumi leaders after the New 
Order regime rejected their attempt to rehabilitate Masyumi (banned by Sukarno) 
as a political party.14 Despite the close relationship between the two men, however, 
Sjafruddin should be considered a distinct thinker in his own right. This is reflected 
in Sjafruddin and Natsir’s divergent attitudes towards the new political reality after 
the collapse of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy regime and the emergence of the army-
dominated New Order. The authoritarian and Machiavellian nature of these regimes 
alienated Natsir, Sjafruddin  and other Masyumi leaders.15 In Natsir’s case, he 
became less creative in dealing with various issues and began to lose his grasp of the 
dynamics of this new development. Although his ideas were still moderate, many 
                                                          
13 M. Dawam Rahardjo, Perspektif Deklarasi Makkah: Menuju Ekonomi Islam (Bandung: Mizan, 
1987/1989), 19-22. 
14 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 107. For a more detailed description of the activities of DDII in 
education, call/mission, health, and agriculture, see Mohammed Kamal Hassan, “Contemporary 
Muslim Religio-Political Thought in Indonesia: The Response to ‘New Order Modernization’” 
(Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1975), 105-108. 
15 Hefner, Civil Islam, 111-113; Robert Cribb and Colin Brown, Modern Indonesia: A History since 
1945 (London: Longman, 1995), 127-128.  
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people perceived them as less inspiring and refreshing than they had been from the 
1930s until the 1950s.16 The harsh policies of these regimes, especially the New 
Order government, had driven Natsir toward conservatism.17 However, this was not 
the case with Sjafruddin. Despite his own disappointments he was able to provide a 
more positive, though still critical, response to the policies of the New Order regime, 
maintaining the vigour and energy necessary to engage dynamically with the 
problems and challenges posed by the new reality. This attitude was reflected in his 
ability to respond fairly and reasonably to an issue or problem. As we shall see, he 
did not take an intrinsically critical stance against the authoritarian regime. When he 
agreed with a government policy, his support was unaffected by the concern that his 
views might be construed as favourable to the regime and contrary to Muslim 
popular opinion.  
Despite the neglect of Sjafruddin’s role in the national struggle and Islamic 
thought in Indonesia, he has nonetheless received broad appreciation and attention 
among foreign scholars and observers of the Indonesian economy. Sjafruddin’s 
economic development ideas and policies were considered to be the most open to 
foreign direct investment, friendly to the role of private companies, sober with 
regard to nationalization, prudent on spending, and pragmatic in other economic 
policies.18 His economic ideas had a noticeable impact on the economic policy of the 
New Order government.19  
                                                          
16 Hefner, Civil Islam, 103. Natsir’s indirect criticisms of Nurcholish Madjid’s ideas for renewal 
revealed this tendency. See Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy, Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: 
Rekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam Indonesia di Masa Orde Baru (Bandung: Mizan, 1990), 141-142. 
Natsir seemed to be preoccupied by “the unity of the Ummah” (Muslim community), an idealistic 
concept or situation which almost has never occurred in Indonesia, even in the 1950s when 
Masyumi constituted an influential and dominant Islamic party. Cf. Samson, “Religious Belief,” 
130.  
17Hefner, Civil Islam, 101.  
18 See for example, Bruce Glassburner, “Economic Policy-Making in Indonesia, 1950-1957,” in The 
Economy of Indonesia: Selected Readings, ed. Bruce Glassburner (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1971), 70-98; John O. Sutter, Indonesianisasi, Politics in a Changing Economy, 1940-1955, 
Data Paper no. 36 (Ithaca, New York: Department of Far Eastern Studies, Southeast Asia Program, 
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The idea of social justice is very important in Indonesian national 
consciousness. The purpose of development in accordance with the Constitution of 
the Republic of Indonesia is “to develop general prosperity, realize social justice for 
all Indonesians, and advance the nation’s life.”20 However, despite the prevalence of 
this concept in Indonesian political discourse, social justice still remains a distant 
ideal. Consecutive Indonesian governments, as we shall see, have had different—
even opposing—ideologies and strategies by which to achieve that ideal. The series 
of cabinets in the period of the liberal parliamentary democracy (1950-1957) failed 
because of various economic, political and ideological factors, as well as domestic 
and international problems which eventually brought down the system.21 President 
Sukarno’s Guided Democracy (1957-1966), accompanied by Ekonomi Terpimpin 
(Guided Economy), which attempted to transform the Indonesian economic 
structure into a socialist model, Sosialisme á la Indonesia, ultimately failed to 
enhance the level of economy and political stability due to economic 
mismanagement, internal political-ideological contradictions, conflicts of interests 
among the regime’s supporting groups, and military confrontation with Malaysia. 
The Guided Democracy system created political instability and economic disaster.22 
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Action: Indonesian Economic Studies and Policies in the 1950s,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
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Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo,” Itinerario 34.1 (March 2010): 1-22. 
19 M. Dawam Rahardjo, Pragmatisme dan Utopia: Corak Nasionalisme Ekonomi Indonesia  
(Jakarta: LP3ES, 1992), 45-55; Robert C. Rice, “The Origin of Economic Ideas and Their Impact on 
Economic Development in Indonesia,” Masyarakat Indonesia  9, no. 2 (1982): 141-154.   
20 Constitution of Republic of Indonesia of 1945 (2002), preamble. 
21 Higgins with Higgins, Indonesia, 85-87; Glassburner “Economic Policy-Making,” 90-91. 
22 Ian Chalmers, “Introduction,” in The Politics of Economics Development in Indonesia: 
Contending Perspectives, ed. Ian Chalmers and Vedi R. Hadiz (London: Routledge, 1997), 15-17; 
Howard Dick, “Formation of the Nation-State, 1930s-1966,” in The Emergence of a National 
Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800-2000, ed. Howard Dick et al (Crows Nest, 
NSW: Asian Studies Association of Australia, Allen & Unwin and University of Hawai’i Press, 
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The subsequent Army-dominated “New Order” regime (1966-1998) reversed the 
policies of its predecessor, reintegrating Indonesia into the global economy and 
receiving massive foreign support in the process. The regime also devised a highly 
centralized authoritarian system and achieved a level of national unity and stability 
that enabled the government to engineer economic growth. However on the other 
hand, flagrant unequal distribution, increased economic disparities, tightly-
controlled socio-cultural development, and rampant corruption were tolerated as 
people lost their political freedom and had to endure suppression and violence to 
retain the New Order’s national stability and economic benefits. Economic crisis, 
which culminated in violent riots and widespread demonstration, finally brought the 
New Order regime’s rule to an end on May 21, 1998.23  
In the post-New Order period Indonesia has had democratically elected 
governments which have implemented liberal pro-market economic policies. 
Changes have taken place since then; economic and monetary stability was 
eventually achieved, though still not to the fullest and immediate extent. Inefficiency 
including widespread corruption and unequal distribution still constitute striking 
complications that inhibit the realization of the ideals of a just and prosperous 
society.24  
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For modern nation-states such as Indonesia with pluralistic religious and 
ethnic groups, the principle of social justice is very significant because it can be the 
basis for unity, prosperity and sustainability of the nation.25 According to Miller, the 
modern concept of social justice is oriented towards society, to effect change in the 
social structure and conditions. For this purpose, Miller emphasizes, social justice 
requires the state as an institutional structure to carry out legislative and policy 
changes that operate on an individual level and which can make purposeful reforms 
in the name of fairness. Miller also emphasizes that the state, despite its power and 
directing capacity, nonetheless requires the cooperation of its citizens, a range of 
social institutions and practices to make the reforms work, and last but not least, a 
culture of social justice penetrating major social institutions and individual 
behaviour. He argues that only nation-states are able to ensure the successful 
implementation of the principles of justice.26  
Social justice is a broader concept than that of economic justice. According to 
Arthur and Shaw, economic justice is conceived of as an essential component of 
social justice. Although both deal with the equitable distribution of wealth in society, 
economic justice may be accomplished without social justice, but not the reverse.27 
Social justice “refers to the structure and policies of a society, and to its political, 
legal, economic and social institutions”.28 John Isbister asserts that social justice has 
three components: equality, freedom, and efficiency. According to him, “[p]eople 
                                                                                                                                                                      
The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004): 3; Richard 
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Robison, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2006): 112.   
25 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
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University Press, 2001), 1-9 and 42-44; David Miller, Principles of Social Justice (Cambridge, 
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26 Miller, Principles of Social Justice, 4-6, 11-13 and 18-19. 
27 John Arthur and William Shaw, Justice and Economic Distribution, 2nd ed. (Eaglewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1991), 5. 
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deserve to be treated as equals, they deserve to be free, and they deserve to get the 
best they can out of their limited resources.”29 Social justice, therefore, requires a 
situation in which political powers and liberties are justly distributed, whereas an 
unjust distribution of these would be acceptable for economic justice.30  
In the present time the topics of social justice and the moral perspective on 
economic justice have gained new significance. The search for an appropriate way to 
realise the ideals of social justice and economic prosperity underlies contemporary 
discussions, which revolve around the difficulties of reconciling economic growth 
with equality, market economy with moral-ethical principles, and practical merits of 
capitalism with their ethical problems.31 In addition, a number of authors try to 
more comprehensively define prosperity and happiness, work to reconcile economic 
efficiency and morality, approach ethics and economics from the standpoint of 
Christianity and other religious traditions including Islam and Judaism, and critically 
question injustices and moral-ethical problems brought about by global capitalism.32 
There are also religiously-based viewpoints which are less critical of current global 
capitalism or even promote it.33 Although many prominent religious figures and 
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32 Rebecca M. Blank and William McGurn, eds., Is the Market Moral? A Dialogue on Religion, 
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thinkers admit that global capitalism has the ability to be “the most efficient 
economic system for wealth creation, [they] also caution that without a firm and 
socially inclusive moral foundation, its institutions will not be motivated or conduct 
themselves in a way which is both democratically acceptable and sustainable over 
time.”34  
Justice in general, including social justice, is also a theme in contemporary 
Islamic thought.35 Many Muslim and non-Muslim writers have shown the 
prominence of justice in Islamic teachings. In theory, it is considered to be a 
supreme virtue and one of the most basic and overriding values in Islam. However, 
in practice the concept is elusive and there are many different interpretations of its 
scope and meaning.36 Sjafruddin’s view of the importance of social justice in 
economic development was derived not only from the teachings of Islam but also 
from socialism, which was popular in Indonesia since the early twentieth century. 
The popularity of socialism—including Marxism and communism—among both 
Islamic and secular Indonesian nationalist leaders was a reaction to the exploitation 
of, and racial discrimination against, indigenous Indonesian populations employed 
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by the Dutch colonial government.37 Socialism exerted a strong influence in the 
Indonesian nationalist movement, so much so that the founding fathers of the nation  
included social justice  among the principles of  Pancasila, the state ideology, thus 
framing it, along with the realization of a just and prosperous society, as the primary 
aspiration of the nation.38 Sjafruddin was active in the underground movement led 
by Sutan Sjahrir, the prominent leader of a socialist group in Indonesia, during the 
time of the Japanese occupation. Only after independence did Sjafruddin join an 
Islamic organization for the first time. He became a member of the Masyumi Islamic 
political party in 1945 and began to study Islam more seriously.39  
Here I focus primarily on the discussion of Sjafruddin’s view on the concept 
of social justice and its implementation in economic development. As this work will 
show, Sjafruddin’s  conception of social justice was unique and departed from that of 
other Muslim thinkers such as Sayyid Quṭb, Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī Muḥammad Bāqir al-
Ṣadr, Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, and Fazlur Rahman, all of whom discussed the issue of 
social justice only at a normative or philosophical level. In contrast, Sjafruddin 
discussed the issue both in normative-philosophical terms as well as in concrete 
terms of policies for economic development. This study will also present the  
contrast between the views of Sjafruddin and those of proponents of the idea of 
Islamic economics such as Muhammad Abdul Mannan, Muhammad Umer Chapra, 
and Khurshid Ahmad, to mention a few. Among Indonesian Islamic figures, 
Sjafruddin was unique in his ideas of social justice and economic development. He 
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stood in the strategic position of not only formulating principles of social justice but 
also having the capacity to directly implement them, having served as Minister of 
Finance, Minister of Prosperity, and Governor of the Central Bank, as well as leader 
of the Masyumi Islamic party.  
Another unique aspect of Sjafruddin’s concept of social justice, as we shall 
see, is that it was implemented, during the early years of Independence, through 
rational and realistic-pragmatic economic policies, and not the nationalization of 
foreign enterprises or the rejection of foreign investment due to nationalistic 
sentiments. He argued for moderate, gradual and reasonable policies to transform 
the remnants of colonial economic structures and to solve economic and social 
problems. For Sjafruddin, it was preferable to maintain social and economic growth 
and stability in order to provide people with jobs than to satisfy emotional 
nationalistic feeling or sentimental national pride by taking over foreign companies 
or nationalizing them by force, a development which nonetheless eventually occured 
in the late 1957 against his advice.40 He also proposed deregulation and 
enforcement of the rule of law, and worked to eliminate sources of corruption.41 
Sjafruddin was very opposed to the politics of political discrimination against 
Chinese-Indonesians on the part of the Indonesian government, arguing for the 
recognition and implementation of their rights as citizens and workers as fully equal 
to those of other Indonesians.42 Sjafruddin also emphasized justice for the regions, 
especially those outside of Java (Outer Islands). According to him, the centralization 
of power in Jakarta was one major hindrance to development, which necessitated 
                                                          
40 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “Dasar Politik Kemakmuran,” in Ekonomi dan Keuangan: Makna 
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that the central government give real autonomy to the regions.43 He also insisted 
that economic development required peace and friendship with other nations 
including the Dutch, towards whom many other Indonesian nationalist leaders 
displayed enmity and resentment. Sjafruddin’s nationalism was not a xenophobic 
one.44  
Sjafruddin was also an independently-minded Muslim economist. Like other 
such thinkers he did not separate the economic from religious and moral teachings, 
a holistic approach reflected in his ideas and policies on economic development. He 
derived the spirit and ethics of social justice from the teachings of the Qur’an and the 
traditions of the Prophet (Hadīth).45 However, at variance with many Islamic 
scholars, he employed scripture not to justify a normative-legalistic approach, but 
instead to derive the principle or spirit behind the letter, taking it as a source of 
ethical guidance and inspiration. References to the verses of the Qur’an and Hadith 
invigorated his proposals for repairing and rebuilding the Indonesian economy, 
including policies to increase production, foster efficiency in the state’s management 
of economic affairs, and ensure prosperity and just distribution.46  
As this study will show, Sjafruddin’s economic views and policies to realize 
social justice and prosperity were also influenced by practices of European welfare 
states, especially Scandinavian (Sweden, Norway, and Denmark) and Benelux 
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(Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) countries,47 and by Neo-Classical 
economics.48 Professor Rahardjo compared Sjafruddin to Milton Friedman in terms 
of his emphasis on monetary policy controlling the regulation of the money supply 
and interest rate intended to increase economic growth and stability.49 In addition, 
Sjafruddin bore a resemblance to Paul Samuelson, as his views reflect a synthesis of 
of Keynesianism with neo-classical theory. This amalgam is termed Neo-
Keynesianism, Neoclassical synthesis, or, according to Joan Robinson, “bastard 
Keynesianism”.50 However, as will be demonstrated, despite all these influences 
Sjafruddin had his own views on the economy and on how Indonesia should select 
and execute economic policies in accordance with the country’s unique conditions 
and circumstances. He argued, for example, that Keynes' theory could not be 
accepted at face value or carried out in a country, including Indonesia, whose 
conditions differed from those present in the country where the theory was born. 
Western economic theories did, in his opinion, contain some truths that were useful 
for Indonesia, but these should be investigated and examined in depth, especially 
with respect to which parts of the theories are valid for and applicable to 
Indonesia.51  
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As I have mentioned above, Sjafruddin’s concept of social justice diverged 
from that of the proponents of Islamic economics. Sjafruddin argued that interest in 
the modern-capitalist system of financial intermediation was not ribā, usury. He thus 
saw no need for a free-interest banking and financial system as an alternative to the 
current one. While admitting that financial practices of the conventional banking 
system contained many excesses and deviations, Sjafruddin nonetheless believed 
that it constituted an efficient system of production and distribution which would 
ensure economic prosperity and justice. He argued that the basic elements of 
modern capitalism—private ownership of property, the systematic and self-
interested pursuit of profit, and the exchange of goods and services on the basis of 
market prices52—were in accordance with human nature and Islam. However, in his 
view, excessive liberal capitalism was also against Islam and nature.53 
In the pattern of Islamic thought which has emerged during the modern 
period, Sjafruddin belongs to the liberal or progressive modernist stream. 
Sjafruddin’s thinking can be classified within the Islamic liberal modernist tradition 
pioneered by Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Abduh, Muhammad Iqbal, and Fazlur 
Rahman, among others, which emphasizes dialogue, peace, and cooperation, 
promotes the humanistic and ethical values of Islam rather than its formal-legalistic 
interpretation, stresses the importance of ijtihād (new interpretation) concerning 
the nature of reason and its relation to religious, social and political reforms, and 
advocates for the establishment of constitutional and representative forms of 
government and the realization of social justice.54  
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This topic has not been previously addressed from this point of view, and 
Sjafruddin’s Islamic thought remains relatively unexamined even within the 
discourse on Islamic contemporary thought in Indonesia. An exception is M. Dawam 
Rahardjo, professor of economics at the Muhammadiyah University of Malang and 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat (LSAF, 
Institute for the Study of Religion and Philosophy) in Jakarta, who briefly discussed 
Sjafruddin’s views on usury in his book on Islamic economics.55 He also treated 
Sjafruddin’s views and policies on national economic development in a book on 
economic thought in Indonesia.56 Meanwhile, Rahardjo’s monograph on Sjafruddin, 
focussing on the latter’s role in Indonesian economic development, was written in 
tribute to him not long after he passed away in February of 1989. In it, Rahardjo 
referred to Sjafruddin as a technocrat who has wielded considerable influence over 
the economic policy of the New Order government.57  
In his B.A. thesis in the Department of History at the University of Indonesia, 
Edi Sudarjat specifically addresses Sjafruddin Prawiranegara’s economic thought, 
locating Sjafruddin’s ideas within the context of Indonesian economic history. 
Sudarjat’s thesis is two-fold, discussing firstly, Sjafruddin’s contribution to 
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Indonesian economic ideas and subsequent influence on the New Order government 
economic policies; and secondly, Sjafruddin’s arguments that bank interest was not 
ribā, including his opinion that Islam did not require its own economic system.58 
Sudarjat's thesis does not cover Sjafruddin’s economic ideas within the context of 
social justice in Islam and Islamic modernist liberal thought, and also excluded his 
political and religious views. Sudarjat concluded that Sjafruddin’s Islamic economic 
thinking was not profound, especially compared to his more advanced monetary 
economic thinking, and simply assumed to be incorrect Sjafruddin’s opinion that 
there was no need to establish Islamic bank. According to Sudarjat, Sjafruddin did 
not possess sufficient knowledge in the field of Islamic law. I will offer a different 
interpretation from Sudarjat’s on this very point.59 
Adnan, another writer who published a monograph on Sjafruddin’s thought, 
explored how Sjafruddin's socialist ideas were integrated with his religious beliefs. 
He argued that the socialism of modern Muslim intellectuals such as Sjafruddin 
emerged from deeply-held religious sensibilities and values.60  Socialism was seen as 
a means towards greater socio-economic justice and prosperity in the economic 
arrangement of a modern state.61 Adnan characterizes Sjafruddin's brand of 
religious socialism as one that took into consideration both material and spiritual 
goods in economic life, and emphasized the collective and public interest without 
compromising the importance of individual responsibility and initiative.62 He locates 
Sjafruddin’s Islamic socialism within a normative-ideological viewpoint. Not 
discussed, however, are any of Sjafruddin’s economic policies or proposals in the 
1950s or after his 1966 release from prison, nor, interestingly, Sjafruddin’ opinion of 
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ribā. Although Adnan’s book originated from his M.A. thesis at “Walisongo” State 
Institute of Islamic Studies, in Semarang, Central Java, his discussion of Sjafruddin’s 
ideas is nonetheless more limited than that in Sudarjat’s B.A. thesis.    
The present work will examine the contributions of Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara to the identification and reconciliation of the intersecting dynamics 
of equality, liberty, and economic development in Indonesia. This will be 
accomplished through an examination of his economic development ideas and 
policies as reflected in his writings and speeches within the period 1946-1983. 
Sjafruddin’s works reveal a plan to simultaneously and harmoniously realize a just 
and prosperous society as enshrined in the Indonesian Constitution. This study also 
seeks to examine the relationship between Islam and social justice, and how the 
latter may be implemented in economic development. This will be accomplished by 
presenting Sjafruddin’s ideas concerning how the state or government, as an 
institutional structure, should bring about economic prosperity, equality, freedom of 
expression, and an ethical-moral society, based on his interpretation of Islamic 
teachings and the modern concept of social justice.63 Also to be discussed are his 
views on the need for laws and regulation, with an independent judiciary to provide 
legal protection and guarantee market mechanisms and private property in the 
means of production.64 
The present study shows, among other conclusions, that the realization of 
social justice is possible through economic policies based on a rational and realistic-
pragmatic approach within the framework of a democratic system of government. 
Equality, liberty, and efficiency can be achieved simultaneously and harmoniously. 
This work also shows the enduring relationship in Islamic thought between Islam 
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and political, economic, and social issues. Sjafruddin did not separate economic 
policy from religious teachings and moral principles, as reflected in his philosophies 
and policies on economic development. But the interrelatedness of Islam and the 
aforementioned issues did not lead to exclusive claims  or to the proposal of a 
separate economic system. For Sjafruddin, religious, ethical, and moral principles 
should provide the foundation for economic development policy and its 
implementation, directing it toward material benefit as well as spiritual purposes. 
His understanding of social justice is considered modern in that it was oriented 
towards effecting change in the socio-economic structure and conditions of 
Indonesian society, with its ultimate goal being the realization of a just, prosperous, 
and moral society. This study shows that a sincere commitment to Islam and a deep 
sense of religiosity, as displayed by the figure of Sjafruddin, are able to foster 
humanitarian concern for others and a commitment to peace and cooperation 
among nations. Finally, this study presents Sjafruddin Prawiranegara’s concept of 
social justice as a model to be studied, further developed, and implemented by 
younger generations of Indonesians for the well-being of the nation. For Indonesian 
Muslims, Sjafruddin is a model of deep and sincere commitment to Islam, the nation, 
and humanity, accompanied by superb expertise in his field. He was also a person of 
courage and integrity, firm and steadfast in his principles, but tolerant of differing 
opinions and ready to discuss them thoroughly.  
This thesis consists of six parts. The first part is an introduction to the 
background of the study and to certain fundamental issues related to social justice. 
This will serve as a frame of reference for later discussions of Sjafruddin’s 
conception of social justice. The second part deals with the problems faced by 
consecutive Indonesian governments in realising a just and prosperous society, and 
the ideologies and policies particular to each government. The third part discusses 
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the importance and development of the idea of social justice in Western thought and 
Islamic tradition. Part four offers a brief biography of Sjafruddin and outlines the 
general patterns of his thought as a religious socialist and Muslim liberal-modernist. 
This section explores distinctive aspects of Sjafruddin’s thinking in general, as well 
as his particular approaches to social justice, economics, politics, and theology. Part 
five examines Sjafruddin Prawiranegara’s view on Islam, social justice and 
development and consists of four chapters: Sjafruddin’s discussion of social justice 
in Islam, capitalism and socialism; development as human development viewed 
from an Islamic framework; social justice and Islamic economics; and his economic 
ideas, proposals and policies. This section forms the core of the present study and 
presents a rather comprehensive exposition of the concept of social justice by a 
single Indonesian Muslim thinker. Part six concludes the discussion of Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara’s philosophy of social justice and offers some reflections on its 





PART TWO: THE PERVASIVENESS OF THE IDEA OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN 
INDONESIAN ECONOMIC THINKING 
The idea of social justice is very important in Indonesian national 
consciousness. Socialism, including Marxism/communism, gained popularity among 
both Islamic and secular nationalist leaders as a response to the discriminatory and 
exploitative policies of Dutch colonial rule.65 In general, Indonesian nationalist 
leaders identified the idea of social justice with a socialism that rejected both 
capitalism and liberal democracy. They also considered the struggle for 
independence to be part of the larger effort to build an equitable society.66 The 
ideology exerted such a strong influence within the Indonesian nationalist 
movement that the founding fathers of the nation included the principle of social 
justice in the state ideology, Pancasila (Sanskrit, literally: The Five Principles), along 
with the primary aspiration of the nation which was the realization of a just and 
prosperous society.67 This part of the thesis will discuss the patterns and problems 
of economic development following the transfer of sovereignty at the end of 1949 
onward, with particular attention paid to the issues surrounding the government’s 
attempt to implement social justice. This discussion is intended to provide some 
background to the pervasiveness of the idea of social justice among Indonesian 
leaders and intellectuals, and how this concern shaped government policies 
concerning economic development. As we shall see, there were many varying 
perspectives on how the concept of social justice was to be applied. But I will first 
briefly discuss a history of spread and development of Islam in Indonesia, and the 
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economic conditions and policies during the Dutch colonial period and the interlude 
of Japanese military occupation and administration. 
2.1. Chapter One: A History of Spread and Development of Islam in Indonesia 
Islam is the religion of the majority of the population of Indonesia and has become 
an indigenized tradition for the last seven centuries of Indonesian history. However, 
scholars continue to debate a number of topics related to the  history of  Islam in 
Indonesia: the time of beginning of its spread, from which area that Islam came,   the 
region where Islam began to arrive and thrive, and how the character of the ongoing 
process of Islamization. Historians have not been able to provide a definitive 
conclusion because the records of Islamization are limited and do not provide 
sufficient information about a process that was very significant in the history of 
Indonesia. The most difficult question to answer is: how did Islam succeed in 
becoming the religion of majority of population of Indonesia?68 
There are some points that historians seem to agree about the spread of 
Islam in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago: the conversion of peoples in the regions 
of Southeast Asia including Indonesia varied in terms of time and it lasted for a long 
time. It is suggested that although Muslim traders had apparently been present as 
early as the time of the third Caliph, ʿUthmān ibnʿAffān (644-656) in some parts of 
Indonesia and other Southeast Asian regions for several centuries before Islam 
became established within the local communities, conversions became significant 
only in the thirteenth, and especially in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.69 In 
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addition, it seems that Islam did not come to Indonesia from one area. In addition to 
Arab Muslim traders, historians refer to the role of the Chinese, Persian and Indian 
Muslims. The influence of Persian and Indian, beside Arab, Islamic cultures were 
profound in Indonesian Islam.70 Apart from the process of Islamization of most 
people in the Southeast Asian archipelago, the process of indigenization of Arab, 
Chinese, Persian, and Indian Muslims also took place. In Java a process of 
Javanization happened among those foreigner Muslims.71  There were 
intermarriages between foreign and local Muslims which brought about the 
formation of Islamic populations and communities. Islamization of Indonesia was a 
work done by those foreign Indonesian Muslims as well as Muslims in various areas 
and at various times. The spread of Islam in Indonesia—as well as in other parts of 
the Muslim world—had been marked by a process of assimilation and 
accommodation that led to Islam in Indonesia to be culturally different from one 
region to other regions, such as Java or Sumatra and between West Java with Central 
and East Java. Similarly, in terms of time Islamization of Indonesian society differed 
from one region to another.72 
Most scholars agree that Islam seemed to spread through trade centered on 
the coastal regions and through daʿwah (missionary) activities and esoteric learning 
of the Sufi teachers. The spread of Islam was apparently complicated and rather 
slow. It started from North Sumatra to the spice-producing areas of East Indonesia. 
The areas where it was most firmly established were those that were most 
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important in international trade: the Sumatran shores of the Straits of Malacca, the 
Malay Peninsula, the north coasts of Java, Brunei, Sulu and Maluku. In East Java, 
highly regarded Sufi teachers, claiming supernatural powers, attracted courtiers of 
Hindu-Buddhist Javanese kingdom of Majapahit. Besides, Islam attracted people in 
the archipelago by reason of the power of its message and by its egalitarian 
philosophy; and its system of commercial law was appealing to traders and to rulers 
who wished to attract trade to their ports. In addition, by embracing Islam, people in 
Southeast Asia thought of themselves as citizens of the Muslim world in ways that 
made it easier to do their business affairs and to grant them political power.73 The 
principle of equality in Islam was a factor driving the population of the towns and 
the north coast of the Java Sea, who were not happy with the teaching of caste in the 
Hindu religion, to embrace Islam. Islam gave the small person a sense of his 
individual dignity as a member of the Islamic community. According to Hindu world-
view, he or she was merely a creature of a lower order than the members of higher 
castes. Under Islam he could, as it were, feel himself/herself their equal even though 
he/she still occupied a subordinate position in the social structure.74 Similar to that 
of Christianity in the West, Islam also played a civilizing function and contributed 
greatly to the humanizing numerous Southeast Asian customs.75 Another factor that 
led to the rapid spread of Islam was penetration of the Western powers, especially 
the advent of the Portuguese to the archipelago. Islam became a “fighting ideology” 
to face Western colonial intrusion and Christian penetration.76    
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As has been said above, the existing Indian-influenced culture of the western 
archipelago at first blended easily with Islam, which had in any case passed through 
the influences of Persia and India before it arrived in the region. There was a process 
of cultural assimilation at work as Islam encountered the pre-Islamic cultures. 
Islamization is a process which has continued down to the present day. Therefore, it 
must not be assumed that once an area is known to have had a Muslim ruler or a 
Muslim population, the process of Islamization was complete. It has continued 
among the population in rural and urban areas both qualitatively and quantitatively 
by support of the authorities or through direct contact with foreign Muslim 
traders.77 In the nineteenth and twentieth century major Islamic reformist 
movement appeared in Indonesia. They have brought changes and reformation of 
educational and socio-economic institutions and purification of Islamic teachings 
from many superstitions and other local elements.78  
In conclusion, Islamization in Indonesia involved a process of assimilation 
and accommodation and mostly it happened gradually and peacefully.79 Islam now 
has spread almost evenly and advanced in the Indonesian archipelago. Although the 
intensity of the acceptance of Islam in Indonesia is different from one region to 
another, and different interpretations of Islam exist among various groups, as also 
occur in other parts of the Muslim world as well as in other religions, Indonesians 
today seem more aware of themselves and more publicly express their Islam 
compared to the 1950s and earlier times.80  
We have another important aspect of Islam in Indonesia in the following 
paragraphs. The fact that many Muslims in Indonesia especially in Java have had 
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maintained many pre-Islamic Indian and local beliefs and practices have been 
discussed widely by many Indonesianists. As it is well-known, Clifford Geertz 
categorized Muslims in Java (precisely Middle and East Java) into three groups. First 
are the santri or orthodox practicing Muslims; second, the abangan or heterodox-
syncretic Muslims practicing or holding traditional local animist beliefs and 
customs; and third, the priyayi, Muslims who are deeply influenced by aristocratic-
Indian ideas and ideals as reflected in their attitudes and behaviour patterns.81 Many 
scholars and experts on Indonesia disagreed with this religious-cultural category. 
While santri-abangan variants could be accepted as legitimate categories based on a 
different religious orientation, priyayi (aristocrat or nobility) is a social status rather 
than a religious category. Priyayi can be classified into variant of either abangan or 
santri.82 Their Criticisms are apparently in line with Geertz later observation as 
reflected in his latter works which emphasize cleavage between santri and abangan, 
and eliminate priyayi variant in analyzing the influence of religious orientation of 
Javanese in their political groupings.83  
Another aspect of the problem of Geertz's religious-cultural category is its 
generalization. Basic distinction between santri and abangan often attributed to 
differences in socio-economic class, political affiliation as reflected in the patterns of 
elite competition in the Japanese era and the early days of independence, political 
mobilization and conflict in rural Java. However, as revealed by Bambang Pranowo's 
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anthropological research for his Ph.D. thesis in a village in Central Java, Geertz's 
thesis that abangans are unreal or nominal Muslims does not seem to apply. In the 
village of Tegalroso, Magelang, Central Java, Pranowo's research shows, Javanese 
abangan are displeased if they are called as nominal or statistical Muslims. They 
believe they are true Muslims, although they do not pray regularly. Even members of 
the PNI (Indonesian National Party) and PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), who 
are indifferent toward religion, still consider themselves as Muslim. Further, in 
historical perspective, according Pranowo, the relationship between santri and 
abangan has varied from time to time. There have been times in which Islam has 
served as a uniting force that includes all classes and has been  able to unite and give 
identity to the entire Javanese community, as during the Java war against the Dutch 
(1825-1830) and in the first ten years of the SI movement (1912-1922).84 In 
addition, the re-emergence of Islamic political parties in the post-Soeharto Indonesia 
has not revived hostility between those people who are associated with the santri 
and those who are associated with the abangan and has not reversed the religious-
political convergence between the two groups which happened during the New 
Order period. Instead, mutual crossings occur between the religious-cultural 
groupings in their political affiliations. Many of those who come from the santri 
persuasion have joined nationalist-secular parties and many of those associated 
with abangan background have joined Islamic parties even a fundamentalist one.85      
A historian, Marshal G.S. Hodgson, also criticized the description given by 
Geertz in The Religion of Java as systematic error. Hodgson said: "Unfortunately, its 
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general high excellence is marred by a major systematic error [...], Geertz identifies 
'Islam' only with what that school of modernists happens to approve, and ascribes 
everything else to an aboriginal or a Hindu-Buddhist background, gratuitously 
labeling much of the Muslims religious life in Java 'Hindu'. He identifies a long series 
of phenomena, virtually universal to Islam and sometimes found even in the Qur'an 
itself, as un-Islamic; and hence his interpretation of the Islamic past as well as of 
some recent anti-Islamic reactions is highly misleading [...] For one who knows 
Islam, his comprehensive data --despite his intention-- show very little has survived 
from the Hindu past even in inner Java and raise the question why the triumph of 
Islam was so complete."86  Therefore, the distinction between abangan and santri as 
Ward Keeler states should be put in a spectrum, not an opposition or dichotomy, and 
should be used cautiously.87           
Geertz's The Religion of Java was based on Snouck Hurgronje's the 
Achehnese and has replaced it as the standard reference on Indonesian Islam. 
Moreover, Geertz's thesis on Islam in Java has deep roots in the anti-Islamic British 
and Dutch orientalism. Similar to Edward Said's observation,  Woodward suggested 
that in Indonesia orientalism not only misrepresented Islam, it denied its existence. 
Orientalists viewed the millions of people who considered themselves to be good 
and devout Muslims are not really Muslims. They applied this particularly to the 
Javanese. In their portrayal, the religion of Javanese is not really Islam but "a 
generally undefined variety of Hinduism and/or Buddhism articulated in classical 
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dance, the gamelan, the wayang, and mystical cults."88 Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, 
Lieutenant Governor General during the British interregnum of 1811-1816 started 
this understanding of Javanese and other Indonesian cultures which had been 
shaped primarily by the acrimoniously anti-Islamic polemics of the time. He viewed 
Islam as "a corrupt, bigoted faith that had lead to the decline of 'classical' Javanese 
civilization."89 It is not clear whether he was influenced by Dutch Protestant 
scholars-- such as Adrian Reland who emphasized the need to study Islam in order 
to defeat and destroy it-- who not only continued the medieval traditions of 
denouncing the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad, but also added a novel element 
that "contemporary Muslims had departed from the original meaning of Islam."90 In 
turn, Raffles' pioneering work, History of Java, and "British colonial scholarship that 
sought to use knowledge of Asian cultures to facilitate colonial administration" 
inspired Dutch Indologie.91 It is clear that since the beginning a strong 
interrelationship between colonial and missionary scholarship had been established, 
as to the conclusion that "Indonesian Islams were corrupt versions of an essentially 
foreign religion" maintained despite advances in empirical understanding of Islamic 
textual and popular traditions had been acquired by Dutch scholars in the 
nineteenth century.92  
Snouck Hurgronje and other Dutch scholars used this orientation and 
understanding of Islam to limit the political potential of Islam and "to provide 
'Islamic' justifications for anti-Islamic colonial policy, including the restriction of 
mosque construction in rapidly expanding urban areas."93 In addition, the Dutch 
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colonial government also adopted Snouck Hurgronje's idea of "associationism" as 
one of the core elements of its "ethical policy" introduced in the early years of the 
twentieth century. The policy not only successfully created the native elite--who had 
used to have  traditional Islamic educations-- alienated from, or even many of them 
were hostile to, their own religion through modern, secular educations, but also 
influenced the post-colonial scholarship. This alienated elite was the one Geertz 
described in the early 1950s in The Religion of Java.94 His study and Benedict 
Anderson's "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture"95 have helped pervasively to 
maintain the persistence of orientalist representation of Indonesian Islam in 
contemporary scholarship. Both of them reverberate conventional propositions in 
Dutch colonialism, and their interpretations of Indonesian religion and culture form 
a paradigm in Indonesian studies. They tended to emphasize the "non-Islamic" 
character of Javanese religion, the marginality of Islam in Indonesian culture and the 
superficial nature of Javanese Islam.96 The influence of the Geertz's and Anderson's 
"Orientalism" in such a way that scholars such as Ward Keeler and Shelly Errington 
who found that the data they obtain from their study of Indonesian culture 
incompatible with Geertz's and Anderson's paradigm, are "forced" to adjust their 
analyses with the established paradigm.97 M.C Ricklefs even repeats Raffles' opinion 
that the conversion of Javanese to Islam "did not alter the fundamentally 
Hindu/Buddhist character of Javanese religious thought...".98 This opinion is similar 
to Geertz's characterization of Indonesia as an Indic state and Anderson's emphasis 
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on Java's tantric past.99 Theodore Pigeaud has gone so far as to claim that "the 'real' 
Javanese religion is to be found in the remnants of pre-Indic mythologies."100  
However, today the orientalist paradigm that consigned Islam to the 
relatively minor position in Indonesian culture and history has ceased to have 
explanatory power. Scholars can no longer ignore Islam as a reality for political or 
religious reasons. The Islamic social and cultural flourishing in Indonesian society 
over more than the last three decades makes it unrealistic to designate Islam as an 
insignificant force located on the boundaries of Indonesian civilization. Postcolonial 
studies of the role of Islam in the life of the Javanese royal courts by S. Soebardi and 
Ann Kumar show that Islam played a central role in premodern priyayi life.101 
William Roff and Karel Steenbrink expose that the orientalist paradigm combined 
missionary fantasies with a colonial policy to diminish conceptually the place and 
role of the religion and culture of Islam in Southeast Asian societies. By doing this 
the colonial governments hoped to be able to silence the political voice of Islam.102  
In the past three decades paradigm shift has occurred in the study of Islam in 
Southeast Asian regions. According to Woodward, "... Islam has gained new 
prominence in Southeast Asian studies. Islamic studies can no longer ignore the local 
Islams of Indonesian and other Southeast Asian cultures [...] There is more at work 
here, however, than a mere reversal of orientalism in which the politics of the orient 
drive western interpretation. The Indonesia of today appears more overtly and self-
consciously Islamic than that of the later colonial period, or even of the early 1950s 
when Geertz conducted his initial field work. The question we must address is 
whether or not this interest is a by-product of the wave of Islamic revivalism that 
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has swept the world since the 1970s, or rather, the emergence of an Islamic society 
from colonial control that sought, for reasons of its own, to obscure and ignore the 
Islamic heritage of its subject people."103 In relation to this paradigm shift what 
Hefner said is illustrative: 
In adopting a Muslim perspective on Indonesian democratization, then, I seek 
to correct for the earlier marginalization of Islam in Indonesian studies. I 
should emphasize, however, that I am interested in the politics and culture of 
the full Muslim community, not merely self-professed Islamists or supporters 
of an Islamic state. In this  book, then, "Muslim politics" refers to any and all 
kinds of political actions based on a person's conviction as a Muslim, whether 
or not the resulting behavior embraces the idea of an "Islamic" state.104   
 
Geertz since then, provided a more accurate picture of Muslims in Java in a 
book that compares between Indonesia or Java with Morocco. According to him, 
Indonesia and Morocco have an obvious likeness, that is, their religion is Islam, 
which is symbolized by the fact that they pray to the same direction toward Mecca. 
But they culturally, historically and geographically different which produced 
remarkably spiritual climate differences indicated by the fact that although they 
both face Mecca but the one facing the east and the other facing the west. If in 
Morocco the Islamic conception of life embodied in activism, moral severity, intense 
individuality, which is blended with saint worship and magical power, then in 
Indonesia the same concept accentuated aestheticism, inner experience, and radical 
dissolution of personality. Geertz no longer portray Islam in Indonesia, particularly 
in Central and East Java as unreal or superficial Islam. Indonesian Islam is real Islam 
but because differences in geography, culture and history, and livelihood, Islam in 
Indonesia as a social, cultural and psychological phenomena is different from Islam 
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in other countries such as Morocco or Middle-East countries.105 These factors also 
bring about not only "a more moderate" Indonesian Islam compared to Islams in the 
Middle-East countries but also moderate or mild secular and authoritarian 
Indonesian regimes in the past (1957-1998).   
Woodward reminds us that description of Indonesian cultures and local 
Islams can no longer be separated from the wider Islamic world of which they are 
part. In his opinion, "[t]he current question should be how rather than if the Muslim 
cultures of Indonesia are Islamic. We cannot, however, avoid discussing the Indic 
and indigenous contributions to Indonesian Islamic cultures for fear of Muslim 
sensibilities. The term 'local Islam' consists of two elements -- it is as mistaken to 
neglect the 'local' as it is to ignore the 'Islam'."106               
2.2. Chapter Two: The Economic Policies of the Dutch Colonial Government 
Dutch exploitation of the human and natural resources of the territory of the 
Netherlands East Indies (now known as Indonesia) began in 1602, when two Dutch 
mercantile companies merged to form Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC), 
the United East Indies Company.107 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
considered to be the starting point for an economic history of modern Indonesia, 
Governor-General Herman Daendels (1808-1811), a representative of the 
Napoleonic Empire, carried out many reforms in order to create a modern 
bureaucracy and build the infrastructure of a modern state. The work was further 
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developed by Sir Stamford Raffles, British Lieutenant Governor General (1811-
1816) during the British interregnum.108 
From the seventeenth century until the demise of colonial rule in 1942, 
Dutch economic policies in the Netherlands Indies, which consisted of ”forced 
deliveries”, “contingencies”, land taxes (or rents), and the cultivation system, were 
primarily intended to benefit Dutch and European interests.109  This was the case 
even during the government of the Liberal Era (1870-1900), which purported to put 
an end to the cultivation system that historically required the exploitation of the 
Indies peoples through forced labor. Liberal economic policy failed to produce the 
intended benefits because, despite ostensible support for indigenous welfare, 
proponents of liberal policy in the colonial government did not regulate Dutch and 
European private capital and enterprises. Indeed, given this conflict of interest, 
living standards actually declined and income and wages fell in real terms.110  
These conditions persisted throughout the early twentieth century, even 
during the period of the Ethical Policy (1901-1920s). Unlike previous economic 
policies of the Liberal Era, the Ethical Policy was designed to regulate free 
enterprise, unrestrained private capital, and labor markets in the Netherlands. The 
Ethical Policy was touted as a turn towards Christian ethics, a recognition of the 
obligation of the Dutch towards the people of the Indies, and an expression of 
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humanitarian concern for their general welfare and economic wellbeing.111 During 
this period some advances in living standards were achieved, but many of the efforts 
failed to combat poverty and bring real prosperity to the Indies people. These 
shortcomings were neither accidental nor unexpected, since the relationship 
between the peoples of the Indies and the Dutch had been always one of exploitation 
and oppression. The primary function of colonies like the East-Indies was to serve 
the interests of the colonizing power in terms of producing goods for its markets and 
consumption.112  
Due to the lack of improvement, the Ethical Policy was abandoned in the 
1920s and the colonial government in fact resorted to even more repressive policies 
toward nationalist movements, especially after the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, 
the Indonesian Communist Party) led abortive violent uprisings against colonial rule 
in 1926/1927.113 These uprisings were reflective of a deep sense of resentment 
against Dutch rule, created by the exploitative colonial economic policies which 
resulted in socio-economic discrepancies, impoverishment, and racial 
discrimination. Indonesians thus concluded that the most effective way of solving 
their problems was the eradication of colonial rule. The colonial experience also 
sensitized generations of Indonesian intellectuals to the ideals of social justice, 
which they saw as having been denied to them as colonial subjects but which, 
through independence, they could achieve for their people. The period from 1945 to 
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1949 saw the culmination of this resolve as the struggle for independence reached 
its final stages and the colony of the Dutch East-Indies was transformed into the 
independent state of Indonesia.114  
2.3. Chapter Three: The Japanese Interval  
The Japanese occupation lasted only from March 1942 to August 1945 but 
had a tremendous effect on the lives of Indonesians. At first many Indonesians 
welcomed the occupying Japanese forces as liberators. However, they later came to 
realize that the Japanese had proven to be more oppressive than the Dutch. Japanese 
economic policy was directed primarily towards wartime interests. Indonesians 
experienced reduced living standards and scarcity, especially of food, clothing, and 
medicines. Food production fell and quotas on forced rice delivery were not met, 
despite increased administrative pressure. By November 1944 some 2.6 million 
Indonesian laborers were arbitrarily subjected to forced labor under cruel 
treatment and harrowing working conditions.115  
The Japanese occupation, including management of the economy, had a 
lasting legacy in the post-independence period. Firstly, it reinforced a paternalistic 
and centralist ethos in state management, and introduced a new neighborhood 
association (tonarigumi) which under the authoritarian governments of Sukarno 
and Suharto would be used to effectively control dissent and movement of 
individuals. It also left behind a large indigenous bureaucracy which inherited 
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lasting practices of corruption.116 However, the Japanese occupation also made it 
possible for Indonesian nationalist leaders and radical youth to prepare for 
Indonesian independence.117 In the final months of its rule, the Japanese authority 
sponsored efforts towards the formation of an independent state in the former 
Dutch colony.118   
2.4. Chapter Four: The Variety of the Idea of Social Justice 
Revolution, nationalism and socialism in Indonesia were strongly influenced 
by varieties of Marxist ideology and Islamic modernism.119 However, differences of 
emphasis and nuance among nationalist leaders who subscribed to Marxist theory of 
imperialism were becoming increasingly visible, especially after Indonesia’s 
sovereignty was recognized by the international community. This pertained 
primarily to three issues: their use of a Marxist perspective on human history, the 
nature of the relationship between Indonesia and Dutch colonialism, and the 
strategy for gaining independence.120 Sukarno, for example, “based his anti-colonial 
views on the Marxist theory of imperialism.”121 He admitted that “imperialism had 
created the lineaments of a modern economy in Indonesia;” however, contrary to 
what would be predicted by Marxist orthodoxy, “he insisted […] that this 
                                                          
116 Dick, “Formation,” 167; Cribb and Brown, Modern Indonesia, 14. 
117 Dick, “Formation,” 167. There was a crucial connection between these two periods of 
Indonesian history that would have long repercussions on Indonesian politics and economics. If 
the oppressive Dutch colonial rule helped to raise the idea of social justice, along with strong 
feelings of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism among Indonesians, then the Japanese military 
occupation gave many Indonesians confidence that they could defeat people of the West and 
aroused a “fascist” character in the Indonesian armed forces: “the notion that society could and 
should be controlled and that the armed forces should be allied with government in closely 
directing and controlling Indonesian society.” Kingsbury, Politics of Indonesia, 34.    
118 Dick, “Formation,” 167.  
119 Clive Christie argues that, “the Marxist ideological viewpoint on revolution, nationalism and 
socialism constituted the most important unifying worldview that linked the anti-colonial 
movements of the Southeast Asia region between 1919 and 1980.” Christie, Ideology and 
Revolution, 3; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution , 44; Cribb and Brown, Modern Indonesia, 12. 
120 Christie, Ideology and Revolution, 52-56. 
121 Christie, Ideology and Revolution, 52.  
39 
 
modernization had made little impact on the indigenous economy.”122 The purely 
exploitative nature of Dutch imperialism, he asserted, had steadily reduced all 
sections of Indonesian society to poverty. The entire nation became proletariat. 
“Capitalist-style colonialism did not—as Marx and Engels had anticipated—‘jolt’ the 
native economy out of its subsistence torpor, and create new classes and greater 
class differentiation.”123 In Sukarno’s view, “the Western class categories of Marxism 
were inappropriate to Indonesian society, since Dutch colonialism had ‘equalized’ 
through impoverishment the status of the vast bulk of the population, and leveled 
the distinctions between peasant, worker, petty-bourgeois and other categories.”124 
Thus Sukarno, in contrast to Marx and Engels, saw capitalist-style colonialism as 
having given rise to two opposing parties: the Dutch as colonial oppressor and 
exploiter, and Indonesia as the oppressed and exploited. Sukarno used Marxist 
theory to emphasize the importance of a sense of national unity among the 
Indonesian population under Dutch rule for obtaining independence. He was 
concerned that class differentiations within the population of the Netherlands 
Indies, including peasant, worker, petty-bourgeois, aristocrat, and others, were 
obscuring the main priority of the struggle for independence from Dutch colonial 
rule. This desire of Sukarno’s would continue to be an obsession for him after 
independence was achieved and he became president of the country. He brought 
forth the concept of nasakom, an acronym of the Indonesian words for nationalism, 
religion and communism, which aimed to unite these three elements in the struggle 
against imperialism, capitalism, and neo-colonialism. But ultimately, it seemed that 
his goal was contrary to the realities of Indonesian society itself.  
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Contrary to “Marx and Engel’s view that pre-colonial Asian cultures had 
become in some way fossilized . . . [Sukarno believed] that pre-colonial Indonesian 
civilization had had an inner dynamic and capacity for natural economic evolution—
an evolution that had been stifled, not advanced, by Western colonialism.”125 
Therefore, for Sukarno, “the Indonesian nationalist movement and the subsequent 
independent Indonesian state should be rooted in the values and traditional political 
systems of indigenous society.”126 In his political and economic thinking, he 
presented the concepts of gotong-royong (mutual aid) within a community and 
musyawarah and mufakat (general consultation/deliberation and consensus) in 
reaching community decisions. His socialist ideology, Marhaenism, was comparable 
to Marx’s concept of the proletariat but broader in scope, and was claimed to be 
typical of Indonesia. The concept of Marhaen included the proletariat as well as all 
grassroots groups and lower classes such as small peasants, small traders, small 
fishermen, stall vendors, cart drivers, and lower clerks, among others.127 In short, 
according to Sukarno, Marhaen was "[…] the destitute People of Indonesia."128 In 
elaborating his ideology he employed elements of socialism, Islam, and Hinduism. He 
mentioned the Hindu god Krishna of the Bhagavad Gita and Gatotkaca or Purabaya, 
the son of Bima, in his description of struggle against colonial rule. 129 Likewise, in 
illustrating the utopian socialist society, he referred to various myths such as the 
Just King (Ratu Adil), Prabu Jayabaya, Vishnu Murti, al-Mahdī, “the guided one”, or 
al-Muntaẓar, “the expected one”, as expressions of socialism and communism which 
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would manifest throughout the world, destroying capitalism and its imperialist 
support system. With the power of Islam, Sukarno said, “Inshā’ Allāh [God willing], 
God will realize a new society.”130 While admitting fundamental ideological 
differences between Marxism and Islam, he argued that both were “fundamentally 
anti-capitalist, and therefore anti-colonialist.”131 For Sukarno, “…true Islam is 
essentially socialistic.”132 Because of this:  
[A] broad-minded Moslem, a Moslem who understands the requirements of 
our struggle, will certainly agree to an alliance with the Marxists, since he is 
aware that usury and the collection of interest are forbidden by his religion. 
He is aware that this is the Moslem way of attacking the very foundations of 
capitalism, for, as we have previously explained, usury is the same as surplus 
value, the inner essence of capitalism. He is aware that, like Marxism, Islam, 
with its “belief in God,” with its “recognition of the Kingdom of God,” is a 
protest against the evils of capitalism.133   
 
He urged Marxists to cooperate with Muslims, since the two shared a common 
opposition to a racially- and economically-oppressive colonial power.134 Sukarno’s 
socialist ideology of Marhaenism, his principles of gotong-royong and musyawarah, 
and his enthusiasm to unite nationalism, Islam, and Marxism impacted Indonesian 
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political and economic development during his attempt to implement them between 
the years 1957 and 1965.135 
A strong emphasis on the idea of social justice also appeared in the social, 
political, and economic thought of Mohammad Hatta (1902-1982), the future Vice-
President (1945-1956). His historical perspective was influenced, by Marx, 
Heraclitus and G.W.F. Hegel.136 Clive Christie discerns that Hatta’s notion of the 
operation of the ‘dialectic’ “[…] formed the basis for his analysis of imperialism. Like 
Sukarno, he accepted the basic Marxist position on the capitalist origins of the 
phenomenon of European imperialism. However, whereas orthodox Marxism 
emphasized the fundamental divide between capitalists of all races on one side, and 
oppressed classes of all races on the other, Hatta’s thinking at this time had a 
tendency to give greater significance to the racial divide between the White 
civilizations of Europe and non-White civilizations of colonized Asia and Africa.”137 
The concept of a fundamental confrontation between civilizations led Hatta to 
believe that “the confrontation between Europe and Asia is not simply a matter of 
race or economics: European civilization encapsulated the ‘idea’ of an innately 
individualistic, competitive approach to economic behavior, while Asian civilization 
embodied the ‘idea’ of social and economic cooperation.”138  
Hatta emphasized the importance of indigenous mutual economic 
cooperation and village democracy in establishing an ideal basis for a distinctly 
Indonesian system of social democracy at a local level.139 But at the national level he 
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realistically held that the formal structures of Western-style representative and 
majority-based democracy should operate.140 Hatta’s political views reflected 
prevalent conceptions of Islamic democracy. He, like all devout Muslims, naturally 
saw ‘Belief in One God’—the first principle of Pancasila—as the ideological basis of 
the state, and “not just as primus inter pares among other principles.”141 It was “the 
necessary moral foundation for the other principles—as an all-encompassing 
religious validation for what would otherwise be purely secular political tenets.”142 
Hatta believed “social justice for all the people of Indonesia” could be achieved 
through a governing policy based on moral principles.143 In the political field he 
emphasized the importance of “a system of popular representation with 
consultation […] and extensive autonomy […] reflecting the idea of ‘government by 
those governed’.”144 In the economic sector he proposed that “the national economy 
would have to be organized on a cooperative basis, and the government would have 
to have duty to control or supervise the branches of production of importance to the 
State and those which vitally affect the life of the people.”145 But Hatta also 
underscored the protection of the development of human individuality. The state 
should carry on its efforts to achieve “the happiness, wellbeing and moral worth of 
man.”146 
Before independence, Hatta “placed greater emphasis on the struggle against 
foreign imperialism, and increasingly used pembangunan (development) to describe 
the anti-imperialist struggle.”147 Sritua Arief, a prominent Indonesian economist, 
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asserted that in terms of economic development thought, Hatta was the first 
structuralist thinker in Indonesia and had developed dependency theory since the 
1930s. In a 1933 article, in accordance with structuralist theory, Hatta explored the 
exploitative dialectic of economic relationships in Indonesia during the colonial 
period which formed the basis of his structuralist thought.148 For instance, after 
surveying world society on the basis of economic outlook and ideology, he said:  
It is clear what an unbalanced picture the world economic structure 
presents. Harmony and economic balance in mutual relations are nowhere to 
be seen. The elements which ought to create such harmony do not exist. 
World economy cannot be saved by slogans of free trade or protectionism. 
Differences in commercial policies are intersected by the clash of ideologies. 
Supporters of the doctrine of free trade are few in number. Whereas the 
older protectionists base their opinions on the economic interests of the 
entire community, the protectionist mentality of the totalitarian states 
evolves from the basic principles of their economic system which is aimed at 
self-sufficiency. World economy can only be saved by planning international 
economic relations.149  
 
  
Hatta’s revolutionary, socialist and collectivist thought enormously 
influenced the economic ideas and philosophy of the 1945 Constitution. It accorded 
the state the responsibility to realize the “just and prosperous society” promised by 
independence. It is not a surprise, therefore, that political mobilization before and 
after independence established an ingrained commitment to economic populism.150  
Another Indonesian nationalist leader with socialist ideas was Sutan Sjahrir 
(1909-1966), the first Prime Minister of the Republic (1945-1947).151 Sjahrir stood 
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out for two ideas which distinguished him from Sukarno and Hatta. First was his 
aversion to the nostalgia of many Indonesian leaders for ancient “Indonesian” 
kingdoms, either Hindu or Islam. For him, the much-touted “lasting” Eastern values 
such as harmony, stability, patience, and spirituality were in fact the last stronghold 
of a ruined and dying feudal-traditional culture. In contrast to many nationalist 
leaders, including Hatta, Sjahrir rejected the idea that Asian civilization had intrinsic 
values distinct from those of the West. Consequently, he rejected the idea—favoured 
at the time—that the task of Asian intellectuals such as Rabindranath Tagore was to 
promote a dialogue between the two civilizations, out of which a synthesis could be 
expected to arise.152  Second, Sjahrir did not see the Indonesian struggle against 
Dutch colonialism as a confrontation between anti-colonialism and colonialism, 
between Asia and “the West”. Instead, he identified his struggle for independence as 
part of a global socialist-democratic alliance, based on equal partnership, against 
modern forms of tyranny, especially the fascisms which threatened Asia just as they 
did Europe. Sjahrir saw it as a tragedy that the Western colonial powers had failed to 
bring an end to the antagonistic and outdated system of colonialism. Sjahrir was a 
great admirer of European democracy and socialism. He was a socialist-democrat in 
the European political pedigree. Sjahrir greatly appreciated the spirit of the West 
with “its resilience, its vitality, its rationality.”153 Paradoxically, according to Sjahrir, 
colonialism was the main factor impeding Easterners from engaging with this 
modern spirit.154 In his opinion, colonialism had persisted not merely on the basis of 
force, but because of the idea, propagated by the West, that Western civilization was 
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different from and superior to Asian civilization.155 For that reason, colonial powers 
were concerned with encouraging “the maintenance of traditional values and 
political systems in colonized Asia, and [highlighting] the essential cultural 
differences.”156 For Sjahrir, in “a society in which colonial relationships ‘corrupt and 
vitiate life’, the ‘educated native’ lost not only his political freedom, but something 
much more profound—his psychological freedom”.157 According to Christie, “Sjahrir 
felt that one of the most destructive aspects of colonialism was that it distorted the 
world-view of the colonized ...,”158 including the Indonesian nationalist leaders such 
as Sukarno and Hatta. They admired Japan and were “trapped in the essentially 
outdated mind-set of the confrontation between colonialism and anti-colonialism, 
between ‘the West’ and Asia.”159 But he also condemned Western colonialism for 
fostering this antagonism on the part of colonized peoples toward the West. In 
Sjahrir’s view, anti-colonialism was hindering the Indonesian nationalist leaders’ 
ability to clearly see the reality of the global situation, but it was Western 
colonialism which had a large share in creating this erroneous perception.160 For 
Sjahrir, the real confrontation was between democracy on the one hand and fascism, 
dictatorship and totalitarianism on the other. In view of what had been happening in 
Europe beginning in 1938, Sjahrir saw that “opposition to the Dutch rule can no 
longer be the primary task of nationalist propaganda or of the nationalist movement 
itself.”161 Instead, he contemplated cooperation between the Netherlands and 
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Indonesia, “[b]ecause the situation in the world at present is a threat not only to the 
Dutch realm, but to the independent future of Indonesia as well.”162   
 Haji Oemar Said (H. O. S.) Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934) was another 
nationalist leader who espoused the idea of social justice.163 He was chairman of 
Sarekat Islam (SI), the Islamic Association (1916-1934), and wrote an essay in 1924 
on Islam and Socialism in order to fend off the growing Marxist-Communist 
infiltration within his own organization. Tjokroaminoto pointed out several 
similarities between Islam and socialism, but stressed that the true socialism in the 
Prophet Muhammad’s teachings was higher and nobler than any other socialism.164 
Nonetheless, he appreciated Marx and Engels’ contributions to the amelioration of 
the lives of the poor in Western countries which resulted in political changes 
there.165 Quoting several Qur’anic verses, he asserted that social justice in Islam 
consisted of freedom, equality, and human brotherhood based on the belief in Allah, 
the Lord of the Universe Who loves all human beings regardless of their nation, 
class, or skin color.166 The realization of social justice in Islam, according to 
Tjokroaminoto, should be implemented in three ways: awakening a sense of 
sacrifice for the advancement of public interest; carrying out the equal distribution 
of wealth; and urging people not to consider poverty as a disgrace.167    
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In contrast to Tjokroaminoto, Haji Mohammad Misbach, a former SI member, 
embraced Communism. He later became a leader of SI Merah, Red SI (later Sarekat 
Raʿjat, the People’s Association) and of PKI in 1923. He was a muballigh (preacher), 
publishing the monthly newspapers Medan Moeslimin (Arena of Muslims) in 1915 
and Islam Bergerak (Islam in Motion) in 1917. He established the bookstore Hotel 
Islam as well as a modern-style religious school, held tablīgh (Islamic propagation) 
gatherings, and argued for the fundamental compatibility of Islam and 
communism.168  
2.5. Chapter Five: Economic Development Policy in the Period of Liberal Democracy 
(1950-1957): Liberty and Efficiency versus Collectivist Equality and Populism 
Indonesia as a nation-state was officially founded in 1945, at the end of the 
Pacific War, when Sukarno and Hatta declared the former territory of the 
Netherlands East Indies an independent state. International recognition came four 
years later in 1949, following intermittent negotiations, armed struggle against the 
Dutch, and UN mediation.169 The new state adopted a European-style parliamentary 
system based on the constitution of 1950. But in less than a decade this system, 
which guaranteed Indonesians democratic freedoms, would be replaced by an 
authoritarian system. According to President Sukarno and the military, the 
parliamentary system was unsuited to Indonesian national character and identity.170  
The purpose of the Indonesian government’s development policies, 
according to the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, is “to develop general 
prosperity, realize social justice for all Indonesians, advance the life of the nation, 
and participate in the establishment of orderly world based on freedom, lasting 
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peace and social justice.”171 As we shall see, successive Indonesian governments 
during this period proposed different approaches to achieve this ideal. The common 
thread uniting them, however, was a willingness to encourage foreign and private 
investment for the sake of economic growth, while at the same time bringing some 
sectors of the economy under national control.172  
  During the period of parliamentary democracy, consecutive Indonesian 
governments produced three economic plans: the Economic Urgency Program (April 
1951), the Five Year Plan (May 1956), and a regional development plan that came 
out of the National Conference in 1957.173 In the assessment of Herbert Feith, 
Professor of Politics from Monash University in Melbourne, Australia, the earlier 
cabinets of this period implemented policies of “maximization of production, fiscal 
stability, and administrative rationalization”, while the later cabinets were more 
concerned with “restructuring the economy in such a way that Indonesian nationals 
held positions of advantage within it”.174  
These different approaches during the post-independence era to achieving 
the ideal of a just and prosperous society originated from two different views, 
personified by President Sukarno and Vice President Hatta, the signatories of the 
Proclamation of Independence. Here we will follow several analyses provided by 
experts of Indonesian politics and economics concerning Indonesian leaders during 
the 1950s and their ideas and orientations. Herbert Feith classified Indonesian 
leaders of this time period into two groups: ‘administrators’ and ‘solidarity makers’. 
The former refers to those leaders “…with the administrative, technical, legal, and 
                                                          
171 Amended Constitution of Republic of Indonesia of 1945 (2002), preamble. 
172 Chalmers, “Introduction,” 10. 
173 Dick, “Formation,” 177; Higgins with Higgins, Indonesia, 74-75 and 91; Higgins, Indonesia’s 
Economic Stabilization, 47.  
174 Feith, Decline, 557. 
50 
 
foreign-language skills, such as required for the running of a modern state”.175 This 
group’s orientation was in contrast to that of the ‘solidarity makers’, that is, “leaders 
skilled as mediators between groups at different levels of modernity and political 
effectiveness, as mass organizers, and as manipulators of integrative symbols.”176 
Hatta and other Indonesian political leaders such Mohammad Natsir, Sukiman 
Wirjosandjojo, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, Wilopo, Mohammad Roem, Djuanda 
Kartawidjaja, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, I. J. Kasimo, Colonel T.B. Simatupang, John 
Leimena, and the subject of this study, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, belonged to the 
first group (administrators). From 1949 to 1953, they were “intensely concerned 
with solving administrative and economic problems, with the strengthening of law 
and order, administrative regularization and consolidation, the maximization of 
production, and planned economic development.”177 Sukarno, as well as the radical 
wing of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, the Indonesian National Party) and the 
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party), was less 
concerned with the aforementioned matters.178 Feith also points out that 
[…] ‘administrators’ were concerned with the immediate future, meanwhile 
‘solidarity makers’ tended to be concerned with images of a distant utopia. 
[Meanwhile] Political leaders of the ‘solidarity maker’ group, including the 
President, made numerous statements about the Indonesia of the future, to 
which the Revolution was a bridge, the Indonesia of prosperity, justice, 
harmony, and strength. They repeated frequently and forcefully that this was 
the vision which had to be realized. But they too were little concerned about 
middle-range goals, or at least did not speak of them specifically. Thus there 
existed what might be called a bifurcation of attitudes toward the future. 
Sukarno fashioned symbols and reiterated the messianic demands and 
promises of the revolution. Hatta made administrative policy and urged 
realism. The two approaches were neither fused nor bridged.”179  
 
Benjamin Higgins, a prominent Canadian economist, makes another 
classification, dividing Indonesian leaders and politicians into an “economics-
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minded” or “developmentalist” group and a “history-minded” or “nationalist” group. 
The first group consisted of “intellectuals who attach high priority to economic and 
social development of the country, who feel that this development must follow 
Western lines in large measure, and who are willing to cooperate with the West, at 
least to the extent of seeking technical and capital assistance from the West, in order 
to achieve this goal.”180 Sjafruddin, Sumitro, Djuanda, Wilopo, Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono IX, Burhanuddin Harahap, Major General Abdul Haris Nasution, 
and Ali Budiardjo were among the leaders who were included in this group.181 
Meanwhile the second group, “history-minded” or “nationalist” leaders, was “a 
mixture of Communists and of a larger number who are nationalist [of PNI], 
conservative (in Western terms), and isolationist. Its leaders attach highest priority 
to ‘completion of the revolution’ in the sense of eliminating the control over 
Indonesian national life exerted by foreigners through economic activity. While 
favouring economic and social development, they attach great importance to 
retention of the national culture, language and religion and to abolishing the 
remnants of foreign influence.”182   
The differences between the two groups reflected the conflicting visions of 
the nation’s two most revered leaders, President Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta. 
The former attached the highest priority to the continuation of the national 
revolution, saying that:  
For us, the common People of Indonesia, the Revolution has not yet ended, 
and for that reason we march forward in order to implement the ideals of the 
Proclamation…On and on go the strivings of that Revolution, on and on one 
phase is followed by another. As I have said: “For a fighting nation there is no 
journey’s end.”183  
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He continued,  
 
[t]here are people who do not understand Revolutionary logic. Those are the 
people who say in the midst of a journey, “The Revolution is over,” whereas 
in fact the Revolution is not yet completed and still goes on, on, and again on. 
This is Revolutionary logic: once we start a Revolution, we must continue 
that Revolution until all its ideas have been implemented…[and] leading to 
the formation of a New World, free from colonialism, free from exploitation, 
free from color discrimination, free from spying on each other with atom 
bombs and thermonuclear weapons in their hands.”184 
   
Sukarno asserted that Indonesia’s independence required the removal of 
“even the slightest trace of colonialism” in the economic sphere.185 He seemed less 
concerned with the practical aspects of a well-planned economic development based 
on real economic considerations.186 What mattered to him was the continuation of 
the struggle to end the colonial grip on Indonesia’s economy, as well as resistance to 
imperialist attempts to weaken national unity and purpose, including the liberation 
of Dutch New Guinea or Irian Barat (Irian Jaya or Papua). For Sukarno, a “‘just and 
prosperous society” would be attained through socialist principles in the form of 
“progressive state control of the economy in general, particularly in the main of 
areas of production and distribution.”187 Indonesia must remove foreign capital and 
foreign experts immediately if it were to gain complete political and economic 
independence. Sukarno saw the presence of the former as a form of colonialism and 
imperialism. 
Hatta differed fundamentally from Sukarno over the appropriate solution to 
the deterioration of Indonesia’s political and economic conditions in the 1950s. 
Above all, he did not believe that the revolutionary mindset which had emerged in 
1945 should be encouraged or intensified. In his opinion, the revolution had ended 
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with the termination of armed struggle through which Indonesia obtained 
international recognition. According to Hatta: 
A revolution is a sudden explosion of society which brings with it an 
“Umwertung aller Werte”. A revolution shakes the floor and the foundations; 
it loosens all hinges and boards. Therefore a revolution should not last too 
long, not more than a few weeks or a few months. It should then be checked; 
the time will then have arrived for a consolidation which will realize the 
results produced by the revolution. What is left unfinished is not the 
revolution itself, but the efforts to carry its ideals into effect over a period of 
time after the foundations have been laid.188 
 
The rebellions, factionalism, political anarchy, adventurisms, corruption, and 
economic malaise that afflicted the country were, in his opinion, effects of the 
revolution not having been checked in due time. Hatta believed that putting an end 
to revolutionary politics was necessary to establish economic and political 
consolidation, in order to achieve social democracy and democratic responsibility.189  
In actuality Hatta had espoused, as had Sukarno and all other leaders, anti-
colonialist, revolutionary, socialist and collectivist thought. However, due to the 
harsh terms of the 1949 Round Table Agreement, Hatta, as vice-president, could 
only adopt a gradualist approach to economic development. In addition, he realized 
that Indonesia still suffered from a lack of human resources, and that the republic 
needed foreign enterprise and capital as well as technicians in order to restore what 
had been destroyed during the revolution and to construct the new nation.190 This 
attitude was also shared by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Djuanda Kartawidjaja and 
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, among others.  
Sutan Sjahrir advocated another way of thinking about how to achieve social 
justice and prosperity. It seemed that Sjahrir had already anticipated the problems 
the new nation would face and the possibility of authoritarian and totalitarian 
tendencies on the part of certain Indonesian nationalist leaders. In retrospect, 
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Sjahrir had recognized that the tendencies were, in part, a reflection of Indonesia’s 
feudal-patrimonial society.191 In 1948, Sjahrir felt that a socialist society could not be 
established in Indonesia within his lifetime. He predicted that the future 
development of Indonesia during the next two or three decades would be that of a 
mixed economy between state and private enterprise. According to Sjahrir’s 
observation, Indonesia did not yet possess a middle class from which the necessary 
managerial and technical personnel were to be recruited. He argued that the 
benefits of some measure of capitalist development would outweigh its potential 
harm, significantly eliminating the burden of the Indonesian feudal heritage and 
developing, in its stead, a more individualist attitude amongst the Indonesian 
people. Moreover, capitalist enterprise would help Indonesia’s economic life by 
providing the government with the necessary administrative personnel to manage 
and serve national interests efficiently, especially in the emerging government-
managed economic sectors.192  
The brand of socialism which Sjahrir wanted to introduce was one that was 
“decentralized and administered locally as much as possible.”193 For Sjahrir, top 
priority should be given to democracy and not to nationalism.194 Sjahrir and the 
other PSI leaders therefore emphasized the importance of “political education of the 
people in order to make them politically mature, critical, and independent in their 
analysis and judgment of political issues” and thus to further raise their democratic 
potential.195 The combination of a decentralized political and economic structure 
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and a politically mature public would prevent strains of totalitarianism and 
authoritarianism from emerging in the future.196 
These economic and social views of Hatta, Sjahrir, and other leaders from the 
modernist wings of Masyumi, PSI, and the moderate wing of PNI, with their 
reasonable and pragmatist tendencies, greatly influenced policies of the early 
governments of the parliamentary period. The prevailing mode of thought during 
this period was based on the premise that achieving social justice and prosperity 
required the implementation of the principles of freedom, equality, and efficiency. As 
mentioned above, Hatta argued that the revolutionary politics which led to 
independence must make way for economic and political stability in order to 
achieve a society with democratic rights and responsibilities. The establishment of 
parliamentary democracy was a step in that direction. This was accompanied by a 
strong collectivist approach to various government economic programs that focused 
on nationalization schemes and funding domestic industries, as well as the 
encouragement of foreign capital in order to stimulate economic growth. These 
measures were meant to establish an efficient economic order while simultaneously 
turning the balance of power away from the vestiges of Dutch economic control 
towards greater indigenous participation. The prevailing approach of the cabinets of 
the 1950s was thus to set up a viable economic system given the realities of the 
time.197 
But the three development plans and various related government policies 
were not fully and consistently implemented. The “administrator” or “economics-
minded- developmentalist” group, which prioritized economic rationality, economic 
and social development and was prepared to collaborate with the West, was often 
challenged by the “solidarity maker” or ‘history-minded’ group, which emphasized 
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emotional nationalism and was more concerned with removing foreign control over 
the national economy.198 Different orientations were seen, for example, with regard 
to the issue of power distribution between the central and the regional 
governments. The conflict between these two groups resulted in ineffective 
development in the regions and an increase in the gap between Java and outside 
areas, among other effects.199 This situation posed a challenge to Indonesia, whose 
leaders, under the pretext of dismantling the Dutch–imposed system of federalism, 
concentrated on integrating the economy and consolidating a centralized state as 
the Dutch colonial government had done before.200 For many Indonesians living 
outside Java, this problem still has yet to be resolved satisfactorily.  
The position of the first group became increasingly weaker because of the 
insistent Dutch refusal to open negotiations on the status of West New Guinea (Irian 
Barat/Irian Jaya/Papua).201 The pragmatic-liberal (administrator or economic-
minded developmentalist) group’s defense of cooperation with the West, including 
protection of Western economic interests, became less tenable given the 
obstructionist attitude of the Dutch concerning the sovereignty of West New Guinea. 
In the eyes of the radical nationalist the policy was simply lacking in nationalist 
spirit. In addition, the established economic structure, colonial in origin, by which 
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the Dutch government maintained its domination202 and which clashed with the 
interests of certain political, social and economic groups,203 further hampered 
economic stabilization and development.204  
Finally, the democratic parliamentary political system—or the abuse 
thereof—was an important political factor in preventing the cabinets from 
maintaining consistent and sustainable economic policies. The system allowed for a 
change of cabinet in a short time. Over a period of approximately eight years, eight 
successive cabinets tried to transform the dualistic or uneven economic structure 
and to carry out redistribution of wealth controlled by foreign powers. Each cabinet 
emphasized a different set of principles than previous ones.205 The two opposing 
political groups used the no-confidence vote against each other in the parliamentary 
system in order to dislodge the serving cabinet. In other words, political parties and 
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their leaders failed to act in a responsible way to create a working parliamentary 
democracy.206 This conflict also spread to the military, prompting one faction to 
demand the dissolution of parliament.207 
Consequently, economic policies of the post-independence Indonesian 
government that aimed to solve economic problems and to free the Indonesian 
economy from the legacy of colonialism did not run as well as expected. There was 
widespread and deep disappointment among many Indonesians, especially those 
outside of Java, as the promises of prosperity and social justice failed to materialize. 
President Sukarno tried to resolve the troubles of the country by implementing in 
February 1957 his concept of Demokrasi Terpimpin, a “Guided Democracy”.208 
However, this move instead exacerbated political instability in the midst of growing 
tension between Jakarta and regions outside Java. The unresolved political disputes 
were an impetus for regional military commanders to launch the PRRI (the 
Government of the Revolutionary Republic of Indonesia) in Sumatra and for 
uprisings of Permesta (Perjuangan Semesta, Universal Struggle) in Sulawesi a month 
later. In addition, the political stalemate in the Constitutional Assembly over the 
issue of the basis of the state was additional ammunition for the Army with which to 
disparage the credibility of the liberal-democratic system. All of these developments 
led to Sukarno’s implementation of martial law, upon army advice, which effectively 
placed the military in charge of the country.209 Eventually the president promulgated 
the Decree of July 5, 1959, which declared “the return” to the 1945 Constitution and 
dismantled the Constituent Assembly. One year later the elected parliament was 
dissolved and replaced by a handpicked parliament.210 
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In conclusion, the pragmatist-moderate economic development policy 
espoused in the early period of parliamentary liberal democracy, intended to realize 
a just and prosperous society, was eventually replaced by a more populist- and 
statist-oriented policy. The effort to achieve social justice and prosperity by 
promoting freedom, equality, and efficiency had failed. The “administrator- 
developmentalist” group was defeated by the increasingly powerful “solidarity 
maker” or radical nationalist group which opposed economic and political 
liberalism, distrusted foreign capital and believed in the complete capacity of the 
state to realize populist development aspirations.  
2.6. Chapter Six: The Guided Democracy and Guided Economy of Sukarno (1957-
1966): The Predominance of Collectivist and Populist Equality 
The establishment of Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy) signified 
the beginning of authoritarian regimes in the history of Indonesia. It came after a 
prolonged period of failed attempts of the parliamentary democracy, in the decade 
following the transfer of sovereignty in 1950, to promote prosperity and 
redistribution of wealth.211 The more dominant mode of thought in this period held 
that social justice and prosperity would be achieved by emphasising a centralized 
state policy and equal distribution of wealth, a policy that ignored economic 
rationality and efficiency and discredited freedom. Sukarno’s Guided Democracy 
was in essence the implementation of his socialist ideology of Marhaenism, with its 
emphasis on anti-colonialism and Western imperialism, his concepts of gotong-
royong and musyawarah, and his enthusiasm to unite nationalism, Islam, and 
Marxism as he had expressed before Independence.  
Sukarno’s Guided Democracy was accompanied by a Guided Economy 
(Ekonomi Terpimpin), in which the Indonesian economic structure was transformed 
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into a socialist or collectivist model that was, according to Sukarno, distinctly 
Indonesian: Sosialisme á la Indonesia. Underpinning the new system was Sukarno’s 
personal charismatic leadership, supported by the radical wing of PNI, and PKI, as 
well as the army. The two parties, especially PKI, were used by Sukarno to check the 
power of the Army.212 Sukarno made it a point to rid Indonesia of any traces of 
Western influence—especially that of capitalism, which he saw as another form of 
exploitation. Soon foreign investment was shut down.213  
The inauguration of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy spelled the end of previous 
governments’ attempts at economic pragmatism, with their emphases—varying 
with each successive cabinet—on increasing production by maintaining the influx of 
foreign capital while nationalizing certain vital industries. The era of Guided 
Democracy did not separate economics from ideology, and promised a self-sufficient 
state-controlled economy through the establishment of heavy industries and 
cooperatives, with some involvement of the private sector.214 These nationalistic 
tendencies existed before but were tempered by the pragmatic and level-headed 
approach of trained economists such as Sumitro, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, and 
Jusuf Wibisono.215 Sukarno, on the other hand, put great emphasis on Article 33 of 
the 1945 Constitution, which placed the responsibility for enacting social justice on 
the state.216 He interpreted this article as giving the state a direct and extensive role 
in the economy, decreasing the role of the private sector. But the severe lack of 
capital and expertise—two problems that plagued even the more realistic plans of 
previous governments—meant that Sukarno’s Guided Economy failed to prepare 
clear steps to achieve the goals of social justice. Its emphasis on collectivist equality 
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came at the cost of a viable and efficient economic system and political freedom. 
Economic policies were formulated under the practically untenable ‘spirit of 
revolution’ (semangat revolusi). Furthermore, under the same ‘spirit’, the 
government initiated an irresponsible military confrontation against the newly-
independent country of Malaysia that consumed a large portion of the government 
budget and led to an increased deterioration of the economy, culminating in severe 
political crisis.217  
With most of the liberal developmentalist-pragmatist group imprisoned, 
exiled, or isolated from the public sphere, there were almost no dissenting voices 
against Sukarno’s authoritarian Guided Democracy from inside Indonesia. An 
exception was that expressed by Mohammad Hatta, Sukarno’s longtime friend but 
now his only opponent, who carried such influential moral authority that not even 
Sukarno dared to put him in prison. In his article entitled “Our Democracy”, Hatta 
criticized the Guided Democracy for making the realization of justice, prosperity and 
democracy even less of a reality. He rightly noted that Sukarno had violated the 
Constitution several times.218 Instead of achieving the aim of the revolution, to 
establish a just and prosperous society and democracy, Hatta predicted that 
Sukarno’s Guided Democracy dictatorship would end in chaos and anarchy, and the 
system would collapse “like a house of cards.”219 Hatta’s prediction proved true. Not 
only did Guided Democracy fail to establish economic and political stability which 
could create a climate conducive to the achievement of social justice and prosperity, 
but in 1965 the system was dismantled and Sukarno himself was eventually 
impeached as president. 
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Mohammad Natsir may be among the earliest to offer a comprehensive 
response to President Sukarno's Guided Democracy, before he finally left Jakarta in 
December 1957 to Padang, West Sumatra in order to take refuge from intimidation 
and threats from leftist groups. In an address given while General Chairman of the 
Masyumi Party, on the occasion of its eleventh anniversary, November 7, 1956, and 
just two weeks after Sukarno’s first calls for a “guided democracy”, Natsir defended 
democracy, along with responsible political parties, as the solution to the nation’s 
problems. Emphasizing Masyumi’s role as a stabilizing factor ensuring Indonesia’s 
safe progress since 1950 and the efforts of various political parties to solve national 
problems, he admitted that the spiritual and material wellbeing of the nation had not 
yet been achieved. Instead, the situation was characterized by “incompetence and 
confusion in every sphere [along with] gross waste of human power, money and 
time”; widespread intrigue; and the privileging of self-interest. He warned his 
audience that the final outcome of this state of affairs would be general 
dissatisfaction, the loss of a sense of social responsibility, and discontent, which had 
led some sections of the population to hope blindly for the coming of a Ratu Adil (a 
just ruler or king), a messianic leader who would right all wrongs. He chastised 
Sukarno for being one of those who proposed the destruction of the existing 
democratic system in order to make way for a kind of supreme authority or 
dictatorship, thought to bring an immediate and total solution to all difficulties.220  
Natsir challenged that idea on the basis that dictatorship, as a system, was 
simply inconsistent with the precepts set down in the teachings of Islam. The 
ideology of dictatorship should therefore be firmly rejected by the Muslim 
community. The second reason was that geographically speaking, Indonesia, 
consisting of thousands of islands with diverse ethnic groups, cultures and 
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languages, was incapable of being ruled by a dictatorship. He argued that the 
difficulties Indonesia was facing stemmed from a lack of idealism, a materialistic 
orientation, the blurring of the lines between right and wrong, and a lack of realism 
in terms of assessment of problems and distribution of duties. Natsir reminded 
politicians and political parties that it was very easy for a democracy, without 
discipline and caution, to break down into lawlessness. He urged the elite leaders to 
safeguard and honour the responsibility and privilege they bear under a democratic 
system to avoid anarchy and dictatorship and to restore confidence in democracy.221 
Another critic of the turn towards dictatorship was Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, 
former Minister of Finance and Trade and Industry, who wrote from exile a tract 
denouncing Sukarno’s arbitrary rule, neglect of economic development, empty 
sloganeering, and propaganda.222 
The eventual collapse of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy regime was a result of 
its inability to sustain the contradictory elements within its own system. The effort 
to eliminate the army leadership (under Abdul Haris Nasution and Ahmad Yani) was 
the catalyst of the crisis, in which six senior generals and one junior officer were 
murdered. But the plot, executed by a small group of leftist army officers in 
collaboration with certain elements of PKI, ultimately failed. Subsequently the 
army—supported by Muslim organizations and university student—orchestrated a 
massive and violent eradication of Communists and their supporters, totalling 
hundreds of thousands of victims in many villages and towns, especially in Central 
Java, East Java and Bali, that brought the country to the brink of a civil war. The 
army, suspecting the president of complicity in the plot, finally managed to force him 
                                                          
221 Natsir, “Restoring Confidence,” 91-94.  
222 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, “The Failing of Sukarno,” in Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-
1965, ed. Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 141-146.  The 
group of Indonesian exiles living in Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong and European countries, led by 
Djojohadikusumo, published a mimeographed booklet in December 1959 entitled Searchlight on 
Indonesia.   
64 
 
to hand over executive power to General Suharto. The Guided Democracy system 
had created political instability and economic disaster, as well as social strife. The 
increasing influence of the Communist Party aroused fear and anxiety on the part of 
the military, religious communities, and conservative elites. Ultimately, the army 
won, the Communists and leftists were eradicated and political parties and civilian 
groups which had supported Sukarno’s Guided Democracy/Economy were 
discredited.223  
 
2.7. Chapter Seven: Social Justice and the New Order Economic Development Policy 
(1966-1998): The Victory of Rationality, Efficiency, and Stability and the 
Subordination of Freedom and Equality  
In March 1967, President Sukarno was impeached by the Provisional 
People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS). His dismissal marked the end of the ‘Old 
Order’ of Guided Democracy and the emergence of the ‘New Order’ of army-
dominated government.224 The big political issues, especially the place of the 
Indonesian Communist Party in Indonesian politics, seemed to be settled, but only 
through tremendous economic and human cost. The New Order government 
emphasized stability and development and limited the scope of political 
participation of civilian groups and political parties. Its fundamental mission was 
economic development.225 In pursuit of this mission, the government returned to the 
pragmatic open-door approach of the early years of independence, while 
abandoning some of its more collectivist and nationalistic tendencies which placed 
great responsibility for social justice and prosperity on the state, an approach that 
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Sukarno carried to an extreme during the era of Guided Democracy.226 Accordingly, 
the rise of Suharto’s New Order was heralded “as the victory of rationality over 
ideology and of economics over politics”.227 However, as we shall see in the 
following account, this high priority given to economic viability and growth came at 
the price of political freedom and equitable distribution of the wealth gained 
through economic development.  
The new government under General Suharto adopted a “development 
strategy” that emphasised economic growth, income distribution and national 
security. The policy was designed by Western-trained economic technocrats under 
the tutelage of Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Minister of Finance in the 1950s 
and a critic of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy/Economy. In a reversal of its 
predecessor’s policies, the new government reintegrated Indonesia into the global 
economy. The policy was reflected by the massive influx of foreign support, 
especially from the Western countries and Japan.228 The army-dominated 
government also devised a highly centralized system, achieving a level of national 
unity and stability that enabled the government to engineer economic growth.229 
New foreign investors and Indonesian businessmen were invited to develop 
Indonesia’s natural resources and to resume industrialization efforts.230 The policies 
worked to restore Indonesia’s economic growth. Economic recovery was made 
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possible by using the revenue accumulated by the government during the oil booms 
in the 1970s.231  
Despite the economic progress, unequal distribution was clearly evident in 
the increasing social and economic disparities. The main beneficiaries of Suharto’s 
economic policies were powerful military officers, bureaucrats, and wealthy 
business cronies (predominantly Chinese-Indonesians). The livelihoods of the 
masses, laborers, and farmers were compromised as their work contributed to a 
rising standard of living without their fairly reaping the result of their labour. 
Corruption was widespread. Indonesia had become a safe place for crony capitalism 
and corruption in the region.232  
In addition, the political stability and economic growth of the New Order 
were in fact the fruit of military-authoritarian rule. Indonesian society had to endure 
suppression and violence for the New Order economic policies, and people had to 
accept a very limited level of democracy to retain economic benefits.233 The policy 
reflected, among other things, another impact of the Japanese military occupation on 
Indonesian political culture. Most of the Army’s top officers who took over state 
power under Suharto’s leadership had been trained by the Japanese military, which 
passed on its doctrine of the armed forces’ active involvement with government to 
closely direct and control society.234  
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During this period the issue of social justice continued to be a concern for 
many sections of the public, considering that the great accumulation of wealth as a 
result of economic development was not matched by a likewise concerted effort to 
redistribute it fairly.235 Having stabilized and expanded the economy, the 
government was met with widespread expectations that the early ideals for social 
justice championed by the nation’s founding figures would be achieved. Critics of the 
government invoked the stipulations of the Constitution and Pancasila as the basis 
for grassroots development policies aimed at promoting national strength through 
government-led initiatives.236 They appealed to the egalitarian principles of the 
leaders of the independence movement, who placed great emphasis on the building 
of an indigenous entrepreneurship, the advancement of small-scale businesses, and 
the cooperative movement.237 In general, these critics believed that the long-awaited 
economic sovereignty of Indonesia was still out of their hands, remaining under the 
control of foreign capital and stipulations for aid as well as of social elites, who 
benefitted disproportionately from the New Order’s single-minded pursuit of 
economic growth. The following account shall further show the variety of the 
concern for social justice among Indonesian economic thinkers.  
Ian Chalmers classifies the streams of economic development thought in the 
New Order period into three: pragmatic-economic liberalism, statist-nationalism, 
and economic populism.238 The first stream of thought was espoused by Western-
trained economic technocrats. They “tended to favor economic deregulation and 
market-oriented policies [and]… pragmatic planners quite prepared to advocate 
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state controls to achieve particular development goals.”239 They were not, however, 
dogmatic economic liberals.240 A particular thinker worthy of note is Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo, Minister of Trade and Industry (1950), Minister of Finance 
(1952-1953 and 1955-1956), Minister of Trade (1968-1973) and Minister of 
Research and Technology (1973-1978). He was considered the doyen of Indonesian 
economists. Most of the economists who established the early New Order economic 
policy, including Mohammad Sadli, Emil Salim, Ali Wardhana, and others, as well as 
its principle architect Widjojo Nitisastro, were his students. Nevertheless, 
Indonesian economist Sjahrir (b. 1945)241, who once opposed the New Order 
regime’s policies, was also his student. During the New Order period Sumitro’s 
students and protégés played very important roles both as planners of the regime’s 
economic policies and as their critics. In the mid-1980s “Sumitro suggested that the 
economy had become over-regulated […].”242 In addition, he criticized the emphasis 
on “equity” by populist-oriented economists and on the concept of “value-added” 
advocated by statist-nationalists.243 A change of direction in his economic thinking 
had taken place. During the early 1950s he devised the Economic Urgency Program, 
including a state-led industrial development plan,244 and in the early years of the 
New Order he advocated economic development policies in which “the state would 
have a major role stimulating new economic initiatives.”245 Sumitro’s new stand 
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appeared to resemble Sjafruddin’s opinion, which the former had opposed in the 
1950s.   
Sumitro was a member of Sutan Sjahrir’s PSI with its socialist-Marxist 
ideology. Here we see the link between Sumitro’s ideological evolution and external 
changes in economic structure and political circumstances. Sumitro was a member 
of the cabinets in the early 1950s which adopted a pragmatic approach to economic 
development. However, in actuality he was less pragmatic and realistic than 
Sjafruddin and more socialistic and nationalistic. His economic policies during the 
1950s were criticized by Sjafruddin because of their profoundly “nationalistic” and 
discriminatory aspects.246 The impetus for this shift seemed to have been the 
collapse of oil prices during the 1980s. From then on, Sumitro vigorously advocated 
a gradual shift towards economic liberalism.247  
Comparable to Sjafruddin with respect to his realistic views reflected in his 
formulation of religious socialism,248 Sumitro, consciously or not, based his adoption 
of economic liberalism on his party’s ideological realism. This was characterized by 
a revisionist-eclectic approach to Marxism of adapting socialism to Indonesian 
conditions and characteristics, as espoused by Sutan Sjahrir (1908-1966), the chief 
figurehead of PSI, and most of its other leaders. They felt that the Marxian doctrine 
of class struggle was irrelevant to the social conditions existing in Indonesia.249  
This exposition of PSI’s aforementioned ideological interpretation of 
Indonesian economy and society helps us to understand how Sumitro and his New 
Order economist-technocrat students, almost all of whom were PSI sympathizers, so 
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easily applied this ideology to real conditions in Indonesia, including their advocacy 
of liberal capitalist economic development.  
Another representative of this stream of pragmatist-liberal thought was 
Widjojo Nitisastro, the main architect of the New Order’s economic policy.250 
Nitisastro was head of Suharto’s team of Presidential Economic Advisers in 1966, 
and later served as Minister of State for National Development Planning/Head of 
Bappenas/The National Planning Body (1971-1983) as well as Coordinating 
Minister of Economics and Industry (1973-1983).251 Nitisastro stressed “a long-term 
development plan and [devoting] greater attention to policy implementation.”252 But 
he also argued for a principal and dominant position for state enterprises in the 
economy, and a more dynamic role for social forces in economic affairs.253 This 
pragmatic-economic liberalist stream of development thought emphasized 
economic freedom and efficiency—but not political freedom and equality—as a 
means by which to realize the national ideal of a just and prosperous society.  
The second stream of economic development thought was a statist-
nationalist one. This mode of thought emphasized the role of the state in creating, 
strengthening, and supervising a self-reliant national economy.254 Baharuddin Jusuf 
Habibie was one of the proponents of this statist-nationalist stream of thought.255 He 
                                                          
250 Widjojo Nitisastro presented his exposition of general economic problems since 1955 in a 
symposium held in September 1955 at the University of Indonesia, but his ideas had been 
ignored during the Guided Democracy period. See Wilopo and Widjojo Nitisastro, The Socio-
Economic Basis of the Indonesian State: On the Interpretation of Paragraph 1, Article 38 of the 
Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, trans. Alexander Brotherton (Ithaca, NY: 
Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell 
University, 1959).   
251 Chalmers and Hadiz, eds., Politics of Economic Development, xiv, 40 and 41. 
252 Chalmers and Hadiz, “Pragmatic Technocrats,” 41. 
253 Chalmers and Hadiz, “Pragmatic Technocrats,” 41 and 45. See also Wilopo and Nitisastro, 
Socio-Economic Basis, 20. 
254 Ian Chalmers, “The Continued Appeal to Statist-Nationalism,” in The Politics of Economics 
Development in Indonesia: Contending Perspectives, ed. Ian Chalmers and Vedi R. Hadiz 
(London: Routledge, 1997), 163-164 and 167; Rosser, Politics, 3.   
255 He was President of Indonesia (May 1998-September 1999), Minister of State for Research 
and Technology (1978-1998), and chairman of the country’s main technology research body, 
71 
 
believed that an “increase of scientific and technological skills” was the key to 
transforming Indonesia into “an industrially and technologically advanced nation”256 
which could achieve real independence “characterized by capacity for economic self-
reliance, by success in maintaining cultural identity, and by the power to maintain 
political integrity.”257 He emphasized the need to protect “national technological 
capacities until the nation reaches the stage when it can compete internationally.”258 
In his view, one particular stage a nation had to undergo during “the transformation 
[…] into a technologically and industrially advanced nation” was that of “large-scale 
basic research” to develop new theories necessary for continued advancement.259 
Contrary to most other proponents of economic nationalism, Habibie was confident 
that Indonesia, despite its economic weaknesses, would be able to compete with 
stronger economies and suggested that economic internationalization could advance 
development.260 
Another figure of this school was Ginanjar Kartasasmita, who held several 
economic posts in the New Order cabinets (1983-1998).261 Kartasasmita stressed 
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the necessity of economic self-reliance for the country’s survival. According to 
him,”… [t]he economic foundation of a self-reliant country is its capacity to satisfy its 
requirements for goods and services domestically.”262 In principle, a country should 
be self-reliant with respect to vital needs such as food and clothing. He therefore 
urged support for a national movement to buy domestic produce.263 However, at 
variance with Habibie, Kartasasmita believed that internationalization might 
hamper efforts to develop a self-reliant economy unless three programs were 
employed: protecting domestic industries, upgrading domestic industries, and 
fostering a patriotic consciousness to choose domestic rather than foreign 
products.264  
Statist-nationalist thought emphasized efficiency, equality, limiting economic 
freedom for the interest of the nation’s collectivism, and putting aside political 
freedom. However, the call for freedom and populist equality continued to be raised 
during the New Order period. Sarbini Sumawinata265 and Soedjatmoko,266 both of 
whom were also former members of PSI, strongly maintained their commitment to 
freedom and equality. Soedjatmoko was less concerned with growth and more with 
a nation’s capacity to grow.267 In his view, development should expand and multiply 
                                                          
262 Ginanjar Kartasasmita, “To Build National Economic Resilience,” in The Politics of Economic 
Development in Indonesiaa, ed. Ian Chalmers and Vedi R. Hadiz (London: Routledge, 1997), 168.  
263 Kartasasmita, “To Build,” 168; Ginanjar Kartasasmita, “Peluang dan Tantangan dalam PJP II,” 
in Peluang dan Tantangan PJP II di Bidang Ekonomi, Politik, Hukum dan Sosial Budaya: 
Demokrasi dan Budaya MEP , ed. A. Suryana Sudrajat (Jakarta: PT Bina Reka Pariwara, 1995), 21.   
264 Kartasasmita, “To Build,” 170-172; Chalmers, “Continued Appeal,” 167 and 171. 
265 He was a former Chairman of the Central Bureau of Statistic (BPS) and a PSI (Indonesian 
Socialist Party) intellectual. In his opinion, development was “a process of political rather than 
economic change.” In the late 1960s he strongly criticized economic policies which he believed 
were benefiting only a small group of the elite. Chalmers and Hadiz, “The ‘Society-First’ Critics,” 
in Politics of Economics Development, 57 and 61-62. 
266 Soedjatmoko was one of the most prominent intellectuals in Indonesia and Asia. In the 1980s 
he was appointed rector of the United Nations University in Tokyo. Chalmers and Hadiz, “Notes 
on the Authors,” xvi-xvii; Chalmers and Hadiz, “The ‘Society-First’ Critics,” in Politics of Economic 
Development, 62-64. 
267 Ambassador Soedjatmoko, “Perceptions of Social Justice,” in The Primacy of Freedom in 
Development. Ed. Anne Elizabeth Murase. American Values Projected Abroad, ed. Kenneth W. 
Thompson, vol. 20 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), 41. 
73 
 
opportunities on the personal level for the entire population.268 He emphasized the 
importance of the decentralization of power and accountability,269 and urged 
policymakers to accompany the top-down strategy with a bottom-up strategy 
“which ensures voluntary participation, initiative and growth at the grass roots 
level.”270 He believed that success in dealing with poverty and social justice would 
ensure freedom on an individual, social, and national level.271    
The call for freedom and equality was also raised by a former student 
activist-turned-economist with a populist approach, Arief Budiman. As a student 
activist he participated in the 1966 movement that was instrumental in 
overthrowing the Guided Democracy regime of President Sukarno. He was well-
known for consistently upholding democratic principles and socialistic ideas.272 
Consequently, he was one of the critics of the New Order with its capitalist model of 
development which, according to him, was based on the assumption that human 
beings were greedy and materialistic.273 For Budiman, a socialist system seemed to 
provide a better guarantee for the preservation of equitable distribution.274  
Also present were prominent economists, intellectuals and NGO activists 
from Islamic organizational backgrounds such as Mohammad Dawam Rahardjo, 
Sritua Arief, and Adi Sasono. Their parents were members of the Masyumi Party and 
they themselves belonged to a modernist Muslim student organization, HMI 
(Association of Islamic University Students) and in the 1960s had joined the student 
movement that toppled President Sukarno. They were reformists rather than 
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revolutionaries, as they focused their efforts on offering practical solutions to 
economic problems. They used structuralist and dependency theory merely as tools 
of analysis to more clearly explain the economic conditions in Indonesia. Their 
writings display a strong commitment to Islamic teachings of human equality and 
justice.275 Sasono and Arief frequently referred to Hatta’s populist and collectivist 
ideas276; meanwhile Rahardjo echoed Hatta’s economic thinking, especially his idea 
of cooperatives, and also appreciated that of Sjafruddin.277 According to them, their 
use of neo-Marxist dependency analysis was justified by similarities in social, 
economic and political conditions between Indonesia and the countries of Latin 
America.278 
Rahardjo interpreted current expressions of “economic domination” as being 
structurally different from those of the colonial period. In the past, an advanced 
nation would directly control another. In contrast, “today’s structural domination is 
indirect, in the sense of asymmetrical ties between the metropolitan centers and 
their satellites, between the centers and peripheries at both global and national 
levels.” Such a relationship, for Rahardjo, “is not a mutually beneficial form of 
interdependence, but is exploitative in nature. The hegemonic power expands and 
penetrates the economically backward region, while this backward region ‘develops’ 
by becoming dependent on the advanced center, becoming relatively more 
backward. Its economy may even decline.”279  
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Rahardjo elucidated why such a relationship is called structural. In his 
analysis, “the elements of domination and dependence are woven together in a 
complex system, both within and between sectors.”280 Political, economic and 
cultural factors “are interrelated to form a domination-dependency relationship in 
the social system.”281 He maintained that “[…] the structures of the colonial 
economic system remained and there was a continuation of the dualistic economic 
system, with a growing modern sector and a traditional sector still in a condition of 
subsistence.282 He called the New Order regime a “repressive developmentalist 
regime”283 that “[…] has as its distinctive features a bureaucracy directed by a 
military-controlled government, economic development organized by technocrats, 
and restrictions on the freedom and activities of the institutions of a conventional 
democracy—although they are still tolerated. In such a situation, mass poverty and a 
distorted distribution of income exist alongside capitalistic economic growth and 
extravagant lifestyles.”284  
Meanwhile, Sasono asserted that the revolution for independence was not 
followed by a social revolution. Even the contemporary Indonesian economy was a 
continuation of that of the Dutch colonial period. Consequently, he suggested, New 
Order economic policy had succeeded merely in prolonging Indonesia’s position of 
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dependency in the international economy. Foreign aid had only served the interests 
of the creditor countries. He also argued that the impoverishment of the Indonesian 
people was not a result of the existing economic system malfunctioning, but was in 
fact a necessary consequence of the system itself. Echoing the prescriptions of 
dependency theory, he suggested that realising the goal of social equity required 
fundamental structural change.285 
Arief’s development thinking was mainly influenced by the structuralist 
paradigmas developed by his teacher, Joan Robinson.286 He pointed out that 
Indonesia’s economic development had produced rapid growth for a small number 
of people, poverty for many, but dependency for all. The rapid growth enjoyed by 
the minority was a dependent form of development, and the poverty suffered by the 
majority was a product of that dependence. Dependence had been accompanied by a 
process of unequal exchange, transplanting a foreign system of production and its 
associated social relations while marginalizing many people from the indigenous 
system of production within which they had existed, functioned and found their 
livelihood. This process of marginalization was not accompanied by their absorption 
into the new system of modern industry, for this new system of production was not 
pro-worker.287 
Arief offered an alternative development strategy which prioritized 
increasing effective domestic demand and not foreign. Arief was aware that foreign 
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economic relations were too important to disregard. Hence he affirmed that his 
alternative strategy was not anti-foreign economic relations, but instead was 
opposed to foreign relations which bound the Indonesian people in dependence. He 
emphasized the need to bring about social structural change to lay the foundation 
for an alternative development process. Without such fundamental change, in Arief’s 
analysis, the Indonesian economy would remain essentially an appendage to the 
expansion of international capital, a process fuelled by multinational corporations 
and controlled by the metropolitan centers.288    
Suharto’s rule finally came to an end on May 21, 1998. He resigned due to the 
continuing economic crisis, which came to a head with fierce protests and 
widespread demonstrations. In accordance with the Constitution, Vice President 
Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie succeeded him as president. Indonesia was experiencing 
its worst financial and economic crisis since the Sukarno era, as entire countries in 
East and Southeast Asia were engulfed by the collapse.289  
Hill, Sadli, and Bresnan point to several factors which contributed to the 
economic crisis, which included structural economic, political, and social 
weaknesses that were long-term and short-term, domestic and international. In 
addition to those shortcomings, the situation was worsened by Indonesia’s pre-
existing external debt and unregulated capital mobility, careless macroeconomic 
management, entrenched corruption, and mismanagement of the crisis by the 
incumbent authoritarian government. Eventually the regime suffered loss of 
legitimacy and confidence after detrimental IMF policies aggravated the crisis and 
occasioned more political instability.290  
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Indonesia’s economy had experienced a steeper decline than any other East 
or Southeast Asian country. Indonesian observers argued that the authoritarian 
political system was the reason Indonesia failed to react effectively to the crisis. 
According to McBeth, a democracy could have responded better to the challenge.291 
The democratic advantage was clearly seen in the cases of Thailand and South 
Korean, where a transition to a more open and democratic popular-based regime 
was the key to building confidence in the government and a more successful 
rehabilitation process.292  
2.8. Chapter Eight: Indonesian Economic Development in the Post-New Order 
Period: Social Justice, Neo-Liberalism, and the Continuing Debate 
Indonesia has seen much change since the fall of the New Order regime. The 
country has been on its way towards a more liberal political and economic policy. 
President Habibie’s government instituted reforms in 1999 when it passed two 
decentralization laws through parliament, although these still preserve the central 
government’s exclusive control over the main sources of revenue of the regions and 
over the bulk of government enterprises.293 In 1999 Indonesia held its first general 
free election since 1955, and in 2004 it held the first-ever direct presidential 
election. Also in 2004 elections were held for members of the House of 
Representatives and the newly-formed Regional Representative Council (the 
equivalent to the United States Senate). The elections were conducted under a 
representative-democratic system combined with direct popular vote, which further 
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guaranteed the people’s sovereignty based on the Amended Constitution of 1945. 
The first and second direct presidential elections (2004 and 2009) resulted in the 
election of President Yudhoyono.294 In addition, political parties and parliaments 
have functioned effectively to control government policies, to undertake legislative 
functions, and to become instruments of political disagreement, and the Indonesian 
press enjoys genuine freedom.295  
The Indonesian economy in the post-New Order period has achieved a 
degree of macroeconomic stability.296 Economic development policies of post-New 
Order Indonesian governments have been developed under International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) advice and pressure from its Neoliberal agenda. Richard Robison and 
Kevin Hewison identify some core elements of the neo-liberal project as “[… 
emphasizing] the market, fiscal discipline, trade, investment and financial 
liberalization, deregulation, decentralization, privatization and a reduced role for 
the state.”297 Such measures, coupled with regulatory reform and the rule of law in a 
range of related economic, social and political policies, have been beneficial to 
macroeconomic improvement and have facilitated economic stability.298  
However, these more liberal political and economic policies that Indonesia 
has undergone since 1998 have not necessarily reduced the long-term problems of 
poverty, corruption and inefficiency, and social and economic inequality. The main 
beneficiaries of political democracy and Neoliberal economic policies are the same 
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old players: “the New Order’s politic-business oligarchies” and crony capitalists.299 
This development could be discerned from Robison and Hewison’s observation that  
[…] it is now evident that the new Indonesian democracy has not been able to 
assert its authority over a state apparatus (and its corps of officials) that had 
evolved under Suharto into a crude mechanism for allocating power and 
resources. Moreover, the power and influence of politicians, tycoons, and 
officials have not been subordinated to a rule of law and the authority of the 
courts, and thus money politics and the authority of political bosses have 
instead appropriated the institutions of democratic governance.300  
 
They further detect that many elements of the authoritarian New Order are able to 
dominate the democratic system and reap the benefits of Indonesia’s recent 
democracy by using their abundance resource.”301 
Although economic growth has been stable and in general the economy is in 
quite good shape, according to Ross H. McLeod there has been disappointment and 
pessimism about the future.302 He observes that although some progress has 
occurred in instituting good corporate governance, this has not taken place as 
expected.303 Corruption is still an acute problem and there has even been a 
flourishing of such behaviour at the level of local government. But the vigorous 
campaign by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) to prosecute corrupt 
officials shows at least an increased determination to act against corruption.304 
Poverty reduction still poses the biggest challenge for Indonesia and this issue has 
overshadowed current government achievements. Although in the current global 
economic recession the slowdown was much less pronounced in Indonesia than 
anywhere else in Southeast Asia, Indonesia still trails behind its neighbours in terms 
of health care, education, and other basic services, while weak government 
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institutions discourage investors and undermine services to the poor.305 The 
unemployment rate in Indonesia was last reported at 6.56 percent in August of 
2011.306 Indonesia discontinued IMF programs on December 31, 2003 and chose not 
to receive further funding on the basis that the government was successful in 
minimizing risks which reassured the market and fostered international confidence 
in the country. Since then, the Indonesian government has had only periodic 
meetings with the IMF for policy discussions, and had paid off all its debt to the IMF 
by 2007.307  
The IMF-directed economic policies in the era of Reformation or the post-
New Order regime period have been challenged and criticized, especially by 
proponents of economic populism and statist-nationalism and even by a prominent 
proponent of New Order pragmatic-economic liberalism. What follows are a few 
examples of reactions and criticism. Mohammad Sadli308 expressed his concern that 
the IMF prescriptions for economic and fiscal policy of the post-New Order regime 
government “may contain a hidden agenda which reflects the values or interests of 
its major shareholders.”309 In an article examining the causes of the 1997-1998 
crises in Indonesia, he clearly links this hidden agenda to interests of U.S. 
multinational companies and protection of domestic markets against forceful 
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competition from labor intensive industries in large developing countries.310 
According to him, although from an economic and technocratic standpoint IMF 
supervision over the Indonesian government’s economic policies has been a blessing 
in disguise, the IMF’s insistence “on completely opening up international trade-- that 
is removal of remaining tariff and non-tariff barriers-- may decimate fledging 
domestic companies.”311 Sadli admitted that economic efficiency is essential; 
however, social and political equity are equally important. For him, the government 
should always treat national aspirations as an inseparable part of its economic 
policy. He therefore urged low-income developing countries to act slowly in 
liberalizing capital markets.312  
The second response is from M. Dawam Rahardjo, a prominent public 
intellectual and critic of Indonesia’s economic policy and a proponent, in the late 
1970s through the 1980s, of the dependency thesis criticizing the economic 
development policy of the New Order regime. But since the early 1990s, following 
international political and economic developments such as the demise of Communist 
states and the end of the Cold War, China and Vietnam’s transitions toward market 
economies, globalization and technological advancement, and the economic success 
and prosperity of Asian Tigers, he gradually shifted his framework of analysis to a 
moderate position on the left-right spectrum.313 He recently argued that a new 
social-democratic front, incorporating aspects of Anthony Gidden’s “Third Way” 
approach and modified to fit the Indonesian context, offers a viable alternative to the 
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Neoliberal policies that have been the dominant influence on the government’s 
economic thinking for the past decade.314 In an attempt to move beyond the 
dichotomy between ideologues of the Market and those of the State, he held that 
working within the framework of Gidden’s proposal would allow for a more effective 
engagement with the demands for economic justice and equality that have long been 
ignored under the New Order’s oligarchic capitalism and the Neoliberalism of the 
post-reformasi government.315 It would also be a step forward from Indonesia’s past 
experimentation with socialist models of government that compromised democracy 
and ignored economic realities of the time, stifling pragmatic and realistic measures 
to improve the economy.316 He argued that Gidden’s Third Way values—i.e, equality, 
protection of the weak, freedom as autonomy, no rights without obligation, no 
authority without democracy, cosmopolitan pluralism, and philosophical 
conservatism—could be easily translated into pre-existing Indonesian values as 
expressed in Pancasila317. Based on these principles he proposed a number of steps 
that the government should take to strengthen the Indonesian economy: 1) increase 
regional autonomy while strengthening political unity of the nation; 2) improve 
transparency, increase public participation, and fight corruption on all governmental 
levels; 3) increase administrative efficiency; 4) strengthen public participation in the 
democratic process; 5) base the government’s legitimacy on its ability to take and 
manage economic risks, rather than simply security risks; and 6) develop a 
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cosmopolitan perspective that fosters not only civil society but also an open society 
capable of critically absorbing and filtering outside influences.318  
A more direct criticism of the current government’s Neoliberal economic 
policies is that of Kwik Kian Gie, a prominent economist who held the office of 
Coordinator Minister of Economy during the government of President Abdurrahman 
Wahid and served as Minister of National Development Planning under President 
Megawati. He argues that structural exploitation and dependency of developing 
countries by industrialized ones was made possible by legislative activism on the 
part of ideologues of the free market beginning as early as 1967 and continuing to 
the present day.319 One example he presents is that of the recent amendments to the 
famous Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, which gives the state responsibility over 
the productive sectors that affect the lives of many and designates Indonesia’s 
economic system as a partnership/’togetherness’ based on the “family affair” 
principle. The latter basically denotes the collectivist ideal of the constitution. The 
new amendments did not change the wording of the original article but did 
introduce new content, which Kwik Kian Gie interprets as an attempt to move the 
constitution away from its collectivist orientation and towards economic liberalism. 
Among the additions was the statement that “the national economy is to be arranged 
based on a democratic economy with the principles of togetherness, just efficiency, 
sustainability, environmental awareness, autonomy, and preserving the balance of 
progress and unity of the national economy; and that further regulations on this 
article shall be determined by legislation.”320 According to Gie, with the principle of 
“just efficiency” in place, the principles of “togetherness” and other collectivist 
values could be compromised, especially if detailed elaboration of the article is left 
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up to legislation.321 He cites as one example of this the 2001 Law No. 22 on oil and 
gas that allowed price increases of up to 126% in accordance with the prices 
determined by the market mechanism of the New York Stock Exchange. Though the 
Constitutional Courts declared this piece of legislation in violation of the 
constitution, the government and parliament ignored the Courts with impunity.322    
Adi Sasono, a former Minister of Cooperative and Small Enterprise 
Development in the President Habibie’s cabinet (1998-1999) and current head of 
the Dekopin (the National Council of Cooperatives), is another contemporary figure 
who has consistently maintained the socialist credentials of Hatta’s economic 
thought and even aspects of Sukarno’s economic populism.  He sees the current 
government’s neoliberal policies as a continuation of the New Order policy of capital 
growth, one that has led to the Indonesian economy’s structural dependency on 
foreign governments and companies.323 In his opinion, despite the growth of 
Indonesia’s economy during the past decade, the modus operandi of capital interests 
remains the same: to maintain Indonesia as a source of raw material and cheap 
labour, a place of capital flight, and a market for products of developed countries.324 
In support of this, Sasono cites a new piece of legislation, Law No. 25/2007 passed to 
replace Law No. 1/1967, which had placed a number of economic sectors under 
State control and protection, such as drinking water, mass media, fishing, 
telecommunication, electricity, etc.325 Law No. 25/2007 did away with this list 
altogether and opened up a number of economic sectors, such as agriculture, to 
foreign investment. For Sasono, this legislation liberalizes the economy in ways that 
leave Indonesians vulnerable to foreign interest and erode their economic 
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autonomy. He further argues that such economic liberalization is more extreme than 
the measures undertaken by developed countries themselves, which would 
implement protectionist policies in the interest of their own people.326 Under 
pressure from the IMF and World Bank, two major instruments of developed 
countries by which to influence Indonesian economic policies, the successive 
reformasi (reform period) governments have sustained the country’s structural 
dependency upon foreign capital and loans.327  
The aforementioned opinions show the persistent relevance of social justice 
and economic development among proponents of both statist-nationalism and 
populism. Indonesians today enjoy relative political stability and freedom but still 
endure social and economic inequality. In addition, corruption and inefficiency 
remain as acute and widespread as before. Similarly to the New Order government, 
the current government has been trying to accommodate various competing 
perspectives on social justice. For example, the Ministry of Cooperative and 
Development of Small Business has been defended as a public means to protect 
small businesses, farmers, and the informal sector. The debate on how a just and 
prosperous society should best be achieved is as lively and important today as it was 
during the early Independence period. 
In conclusion, the idea of social justice is clearly rooted in the Indonesian 
historical experience of oppressive, exploitative, and discriminative Dutch colonial 
policies which, based on racial differences and driven by economic interests, 
resulted in impoverishment and socio-economic disparities. These conditions 
encouraged Indonesian nationalist leaders and intellectuals under colonial rule to 
take inspiration from a variety of ideological streams and resources, including 
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Islamic teachings, to elevate social justice one of the basic guiding objectives of their 
struggle for independence. Successive post-independence Indonesian governments 
have faced various political, economic, and social problems in realising this 
objective. Furthermore, opinions differed on how to employ the principle of justice 
in politics and economic development policy; these were manifested in the tension 
tension between freedom, equality, efficiency, economic growth, and stability. 
Different actors—governments, public intellectuals, politicians—adopted diverse 
economic policies, political systems and even ideological inclinations to solve these 
issues and to realize the ideal of a just and prosperous society. The liberal 
parliamentary system allowed for broad political participation but failed to 
adequately raise the level of economic performance. Those who put emphasis on 
freedom, rationality and efficiency were confronted by forces that emphasized 
populist and collectivist equality. The confrontation created social and political 
instability. Mass mobilization and ‘ongoing revolution’ under Sukarno’s systems of 
Guided Democracy and Economy created economic stagnation and social-political 
instability. In this period priority was given to populist and collectivist equality 
while freedom and efficiency were reduced and disregarded. The New Order army-
dominated regime was able to generate economic growth. However, as we have 
seen, this was achieved at the expense of political participation and social 
development. Preeminence was given to efficiency and stability, while freedom and 
equality were seen as lesser concerns. All these factors engendered political, 
economic, and social instabilities in Indonesia during most of the second half of the 
twentieth century that culminated in the economic and political crises of 1998. In 
the post-New Order period Indonesia has had democratically-elected governments 
that have implemented pro-market Neoliberal economic policies. Although 
successive Indonesian governments embraced different, and at times even opposite, 
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economic development strategies, political frameworks, and ideological 
orientations, they nonetheless all expressed strong concern for the interests of the 




PART THREE: THE IDEA OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN WESTERN AND ISLAMIC THOUGHT 
In the previous section, we examined the historical background of the 
discourse on social justice among Indonesian nationalist leaders and intellectuals. 
The prominence of this discourse can be traced to their desire to emancipate 
Indonesians from the experience of colonialism that deprived most of them of 
freedom and prosperity. This tradition of local discourse forms an important aspect 
of Sjafruddin’s thinking on the issue. Sjafruddin also spoke as a Muslim leader and 
intellectual, and his contribution to the discourse of social justice and development 
should be viewed from a distinctly Indonesian modernist Islamic perspective. 
Furthermore, he was also a scholar who was trained, during the formative period of 
his education, in the Dutch system with its secular and European orientation. In this 
section, therefore, I will briefly discuss the idea of social justice in both Western and 
Islamic thought. By taking into consideration these two historical contexts we are in 
a better position to appreciate Sjafruddin’s eclectic thought that integrated both 
Western and Islamic traditions. This will prepare the ground for a critical analysis, in 
part five, of Sjafruddin’s unique contribution to Islamic modernist thinking about 
social justice.  
3.1. Chapter One: The Idea of Social Justice in Western Thought  
The idea of social justice emerged in the early twentieth century and its 
increased popularity, especially after the publication of John Rawls’ A Theory of 
Justice in 1971, was one of the most prominent developments in the history of 
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political philosophy in the West.328 The concept of social justice has been interpreted 
differently in various periods throughout history. Ancient philosophers such as Plato 
defined justice as “performing the function(s) for which one’s nature is best 
fitted,”329 and argued that true justice could flourish only if the rulers were 
philosophers/guardians who exercised authority over the polity.330 The three social 
classes—the philosophers/guardians, the soldiers/auxiliaries and the 
workers/businessmen—were allowed to perform their respective functions on the 
basis of a clear division of labor.331 According to Solomon and Murphy this notion of 
justice “makes more sense with ‘righteousness’ than with justice” and denotes an 
understanding of justice as inequality.332 Plato’s idea of justice also signifies the 
importance of the “totalitarian state” as defined by Popper, a society where 
individuals depend on the state to guarantee their existence.333   
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle used the word dikaiosune (which more 
properly means ‘righteousness’) and identified justice as a virtue. He classified 
justice into “distributive” and “rectificatory” types and defined it as fairness and 
equality (proportion) and a mean between extremes.334 Insight into social change 
and mobility was thus absent in the ancient Greek philosophers’ conception of 
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331 Plato, The Republic, 198-199, 206, 209 and 218. 
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Nicomachean Ethics (ca. 322 B.C.),” in What is Justice? Classic and Contemporary Readings, 2nd 
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justice. Instead, they thought of justice as a situation in which each person was to 
duly perform his or her proper role in the community. Only when this social order 
was maintained could the state be strong and flourish.335  
Aristotle’s idea of distributive justice and other Greek philosophies of justice 
reached the Western world through the works of medieval thinkers such as Saint 
Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274).336 In Aquinas’ view justice was a cardinal virtue, 
inherent in the laws of nature and reflected through human conduct. Justice, then, 
was grounded in the natural order of the world and could be discovered through the 
efforts of human reason. Human society ought to be modeled in accordance with the 
order of the natural order, and as such ought to reflect its cosmological hierarchy. 
The notion of equality in society thus follows this hierarchical model, treating 
persons according to their innate natures and societal functions. However, Christian 
thinkers like Aquinas added the supernatural-theological virtues of faith, hope, and 
charity, grounded in Christian theological belief of Christ as God-incarnate and 
savior of humanity, to these virtues that are grounded in nature.337 
Unlike ancient and medieval theories of justice which were conceived, as we 
have seen, within the framework of virtue ethics, a particular kind of human 
excellence in moral conduct, modern theories have been designed to deliver social 
change and reform in the name of fairness.338 In addition, justice received normative 
groundings as duty and responsibility in Kantian deontological ethics.339 
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Summa Theologia (1274),” in What is Justice? Classic and Contemporary Readings, 2nd ed., ed. 
Robert C. Solomon and Mark C. Murphy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 35 and 49-
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338 Miller, Principles of Social Justice, 4.  
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Furthermore, in the history of modern Europe, social contract theory has been 
important to the concept of justice. The theory was a response to the questioning of 
the legitimacy of the state to make and carry out laws and to punish offenders. 
Responding to the question of whether the state is legitimate if it is just, social 
contract theory argues that states and governments are legitimate if they are formed 
and supported by the mutual agreement of their citizens.340 Social contract theories 
assume a “state of nature” that describes the parties involved before the agreement 
is formed. Depending on how theorists view human nature, the initial situation—in 
the absence of justice accorded by the social contract—can be antagonistic (Hobbes) 
or more or less sociable in some primitive order (Locke and Rousseau). Whatever 
the view of human nature, however, social contract theories assumed that agents 
acted rationally when entering into the social contract. This rationality was based on 
a self-interested calculation of whether the potential benefit of cooperation—the 
establishment of normative structures—outweighed the conditions of the “natural 
state” before the formation of the social contract. For Hobbes, this led to the 
establishment of the state based on social contracts among autonomous individuals. 
However, this emphasis on restricting natural human impulses meant that the 
preservation of social order, as the ultimate purpose of any social arrangement, was 
a pragmatic affair, and could therefore justify coercive, absolute rule.341 Justice, then, 
was the condition whereby this social stability was preserved through the right of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
modern society. The concepts of duty and responsibility in the modern sense appear only 
marginally; those of goodness, virtue, and prudence are central. The respective roles of these 
concepts hinge upon a central difference. In general, Greek ethics asks, what ought I to do if I am 
to fare well? Modern ethics asks, what ought to do if I am to do right? And it asks this question in 
such a way that doing right is made something quite independent of faring well.” (See also 
William K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 25-28 and 30-33.  
340 Solomon and Murphy, eds., What is Justice? Classic and Contemporary Readings, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 59. 
341 Thomas Hobbes, “The State of Nature and the Laws of Nature,” in What is Justice? Classic and 
Contemporary Readings, 2nd ed., ed. Robert C. Solomon and Mark C. Murphy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 60 and 68-69. 
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governance.342 For Locke, on the other hand, the establishment of the State was 
necessary in order to guarantee the preservation of property through a certain 
ordering of society. However, because the natural state of human beings, according 
to Locke, was one of liberty and the right to ownership, the state must not intervene 
unduly in people’s lives.343 Similarly, for Rousseau, the state did not function to 
create ‘order’, but rather to realize as best as possible the natural conditions of 
humanity, in the context of a modern civilization that has created excessive social 
inequalities.344  
Thus the idea of social change in justice can be discerned from Rousseau's 
theory. As David Miller writes, the modern concept of social justice is oriented 
towards society, to effect change in social structure and conditions. He traces the 
current discussions on social justice to liberal social philosophers of the late 
nineteenth century in their various treatises on political economy and social 
ethics.345 This period witnessed increasing ethical and political oversight of 
prevailing economic and social institutions and the dramatic rise of socialist 
movements as genuine contenders for political power. These developments 
ultimately led to significant changes in the market economy, including some existing 
property rights, as well as in the character of the state, as policies were reformulated 
to facilitate the just distribution of social resources. During this period, however, 
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social justice was still strongly associated with the old concept of distributive 
justice.346  
Miller also discusses significant elaborations on social justice theories 
developed in the first half of the twentieth century by scholars such as Westel 
Willoughby, L. T. Hobhouse, and T. N. Carver as well as by Pope Pius XI in his 
encyclical Divini Redemptoris.347 Miller considers these theories to contain ideas of 
an organic conception of society. Miller argues that beyond guaranteeing fair 
treatment of individuals, social justice also promotes strong economic activities 
which, pursued in a safe and orderly atmosphere, contribute to the health of the 
social body and to the prosperity and progress of society through the cooperation of 
its elements. In this view, Miller concludes that “[t]he aim of social justice is to 
specify the institutional arrangements that will allow each person to contribute fully 
to social well-being”.348 Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams argue that the 
question of social justice arises when decisions are made regarding “the distribution 
of benefits and burdens between different individuals or groups”.349 Similarly, Miller 
suggests that the nature of this distribution is the main concern of social justice. As 
such, he sees an unjust policy or condition as a case in which a certain individual or 
group receives or enjoys either more or less than what they ought to, compared to 
other members of society.350 Social justice, for this purpose, requires that the state 
act as an institutional structure to carry out legislative and policy changes that affect 
every individual, and to enact purposeful reforms in the name of fairness.351 He 
argues that only nation-states are able to ensure the successful implementation of 
                                                          
346 Miller, Principles of Social Justice, 2-3.  
347 Miller, Principles of Social Justice, 3-4 and 270-271. 
348 Miller, Principles of Social Justice, 4 and 270- 271. Miller also mentions, quoting T.N. Carver, 
the suggestion that establishing just social institutions ensures not only fair treatment for 
individuals but also contributes to national survival and prosperity.  
349 Clayton and Williams, “Introduction,” 1. 
350 Miller, Principles of Social Justice, 1 and 10.   
351 Miller, Principles of Social Justice, 4-6. 
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principles of justice. Furthermore, he defers to the future the idea of realising global 
justice.352  
A significant development in Western theory of social justice occurred in 
1971 with the publication of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. Rawls’ theory of social 
justice was grounded on two sets of principles. First, “each person is to have an 
equal right to the most extensive system basic liberties compatible with a similar 
system of liberties for all”. Second, “social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and 
attach to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity”.353 Rawls further explains that: “All social primary goods—liberty and 
opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—are to be distributed 
equally unless an unequal distribution of any all of these goods is to the advantage of 
the least favored”.354 Rawls comes to this view through the device of the social 
contract, a thought experiment known as the “original position” which describes a 
situation where people building a political order are kept behind a “veil of 
ignorance”, unaware of their social, historical and personal context. They know only 
general facts about human beings and human societies. In such a situation, the 
subjects come to agree upon the fundamental components of social justice.355  
With this theory, Rawls argues for a principled reconciliation of liberty and 
equality, and he sought to prove that social justice could be the basis for unity, 
                                                          
352 Miller, Principles of Social Justice, 18-19. Miller presents three features of nation-states that 
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stability, prosperity and sustainability of a society or nation.356 The most 
fundamental idea in Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness is “the idea of society as 
a fair system of social cooperation over time from one generation to the next.”357 
Citizens who engaged in this social cooperation were people with “the capacity for a 
sense of justice: it is the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from (and not 
merely in accordance with) the principles of political justice that specify the fair 
terms of social cooperation”.358 Such citizens also possessed “the capacity to have, to 
revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good.”359 Another fundamental 
component of Rawls’ theory of justice is the idea of a basic structure (of well-
ordered societies), being “the way in which the main political and social institutions 
of society fit together into one system of social cooperation, and the way they assign 
basic rights and duties and regulate the division of advantages that arises from 
social cooperation over time.”360 This basic framework consisted of “[t]he political 
constitution with an independent judiciary, the legally recognized forms of property, 
and the structure of the economy (for example, as a system of competitive markets 
with private property in the means of production), as well as the family in some 
form.”361     
Rawls' book occupies a considerable place in discussions about social justice 
in contemporary history for at least two reasons. First, Rawls' theory of social justice 
is a critique of and viable alternative to utilitarianism, the dominant and most 
influential theory of justice in Western philosophy throughout the twentieth 
century. Utilitarianism, first developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by 
                                                          
356 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 3-6; Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 1-9.  Miller, Principles of Social 
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David Hume, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick, 
claimed that “the most plausible principle of social justice requires institutions that 
maximize the sum of benefits and burdens.”362 The main idea of utilitarianism, 
according to Rawls, was that a society is just when “its major institutions are 
arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all 
the individuals belonging to it.”363 The second reason for Rawls’ importance in 
contemporary discussions on justice is the impact and influence generated by A 
Theory of Justice in political philosophy and other academic disciplines. No study on 
justice now can avoid direct engagement with the work of Rawls. His theories 
receive both appreciation and criticism and continue to be a rich source of ideas and 
debate.364 In Nancy L. Rosenblum’s opinion, Rawls’ A Theory of Justice is one of the 
most influential works in political philosophy. She suggests that “[f]or almost twenty 
years, Rawls and other theorists have worked to broaden liberalism’s foundations 
                                                          
362 Clayton and Williams, “Introduction,” 3. 
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364 Solomon and Murphy, What is Justice?, 279. Robert Nozick, a colleague and important 
opponent of Rawls’, developed an entitlement conception of justice in which the justness of a 
distribution is determined by rules of just acquisition and transfer, as an alternative to Rawls’ 
‘justice as fairness’. Clayton and Williams, “Introduction,” 3, 5 and 6; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, Publishers, 1974), 150-183. Rawls, in Brian Barry’s 
opinion, is the most original and interesting political philosopher of the twentieth century. In 
Barry’s assessment, Rawls’ attempt to argue that the difference principle can be derived from the 
original position has been widely rejected. Brian Barry, Theories of Justice: A Treatise on Social 
Justice, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 147-148 and 214. Michael Walzer 
rejects neo-Kantian deontologist universalism as developed by Rawls. He emphasizes that 
“[j]ustice is a human construction, and it is doubtful that in can be made in only one way.”  He 
argues that “that the principles of justice are themselves pluralistic in form; that different social 
goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by 
different agents; and that all these differences derive from different understanding of the social 
goods themselves—the inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism.”  Because 
justice “is rooted in the distinct understandings of places, honors, jobs, things of all sorts, that 
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Justice, 5-6 and 314; David Boucher, “British Idealism and the Just Society,” in Social Justice: 
From Hume to Walzer, ed. David Boucher and Paul Kelly (London: Routledge, 1998), 95-98. 
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beyond its conventional basis in Locke, drawing on sophisticated versions of social-
choice theory and on the moral and political arguments of Kant and Hume.”365 
Lately, issues of social justice have dominated the intellectual scene in 
political philosophy. For instance, there has been a change in much of contemporary 
political theory in Britain and the United States of America to focus more on issues 
of distribution, justification of claims of justice, and the interpretation of equality.366 
Likewise, popular topics in contemporary political philosophy are the ideals of 
justice, freedom, and community. In Will Kymlicka’s opinion, the subjects of the 
meaning of power, sovereignty, or the nature of law, as well as the political spectrum 
of left and right, have been increasingly abandoned.367 Ronald Dworkin suggests that 
the idea that “each person matters equally is at the heart of all plausible political 
theories.”368 Social justice issues are so central to contemporary political philosophy 
that Kymlicka concludes that “the idea of an egalitarian plateau for political 
argument is potentially better able to accommodate both the diversity and unity of 
contemporary political philosophy.”369 Debates on social justice persist to this day 
and have expanded to encompass various issues such as (economic) 
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development,370 international social justice,371 cultural rights, the environment, the 
community, the family, and morality theory, among others.372  
In conclusion, the previous discussion explored the importance of the 
concept of justice in the history of Western thought, showing how ideas of social 
justice differed in ancient Greece, medieval Christianity, and contemporary political 
philosophy. It presented the importance of social contract theory in the 
development of the concept of justice in the history of modern Europe, above all the 
significant place occupied by John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in contemporary 
discourse, as well as expanding debates on social justice to various issues.  
3.2. Chapter Two: The Idea of Social Justice in Early and Classical Islamic Thought 
The prominence of the subject of justice in the history of Islamic thought can 
be ascribed first and foremost to the Qur’an and the Sunnah/Hadith (traditions of 
the Prophet Muhammad). Notwithstanding that the scriptures clearly command 
Muslims to implement justice in their personal life and social conduct,373 Yūsuf al-
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373 Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Conception of Justice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1984), 6. In Islamic nomenclature the most common word used to denote justice is ʿadl. In 
addition, Khadduri points to other words that are used as synonyms of ʿadl, namely: qist, qasd, 
istiqama, wasat, nasib, hissa, mizan, haqq and many others. Antonyms of ʿadl is jawr (injustice, 
oppression, tyranny, outrage), zulm (wrongdoing), ṭughyān (tyranny), mayl (inclination), inḥirāf 
(deviation) and others. In addition, some senses of the word ʿadl with different meanings can be 
found in the Qur’an: ʿadl (or ʿidl) may also mean example, equivalent or alike (al-Mā’idah 5:95), a 
literal expression which is indirectly related to justice; justice (al-Nisā’ 4:58); upright (al-Anʿām 
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Qaraḍāwī concluded that “[t]hey do not lay down any specific framework for how 
they should be implemented.”374 Similarly Lawrence Rosen observed that“[j]ustice is 
the most essential, if indeterminate, of virtues of Muslims, because it keeps open the 
quest for equivalence, a quest seen as central to both human nature and revealed 
orderliness in the world of reason and passion.”375 Sūrat al-Baqarah 2:143 states 
that the Muslim community was created to be a just society, and from sūrat 
(chapter) al-Nisā’ 4:58, sūrat Ṣad 38:26, and sūrat al-Naḥl 16:90, it can be 
understood that it is obligatory for a ruler or government to establish and enforce 
the law in accordance with the principles of justice.376 In addition to the scripture, 
disputes in the early Muslim community regarding the legitimacy and qualification 
                                                                                                                                                                      
6:152); compensation (al-Baqarah 2:123); and equal to God (al-Anʿam 6:1). Khadduri concludes 
that “the literal meaning of ʿadl in Classical Arabic is thus a combination of moral and social 
values denoting fairness, balance, temperance and straightforwardness.” Al-Fayrūz-ābādī, a 
lexicographer (d. 718/c.1319), says that “ʿadl (justice) is antonym of jawr (oppression, tyranny) 
and the thing that is proven in the mind as being straightforward” [Al-ʿadl: ḍidd al-jawr, wa mā 
qāma fī al-nufūs annahū mustaqīm]. Majd al-Din Muhammad bin Yaʿqub al-Fayrūz-ābādi, Al-
Qāmus ‘l-Muḥīṭ, 7th ed. (Beirut: Al-Resalah, 2003/1424), 1030. For further explanation of the 
meaning of ʿadl and others, both literally and conceptually, see Khadduri, Islamic Conception, 5-8. 
374 Kamali, Freedom, 109.  
375 Lawrence Rosen, “Concepts of Justice,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic 
World, ed. John Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
376 Kamali, Freedom, 107-113. Kamali argues that justice in Islam is both a collective obligation 
(farḍ kifāya) and a supreme virtue, while according to Rahbar, “the essential motive principle of 
virtuous conduct in Qur’ānic thought is fear of God the Strict Judge, and not fear of God the 
Capricious Tyrant.” Rahbar also maintains that the dominant note of the Qur’an is the idea of 
God’s justice. Daud Rahbar, God of Justice: A Study in the Ethical Doctrine of the Qur’ān (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1960), xiii.  Other verses of the Qur’an and Hadith enjoin Muslims to do justice, as 
shown in the following verses: “O you believe, stand out firmly for justice, bearers of witness for 
God, even though it be against your own selves or your parents, or your kin—and whether it be 
(against) rich or poor; God has a better right over them both. So follow not (your) low desires, 
lest you deviate. And if you distort (justice) or turn away from (truth), surely God is ever Aware 
of what you do” (An-Nisā’ 4:135); “O you who believe be upright for God, bearers of witness with 
justice; and let not hatred of a people incite you not to act equitably. Be just; that is nearer to 
piety. And keep your duty to God. Surely God is Aware of what you do” (Al-Mā’ida 5:8). In a 
ḥadīth qudsī, sacred hadith, God spoke through His messenger: ‘O My slaves, I have made 
oppression unlawful among you, so do not oppress one another’ (Reported by Muslim). From Al-
Ḥāfiẓ Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Bulūgh al-Marām min Adillat al-Aḥkam (Riyadh: Darus Salam, 
1996/1416), Ḥadīth no. 1290. Justice is the goal of all of the revealed scriptures: “Certainly We 
sent Our messengers with clear arguments, and sent down with them the Book and the measure, 
that human beings may conduct themselves with justice…” (Al-Ḥadīd 57:25). “Surely God 
commands justice and the doing of good (to others) and the giving to the kindred, and He forbids 
indecency and evil and rebellion. He admonishes you that you may be mindful” (An-Naḥl 16:90). 
The Prophet said in a hadith: “Beware of oppression, for oppression will turn into excessive 
darkness on the Day of Resurrection […]” (Reported by Muslim). From al-ʿAsqalāni, Bulūgh al-
Marām, Ḥadīth no. 1280).    
101 
 
of the Prophet’s successor centered on the question of justice which spawned a 
number of early theological positions.377 The civil war (656-661 CE) which followed 
the murder of the third Caliph, ʿUthmān binʿAffān, in 656 CE, gradually led to the 
formation of three major politico-religious groups: the Sunnī,378 the Shīʿī,379 and the 
Khārijī.380 A number of theological schools also emerged during this period, 
including the Qadariyya, the Jabriyya, and the Murji’ah, while later schools such as 
the Muʿtazila,381 the Hanbaliyya, and the Ashʿariyya traced their theological 
genealogy to debates during this early period.382  
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86-87 and 169.  
379 The Shīʿa (the partisans of ʿAli), based on the principle of designation by the Prophet and in 
accordance with the tradition of the Prophet (Sunnah), claimed that political justice lay in the 
strict perpetuation of the line of legitimate succession. The Shiʿa insisted that the leadership 
belonged to a member of the Prophet’s family and it fell to his direct biological descendants to 
implement justice. In later development, the Shiʿa elevated the concept of God’s justice (al-ʿadl al-
ilāhī) and benevolence (luthf), in which God should give guidance to human beings, especially in 
matters of such importance as that of leadership of the community. Mahmoud Ayoub, “The 
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Barazangi et al (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996), 21; Khadduri, Islamic Conception, 
15-20; Enayat, Modern, 4-5. Justice (ʿadl) is one of five of the Shīʿa fundamentals of religion (uṣūl 
al-dīn). The other four are: tawḥīd (monotheism), nubūwah (prophethood), imāmah 
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Following the period of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, the issue of justice 
emerged within theological debates in reaction to the oppressive policies of the 
Umayyad dynasty (661-750). In an effort to strengthen their power, the Umayyads, 
who had initially based their legitimacy on the doctrine of an elected caliph, 
manipulated and distorted aspects of Islamic doctrines in accordance with their 
political interests, marshaling them in support of monarchical rule.383 They referred 
to themselves as “deputy of God”, khalīfat Allāh, as well as “successor of the 
Messenger of God”, khalīfat Rasūlillāh, and were influenced by the Roman 
dynastic/aristocratic system. Meanwhile their successors, the Abbasid dynasty, were 
influenced by court practices of the Iranian/Persian political culture of absolute 
monarchy.384 Since then, therefore, the notion of justice in Islam was shaped within 
the context of an Iranian/Persian political culture or dynastic system that at the time 
prevailed over most of the civilized world. This philosophy of justice persisted until 
the nineteenth century, when European and Islamic reformist-modernist ideas 
began to force fundamental changes.385  
Formulations of justice, human freedom, and responsibility gradually 
developed and were influenced by more systematic theological doctrines. Muslims’ 
encounters with Greek, Hellenistic, Buddhist, Christian, and Iranian philosophy and 
theology enriched philosophical, religious and moral speculations.386 The Muʿtazilite 
school of theology fully developed the ethical and political implications of human 
responsibility and free choice, with the premise that human freedom and 
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responsibility originated from the principle of divine justice. However, the Muʿtazila 
drew the conclusion—not accepted by many other Muslim groups--that it was 
impossible for God to do the unreasonable and the unjust. For them, divine justice 
corresponded symmetrically with human justice. The Muʿtazila’s excessive emphasis 
on reason, God’s justice, and Oneness brought them into conflict with more powerful 
opponents.387  
Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (780-855), champion of Sunni traditionalism, sought to 
minimize the use of reason in the interpretation of scripture, employing instead a 
literalist methodology.388 However, because his teaching was simply a reaction to 
the Muʿtazila’s excessive emphasis on human rationality and free will, Ibn Ḥanbal’s 
efforts failed to provide a complete exposition for Sunnism. Traditionists such as Ibn 
Ḥanbal emphasized formulations of Divine Power and Will to such an extent that 
they obscured other important Divine attributes, such as Justice.389  
It was Abu al-Ḥasan bin Ismaʿīl al-Ashʿarī of Baghdad (d. 324/936), a former 
moderate Muʿtazilite, who would offer a more constructive middle-ground 
approach, by maintaining a careful balance between Revelation and independent 
human reasoning as sources by which to derive an understanding of God and His 
attributes. At his hand, the formulation of Sunni belief was decisively laid down.390 
However, Ashʿarī theology was not adopted by all Sunnī Muslims. Abu Jaʿfar al-
Ṭahāwī (d. 321/935), Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and Abu Bakr al-
Bāqillānī (d. 1012) tried to formulate a theology that would be a truer middle 
ground between the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya. They maintained the primacy of 
God’s will in determining what was just. However, to a greater extent than the 
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Ashʿariyya, they allowed room for human freedom and rationality with respect to 
the capacity of humans to differentiate and choose the just from the unjust.391  
Although debates concerning divine sovereignty and human free will were 
more or less settled by the 4th/10th century,392 the issue of justice has remained a 
central subject of discussion in various Islamic schools of thought in Islam. 
Philosophers were concerned less with a correct understanding of God and His 
attributes, and more with how people’s lives could be brought to participate in 
divine governance. Muslim philosophers conceived of justice as the underlying 
principle of this relationship, and justice had both an inward (ethical) and an 
outward (political) dimension.393 In al-Fārābī’s (c. 878-c. 950) The Virtuous City, al-
Madīna al-Fāḍila justice is realized in the division of good things (security, wealth, 
honor, and dignity, among others) among the people of the City and under the 
authoritarian rule of the Imām, or supreme ruler. Meanwhile, the conception of 
justice both in the Just City and Kitāb al-Shifā’, The Book of Healing, of Ibn Sīnā (980-
1037) was presented in terms of social contract theory, exploring how the welfare of 
all classes of the City might be secured by a public fund under the leadership of a 
just, prophet-like ruler. On the whole, their discussions were closely linked to the 
views of Plato or Aristotle.394  
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 However, the major sources for classical discussions concerning justice as a 
socio-political condition were found in the historical development of Islamic Law. 
Unlike philosophical discussions, which took place only in elite intellectual and 
political circles, the discourse of Islamic legal thought penetrated all levels of Islamic 
society, and has therefore had the most lasting influence on the development of the 
conception of social justice in Islam. As a result, most discussions of social justice 
among Muslims take place from a legal point of view, with the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah as the principal sources of reference.395 Furthermore, because of its 
powerful normative and practical apparatus, Islamic law—and not theology or 
philosophy—has been the central domain of Islamic ethical thought.396  
This is seen in the exposition of social justice by a number of prominent 
jurists. Abū Bakr al-Ṭurṭūshī (d. 520/1127), for example, argued that a sense of 
social responsibility should in turn pressure the ruling regime to implement justice 
as state policy.397 Ibn Taymiyya (b. 661/1263 and d. 728/1325) developed the 
concept of siyāsah sharʿiyyah, or Sharīʿah-oriented policy (political law or judicious 
policy), as a supplement to the Sharīʿah (Revealed Law), while Najm al-Din al-Ṭawfi 
(b. 675/1259 and d. 716/1316) argued in favour of the status of maṣlaḥah (public 
interest) as a source of law, with or without the existence of naṣṣ (explicit text of the 
Qur’an or Sunnah) to ensure social justice.398 According to Abu Zayd ʿAbd al-Rahman 
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Ibn Khaldūn (d. 806/1408) law was very significant as a means of administering 
justice, repairing social conditions, and preventing civilizational decadence and 
degeneration through the administration of justice.399 Abu ʿAbd-Allah Ibn al-Azraq 
(b. 832/1427 and d. 896/1491) contended that human beings were by nature 
oppressive and unjust. In his opinion, both ruler and ruled should be checked by 
restraining forces whose aim was the attainment of justice. Similarly to Ibn Khaldūn, 
al-Azraq held that this could be achieved through administrative processes.400  
In the modern era, Muslims’ approach to social justice has experienced 
significant changes. Muslim scholars and political activists began to reinterpret the 
classical patrimonial conception of justice after realising that it was no longer able to 
accommodate the dynamics of the emerging modern society.401  
3.3. Chapter Three: Modern Muslims’ Conceptions of Social Justice 
The emerging modern discourse on justice is part of Islamic responses to the 
decline of the Muslim world and its powerlessness against the encroachment of 
Western colonialism, imperialism, and scientific and technological advances. 
Muslims have observed many Western states outdistance Muslim countries in terms 
of material progress and standards of justice. While they admired this progress, 
Muslims also witnessed the oppression carried against many Muslim nations by 
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those same powers. Yet at the same time, the excessive autocracy of Muslim rulers 
toward their own people was no less severe. Many Muslim rulers came under the 
domination of Western powers, and were forced to make political and economic 
concessions at the expense of public interest, worsening the plight of their own 
people. The widespread social and economic malaise also escaped the attention of 
the traditional ʿulamā’, scholars to whom Muslims look for guidance.402  
Modern Muslim attitudes toward the issue of social justice have been 
divided. In the first group were the modernists and/or reformists, including the 
Iranian Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (d. 1897), Sayyid Aḥmad Khān of the Indian sub-
continent (1817-1898), the Egyptian Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905), and the Syrian 
Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935), all of whom advocated the adoption of Western institutions in 
Muslim countries to some degree, while remaining committed to the belief that 
injustices could be remedied by renewing the principle of consultation (shūrā) in 
the form of elective assemblies. The second group consisted of traditionalist ʿulamā’ 
who merely maintained the status quo and encouraged an ethic of taqlīd (blind 
imitation of tradition or opinions of former ʿulamā’) and passiveness, curbing any 
initiative from the community to change the old standards.403 The third group were 
the secularists, who argued for the adoption of secular Western-influenced 
standards of justice without regard for their relevance to or compatibility with 
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Islamic traditions. The most prominent examples of this ideological trend are 
Kemalism in Turkey and Salamah Musa’s socialism in Egypt.404  
Differences between these groups centered on the extent to which secular 
foreign elements could be adapted to Islamic tradition. The modernist-reformist 
group rejected the comprehensive adoption of any one modern ideology such as 
nationalism, socialism, or capitalism, but they were not opposed to the assimilation 
of certain elements of Western conceptions of justice that did not contradict Islamic 
ethical principles. Instead, they argued for a formula that synthesized Islamic 
principles of justice with modern standards, ensured continuity with Islamic 
tradition, and was sensitive to the conscience of the community.405  
However, the credibility of the modernist approach was destroyed in the 
aftermath of the two World Wars, when many Muslims felt betrayed by the West 
and began to express anti-Western sentiments. This led to the popularity of a fourth 
group, the neo-fundamentalists, who called for a return to the ways of the pious 
ancestors (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ), the first generation of Muslims. Neo-fundamentalists 
believed this to be the only course open to contemporary Muslims, if they were to 
overcome their weaknesses and deliver justice and prosperity.406  
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These Muslim thinkers began to envision Islam as a complete system (a ‘way 
of life’) that was in competition with other ideologies such as capitalism or 
socialism.407 As we shall see, the Muslim neo-fundamentalists held the conviction 
that Islam offered a comprehensive set of divinely-inspired norms, principles and 
regulations that can and should be implemented in a given territorial context. These 
principles were accessible only through the Qur’an and Sunnah and were not 
derived from any other criteria or sources of morality.408 Whereas many of the 
patrimonial conceptions of justice (both philosophical and legal) in the classical 
period were advanced as pragmatic efforts to ensure social stability, thus 
guaranteeing the ability of individual Muslims to perform the ritual demands of the 
religion,409 the Muslim neo-fundamentalists’ conceptions of social justice were at 
their root a matter of adhering to a set of uniquely Islamic principles and rules of 
conduct. To be a faithful Muslim required that one live in (or at least desire) an 
Islamic political or economic system. This view was further supported by the 
conviction that Islam as system could provide a better life arrangement than that of 
capitalism, socialism, or other competing ideologies.410 There emerged a conception 
of social justice as being a matter of adhering to a set of Islamic principles and rules 
of conduct that form part of a self-contained and uniquely Islamic “economic 
system”. Islamic economics, according to its proponents, has within it inherent 
mechanisms for social justice. However, it should be emphasized that, as we shall 
see, the liberal modernists offered a different response. Though sharing the 
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modernist-revivalist or neo-fundamentalist conviction that Islam was a complete 
way of life, they did not espouse the idea that Islam comprised a distinct or 
“authentic” political and economic system derived from a divinely-revealed set of 
norms and values in order to regulate individual and communal life (as was believed 
by the revivalist-modernist group). For liberal modernists, the aims of the Law 
(maqāṣid al-sharīʿah) or its general principles and values  were more important than 
the detailed rules and regulations derived from the Qur’an and Sunnah according to 
the conventions of Islamic jurisprudence. They argued that the essence of Islam, or 
Sharīʿah, was basic values such as justice, freedom, equality, consultation or 
participation (shūrā), and accountability or responsibility (mas’ūliyyah, 
musā’alah).411 They could therefore accept and incorporate modern ideas—for 
example, democratic forms of government or the modern banking system—into 
their political and economic philosophies.412 As we shall see, Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara’s concept of social justice represented a liberal modernist point of 
view. 
Unlike most Islamic discussions of justice in pre-modern times, in the 
modern period many Muslim intellectuals have articulated their ideas about Islam, 
including justice, within a category that had no precedent in Islamic intellectual 
tradition: that of “Islamic thought”. This pattern can be seen in the writings of 
Muḥammad ʿAbduh, Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī, Muḥammad al-
Ghazālī, Sayyid Quṭb, Murtaḍā Mutahharī, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, and Maḥmūd 
Talegānī, among others.413  
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Ḥasan al-Bannā (1906-1949), founder and leader of al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, 
the Muslim Brotherhood, represented an early proponent of the revivalist-
modernist school of thought. The organization presented itself as a defender of the 
poor and downtrodden and was committed to comprehensive human and socio-
economic justice inspired by a religious spirit. In Bannā’s view, it was necessary to 
formulate an Islamic ideology; i.e. a holistic Islamic theory capable of advancing a 
remedy for the prevailing social condition.414 He rejected attempts to synthesize 
Islamic and Western ideologies that have been espoused, in varying degrees, by al-
Afghānī, Khān, ʿAbduh, and Riḍā. His views would later be elaborated by other 
Muslim Brotherhood leaders such as Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAwdah, 
and Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī.415 A key thinker was Sayyid Quṭb (1906-1966), a chief 
ideologue of Islamic fundamentalism whose major work on social justice has shaped 
fundamentalist thought on social and political issues.416 Quṭb was the first Muslim 
scholar to explicitly use the Arabic term for ‘social justice’ within the context of 
contemporary Islamic history in his 1949 book al-ʿAdālah al-Ijtimāʿiyyah fī ‘l-Islām, 
Social Justice in Islam.417 He emphasized the importance of practical, everyday 
actions which could, he posited, be religious acts in themselves. Religion, according 
to Quṭb, must embrace all human activities. He argued that the current secular 
state’s monopoly over religion must be dismantled by removing the privileges of the 
clerical class, which he believed was entwined with the secular state. Quṭb argued 
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that in certain periods of Islamic history, the clergy had prevented economic and 
social development on the part of the poor.418 At the same time he praised them, 
especially the fuqahā’ (jurists), for the development of the science of jurisprudence, 
and advised Muslims to be confident in the ability of the Sharīʿah to govern modern 
society.419 He understood social justice as involving human prosperity in both its 
material and its spiritual dimensions.420 Quṭb held the following principles to 
constitute the foundation of Islamic social justice theory: absolute freedom of 
conscience, complete equality of all humans; and firm mutual responsibility among 
members of society.421 He emphasized that Islam recognized the right to individual 
ownership by legal means of acquisition and protected the rights of the possessor. 
However, justice was not always concerned with the interests of the individual. 
Justice was both for the individual and for society, and justice must exist in all of its 
shapes and forms.422  
In 1960, Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī (1915-1964), head of the Syrian branch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood (known as al-Jabha al-Ishtirākiyya, the Socialist Front), 
published Ishtirākiyat ‘l-Islām, The Socialism of Islam, in which he reflected on 
important elements of the thought of ‘al-Afghāni, ʿAbduh, and Riḍā which Bannā and 
Quṭb had tried to abandon.423 In his book, Sibāʿī argued that socialism and Islam 
were compatible and that in principle, both were against human exploitation. He 
also emphasized that unlike Western socialism, Islamic socialism was against class 
struggle, instead advocating cooperation and friendship as means to bring about 
social change and the expansion of civilization. It recognized private property and 
supervised economic development, offering a formula for eliminating poverty and 
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allowing individuals to achieve their potential based on five principles: the right to 
live, the right to liberty, the right to knowledge, the right to dignity, and the right to 
property. Islamic socialism attached importance to religious values, and satisfied all 
citizens’ interests without discrimination and regardless of their religion.424  
Although there has been a strong tendency among contemporary Muslims to 
safeguard Islamic identity and authenticity, foreign elements, e.g. modern Western 
ideas, nevertheless exist even in the thought of Bannā and Quṭb.425 This tendency 
was similar to the incorporation which occurred during the classical period with 
Islam’s encounter with various religious, philosophical, and political ideas of the 
Greek and Persian traditions. In previous periods, foreign elements of justice had 
been incorporated into Islamic theories and governance on the condition that they 
were introduced through recognized legal channels (ijmāʿ, consensus, qiyās, 
analogy, and others).426 Therefore Bannā argued that it was not in violation of 
Islamic intellectual tradition, for instance, to accept parliamentary democracy and 
(moderate) nationalism, although he rejected any role for a multiparty system.427 
His view of social justice, such as state intervention in economic affairs and taxes on 
income and wealth, including progressive taxation, also reflected a modernist and 
quasi-socialist reading of the Islamic scriptures.428 Quṭb, in Tripp’s judgment, was 
similarly clearly influenced by Western liberalism and socialism, not only in his 
earlier works but also even after he consciously sought to remove such influences in 
his thought. Tripp points to “a liberal individualist influence” in Social Justice in 
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Islam in Quṭb’s attempt to reconcile the claims of the community with the rights of 
the individual.429  
In recent times, discussions of social justice have increasingly been placed 
within the framework of Islamic economic theories.430 In the Sunni world, one of the 
most influential sources for social justice discourse in the context of a model of 
Islamic economics are the works of Sayyid Abū ‘l-Aʿlā Mawdūdī (1903-1979), 
founder and head of the Jamāʿat-i Islāmī in Pakistan.431 He approached the topic not 
as an economic theoretician but as a religious reformer who wished to advance 
aspects of Islamic teachings and methodology as solutions for contemporary 
problems which, in the immediate context of the British India, had emerged from 
colonization and the challenges of modernity.432 Indeed, Mawdūdī’s proposals for an 
Islamically-based economic system stemmed from more practical concerns of social 
injustice, indebtedness, and economic dependency affecting many poor Muslims in 
his country.433 The importance of Mawdūdī’s approach lies less with the conceptual 
details of an Islamic economic theory—an endeavour which was further developed 
later on by many of his students—and more with his clear and forceful articulation 
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of a uniquely-Islamic approach to economics as the only natural system for Muslim 
societies, as opposed to the alternatives of capitalism and communism.434  
According to Mawdūdī, an economic system obtained from the Islamic vision 
does not allow moral values to be separated from the allocation and distribution of 
resources.435 As such, the strategy to realize spiritual happiness as well as material 
prosperity must not only rely either on the state, as in communism, or on the 
market, as in capitalism. Rather, a new set of mechanisms needed to be conceived, 
and these were derived from the moral foundation of Islam as rooted in the Qur’an 
and Sunnah.436 Most important was the reform of the individual Muslim in his moral 
and spiritual life. Mawdūdī insisted that it was not enough that a grand economic 
theory make provisions for equality and justice in society; rather, that theory must 
affect the human agent in a personal and direct way. The goal of an Islamic 
economics was to instil the virtues of justice, kindness, fraternity, and discipline as 
sincere ways of being, rather than to emphasise the end result of quantitatively-
measurable policies or acts of good governance.437 He envisioned an economic 
system where individual citizens would feel personally responsible for fulfilling the 
needs of the poor, eschew a lavish lifestyle for a simple one, and maintain within 
themselves a “kindling moral flame” that was always ready to sacrifice one’s due for 
another’s basic needs.438 Mawdūdī seemed to argue that true improvement of social 
justice in society required the participation of individual agents alongside a 
centralized mechanism that encouraged and provided the means by which this 
participation in the cause of justice was achieved.439   
                                                          
434 Nasr, “Mawdudī,” 105; Chapra, “Mawlana Mawdūdī’s Contribution,” 164. 
435 Chapra, “Mawlana Mawdūdī’s Contribution,” 164. 
436 Chapra, “Mawlana Mawdūdī’s Contribution,” 165. 
437 Chapra, “Mawlana Mawdūdī’s Contribution,” 167. 
438 Chapra, “Mawlana Mawdūdī’s Contribution,” 166. 
439 Chapra, “Mawlana Mawdūdī’s Contribution,” 167 and 169. 
116 
 
 Mawdūdī asserted that these goals would be achieved only through 
“comprehensive socio-economic and political reform”.440 By this he meant that the 
solution to contemporary injustices facing Muslims was the establishment of an 
Islamic state whose legal basis was the Sharīʿah.441 Lacking the theoretical details of 
Muhammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr’s economic theory (to be discussed below), Mawdūdī’s 
reformist approach assumed a direct correlation between the injunctions of the 
Sharīʿah and universal moral imperatives, which in turn formed one central 
mechanism in the Islamic economic system as it was coordinated at some level by 
the ideal Islamic state.442 The function of this state, in turn, was not to achieve 
industrial development but rather to establish a just social order, which was 
precisely the central moral imperative of the Sharīʿah in the context of a social 
collective.443  
Mawdūdī’s thinking about Islamic economics has been further elaborated by 
his disciples, includings Muhammad ʿAbdul Mannan, Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, 
Muhammad Umer Chapra, Khurshid Ahmad, and Fahim Khan as well as a number of 
economic theorists outside of Mawdūdī’s immediate circle, such as Syed Nawab 
Haider Naqvi.444 Through the research and activities of these scholars and others, 
the Islamic perspective on issues of finance, taxation, commerce, banking, and even 
insurance was not only fully developed as a viable theory, but was also actively 
implemented through the gradual establishment of Islamic banks445 and other 
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financial and research institutions in the Middle East, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and even some non-Muslim countries such as the United Kingdom and Hong 
Kong.446  
Murtaḍā Muṭahharī in Iran and Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr in Iraq were the 
most prominent Shīʿī Muslim thinkers who formulated ideas on social justice. In Iran 
and Iraq these theories were devised mainly to refute various brands of Marxist 
socialism. In the 1950s the communist party was gradually gaining popularity in 
Iraq, while in Iran the Tudeh party, though officially illegal, had much popular 
support.447 As previously mentioned, given the central importance of justice in both 
Shīʿite and Muʿtazilite theology, proponents of these schools of thought emphasized 
human freedom as the moral imperative for social justice, relying on both rational 
and revealed proofs. This emphasis was clearly visible in Muṭahharī’s philosophical 
thought concerning social justice. His theory was based on a tawḥīdi theological 
framework, in which all matters of human and divine engagements are observed 
through the principle of Divine Oneness (tawḥīd). In this understanding, divine 
justice was one manifestation of tawḥīd, especially as it related to the divine 
ordering of creation on the one hand, and the created order’s “participation” in that 
divine order on the other. Muṭahharī wrote that the prophets “have come to impart 
to man the kind of vision and world view that would allow him to form an image, 
however sketchy, of the whole system of creation, to the extent of his allotted 
                                                                                                                                                                      
rather than to close the bank, which would risk causing outspread dissatisfaction. The bank was 
renamed the Nasser Social Bank and the government made certain that it would not play a 
significant role in the financial business. Wilson, Economics, Ethics and Religion, 155-156.    
446Wilson, “Development of Islamic Economics,” 210-214; Wilson, Economics, Ethics and 
Religion, 155-160.   
447 Wilson, “Development of Islamic Economics,” 202. 
118 
 
powers”. According to him, though the realm of social justice remains resolutely in 
this world, its end and source are oriented towards the Divine.448  
Muṭahharī hence described four ways by which the word ʿadl (justice) was 
understood in the Qur’an, namely: justice in creation, ethical justice, justice in law, 
and social justice. He observed that of these four, the Qur’an was chiefly preoccupied 
with the last. This was because social justice was the single most important means 
by which to realize the ideal human society, which was the highest ‘image’ of the 
transcendental divine ordering that could be achieved within the social context.449 In 
this regard, Muṭahharī differed very little from past Muslim philosophers of the 
Peripatetic (mashshā’ī) and Illuminationist (ishrāqī) traditions, who examined 
issues of social arrangements from the macrocosmic-microcosmic framework.450 Yet 
at the same time he diverged considerably from his predecessors in that he engaged 
with modern conceptions of social justice, where its implementation was conceived 
of within a planned economy in the context of a nation-state.451 Moreover, 
Muṭahharī also transformed the moral value of social justice into a sort of liberation 
theology, which he used to challenge the dominant imperialist-capitalist power. This 
last impetus was of course intensified as he later became one of leading ideologues 
of the Islamic Revolution.452 
Muṭahharī upheld the principle of priority in the fight for social justice. In the 
first phase, wisdom and good counsel must be employed. Should the stages of 
intellectual persuasion (wisdom equals reasoning) and of spiritual persuasion 
                                                          
448 Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari, Fundamentals of Islamic Thought: God, Man and the Universe, 
trans. Ruth Campbell, Contemporary Islamic Thought, Persian Series (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 
1985), 118-119.  
449 Farhad Nomani and Ali Rahnema, Islamic Economic System (London: Zed Books, 1994), 36-
37. 
450 Muṭahharī, Fundamentals, 145-156. 
451 Mahmood T. Davari, The Political Thought of Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari: An Iranian 
Theoretician of the Islamic State (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 96-98. 
452 Hamid Dabashi, Islamic Liberation Theology: Resisting the Empire (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 212; Davari, Political Thought, 83-84, 90 and 103-105.  
119 
 
(counsel equals reminding) fail, then the exercise of force against the oppressive 
regime or power would become moral. Thus on the one hand, Muṭahharī seemed to 
present a notion of social justice as a means by which to produce an ideal stable and 
prosperous Islamic society by employing intellectual and spiritual persuasions; on 
the other, the normative value of social justice seemed to be a revolutionary 
ideology, in that the advancement of social justice challenged a corrupt and 
oppressive state of affairs. Principles of social justice undermined the complacency 
of the socio-economic status quo, and urged it towards a greater ideal.453 
Regarding the first expression above, Muṭrahharī situated the injunctions of 
social justice within an Islamic value system which acknowledged diverse 
ownership (individual, public, and governmental) and economic freedom, in which 
the competitive market was accepted as the coordinating mechanism of the 
economy. Yet that value system also limited these basic capitalist principles with 
legal injunctions derived from the Qur’an and Sunnah, such as prohibiting 
involvement in the trade of forbidden items such as wine. The limiting variable of 
social justice, on the other hand, was of legal import but also carried the more 
universal moral concepts of equality, fraternity, and fairness. A number of scholars 
regard Muṭahharī as a “moderate” in his definition of these concepts, on the basis 
that his conception of social justice referred to a sort of equity in the distribution of 
goods, whereby equity meant fairness.454 Differentiation in capability was a God-
given trait—it was a fact of creation and part of the greater order. Hence, to reward 
on the basis of this difference was not discriminatory—in fact, it was an injustice to 
do the opposite and treat these differences equally, since such an act assumed the 
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power to flatten out into likeness things that were by nature different.455 
Understood thusly, social justice was to be achieved through equality before the law 
and equal access to opportunities, allowing for social mobility and opening the 
circulation of capital.456 This moderate position contrasted with that of so-called 
“radical” ʿAlī Sharīʿatī who showed a more socialist persuasion, whereby economic 
resources are equally distributed amongst all with minimal or no regard to 
differentiation in human capability, aptitude, privilege or effort.457 
The normative injunctions that aimed to produce this vision of social justice 
were derived from Islamic sources, namely the Qur’an and Sunnah. In this regard, 
though the general concepts of equality, fairness and fraternity were universal, 
Muṭahharī would argue that these could be best achieved only by adhering to Divine 
Wisdom as expressed in these sources. Prohibition of usury is one oft-cited example 
of these injunctions, to which we may add others such as the prohibition of price 
fixing and hoarding; open access to homogeneous goods; and the free flow of 
information.458 However, a degree of interventionism in the market economy was 
necessary in order to promote social justice. Muṭahharī envisioned a planned 
economy oriented towards social justice, while preserving the market as the basic 
coordinator of the economic system. This assumed, of course, the existence of some 
sort of Islamic state that was constituted so as to carry out the moral imperatives of 
the religion through religiously-valid means.459 
However, Muṭahharī also regarded the imperatives of social justice as a 
revolutionary ideology operative in the context of challenging an oppressive status 
quo. This aspect of social justice has its roots in the unique status held by Divine 
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Justice and its sacred historical manifestation in Shīʿī theology and historiography, a 
position which has direct consequences for expectations of human conduct in the 
spheres of social arrangements and politics.460 Whereas the foregoing conception of 
social justice assumed the existence of an ideal Islamic state, Muṭahharī’s ideological 
social justice also sought to effect change in the status quo. Hence, Muṭahharī’s 
advocacy of a rationalist approach to ijtihād in matters of social justice is obvious, 
since this method alone allows the mujtahid greater freedom in producing new 
ordinances derived from the Qur’an and Sunnah to address perpetually-changing 
contemporary problems and solutions.461 These two aspects of Muṭahharī’s 
conception of social justice reveal the dynamic and stabilizing dimensions of an 
Islamic socio-economic ideal, which Muṭahhari maintained had continual relevance 
through the ages. 
Probably the single most important contribution to the early development of 
Islamic economics as an alternative to capitalism or communism was the two-
volume work Iqtiṣādunā, Our Economics, written by the Iraqi scholar and political 
activist Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr (1935-1980).462 Ṣadr, who lived in Najaf, Iraq, 
explored in this great work the conceptual roots of capitalism and socialism which 
he deemed incompatible with Islam. Ṣadr asserted that Islam provided a unique 
economic system which, if applied properly, could meet the needs of the modern 
era.463  
This work distinguishes itself from earlier attempts to conceptualize an 
economic theory according to Islamic principles in terms of its comprehensive 
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structure and consistent methodology.464 Like Muṭahharī, Ṣadr’s economic theory 
was a response to competing communist and capitalist ideologies, which 
characterized the internal debate in Iraq during the 1970s.465 Indeed, Ṣadr began the 
conceptualization of his theory with a comprehensive critique of the capitalist, and 
especially Marxist, approach. His basic, more constructive methodology, however, 
was informed by his education in the traditional Islamic sciences and especially his 
specialist training in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence).466 He argued that an economic 
theory based on the sources and value-system of Islam could obtain only through 
recourse to what he calls a “legal superstructure,” by which he meant the 
jurisprudential method and sources of the Sharīʿah.467 Apart from this 
superstructure, Ṣadr saw no other methodological source from which an 
independent economic theory could be derived. It is in this sense that Ṣadr wrote the 
dictum that “Islamic economics is not a science”.468 A uniquely-Islamic approach to 
economics was obtained through the very specialized operation of ijtihād, which 
involves extensive legal research into the classical jurisprudential and moral 
principles regulating economic life, coupled with an acute understanding of the 
socio-economic circumstances at hand.469 Given this, Ṣadr was one of the first 
theoreticians who accepted a deductive approach in conceiving an Islamic 
economics based both on natural laws, such as supply and demand, as well as on the 
moral demands and legal approach of the Sharīʿah.470  
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According to Ṣadr, the integration of economic theory in the legal 
superstructure of the Sharīʿah was an expression of Islam's all-embracing vision that 
acknowledges and addresses both the material and spiritual conditions of human 
beings.471 He did not accept the inadequate anthropological assumptions of 
communism and capitalism, both of which reduced the human condition to material 
determinations.472 Economic arrangements must take into consideration the 
spiritual well-being of members of society. A more practical expression of this 
concern is that the economic system that is integrated within that legal 
superstructure is also regulated by the basic moral imperatives embedded in that 
superstructure. These moral imperatives include basic Islamic social virtues such as 
awareness of social justice, fraternity, and—most importantly—the spiritual ends of 
humanity. As such, Ṣadr’s conceptualization of Islamic economics assumed the 
governing auspices of an Islamic state that would be able to coordinate these 
integrated areas of human activity into the all-embracing Islamic vision of the ideal 
community.473 He presented a mixed economy model in which the state 
systematically intervened in economic activity in order to uphold social justice and 
fraternity within the community through a welfarist model of governance.474  
In conclusion, similar to the developments in the conception of justice in the 
Western tradition, the conception of justice among Muslims through the modern 
period experienced significant development as a consequence of interaction with 
contemporary Western ideas of justice with their contractual and social change-
oriented dimensions. If in the pre-modern period, the Islamic discourse on social 
justice was applied mainly in the legal and to a lesser extent philosophical traditions 
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mainly with respect to a patrimonial and virtue ethics conception of justice, the 
Islamic discourse since the nineteenth century has emphasized legal, social, 
economic, and political dimensions which can be labelled Islamic thought. Islamic 
economics features one of the most elaborate conceptions of justice within this 
approach, as it tries to introduce Islamic moral principles into economic theory and 
practice as an alternative to secular approaches, and to employ principles of justice 
and equality side by side with those of economic efficiency and growth for the larger 
purpose of both spiritual and material prosperity.475  
This chapter has shown the importance of the idea of justice in Islamic 
intellectual history, though Muslims, conditioned by various political cultures and 
societies in which they lived, have interpreted it differently. Justice is a central 
concept in Islam and has implications for diverse sciences of the Islamic tradition, in 
the fields of theology, morality, and law. We have seen how discussions on justice 
during the early period of Islam centered mainly on sectarian and theological issues 
pertaining to classical disputes on how God’s attributes relate to His essence. This 
discourse, however, had marginal or no normative implications on ethics, let alone 
on policies of governance related to economic welfare. Rather, the sources of Islamic 
thinking on justice as a condition of economic and social welfare were the 
philosophical tradition on the one hand, and the legal tradition on the other. These 
sources continued to exert some influence right up to the modern period. However, 
in the context of colonialism and the emergence of the modern state, new 
perspectives on the issue changed this paradigm irrevocably, from the hitherto 
patrimonial and virtue-ethics conception of justice to a modern one.  
 
                                                          




PART FOUR: SJAFRUDDIN PRAWIRANEGARA: BIOGRAPHY AND GENERAL OUTLINE 
OF HIS THINKING 
4.1. Chapter One: A Brief Biography 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara is considered the best example of a proponent of 
economic liberal policy in Indonesia,476 at the same time as he is perceived to be a 
conservative economic policymaker.477 These facts may seem at first rather 
contradictory. In 1948 Sjafruddin promoted ‘religious socialism’ as an ideology 
which, according to him, was suitable to Indonesian society and was in harmony 
with the Constitution. He was known then as an ideologue of religious socialism par 
excellence in the Islamic Masyumi Party.478 Furthermore, during the Japanese 
occupation (1942-1945) he was close to Sutan Sjahrir, the founder of and leading 
figure in PSI.479 During his tenure as Minister of Finance in a number of cabinets 
during the 1950s and as the first Governor of the Central Bank of Indonesia (BI), 
Sjafruddin—along with other figures of the realist-pragmatic camp—initiated 
economic policies promoting “maximization of production, fiscal stability, and 
administrative rationalization.”480 One of the best descriptions of Sjafruddin was 
offered by Benjamin Higgins, a well-known Canadian economist who served as a 
member of a United Nations technical assistance mission to Indonesia and as 
Director of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Indonesia Project in the 
1950s. Higgins described him as:  
[having] already established an international reputation, later to become still 
more solid, as a sound, conservative central banker with reliable judgment 
and an excellent nose for the requirements of economic policy. He was also a 
man of absolute integrity, unlimited gentleness and patience, and profound 
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spirituality. Much of the intellectual leadership of the sprawling Masyumi 
Party...came from him.481 
 
Higgins also pointed out the seeming contradiction between Sjafruddin’s 
economic policy and his ideology, stating that “Sjafruddin spoke for his party as well 
for himself in embracing religious socialism as the economic ideology suitable for 
the new republic [though] his ‘socialism’ left plenty of room for private enterprise 
and individualism.”482  
A description given by Sutan Rais Alamsjah, who wrote brief biographies of 
ten prolific Indonesian leaders in the 1950s, not only helps us to understand 
Sjafruddin’s character and political, economic, and religious ideas, but also 
foreshadowed his life’s journey and the role he would later play in Indonesian 
national development:   
[He is] a leading statesman who holds his own distinctive principles. He is 
never hesitant in stating his opinion, and he accepts all consequences of the 
actions he takes. His name is famous and intimately known by our people, 
more so since the upheavals of the Revolution. In the past five years, 
Sjafruddin has emerged to be one of the most stalwart among the many 
leaders, heroes and warriors of the homeland in completing the struggle for 
independence. His politics has foresight. He is a financial and political expert. 
In everyday life, he always seems happy, always smiling and laughing; 
sometimes his smile appears bitter [cynical] to friends whom he considers to 
be guilty of some wrongdoing. But even if he mocks and provokes he 
expresses it through humour. He is amiable, warm-hearted, soft and slow-
speaking, but always firm and straightforward. Whatever he says, that is the 
content of his heart. He is unskilled in sweet-talk, in planting a sugar cane on 
the lips [a Malay/Indonesian proverb referring to flattery or honeyed words]. 
If someone is wrong, he would argue against him straightforwardly, no 
matter whose [opinion] it is. [On the other hand] if his opinion was taken to 
task, and it is well-justified, he is courageous enough to drop his word. He 
was consistent, and honest. He is also an Islamic writer with sharp pen. His 
essays are substantial and insightful. In all his writings, he always inclined 
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towards Islam. When he gives a speech, the audience is often full of laughter. 
He is funny and has a lot of humor. Within the party, he is among its 
prominent [leaders], offering his utmost energy.483   
 
These quotations seems to confirm the generally-held view that Sjafruddin 
was a rational and honest person, two important traits that would be reflected in a 
number of political decisions he made during his involvement in the revolution and 
subsequent republican governments. His personal character, along with the 
intellectual behaviour he acquired from his Dutch higher education, permeated his 
religious, political and economic views. In evaluating and forming economic policies, 
he based his assessment on a rational and realistic consideration of the situation 
which Indonesia faced at the time, instead of on a rigid ideology or a sentimental 
“spirit of revolution”. Nevertheless, he was not a realist who merely sought to 
maintain the existing economic structure, nor a rationalist who had no ‘heart’ or 
compassion for the conditions of the common people in deciding economic policy. 
He was an idealist whose vision of the future was based on concrete situations and 
moral considerations. As such, Sjafruddin was able to avoid the extremes of 
romantic idealist-fanatic or realist-opportunist.  
This approach was also reflected in his understanding of Islam and his 
practice of the religion. Indeed, on the one hand, Sjafruddin had strong faith in God's 
omnipotence and believed that Islam was the last religion and the complete way of 
life. But on the other hand, his understanding of Islam was also rational, humanist 
and progressive. According to Sjafruddin, Muslims in modern times were permitted 
to diverge from the opinion of the Prophet on worldly matters, if it was no longer 
relevant to today's circumstances or if the traditional implementation of Islamic 
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economic precepts caused needless difficulties, such as the detailed parameters of 
zakāt (alms-tax) and ribā (usury), as prescribed by the traditional texts.484 The 
Prophet’s ideas and policies reported in many hadiths were, according to Sjafruddin, 
based on an understanding of worldly issues that was conditioned by the 
circumstances of his time.485  This opinion would be regarded as liberal among 
Muslims even by today’s standards.486 
Sjafrudddin Prawiranegara was born on February 28, 1911 in the sub-
district of Anyar Kidul, Banten, West Java. He was the second child of Raden (Prince) 
Arsjad Prawiraatmadja, who was the head of the sub-district of Muncang, Banten. 
His family was of the Bantenese aristocracy and he therefore received a good 
Western education within the Dutch colonial system: he completed elementary 
schooling at an Europeesche Lagere School (ELS, European Primary School) in 
Serang, Banten, and Ngawi, East Java, and a Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs 
(MULO, More Advanced Primary Education) in Madiun, East Java, before gaining 
entrance to secondary education at an Algemene Middelbare School (AMS, General 
Middle School) in Bandung, West Java. At the university level, he studied law in RHS 
(Rechts Hogeschool) in Jakarta, which was the predecessor of the Faculty of Law of 
the current University of Indonesia. He graduated from RHS with the degree of Mr. 
(Meester in de rechten, Master of Law) in 1939.487  
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Throughout the period of the Dutch colonial rule, as a student and in the 
early years following his graduation from RHS, Sjafruddin was not involved in any 
nationalist or Islamic organizations. Instead, during his studies, he was an active 
member of the conservative non-political organization USI (Unitas Studiosorum 
Indonesiensis), a forum which provided activities to meet student needs and 
interests, such as discussions, trips and sports. This forum paid almost no attention 
to the social conditions of the colonial state, let alone its political problems. 
According to Anderson,488 USI was sponsored by the Dutch colonial government to 
counter the somewhat-radical PPPI (Indonesian Students’ Association). But in his 
book on intellectual and nationalism, J.D. Legge wrote that “[…] it would be 
inaccurate simply to categorize PPPI as radical and USI as conservative. USI 
members saw themselves as being ‘liberal’ in the broad sense rather than narrowly 
nationalist.”489 Moreover, USI eventually became a network for students and former 
members to communicate and to awaken nationalist spirit during the Japanese 
occupation.490 However, Sjafruddin’s interests extended beyond student activities. 
He was very much concerned with and engaged in social and humanitarian efforts. 
He founded PEKOPE (Penolong Korban Perang, War Victims’ Helpers), a war relief 
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organization, in which he was deeply involved. He served as secretary of the 
organization up to the advent of the Japanese military occupation in 1942.491 Soon 
after his graduation, Sjafruddin began working in a private radio-broadcast and 
became editor of its publication, Soeara Timur (Voice of the East). The journal was 
sponsored by Soetardjo Kartohadikoesoemo, a member of the Volksraad (People’s 
Council) and initiator of the famous 1936 petition requesting Indonesian self-
government within a Dutch-Indonesian union.492 However, neither nationalist 
organizations nor the Dutch-sponsored Stadswacht (City Guard) suited Sjafruddin’s 
political aspirations.493 After all, he was a cooperator, unlike Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, 
and many other Indonesian leaders who did not work jointly with the colonial 
power (non-cooperators). In 1940 he took a job as an employee in the Department 
of Finance and was posted at the tax office in Kediri, East Java. During the Japanese 
military occupation he was assigned as head of the Kediri tax office and was then 
moved to head of the tax office in Bandung.494 But the suffering of Indonesians under 
Japanese occupation, which was more severe than that under Dutch colonial rule, 
changed his belief that Indonesians were still unprepared for independence.495 
While the Dutch were still in power, Sjafruddin had been convinced that Indonesia 
was not yet ready to become independent because its people lacked expertise and 
experience in almost all fields. He believed in the good intentions of the Dutch to 
educate Indonesians, develop the country and ultimately to grant them 
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independence.496 During the Japanese occupation, however, he came to the 
conclusion that Indonesian independence should be sought immediately, despite the 
lack of human resources to manage economic and social structures on a national 
level. The lack of expertise, he believed, could be gradually surmounted.497  
He therefore began to attend meetings of youth activists and leaders of 
independence movement in Bandung, and went to Jakarta to meet his old friends 
from USI and to join the underground movement against the Japanese occupation 
led by Sutan Sjahrir.498 Sjafruddin’s involvement in these activities would bring him 
to the forefront of national politics in the crucial period following the declaration of 
independence in August 1945. His first position in the new government was as 
secretary of the Indonesian National Committee (KNI) of the Priangan Residency in 
Bandung. The KNI was a transitory government body established to extend 
government rule throughout the various regions of the nascent state. He held the 
position only for a short time, since he was soon appointed one of fifteen members 
of the Working Body of the Central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP) in Jakarta 
with Sjahrir as its chairman. Sjafruddin’s involvement in politics took a different 
turn following Vice President Mohammad Hatta’s famous promulgation on 
November 3, 1945 that changed Indonesia’s system of government from a 
presidential to a parliamentary system. In this declaration, the government urged all 
citizens to create and join political parties as a means of democracy. In this new 
political situation, Sjafruddin eventually chose to join the Muslim Masyumi Party in 
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1946, despite his association and closeness with Socialist Party leader Sjahrir, an act 
which brought him into national politics.499 
Along with Mohammad Natsir, Sjafruddin led Masyumi’s dominant socialist 
religious wing. His influence among those in the party who espoused Modernist 
Islamic views increased with the publication of his book, Politiek dan Revolusi Kita, 
Politics and Our Revolution (Yogyakarta: 1948).500 The book was a reflection of 
Sjafruddin’s short-lived involvement in the struggle to maintain independence, his 
period as a member of cabinet, and his membership in Masyumi. The religious 
socialists within Masyumi provided a bridge that made possible its cooperation with 
the Socialist Party led by Sjahrir. This was evidenced by Sjafruddin’s serving as Vice 
Minister of Finance in Sjahrir’s second cabinet (March 12-October 2, 1946) and 
Minister of Finance in his third cabinet (October 2, 1946-June 27, 1947), as well as 
being appointed Minister of Economic Affairs/Prosperity in the non-party cabinet of 
Mohammad Hatta (January 29-December 19, 1948).501  
Upon being appointed minister of economic affairs, Sjafruddin assumed a 
very crucial role in the struggle to defend Indonesian independence as head of the 
Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI). On December 19, 1948 
the Dutch launched their second military action intended to overrun Republican-
controlled areas of Java by occupying Yogyakarta and arresting Indonesian leaders 
including President Sukarno, Vice President Hatta, and several ministers. Having 
anticipated such an attack, the Republican leaders agreed that Vice President/Prime 
Minister Hatta would move to central Sumatra, from where he would direct 
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government operations. The beginning of December saw the two leaders set off for 
Bukit Tinggi in the west of Sumatra where they began to set up what would become 
the provisional Emergency Government. However, with the existing UN-sponsored 
negotiations on the verge of breakdown, Hatta was forced to return to Java to take 
part in the discussions. In his absence Sjafruddin was given complete control over 
leadership of the Emergency Government. Hatta was expected to return to Sumatra, 
but a renewed Dutch offensive thwarted this plan.502 With the news of the assault in 
Java, Sjafruddin quickly moved PDRI to an isolated and secure region in the 
western/central part of Sumatra. A division (“Commissariat”) was set up in Java, led 
by cabinet ministers and military leaders who had managed to evade Dutch 
incarceration. He also made contact with several Indonesian representatives abroad 
such as Mr. A.A. Maramis, Indonesian ambassador in New Delhi, and L.N. Palar, who 
headed the Indonesian observation mission in the UN. The ability and effectiveness 
of PDRI under Sjafruddin’s leadership as a legitimate political voice representing 
Indonesian territory free of Dutch control, combined with the highly-visible guerrilla 
resistance of the Republican armed forces, made it possible for Sjafruddin to instruct 
the Republic’s delegation to the UN to demand considerably stiffer concessions in 
negotiations with the Dutch compared to those which obtained before the second 
aggression. Sjafruddin’s Emergency Government maintained its political pressure 
until, after prodding from the UN and Great Powers, the Dutch released Sukarno, 
Hatta, and other Republican leaders, who were able to return to a Republican-
controlled Yogyakarta.503 The inability of the Dutch to impose a political settlement 
by military means, coupled with various international pressures, forced them to 
negotiate sovereignty with the United Republic of Indonesia and they eventually 
recognized Indonesian independence. Sjafruddin as head of PDRI had already 
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handed back his mandate to President Sukarno before negotiations started.504 Soon 
after an independent Indonesia gained recognition from the Dutch on December 27, 
1949, Sjafruddin continued to work closely with Hatta, serving as Vice Prime 
Minister in his cabinet from January 1 to September 6, 1950, and as Minister of 
Finance in the cabinet of Mohammad Natsir from September 6, 1950 to March 20, 
1951. He was then appointed president of De Javasche Bank by the cabinet of Prime 
Minister Soekiman Wirjosandjojo on July 14, 1951. Under Sjafruddin’s leadership De 
Javasche Bank was transformed into the (Central) Bank of Indonesia of which he 
became the first governor on July 1, 1953. He held this position for a second term 
until 1958.505 
 Sukarno’s response to a series of developments during 1957, including 
the Outer Islands’ demand for considerably increased local autonomy and more 
rapid economic development, the instability created by the democratic 
parliamentary political system—or more precisely, its abuse506—and continued 
Dutch intransigence concerning control of the province of Irian Barat/West Papua, 
led to Sjafruddin’s decision to break with Sukarno and with the head of his non-
party cabinet, Djuanda Kartawidjaja. President Sukarno tried to remedy the troubles 
of the country by instituting in 1957 his concept of Guided Democracy. However, the 
program ultimately exacerbated political instability in the midst of rising tensions 
between Jakarta and regions outside Java as well as growing radical nationalist 
sentiment in the left wings of PNI and PKI. Sjafruddin strongly opposed Sukarno’s 
program. Although he shared Sukarno’s indignation toward Dutch obstruction of a 
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UN discussion concerning the Irian Barat/West Papua dispute, Sjafruddin was 
nevertheless highly critical of certain actions taken by labour unions and later by the 
army, including seizures of Dutch enterprises and inter-island shipping companies, 
which were either initiated or approved by Sukarno. He deemed these actions rash 
and economically detrimental. Sjafruddin’s strong criticism of this plan before 
Sukarno and the National Conference on Development in November 1957 set off a 
barrage of harassing phone calls and a campaign of abusive attacks against him in 
both Sukarno- and communist-aligned newspapers, accusing him of trying to protect 
Dutch interests.507  
 By the end of the month Sjafruddin had left Jakarta for Sumatra due to 
increasing intimidation. His stay in Palembang was marked by his correspondence 
with South Sumatra local rebel leader Colonel Barlian, in which economic and 
political concerns were discussed. It was also during this time that Sjafruddin sent 
Sukarno an open letter urging him to put an end to his totalitarian Guided 
Democracy system in exchange for a cabinet of experts led by ex-Vice President 
Hatta and the Sultan of Yogyakarta508.  
This period proved to be the beginning of Sjafruddin’s most controversial 
years. Reaching Padang, West Sumatra later in January 1958, he, along with 
Mohammad Natsir and Burhanuddin Harahap—both former prime ministers from 
the Masyumi Party—and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo from the Indonesian Socialist 
Party—who like Sjafruddin was a former minister of finance—came out as the most 
prominent civilian leaders in a military dissident movement for political autonomy, 
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which covered most of Sumatra and parts of Sulawesi. They had reached a point 
where they were no longer able to compromise further with the central government. 
The movement emerged from mounting frustration over how things were run in 
Jakarta, most notably the Javacentricism of the state’s economic policies in addition 
to the absence of any effective regional representation in government. The people’s 
disenchantment stemmed largely from the government’s poor state management, 
rampant corruption and excessive red tape. Furthermore, disillusionment with the 
government intensified with Hatta’s resignation as vice president in 1956. Sukarno’s 
decision to adopt the trajectory of Guided Democracy moved him further away from 
the parliamentary system. This move was reinforced by his sympathetic position 
towards the Indonesian Communist Party, so much so as to include them in the 
government.509 Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Husein, one of several military 
commanders striving for increased autonomy in the region, declared the formation 
of the PRRI on February 15, 1958 with headquarters in Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatra. 
Sjafruddin was appointed prime minister of the newly-established counter-
government.510 Two days later Lieutenant Colonel Ventje Sumual announced the 
formation of the Permesta (Perjuangan Semesta, Universal Struggle) movement in 
Sulawesi/Celebes, and joined the PRRI in opposition to the central government.511  
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Sjafruddin’s resolve to join the PRRI-led movement calls into question his 
rationale for such a decision. As previously mentioned, he was well respected and 
considered by many to possess a very sensible and practical character. Sjafruddin 
was consistently realistic in his approach to a problem and keen to find the best 
long-term solution, an attitude exemplified in his economic and political policies in 
which all relevant factors and existing conditions were considered. Here we need to 
examine the situation with regard to the ultimatum prepared by the dissident 
colonels demanding that the central government in Jakarta give in to their demands. 
Sjafruddin opposed this, as he saw the ultimatum as a futile effort: he knew that if 
the central government chose to respond with military force, the PRRI would have 
little chance of success and he predicted its impending failure. He warned them that 
Colonel Barlian, without whose firm support PRRI would not succeed and whose 
control over resource-rich Palembang would be a huge advantage for the PRRI,512 
had expressed that he would not support the formation of a counter-government; 
this despite the fact that Barlian was one of the dissident regional army commanders 
who signed the Palembang Charter on September 8, 1957 demanding the 
appointment of Hatta as prime minister and outlawing the Communist party.513 
Urging restraint, Sjafruddin asked them to abandon the ultimatum and instead to 
strive for a peaceful solution in order to avoid civil war, but the hawkish colonels 
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went ahead with their plans. Despite his conviction that the movement was a lost 
cause, and against his own better judgement, Sjafruddin stood by the PRRI. His 
prediction regarding the events turned out to be true: the central government, with 
relative ease, deployed troops and attacked and seized Bukit Tinggi. The 
headquarters of the PRRI and other towns in West Sumatra were overrun in just two 
months. And although the PRRI continued to fight a guerrilla war from the jungles,514 
the PRRI/Permesta rebellion failed to achieve its goal. Hatta, Masyumi, and PSI were 
discredited.515 
 The problems and events outlined above ultimately led to an increasingly 
dominant role for President Sukarno, the army, and the (later antagonistic) PKI.516 
In addition, the political stalemate in the Constitutional Assembly over the issue of 
the basis of the state provided extra ammunition for the army to disparage the 
credibility of the liberal democratic system. Eventually the president promulgated 
the Decree of July 5, 1959 for “the return” to the 1945 Constitution, dismantling the 
Constituent Assembly and, one year later, the elected parliament.517  
Why did Sjafruddin decided to join the PRRI movement when he had 
predicted that it would either fail or have little chance of successfully obtaining 
concessions from the central government? His decision seems to be completely out 
of character, and was perhaps an example of his own human weakness. Worried that 
he would be considered a coward, and feeling a strong sense of solidarity for the 
people involved, Sjafruddin was unable to turn his back on the dissident movement. 
Sjafruddin felt that his involvement with PRRI had already run too deep. There was, 
in his mind, no going back—it was a fait accompli. Ajip Rosidi argues that these 
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sentiments were also shared by other leaders such as Mohammad Natsir and 
Burhanuddin Harahap. The extent of their involvement with PRRI was, as they saw 
it, at the point of no return. 518   
Initially, Sjafruddin, Natsir, and Harahap came to Sumatra seeking safety 
from the intimidation and threats that they and their families had endured in Jakarta 
from leftist Communist elements. They failed to receive protection from law 
enforcement apparatus, either the police or army. At that time they did not yet know 
that the colonels and Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, the colonels’ principal civilian 
agent, had already decided to act against the central government with the support of 
the CIA. Only in the next few weeks, following a gathering in Sungai Dareh, West 
Sumatra where the dissident colonels convened to discuss national political and 
economic problems, did they and Mr. Assaʿat (former president of Indonesia 1949-
1950) gradually learn the nature of the plan.519 Natsir, Sjafruddin, and Harahap’s 
participation in the Sungai Dareh conference had a number of important results. 
They successfully dissuaded the military from attempting a separatist movement, 
insisting that any emergency government consist of a broad representation of 
Indonesians so as not to appear separatist (thus delaying its formation) and 
stipulating that “the rebels must be prepared to rejoin the central government, if it 
succumbed to rebel pressure and changed its nature and composition.”520 However, 
by their very presence at the Sungai Dareh meeting—their relatively restrained 
participation notwithstanding—Sjafruddin, Natsir, and Harahap were, in the words 
of Kahin, crossing “a Rubicon and […] it would not be possible to return to 
Jakarta.”521 And despite these leaders’ moderating influence, Sjafruddin ultimately 
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failed to convince the military representatives not to issue an ultimatum to the 
central government.522  
The ultimatum was eventually issued by the military rebels without 
Sjafruddin’s signature, demanding, inter alia, that “Sukarno resume his 
constitutional position and rescind his unconstitutional actions of the past year, that 
the Djuanda administration return its mandate, and that Hatta and the Sultan of 
Yogyakarta be appointed to form a new cabinet to hold office until new elections 
were held.”523 Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Husein gave the central government five 
days to respond. But such a direct challenge was impossible for the central 
government to accept. The cabinet promptly rejected the ultimatum and refused all 
PRRI demands. Even the rebels’ supporters in Jakarta, who were trying to find a 
peaceful solution, were dismayed at Husein’s ultimatum.524 In this situation, 
Sjafruddin, as did other civilian leaders, reluctantly went along with the rebels. He 
had nowhere to go except to join the rebellion he knew would fail. Here it is fitting to 
quote George McTurnan Kahin’s view on Sjafruddin’s standpoint: 
No one can be sure what the outcome would have been if Sjafruddin had 
succeeded in blocking an ultimatum until Sukarno’s return and discussions 
with him had been held. But if Sjafruddin and his supporters had prevailed, 
the outcome might have been less disastrous for the peoples of Sumatra and 
Sulawesi than was the uncompromising challenge represented the gauntlet 
which the colonels flung down. More clear-cut, and more fundamental, was 
the issue in which he, Natsir, and Burhanuddin did prevail, when they 
successfully opposed the inclination of some of the colonels to go for broke 
by forming a separate state of Sumatra. And thus PRRI was defined as an 
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character—or indicative of his strong confidence in his ability to convince the dissident military 
leaders to cancel their plan.  
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Indonesia-wide movement strictly opposed to any secessionist diminishment 
of Indonesia’s territorial integrity.525  
 
For around three years Sjafruddin, joined by his family, and his allies were 
able to lead a guerrilla resistance against the central government’s troops in the 
forests of Sumatra. However the Papua campaign forced the army to negotiate with 
the PRRI rebels. Meanwhile the latter were running out of ammunition and other 
supplies, and with the promise of general amnesty from the president, Sjafruddin 
and other yet-uncaptured PRRI leaders gave themselves up in 1961. Sjafruddin also 
ordered his forces to surrender “well after the erstwhile bellicose dissident 
Sumatra-based colonels had worked out their own terms for doing so.”526 Despite 
having been promised amnesty and pardon, he and other rebel leaders were 
detained without due process. Also jailed were a number of other anti-communist 
politicians from Masyumi and PSI who were not involved in the rebellion or in any 
illegal action but were against Sukarno’s Guided Democracy; they included Sutan 
Sjahrir (the first prime minister of Indonesia), Subadio Sastro Satomo, Mochtar 
Lubis, and others from PSI, as well as Mohammad Roem, Haji Abdul Malik Karim 
Amrullah (Hamka), Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Kasman Singodimejo, Isa Anshori, E. Z 
Muttaqien, and others from Masyumi. They were only released after the army took 
over power in 1966.527 
During his time in the Military Prison (RTM) from 1963 to 1966,528 
Sjafruddin came to assume a more traditional religious role as he was regularly 
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asked to give the Friday prayer sermon. Like many Dutch-educated leaders of the 
Masyumi Party, he had not been well-educated in the traditional religious 
curriculum and never took to the pulpit. Though he had frequently given religious 
speeches, he had never delivered an official ritually-prescribed sermon in a mosque, 
such as that of Friday prayers. However, during his time as leader in the PRRI (1958-
1961), he received lessons on delivering sermons from Buya Malik Ahmad, a 
religious scholar from West Sumatra. This skill was put to use when he became a 
regular preacher for the prison congregation. He would always write down a draft in 
preparation for his sermon, notes which were intended to be the basis of a more 
extensive study for a later time. Each presented a self-contained topic that discussed 
his insights and observations on God, spirituality, and the fundamental tenets of 
upright behaviour.529 For instance, in a speech about the meaning of freedom, he 
observed that “[t]here are many people who live in society and who are thought to 
be free, but whose souls are actually cornered. The first because he has done wrong, 
the second because he was wronged, the third because he fears. Indeed, the more 
prisons we find in a country, and the more people are imprisoned [therein], the 
closer that society is to the state of a prison!”530 According to him, this kind of 
entrapment also exists as an inner psychological state, irregardless of external 
conditions of physical freedom. The only difference is that those who are actually 
imprisoned are forced to confront their problems directly because of the segregated 
space of the prison. Those who are outside the walls have the illusion of freedom, so 
they are never compelled to confront the causes of their inward imprisonment. He 
                                                                                                                                                                      
September 1963 onward Sjafruddin, along with civilian leaders like Natsir and Harahap and 
other PRRI/Permesta military officers, were placed in Military Prison House (RTM), Jakarta in 
worse prison conditions. This time they were without their families. They were imprisoned until 
July 1966 until political changes in the national leadership. Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 
219-221; Ricklefs, A History, 307.        
529 Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 224-225.  
530 Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 226. 
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concluded that real freedom belongs only to God and that "the awareness that we 
are merely God’s creatures and servants, and therefore we must live in accordance 
with its laws, rules, and decisions, that is where our true freedom lies".531 Other 
topics included a moral discourse on fear and sadness as the cause of shameful and 
base thoughts and actions, and a philosophical discussion on rationality and 
spiritual intuition.532 
Sjafruddin was released on July 26, 1966 after President Sukarno lost power 
to the army, although he still remained officially the president. The Masyumi leaders, 
who were realeased from prison earlier (May 1966) than Sjafruddin, were soon 
involved in the effort to rehabilitate the party.533 But Sjafruddin felt disheartened to 
be involved in politics again after it became clear that the army-dominated regime 
had decided to forbid the rehabilitation of Masyumi and PSI as political parties. The 
two parties had been banned by the Sukarno regime in 1960. Moreover, the army-
dominated “New Order” regime also revoked the right of 2.500 former Masyumi 
members to vote in the 1971 election. Confronted with the oppressive political 
climate and the realities of his circumstances, Sjafruddin decided to spend the rest of 
his life engaged in religious, social, and economic activities away from formal 
politics. He wrote books and articles on Islamic issues and social, economic, 
financial, and development affairs. He gave sermons on Fridays and on the holidays 
of ʿĪd al-Fiṭr and ʿĪd al-‘Aḍḥā, delivered lectures at university campuses and student 
forums, and presented papers at public meetings and discussions. Sjafruddin was 
active in the Dewan Daʿwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII), the Council of Indonesian 
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Islamic Mission, an Islamic missionary organization established by former Masyumi 
leaders on May 1967 and led by Natsir after his release from prison.534 
Sjafruddin was also elected general chairman of Husami (Himpunan 
Usahawan Muslimin Indonesia, the Indonesian Association of Muslim 
Entrepreneurs), founded on July 24, 1967.535 As chairman, Sjafruddin had to face the 
New Order government on matters concerning hajj (pilgrimage) services. According 
to his calculation, the government service was overly expensive due to inefficiency, 
extensive fraud and corruption. Under his leadership, in 1969 the organization was 
able to provide better service at a reduced price for people who wanted to perform 
the pilgrimage to Mecca (25% lower than the cost demanded by the government), 
by virtue of a more efficient arrangement. However, the following year Sjafruddin 
was confronted with the New Order government’s monopolistic regulation, as the 
government forbade all private hajj travel companies from delivering the service. In 
the end, the government put a stop to Sjafruddin’s efforts by cutting off Husami’s hajj 
services altogether, asking the Saudi government to deny landing permission to the 
airplanes used by Husami to transport the pilgrims.536 
 During the Suharto Era, Sjafruddin emerged as one of the most vocal and 
respected critics of the New Order government. Though he was known to be 
supportive of the economic measures of the New Order technocrats, he maintained a 
consistent and informed condemnation of government corruption and injustices. In 
the 1980s he was one of the members of the Petisi 50 (Petition of 50) group, which 
consisted of the New Order’s most prominent and esteemed opponents. His fierce 
political opposition during this era led to the regime’s imposing restrictions on his 
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movement; he was banned from travelling abroad except for necessary medical 
reasons.537   
The restriction of his freedom notwithstanding, Sjafruddin continued his 
sharp and resolute criticism of the government for its wrongdoings, including 
corruption and other abuses of power, until the end of his life. Benjamin Higgins was 
right when he described Sjafruddin in the 1950s as a man of profound spirituality. In 
his last letter to Prof. George McTurnan Kahin and his wife Audrey of Cornell 
University on December 5, 1988, just over two months before he passed away, 
Sjafruddin wrote:  
After the death of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX who was—and still is—very 
near and dear to us because of all the help he extended to Lily [Sjafruddin’s 
wife] and our four children [at that time] while I was away in Sumatra, I am 
more than ever aware that the time is nearing that the Angel of Death will 
fetch me and join me with all other friends and comrades in arms who have 
preceded us to the other and hopefully better world.538  
 
During the late 1980s, Sjafruddin’s health deteriorated drastically. He passed away 
on February 15, 1989 in Jakarta, just short of his seventy-eigth birthday.  
Sjafruddin was a controversial and almost tragic figure in the modern history 
of Indonesia. However, his name has been recently rehabilitated as of November 7, 
2011, when the current Indonesian government conferred upon him, along with 
nine other national dignitaries, the status of national hero in recognition of his 
various contributions to the Republic of Indonesia.539 The elevation of Sjafruddin as 
a national hero was a very significant step in the process of reconciling divergent 
forces in the bitter history of Indonesian politics. However, this historical 
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reconciliation was not accorded to those political groups whose action and ideas 
were taken to be subsersive to the ideals of Indonesia’s territorial integrity: this 
included members of PKI, those Muslims who tried to found a separate Islamic state 
by means of violence, and those who sought to have a separate state (Republic of 
South Moluccas) in the Christian-majority area of South Moluccas in eastern 
Indonesia. 
4.2. Chapter Two: General Outlines and Patterns of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara’s 
Thought 
This chapter will explore the principal ideas and patterns in Sjafruddin’s 
political and religious thought, beginning with a discussion of his method of 
interpretation of injunctions contained in the Qur’an and Hadith, which positioned 
him as a liberal-modernist Muslim thinker; and secondly, addressing his political 
and social ideas.   
4.2.1. A Liberal Modernist Interpretation of Islam 
Sjafruddin’s ideological orientation can be characterized as liberal-
modernist. However, this view of him is rarely acknowledged in intellectual and 
academic circles in Indonesia because his reputation has been associated mostly 
with his involvement with the PRRI movement and his opposition to Sukarno’s 
Guided Democracy and the New Order authoritarian regime. While most of younger 
liberal modernist Muslims employed a generally accommodative attitude towards 
the New Order authoritarian regime, Sjafruddin’s critical attitude toward the 
undemocratic army-dominated political system during its dominance from 1967 to 
1998 meant that many failed to recognise his liberal-modernist views. Almost all 
Indonesian and foreign observers and academics in the New Order period confined 
their designation of Sjafruddin to his role as a civilian leader of PRRI or as a 
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prominent economic policy maker in the 1950s.540 A few writers discussed his 
writings on Islam very briefly in the context of modern Indonesian Islamic thought, 
mostly with respect to his response to the New Order economic policy, as well as to 
the issue of Pancasila as the state ideology and the New Order government’s efforts 
to enforce it as the sole foundation of socio-religious organizations.541 With the 
exception of Prof. M. Dawam Rahardjo, a well-known economist and socio-religious 
thinker with precise knowledge of Sjafruddin’s liberal line of thought, no one seems 
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(Clayton, Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, 2008), 11-13; Prawiranegara, Al-ʿAqabah, 10. The title 
of the book is inspired by Robert Heilbroner’s book The Great Ascent: The Struggle for Economic 
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steadfastness and compassion.” See Maulana Muhammad Ali, The Holy Quran: Arabic Text with 
English Translation and Commentary (Dublin, OH: Ahmadiyya Anjuman Ishaʿat Islam Lahore, 
2002), 1214; M. A. S. Abdel Haleem, The Qur’an: A New Translation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 595. 
541 See Hassan, “Contemporary,” 91 and 241-246; Faisal Ismail, Islam and Pancasila: Indonesian 
Politics, 1945-1995 (Jakarta: Badan Litbang Agama dan Diklat Keagamaan, 2001/1422), 18, 128, 
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to have discerned the latter’s liberal orientation in interpreting Islam. Even Rahardjo 
confined his analysis too briefly to the issue of ribā.542  
The patterns and methods of Sjafruddin’s thought are best expressed by 
Fazlur Rahman in his characterization of Muslim modernists as “those who have 
made an articulate and conscious effort to reformulate Islamic values and principles 
in terms of modern thought or to integrate modern thought and institutions with 
Islam.”543 They are immersed in the issues of the nature of reason and its relation to 
faith, social reform, education, the status of women, political reform, and 
constitutional and representative forms of government.544 Sjafruddin’s religious 
understanding can be classified as a liberal-modernist position signified by an 
emphasis on ijtihād (individual interpretation based on rationality or reason) and 
the integration of modern ideas and institutions within the moral-social orientation 
of the Qur’an.545  
When discussing various topics related to Islam, Sjafruddin always tried to 
refer primarily to the Qur’an rather than to the traditions of the Prophet. His method 
was similar to that of many other modernist Muslims such as Muhammad Abduh 
(1849-1905), Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) and 
Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988).546 He would often also refer to the opinions of the 
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Islamic reformist Indonesian scholars (ʿulamā’), but would use them critically. 
Sjafruddin contended that the Hadith were bound by the conditions of the Prophet's 
lifetime. Therefore, in his opinion, many regulations in the Hadith were no longer 
suitable to the present situation. His understanding of Hadith could be compared to 
that of Ghulam Ahmad Parwez.547 Sjafruddin believed only the Qur’an to be the 
revelation of God. While Hadith were the Prophet Muhammad’s explanation and 
application of the revelation as a human being—albeit a prophet and messenger of 
God—Sjafruddin’s opinion was based on the Qur’an, Chapter al-Kaḥf 18:110: “Say, ‘I 
am only a human being, like you, to whom it has been revealed that your God is One. 
Anyone who fears to meet his Lord should do good deeds and give no one a share in 
the worship due to his Lord.’” According to him, the epistemological value of a 
hadith, unlike that of the Qur’an, was relative, because as a human being the 
Prophet’s view on worldly affairs was limited to a certain place and time.548 
Sjafruddin also believed that ijtihād should not be limited to the methodologies of 
the four Sunni legal schools of thought. He did not agree that the opinions of past 
scholars should limit the ijtihād of today. Therefore the Prophet’s rules about zakāt, 
for example, were, in Sjafruddin’s opinion, only valid for the type of society in the 
seventh century CE. Similarly, the rules of zakāt in the classical fiqh works of past 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the biography of the Prophet as it shows his historical conduct, as distinguished from the 
‘technical Sunnah’ contained in Hadith works. The Modernists, in general, had been led to put 
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incompatible with the Qur’an.” See Rahman, “Islam: Challenges and Opportunities,” 321-322; 
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Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Tranformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), 147.    
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scholars were only valid for the time and place in which they were produced. In 
other words, the application of zakāt at the present time must take a fundamentally 
different form in order to cope with the complex development of modern society.549 
Therefore, Sjafruddin did not agree with the view that Hadith should be used as a 
delimiter in ijtihād or in giving an opinion on religious matters. It seemed that 
Sjafruddin used Hadith only insofar as they did not delimit or restrict his 
understanding of the principles of the Qur’anic stipulations. In his view, unlike 
Hadith, the principles stipulated in the Qur’an were not bound by the conditions and 
situations which obtained in the time of the Prophet. It could be said that for 
Sjafruddin what really mattered was the spirit of the stipulations. The stipulations 
regarding zakāt in the Qur'an should not be understood literally but should be taken 
as principles. Here, for Sjafruddin, the spirit or essence of the injunctions was the 
obligation to equalize distribution of wealth and income.550  
Sjafruddin emphasized three main components in his reinterpretation of 
Islam: the rational approach, the social-humanitarian approach, and the ethical 
approach.551 For the first, he stated that there were many teachings that were 
presented as Islamic but which were actually interpretations of scholars, whether or 
not they were based on prophetic Hadith. According to him, “the best interpretation 
of the Qur’an is not that which is based upon the the Hadith of the Prophet, peace be 
                                                          
549 For a discussion of the re-interpretation of zakāt in the context of modern Indonesian society, 
see Masdar F. Masʿudi, Keadilan: Risalah Zakat (Pajak) dalam Islam, pengantar Abdurrahman 
Wahid (1991; repr., Bandung: Mizan, 2005). 
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McDonough, Authority of the Past, 3.   
551 Prawiranegara, Islam dilihat, 19-21 and 24-26. 
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upon him, even if those Hadith were authenticated; [rather] the best interpretation 
is that which works with the results and opinions of modern science, and which is 
appropriate to the conditions and needs of the modern society in which we live.”552 
Sjafruddin thus emphasized the need for religious scholars to understand modern 
knowledge so that their opinions were no longer narrow and defensive, such as 
denying that human beings could land on the moon.553 Although Sjafruddin noted 
the limitations of science in explaining every natural phenomenon, he nevertheless 
criticized religious authorities who held that the theory of evolution was against the 
teachings of Islam.554 On the other hand, Sjafruddin also called for modern scholars 
and scientists to realize that the world was created by God for a particular purpose, 
which was so that human beings not only would come to realize God’s freedom and 
power, but that they would also use their knowledge of the world to meet their 
needs.555 Religion and science had their own functions. Religion, according to 
Sjafruddin, sought to “connect human beings with God, their fellow human beings, 
and the environment.”556 Human beings must understand that life in this worrld is 
temporary, while life in the Hereafter was everlasting.557 Science, on the other hand, 
functioned to “fashion the environment in such a way that it can be used for the 
livelihood of human beings.”558 As such, “there is not conflict between Islamic 
teachings and science”559; rather, both complemented each other. However, it was 
clear to Sjafruddin that science would not always be able to control or understand 
                                                          
552 Prawiranegara, Islam dilihat, 20. Sjafruddin’s opinion on religon and science, for example, was 
similar to Muhammad Abduh’s view on the subject. Prawiranegara, Al-ʿAqabah, 47. Fazlur 
Rahman comments that Abduh, “convinced that science and the faith of Islam cannot conflict, 
argues that Faith and scientific reason work at different levels.” Rahman, Islam, 217.  
553 Prawiranegara, Al-ʿAqabah, 46. On this subject Sjafruddin’s view is similar to that of Sayyid 
Aḥmad Khān. See McDonough, Authority of the Past, 13.  
554 Prawiranegara, Al-ʿAqabah, 54-56. 
555 Prawiranegara, Al-ʿAqabah, 47 and 49. 
556 Prawiranegara, Al-ʿAqabah 47. 
557 Prawiranegara, Al-ʿAqabah, 47-48. 
558 Prawiranegara, Al-ʿAqabah, 48. 
559 Prawiranegara, Al-ʿAqabah, 54-56. 
152 
 
all the phenomena that occur in the world. Human reason was not a subsitute for 
God.560  
The second approach refers to Sjafruddin’s belief that the social teachings of 
Islam must be able to fulfill justice and ties of kinship between fellow human beings, 
especially between those of the same faith.561 In the third approach, he emphasized 
the need to abandon formal and legalistic approaches to Islam. Instead, what ought 
to be prioritized was ethical guidance in public life, not mere symbolism nor the 
worldly interests of the leaders.562  
Why did Sjafruddin argue that there was no need to use the Hadith as the 
sole basis of interpreting the Qur’an, on the grounds that they were tied to the social 
conditions during the time of the Prophet? He believed that one of the main reasons 
why Muslims lagged behind in science, technology, and industry was because they 
did not foster freedom of thought which, along with the exchange of ideas, was 
important in developing creativity and increasing productivity. A society that did not 
widely nurture freedom of thought would not produce creative human beings.563 
Assuming Islam to be a source of motivation and inspiration for Muslims in their 
lives, but faced with a situation where many amongst them did not accept freedom 
of thought, Sjafruddin concluded that the first step which needed to be taken was to 
prioritize the role of ijtihād in interpreting Islamic teachings, which in itself would 
lead to progress in many aspects of human life.564  
                                                          
560 Prawiranegara, Al-ʿAqabah 56-57. 
561 Prawiranegara, Islam dilihat, 21. 
562 Prawiranegara, Islam dilihat, 25-26. 
563 Prawiranegara, Islam dilihat, 12-13. 
564 Prawiranegara, Islam dilihat, 12-13. Other than his writings on the need for freedom of 
thought in the context of religious opinions, he also emphasized in his 1971 work the importance 
of freedom of thought in politics. According to him, freedom of thought was a human right that 
would influence whether a country was able to develop harmoniously or not. If this human right 
were not recognized then, Sjafruddin argued, it would not only decrease the creativity of the 
people and give way to corruption; it will also cause deep social tension that on the surface might 
seem calm, but could erupt at any time. Sjafruddin justified the necessity of freedom of thought 
with the following verse of the Qur’an, Chapter al-Baqarah 2:256: “Thre is no compulsion in 
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The method of Qur’anic interpretation that Sjafruddin advocated would have 
radical consequences in its deconstruction and reconstruction of Islamic law as 
traditionally developed by classical scholars. It was not surprising, then, that he 
presented many innovative, progressive, and controversial ideas and was not 
hesitant to criticise them. Though he desired a reinterpretation of these issues in 
light of modern conditions, he was not always able to further elaborate on certain 
subjects in Islamic law, which shows in part his limited access to the classical Islamic 
intellectual tradition. For example, he expressed his agreement with the opinion of 
Munawir Syadzali (Minister of Religious Affairs 1983-1993) who from the beginning 
of his tenure incessantly emphasized the need for what he called a "re-actualization 
of Islamic Teachings".565 One issue that Syadzali raised concerned the need for 
Muslims to redefine the laws of inheritance described in detail in the Qur’an. He 
particularly questioned the provision that stated that the portion of the male should 
be equal to the portion of two females, which he considered no longer in line with 
the structure and context of modern society and culture. He proposed to modify the 
established traditional interpretation with a new interpretation in accordance with 
the modern Indonesian social context. In proposing this idea, Syadzali cited a 
number of precedents in Islamic history and the opinions of many classical Islamic 
scholars as well as principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, all of which supported his 
position.566 Nonetheless, his ideas were sharply criticised by scholars who argued 
                                                                                                                                                                      
religion.” He also quoted Chapter al-Ghāshiya 88: 21-22: “So [Prophet] remind them: your only 
task is to remind, you are not there to control them. Prawiranegara, Al-ʿAqabah, 42-43. 
565 See, for example, Munawir Sjadzali, “Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam dalam Konteks Realitas Baru 
dan Orientasi Masa Depan,” in Bunga Rampai Wawasan Islam Dewasa Ini (Jakarta: Penerbit 
Universitas Indonesia, 1994), 42-48.   
566 Sjadzali, for example, refers to the theory of naskh (abrogation) in the Qur'an as understood 
by many scholars, both classic such as Ibn Kāthir and modern such as Muṣṭafā Aḥmad al-Marāghī, 
to argue for a need for new interpretation of many injunctions in Islamic law to make them more 
suited to the contemporary time and place. The core of the theory of naskh is that certain laws in 
specific Qur’anic verses were abrogated and replaced by other laws in different verses. This 
concept was used by Islamic scholars to justify changes in the law concerning certain subjects, 
replacing it with new laws derived from different verses. and replace it with a new law contained 
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that the rules of Islamic inheritance law were so clear—unlike most other legal 
rules—that there were few differences in interpretation or few opportunities for re-
interpretation apart from the explicit meaning within the text of the Qur’an.567 
Sjafruddin, to the surprise of many circles, agreed with Syadzali's conclusion on the 
need to reinterpret the laws pertaining to inheritance as stipulated in the Qur’an.568 
In a bold proposition, Sjafruddin also proposed reconsidering the existence of the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs. He was worried that this had becomes a means for the 
commercialization of religion and a political instrument for the government and 
ministry officials.569  
Sjafruddin also agreed with the New Order family planning program. He 
criticized a fatwā, a formal religious legal opinion, that declared that the prevention 
of pregnancy should be limited to a case-by-case basis and only when there are 
hardships that force the decision. The fatwā did not approve of limitations on 
pregnancy being permitted on a massive scale. According to Sjafruddin, it was 
necessary to control birth rates through family planning in order to prevent poverty 
                                                                                                                                                                      
in other verses. Sjadzali also pointed to a number of important decisions taken by Umar bin 
Khattab, the second caliph, and Umar bin Abd al-Aziz, “the Fifth Rightly Guided Caliph” (682-720 
CE) on certain legal matters which seem to represent a departure either from the texts of the 
Qur’an or from the Sunnah of the Prophet. See Munawir Sjadzali, “Syariah: A Dynamic Legal 
System,” in Bunga Rampai Wawasan Islam Dewasa Ini (Jakarta: Penerbit Universitas Indonesia, 
1994), 10-13.  
567 Even Maulana Muhammad Ali, a modernist Islamic scholar from India/Pakistan and head of 
Anjuman Isha at Ahmadiyya, Lahore famous for his rational approach, did not present a new 
interpretation of the provisions of inheritance contained in the verses of the Qur’an that have 
been mentioned (Al-Nisā’ 4:7, 11-12, and 176). He said simply that Islam introduced reform to 
the rules relating to inheritance in the Arab society: that is, making the female a co-sharer with 
the male, and dividing “the property of the deceased person amongst the heirs on a democratic 
basis, instead of handing it all over to the eldest son, as is done by the law of primogeniture...a 
new law was given which put widows and orphans on a level of equality with those who fought 
for the defence of the tribe and the country.” See Maulana Muhammad Ali, The Religion of Islam: 
A Comprehensive Discussion of the Sources, Principles and Practices of Islam (Dublin, OH: The 
Ahmadiyya Anjuman Ishaʿat Islam, 1990), 517-518; Muhammad Ali, Holy Quran, 196-198 and 
243. Another modern interpreter, Abdullah Yusuf Ali, has a similar interpretation. See Abdullah 
Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur’an: Text, Translation & Commentary, vol. 1 (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad 
Ashraf, 1938), 180-182 and 235-236.      
568 Lukman Hakiem, “Pelajaran dari Pak Sjaf,” in George McTurnan Kahin et al, Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara: Penyelamat Republik (Jakarta: Yayasan Asrama dan Pendidikan Islam and 
Panitia Peringatan Satu Abad Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (1911-2011), 2011), 77-79. 
569 Prawiranegara, Al-ʿAqabah, 10. 
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and its dire consequences; and the population of certain regions in Indonesia had 
reached a density that made family planning an urgent necessity. In other words, 
Sjafrudin agreed with and even promoted family planning in accordance with the 
government’s program. For him, there was no clear evidence from religious sources 
that prohibited controlling birth rates based on the mutual agreement of the couple 
in order to promote individual and social welfare. Furthermore, he believed that the 
fatwā should have elicited the expertise of economists in order to obtain a deeper 
understanding of the issue.570 
Another of Sjafruddin’s controversial opinions concerned Porkas, a national 
lottery operated by the government to raise funds for sports development. Contrary 
to the opinions of many Indonesian religious scholars, he argued that it was not 
gambling and therefore Muslims were not forbidden to buy it.571 However, what is 
rather bizarre is that the aforementioned ideas did not provoke an outcry from 
Muslim conservatives and fundamentalists in Indonesia. What often occurred was 
only a surprised but quiet response, confusion, or at most a disgruntled feeling 
towards him on the part of many who did not agree with his opinions but 
nonetheless respected him. There has never been public criticism of Sjafruddin, 
unlike what has occurred with certain controversial ideas voiced by other Muslim 
scholars such as Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Munawir Syadzali.572  
  Sjafruddin also surprised all who knew him when in 1984 he congratulated 
Nahḍat al-ʿUlamā’ (NU), the Revival of Islamic Scholars (a socio-religious 
organization based mainly in rural areas and led by ʿulamā’ who headed pesantrens, 
traditional Islamic boarding schools), for accepting the state ideology of Pancasila as 
                                                          
570 Prawiranegara, Al-ʿAqabah, 57-60. Sjafruddin’s opinion in support of family planning 
programs was similar to that of Fazlur Rahman. See Rahman, “Islam: Challenges and 
Opportunities,” 323. 
571 Hakiem, “Pelajaran dari Pak Sjaf,” 76-77. 
572 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press and 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 70-79. 
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its organizational basis.573 On July 17, 1983 Sjafruddin had sent a letter to President 
Suharto voicing his disagreement with the government’s plan to enforce Pancasila as 
the sole foundation of all social organizations.574 In his understanding, shared by 
many others, Pancasila was intended to be the foundation of the state and the basis 
for the Constitution, but not the foundation of citizens’ organizations, whether their 
character was political, social, or other. Initially, all Islamic, Christian, and other 
religious organizations opposed the government’s passage of the bill, believing that 
it denied the distinct character of each religious organization and the pluralistic 
nature of Indonesian society, and contravened the Constitution and Pancasila itself. 
Moreover, in Sjafruddin’s view, by forcing all societal and religious organizations to 
have a single foundation, Indonesia would become a “fascist” state.575 However, all 
organizations eventually submitted to the government’s plan to impose Pancasila as 
their sole foundation, and adopted various ways to avoid contradictions with their 
religious teachings. For example, the Supreme Assembly of Indonesian Bishops 
(MAWI, Majelis Agung Wali Gereja Indonesia) changed its name to the Conference of 
Indonesian Bishops (KWI, Konferensi Wali Gereja Indonesia) in order to avoid 
violating the hierarchical structure and rules of the Roman Catholic Church; the 
Council of Indonesian Churches (DGI, Dewan Gereja Indonesia) changed its name to 
the Alliance of Indonesian Churches (PGI, Persekutuan Gereja Indonesia);576 and the 
NU accepted Pancasila as its foundation, but established Islam as ʿaqīda (faith or 
doctrine). In fact, there was almost no significant change to the nature of the latter 
                                                          
573 Hakiem, “Pelajaran dari Pak Sjaf,” 72-75. 
574 Sjafruddin’s letter was an exercise in freedom of thought. At that time it was rare for people to 
dare to oppose President Suharto’s policy directly. Sjafruddin argued that the expression of 
freedom of thought should be done in the right manner, exhorting people to respect other 
people’s opinions. To support his argument he quoted a French saying, “du choc des opinions 
jaillit la verité,” and verses from the Qur’an (16:125): “[Prophet], call [people] to the way of your 
Lord with wisdom and good teaching. Argue with them in the most courteous way, for your Lord 
knows best who has strayed from His way and who is rightly guided.” Prawiranegara, Al-ʿAqabah, 
44.    
575 Prawiranegara, “Pancasila as the Sole Foundation,” 74-78. 
576 Ismail, Islam and Pancasila, 242-244. 
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organization, except that it reiterated its commitment to the 1945 Constitution and 
Pancasila as the ideology of the state—something that all social organizations and 
political parties in Indonesia had already maintained since 1959. Other Islamic 
organizations emulated the NU’s solution.577 Sjafruddin, admiring the flexibility and 
bravery of the NU’s problem-solving strategy, congratuled the organization on its 
pioneering ways.578 While Sjafruddin’s response surprised many people who had 
been acquainted with his previous views on the issue,579 this was just one example 
of his honest and open attitude in accepting other views which he regarded as right 
or better than his own opinion, a trait that permeated his involvement in economic, 
political, and social issues of his time.  
While his views seemed progressive and liberal, Sjafruddin’s stature and 
credibility were lessened in the eyes of traditional scholars because, like many 
Western-educated modernists, he lacked competency in the Arabic language and his 
access to classical Islamic sources was therefore limited.580 Sjafruddin began to learn 
Arabic only in 1950. He was eventually able to understand the Qur’an but not the 
Hadith collections, not to mention works on jurisprudence written by classical 
jurists and scholars. In fact, he never referenced these in any of his religious 
writings. Furthermore, while partial translations and commentaries of the Qur’an 
                                                          
577 See Effendy, Islam and the State, 131-133; Ismail, Islam and Pancasila, 248-250. 
578 However, after the downfall of the New Order regime in 1998, NU changed its basis (asas) 
from Pancasila to Islam again, in its Mu’tamar (Congress) in 1999. 
579 Hakiem, “Pelajaran dari Pak Sjaf,” 72-76. 
580 Sjafruddin’s position is more or less consistent with Fazlur Rahman’s description that 
“...modernism, in so far as it existed at all, has been the work of lay Muslims with a liberal 
education. But the lay modernist, although his services have been undeniable in keeping a 
psychological and moral balance between traditionalism and Westernism...could speak for 
himself only and, his credentials from the Islamic side being always somewhat questionable, he 
could not lay the foundations of a new Islamic theology.” Rahman, Islam, 221. In Sjafruddin’s side 
he sometimes criticized indirectly the opinions or conservativism of the ʿulamā’, but Sjafruddin 
was not anti-clerical or hostile to them. He maintained that if it has been cleansed of the elements 
of pettiness and narrowness, then there was something useful in conservatism as a stabilization 
factor (stabiliserende) which was important for the development of the Indonesian state. See 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 43; Sjafrudin Prawiranegara, “Isrā’ 
dan Miʿrāj Ditinjau dari Sudut Filsafat, Psikologi, dan Ilmu Alam,” in Islam Sebagai Pedoman 
Hidup, vol. 1 of Kumpulan Karangan Terpilih, ed. Ajip Rosidi (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1986), 69-
71; Ajip Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 183.  
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into Indonesian were already accessible in the 1920s,581 Indonesian translations of 
the Hadith collection books were not yet widely available at that time.582 A complete 
translation and commentary of the Qur’an into Dutch was published in 1934, 
adapted from the English translation and commentary by Maulana Muhammad Ali, 
the founder and leader of Anjuman Ishaʿat Ahmadiyya, Lahore.583 This translation 
was widely read by Western-educated Muslims like Sukarno and by students and 
youth involved in Islamic organizations like the Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB, Young 
Islamic Alliance) and the Studenten Islamische Studieclub (SIS, Islamic Student 
Study Club). Sjafrudin first learned to understand the content of the Qur’an from this 
translation.584 Muhammad Ali’s interpretations and commentaries on the Qur’an, 
with their rational and spiritual bent, appealed to many Western-educated 
Indonesians. They offered an insightful response to the various allegations made by 
Western orientalists against Islam and the Prophet, and provided a tolerant and 
open-minded understanding of Islam. Meanwhile, the Hadith collection book used 
by Sjafruddin was a translation of the Bulūgh al-Marām by Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, 
translated into Indonesian in 1968 by Ustadh Ahmad Hassan, a prominent teacher in 
Persis (Persatuan Islam, Islamic Unity), a reformist-fundamentalist organization 
which emphasised education, daʿwa and tablīgh (missionary and preaching 
activities). Sjafruddin began quoting Hadith in his writings after his release from 
                                                          
581 A complete translation and commentary of the Qur’an in Indonesian was first published in 
1938, written by Mahmud Yunus and H. M. K Bakri. See Howard M. Federspiel, “Deepening Faith 
and Strengthening Behavior: Indonesian Muslim Studies of Qurʻan and Hadith” (Jakarta, 
Indonesia: [s.n.], 1987?), 20 and 85-88. 
582 The translation of Sahih Bukhari by Zainuddin Hamidy et al, ʿulamā’ from Persis (Persatuan 
Islam, Islamic Unity) was first published in 1937 and reprinted in 1983. Federspiel, Deepening 
Faith, 393. 
583 Maulwi Moehammad Ali, De heilige Qoer-an, vervattende den Arabischen Tekst met 
ophelderende aanteekeningen en voorrede; in het Nederlandsgh vertaald door Soedewo 
(Batavia: Hoofdcomité Qoer-an fonds onder de auspiciën van de Ahmadijah-Beweging Indonesia 
[Centrum Lahore], 1934). The translator was Soedewo, a member of Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB), 
an Islamic Youth organization, and a prominent leader of Ahmadiyyah in Jogjakarta (Lahore 
group). 
584 Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 27.  
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prison in 1966. This new approach appeared, for example, in a general lecture held 
by University of Indonesia on the subject of Isrā’ and Miʿrāj in November 1966,585 
whereas his writing on the same topic in the 1950s did not quote any Hadith. His 
articles on Islamic economy started to include Hadith support in 1968,586 while in 
his 1951 article on the same topic none were quoted to strengthen the arguments.587   
In interpreting the texts of the two main sources of Islam, Sjafruddin 
deployed his knowledge and expertise in economics and finance as well as his 
general knowledge of world history, especially the intellectual history of Western 
society.588 As I have discussed briefly in Chapter 1, Sjafruddin’s understanding of 
Islam was quite limited, since he started studying Islam only after joining the 
Masyumi Islamic political party in 1945. His duties as a high government official 
during the 1945-1949 War of Independence did not allow him many opportunities 
to fulfill his aspiration to learn the Islamic sciences. He studied Islam intensively 
after Indonesia received international recognition of its sovereignty in late 1949. As 
a result, Sjafruddin’s early writings did not contain many quotations of Qur’anic 
verses or Hadith narrations. Instead, he frequently referred to the history of 
Western thought and to books and sources written by Western authors, as well as 
                                                          
585 Prawiranegara, “Isrā’ dan Miʿrāj,” 118-149. 
586 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud, 260-295. 
587 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “Motif atau Prinsip Ekonomi Diukur Menurut Hukum-hukum 
Islam,” in Ekonomi dan Keuangan: Makna Ekonomi Islam, vol. 2 of Kumpulan Karangan Terpilih, 
ed. Ajip Rosidi (Jakarta: CV Haji Masagung, 1988), 26-39. 
588 Among the books he used in many of his writing were: “The Christian Significance of Karl 
Marx” by Alexander Miller; “Handboek der Maatschappijleer” by Max van Pol; “The Development 
of the Soviet Economic System: An Essay on the Experience of Planning in the U.S.S.R.” by 
Alexander Baykov (Cambridge: Macmillan, 1947); “Concise History of the Law of Nations” by 
Prof. Hussbaum; and Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer 
Morphologie de Weltgeschichte (München: Beck, 1922-23). Later, after his release from prison in 
1966, he also referred to Samuel Eliot Morison, The Story of the Old Colony of New Plymouth 
(1956); Henry B. Mayo, Democracy and Marxism (New York: Oxford Univerity Press, 1955); 
Richard Crossmann, The God that Failed: Six Studies in Communism (London: Hamilton, 1950); 
Anthony Nutting, The Arabs: A Narrative History from Mohammed to the Present (Mentor Book, 
1965); Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History (Mentor Book, 1961); and Thomas 
Arnold, The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith (London: 
Constable & Co. Ltd., 1913). 
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authors within other religious traditions.589 The events of Islamic history were 
increasingly visible in his writings only after 1950. Unsurprisingly, his Western 
education and relatively rudimentary introduction to the Islamic sciences accounted 
for his view of Islam as an ideological “system” that was in competition with other 
ideologies such as Marxism and capitalism. In the later period, he also came to 
recognize Islam as a moral and spiritual tradition. It was during this phase that we 
find many of his discussions on moral and spiritual subjects.590  
Sjafruddin’s Western educational background and his rational character 
account for his liberal approach to interpretation, from which he advanced 
innovative assessments and solutions. He knew that his understanding of ribā, for 
example, did not conform with, nor was it bound by, traditional or conventional 
opinion. However, he was convinced that his understanding of the topic was in 
better accordance with the spirit of the Qur’an and the tradition of the Prophet 
because it was also based on proper assessment of modern economics and its 
current practice and implementation. Another instance of Sjafruddin’s liberal 
interpretation of Qur’anic verses was on the subject of religious pluralism. He 
asserted unapologetically that there was no religion more tolerant than Islam since 
it allowed for the possibility that adherents of other religions could attain salvation. 
He pointed to Chapter al-Baqarah 2:62 which reads as follows: 
The [Muslim] believers, the Jews, the Christians, and the Sabians—all those 
who believe in God and the Last Day and do good—will have their reward 
with their Lord. There is no fear for them, nor will they grieve. 
 
Another verse, Chapter al-Mā’ida 5:69, states that: 
 
For the [Muslims] believers, the Jews, the Sabians, and the Christians—those 
who believe in God and the Last Day and do good deeds—there is no fear: 
they will not grieve.     
                                                          
589 He frequently quoted from Pope Pius Xl’s Encycliek Quadragesimo Anno. 
590 He often referred to ʿAbdul Raḥmān ʿAzzām Pāshā, The Eternal Message of Muhammad (New 




Sjafruddin’s commentary on this verse reads as follows: 
[In those verses] it is affirmed that [religious people] who may be received at 
the hands of God were not only the followers of Muhammad (peace be upon 
him), but also Jews, Christians and Sabians, provided they were faithful to 
God, faithful to the Day of Judgement, and did righteous work. [... This is] not 
just given to Jews, Christians and Sabians before the birth of Prophet 
Muhammad (peace be upon him) but also applies now. Because the 
requirement for acceptance to the side of God really is to be faithful to the 
One God and the Day of Judgment and to do good works. Hence the term 
Sabian can be interpreted as all those who are not Christian, nor Jew, nor 
follower of the Prophet Muhammad.591  
 
Sjafruddin’s commentary was similar to those of Maulana Muhammad Ali 
and Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s, which he read.592 However, in his interpretation Sjafruddin 
emphasized two points which the Qur’anic verse says only in a general way. The first 
was that God’s eternal reward was not only given to the Jews, Christians, and others 
who believed in God and the Last Day and did good work who lived before the the 
coming of the Prophet, but also to those religious groups who came after the 
Prophet up until the present time. The second was expressed frankly by Sjafruddin: 
that “on the contrary, although there may be those who claim to be followers of the 
Prophet Muhammad, there is no guarantee that they would be accepted by God…. 
All, apart from our faith and good deeds, depends on God's decision. Only God knows 
who amongst us are deviant and who are on the right path.”593  
                                                          
591 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “Masa Depan Islam,” in Islam Sebagai Pedoman Hidup, ed. Ajip 
Rosidi (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1986), 181. 
592 Muhammad Ali, Holy Quran, 33; Yusuf Ali, Holy Qur’an, 33-34.  
593 Sjafruddin explained that Islam had two meanings: a specific one, which is the religion 
revealed by God to the Prophet Muhammad, and a general, more open one, which encompasses 
all religions that teach faith in God, the Day of Judgement, and enjoin their believers to good 
works.  Prawiranegara, “Masa Depan Islam,” 181. As a comparison, the Qur’anic commentary of 
Muḥammad Taqī al-Dīn al-Hilālī and Muhammad Muhsin Khān states that “the provision of this 
Verse [along with the verse 5:69] was abrogated by the Verse 3:85” based on a hadith mentioned 
by Ibn ʿAbbās and quoted by al-Ṭabarī in his commentary. They comment that “after the coming 
of Prophet Muhammad [Peace be upon Him] on the earth, no other religion except Islam, will be 
accepted from anyone.” Muḥammad Taqī al-Dīn al-Hilālī and Muḥammad Muhsin Khān, trans., 
Translation of the Meanings of The Noble Qur’an in the English Language (Madinah, Saudi Arabia: 
King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qur’an, 1417).   
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Sjafruddin presented his views on the salvation of non-Muslims during a 
ceremony for the commemoration of the Prophet Muhammad organized by the 
Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, Islamic University Students’ Association) in 
Pekalongan on May 17, 1970, and repeated it on May 31 of the same year in a speech 
before students of Airlangga University and the Surabaya Institute of Technology. 
Interestingly, this did not provoke a negative reaction amongst Muslims. Twenty-
two years later Nurcholish Madjid, former General Chairman of HMI (1966-1971) 
and leader of a younger generation of Muslim modernists than that of Mohammad 
Natsir in Masyumi, conveyed a similar opinion in a lecture at the Jakarta Cultural 
Center, Taman Ismail Marzuki on October 21, 1992. His views soon attracted a 
backlash from many quarters, especially from the Dewan Daʿwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia (DDII, Council of Indonesian Islamic Mission). It was the younger 
generation of the DDII which launched a vigorous campaign against Madjid. Most of 
them had not completed university-level education, and among them were those 
who had received a Wahhabi-style Islamic education in Saudi Arabia. On the whole, 
their educational pedigree lagged far behind the intellectual caliber of the former 
Masyumi leaders, especially those who had received Dutch higher education. These 
factors accounted for the reactionary and fundamentalist attitudes of the younger 
generation of modernists who were close to or joined the DDII.  
4.2.2. Social and Political Ideas  
In order to further contextualize Sjafruddin’s social, political, and economic 
thought within his immediate intellectual milieu, I will now discuss the differences 
between Sjafruddin’s thought and that of Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, and fellow party 
members from modernist Islamic groups who joined the Masyumi Party.  
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In terms of economic policy, Sjafruddin’s view was in sharp contrast to that 
of Sukarno. Owing to pragmatic-realistic considerations, Sjafruddin did not agree 
with the arbitrary nationalization of Western companies operating in Indonesia. 
National and foreign private companies, he felt, should be allowed to continue 
operating as long as they were proven efficient and productive. In his view, it was 
important for foreign capital to continue to play a role in the economic development 
of Indonesia. What mattered to him was not ownership but oversight through 
government regulation.594 
The similarities between Sjafruddin and Sjahrir cannot be denied. For one, 
both adopted a non-xenophobic anti-colonialist nationalism. Sjafruddin did not view 
the struggle for independence from the Dutch as involving animosity against the 
Dutch people, the ‘West’, or ‘capitalism’. Capitalism was resisted insofar as it caused 
colonialism through oppression and exploitation of the weak, and enmity was 
directed only against acts and not against the people or country that committed 
them. For this reason Sjafruddin supported the diplomacy of Sjahrir and Hatta over 
the strategies of groups whose sole focus was to counter the Dutch using armed 
resistance.595 Sjahrir and Hatta insisted on a diplomatic approach which took into 
consideration global realities in the struggle for independence.596 In addition, 
Sjafruddin’s religious socialism, as with Sjahrir’s socialism, was receptive to 
elements of capitalism as part of its ideology and economic agenda. Sjafruddin 
argued that it would take a long time before the state was sufficiently efficient and 
extensive to manage the country’s economic life.597 As with Sjahrir and Hatta, 
                                                          
594 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Politiek dan Revolusi Kita (Politics and Our Revolution) 
(Jogjakarta, 1948), quoted in Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 310; Rahardjo, Pragmatisme 
dan Utopia, 47; Higgins with Higgins, Indonesia, 89-90. 
595 Anderson, Java, 310-311. 
596 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 50-51; Christie, Ideology and Revolution, 
108-110. 
597 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 311-321. 
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Sjafruddin therefore stressed heavily the importance of well-planned economic 
development based on real economic considerations rather than ideological 
demands.598 The difference between Sjafruddin and Sjahrir was that while the 
former regarded religion and morality as fundamental elements in development, 
Sjahrir was a materialist socialist whose spirit was very much that of secular 
humanism.599 Religious ethics were not part of Sjahrir’s worldview at all, whereas 
Sjafruddin’s ideological consciousness was that of religious humanism.600 In this 
respect, Sjafruddin, like many religious socialist groups within Masyumi, was much 
closer to Hatta’s approach to development. Sjafruddin and Hatta, like Muhammad 
Natsir, based their understanding of politics, economics and social democracy on 
Islamic teachings601. However, Hatta was more socialistic in his economic thinking—
as reflected in his idea of the importance of cooperatives in development—while 
Sjafruddin was more capitalistic.602  
Sjafruddin’s thought differed not only from that of the three aforementioned 
leaders of non-Islamic nationalist movements, but also that of from his friends from 
the religious-socialist group within the Masyumi Islamic political party. The latter 
individuals shared a common background of Western-style education in the Dutch 
system, but while they were all active in the nationalist Islamic organizations before 
the Second World War, Sjafruddin was not. For example, Western-educated Muslim 
intellectuals such as Mohammad Natsir (future Prime Minister), Mohammad Roem 
                                                          
598 Higgins with Higgins, Indonesia, 87-88. 
599 Sjahrir, Out of Exile, 144-146. 
600 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “Memetik Pelajaran dari Iqbal,” in Islam Sebagai Pedoman Hidup, 
vol. 1 of Kumpulan Karangan Terpilih, ed. Ajip Rosidi (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1986), 281-282. 
601 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 310; Christie, Ideology and Revolution, 170-172. 
602 Rahardjo, Pragmatisme dan Utopia, 52. For more discussion of Sjafruddin’s distinct 
ideological position among Indonesian Islamic and nationalist leaders, see Dr. Syed Hussein 
Alatas, Kita dengan Islam: Tumbuh tiada Berbuah (Singapura: Pustaka Nasional Pte. Ltd., 1979), 
107-146. Concerning Sjafruddin, Alatas says: “Here is an example of how a new type of human 
being of the Islamic community guides Muslims toward advancement of a [modern] age”, 146; 
Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 274-275. 
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(future Minister of Foreign Affairs), Jusuf Wibisono (future Minister of Finance), and 
Prawoto Mangkusasmito (future Deputy Prime Minister) either joined the Jong 
Islamieten Bond (JIB, Young Islamic Alliance), an Islamic youth organization 
founded in January 1925,603 or were active in the Studenten Islamische Studieclub 
(SIS, Islamic Student Study Club), a university student organization established in 
December 1934.604 Meanwhile Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, the first General Chairman of 
Masyumi and future Prime Minister, held an important position in the Partai Sarekat 
Islam Indonesia (PSII, formerly SI; Indonesian Islamic Association Party), the first 
nationalist political organization, during the pre-independence era.605 They all 
embraced anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist views without adopting Marxist 
theory, even if in an adapted form, as did Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir.606 They studied 
Islam under the guidance of Haji Agus Salim,607 who also came to be a religious 
mentor for Sukarno and Hatta.  
JIB was founded after the proposal to offer Islamic courses as part of the 
activities of Jong Java, the Javanese Youth Organization, was rejected by the 
organization’s congress in 1924. This decision was rendered despite the fact that 
other religious courses from Protestant and Catholic denominations had long been 
running. In addition, Muslim students who studied in Dutch colonial government 
schools like MULO and AMS found gaining religious instruction in their faith to be 
similarly difficult. Hence the Chairman of Jong Java, Sjamsurizal, with the help of 
Hadji Agus Salim, founded JIB as a separate youth organization that aimed, inter alia, 
                                                          
603 Ridwan Saidi, Kebangkitan Islam Era Orde Baru: Kepeloporan Cendekiawan Islam sejak 
Zaman Belanda sampai ICMI (Jakarta: LSIP, 1993), 27-32. 
604 Saidi, Kebangkitan Islam, 41-47. 
605 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 65-66 and 94-95. 
606 The views of the latter three figures have been analyzed in part 2.3. 
607 Hadji Agus Salim was a prominent ideologue of the Sarekat Islam (SI), Islamic Union, which in 
1929 became Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII), the Indonesian Islamic Association Party. He 
proclaimed that “the struggle for political independence would be followed by the struggle for 
economic sovereignty.” Chalmers, “Introduction,” 9. 
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to meet the needs of Muslim youth and students with respect to learning and 
practicing their religion.608 Similarly, SIS was founded in order to increase Muslim 
students’ knowledge of their religion.609 
As a part of the ethical policy, the Dutch government provided modern 
education for Indonesians. One of its stated aims was to keep them away from the 
influence of Islam, especially the influence of its political manifestations in pan-
Islamism. The colonial government was afraid that it would strengthen anti-colonial 
sentiment.610 The aim was partly achieved in that many Western-educated Muslims 
became hostile or indifferent to Islam.611 However, the presence of JIB and SIS 
offered the opportunity for religiously-inclined students to become more committed 
Muslims. Often coming from families who were nominally Muslim, these students 
had received Dutch education and were otherwise unacquainted with Islamic 
teachings and practice.612  
Moreover, these two organizations became training grounds for Indonesian 
nationalist movements. Many of those who joined JIB and SIS became prominent 
figures in the struggle for independence and played important roles in the 
government of the Republic of Indonesia and the leadership of the Masyumi Party 
following independence.613 As Kahin wrote, the modern education which was 
provided by the colonial government eventually became the chief force of the 
                                                          
608 Saidi, Kebangkitan Islam, 26-30. 
609 Saidi, Kebangkitan Islam, 40-42. 
610 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 44-46. 
611 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 47. The Dutch were also partially successful in their 
efforts to alienate native administrators, most of whom came from aristocrat background, from 
Islam, by restricting public expressions of Islamic piety and de-Islamizing Java’s courtly arts. 
Robert W. Hefner, “Social Legacies and Possible Futures,” in Indonesia: The Great Transition, ed. 
John Bresnan (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 90-91.  
612 Saidi, Kebangkitan Islam, 34-37, 42-47 
613 Saidi, Kebangkitan Islam, 32-40 and 50-54. 
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Indonesian nationalist movement. This applied to both secular intellectuals and 
Islamic-oriented ones.614  
The emergence of bona fide secular and Islamic nationalist groups that 
would form the core of the struggle for independence was the result of unintended 
consequences of colonial government policy during the beginning of the twentieth 
century.615 The policy originated from an attempt to prevent the spread of pan-
Islamism by providing Western education for Indonesians. However, the Dutch’s 
preoccupation with the perceived dangers of pan-Islamism caused them to 
underestimate the dangers threatening the colonial regime that were part and 
parcel of the Islamic modernist movement initiated by Mohammad Abduh in Cairo. 
Indeed, as it turned out, the Islamic modernist movement would play a major role in 
the Indonesian nationalist movement.616  
Political activism and social justice causes were central aspects of Islamic 
modernism. This approach predisposed its adherents to participate in the 
awakening nationalist feelings of their fellow countrymen. According to Kahin, the 
nationalistic content of Islamic modernist ideas fostered strong anti-imperialist 
positions, and members of the movement developed ways to reconcile this view 
with socialist economic principles more successfully than in any other Islamic 
country.617 Thus modernist Islamic teachings as they developed during the late 
nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century in Cairo found a 
formidable response in Indonesia. Only gradually did the colonial government 
become fully aware of the dangers of the modernist-reformist movement, including 
                                                          
614 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 49. 
615 For further explanation of the emergence of the Dutch-educated Indonesian leaders, see 
Robert Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 
1960), 72-100 passim. 
616 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 45-47. 
617 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 46. 
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Muhammadiyah with its educational and social programs618 and Sarekat Islam with 
its “nationalistic, anti-imperialist, and socialistically inclined program”,619 to the 
stability and continuity of Dutch colonial rule.620  
Though the goals of providing the elite Indonesian population with a 
Western education—viz. to eliminate the importance of religion as a basis for 
political and social consideration and promote a cultural association with the 
Dutch—were partially fulfilled in that many of the students tended to assimilate and 
participate in the colonial cultural and political order,621 at the same time the leaders 
of the emerging nationalist movement were all products of Dutch education.622 The 
Western-educated elite such as Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir assumed prominent 
leadership roles in the movement.623 On the other hand, Dutch education also 
fostered the learning of Muslim Indonesians who received a Western education but 
were more religiously-inclined in their social and political outlook, such as Sukiman 
Wirjosandjojo, Muhammad Natsir, Jusuf Wibisono, and Mohammad Roem. This 
modernist Islamic group was educated in Western and Islamic social and political 
thought, the formulation of which was antagonistic to the political and social 
arrangement of the colonial regime. Both these groups provided political leadership 
to the Indonesian masses.624 
                                                          
618 Van Niel, Emergence, 85, 149-150 and 166-168. 
619 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 48.  
620 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 46-48; Christie, Ideology and Revolution, 7-9; Ricklefs, A 
History, 205.  
621 To a certain degree Sjafruddin was among this group of students that fostered Western values 
of progress and secularity in opposition to Islamic ideals. In his years as a university student, his 
reading of Marxist-Socialist and other secular philosophical books, including Marx and Engels, 
shook his religious belief and almost led him to reject against the teaching of Islam and religion in 
general. However, Sjafruddin remained a Muslim because of his strong Muslim family 
background, like that of most people who came from Banten (Bantam), West Java.  In addition, 
the death of his father caused him to renew his faith in the power of God and the belief in the 
afterlife. Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 26-30 and 33-34. 
622 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 47-49.   
623 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 48-49. 
624 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 49. 
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Another difference between Sjafruddin and the Masyumi leaders who were 
active in student or political organizations in the time of Dutch rule was that the 
latter showed more nationalistic policies than Sjafruddin when they became active 
in the government during the 1950s. This dissimilarity coud be caused by their 
diverse orientation and activities aforementioned. This could be seen with regards 
to Prime Minister Sukiman Wirjosandjojo and Finance Minister Jusuf Wibisono. The 
latter implemented a policy that was consistent with those of Djuanda and Sumitro 
in giving privileges to indigenous entrepreneurs (including the members of 
parliament). This was part of a larger goal of gaining economic sovereignty in the 
form of establishing an indigenous entrepreneurial class, given the colonial regime’s 
systematic marginalization of native Indonesians from full participation in economic 
life and the great disparity in income and economic clout between the ‘natives’ on 
the one hand and the Dutch and Chinese on the other. Sjafruddin, however, feeling 
less of the ‘nationalistic’ sentiments of his peers, considered the policy to be 
straightforwardly discriminatory and unconstitutional.625  
We begin with Sjafruddin Prawiranegara’s political ideas, especially the issue 
of the relationship and degree of interaction between Islam and the state. We must 
discuss Sjafruddin’s point of view on this issue because his own party, Masyumi, of 
which he was one of its most prominent leaders, endeavoured to have the “teachings 
                                                          
625 See Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “Kesulitan-kesulitan Masa Peralihan Ditinjau dari Sudut 
Ekonomi,” in Ekonomi dan Keuangan: Makna Ekonomi Islam, vol. 2 of Kumpulan Karangan 
Terpilih, ed. Ajip Rosidi (Jakarta: CV Haji Masagung, 1988), 68; Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 
184. As an illustration of the difference of policy between Sjafruddin and Wibisono, Feith 
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allocations. The Sukiman cabinet’s Minister of Finance, Jusuf Wibisono (of the Masyumi), was a 
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as Natsir’s Finance Minister, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. Favored by a continuing high level of 
export earnings and seeing that a fairly generous distribution of rewards would help to keep the 
politically divided cabinet together, Jusuf initiated an informal arrangement whereby 
government banks gave credit to firms those directors were from particular government parties”. 
Feith, Decline, 219 and 479.    
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of Islam be the basis of the Indonesian state”.626 The draft of the constitution 
proposed by Masyumi formulated two alternatives for the foundation of the state: 
“the Republic of Indonesia based upon Islam” or “[t]he Islamic Republic of Indonesia 
based upon the God the One.”627 The organization Nahḍat al-ʿUlamā’ (NU) also 
fought for the implementation of the Sharīʿah and the establishment of Islam as the 
basis of the state.628 The problem that the Islamic parties encountered was that they 
were not able to obtain majority representation in the Constitutional Assembly. Four 
of the Islamic parties obtained 228 combined seats (44.36%), while secular 
nationalist, communist, socialist, and Christian parties received a total of 286 seats 
(55.64%).  These parties were against the idea of a state based on Islam, opting 
rather for Pancasila—though each had its own interpretation of what Pancasila 
meant. The two sides were thus unable to push for their respective agendas.629 By 
the end of 1958, however, they had managed to agree upon 90% of a draft of the 
constitution and to compromise on a draft of formulas for the basis of the state. The 
draft of one formula was as follows: 
[The] State of the Republic of Indonesia is based on the resolve to establish a 
socialistic community that believes in God the One, with the understanding 
that complete social justice and equal prosperity would be guaranteed; one 
that would receive mercy from God most Compassionate and Merciful, in 
accordance with the teachings of Islam, [Protestant] Christianity, 
Catholicism, and other religions that exist in our homeland. […] The next 
foundations of the state are: the unity of the nation realized through mutual 
assistance; humanism; and nationalism and democracy guided by the 
wisdom arising from consultation and representation.630  
                                                          
626 Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam: Perbandingan 
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627 Mahendra, Modernisme, 204. 
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Islamic parties such as Masyumi and NU were in fact ready to accept a 
compromise.631 Sarino Mangunpranoto, chairman of the PNI delegation in the 
Constituent Assembly, also signalled the possibility of an ideological compromise 
when he mentioned a “national state in which the Islamic law was guaranteed.”632 
But efforts at cooperation between those who supported Pancasila and the Islamic 
parties who advocated an Islamic foundation were defeated by political, economic, 
social problems such as rebellions, economic deterioration, and social ills; President 
Sukarno’s ambition to implement the Guided Democracy; and the Army’s desire to 
obtain more power in government.633 President Sukarno eventually issued a 
presidential decree on July 5, 1959 reinstating the Constitution of 1945 while at the 
same time abolishing the Constituent Assembly. This decision was made after the 
vote in the Assembly failed three times to obtain the two-thirds of the required votes 
needed to pass the motion calling for a return to the 1945 Constitution with or 
without amendments.634 Sukarno’s unilateral action came despite the fact that the 
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after the declaration of independence and before the meeting of PPKI, a Japanese navy officer 
allegedly came to Hatta informing him that the Christians, most of whom lived in the eastern 
parts of the country, would not join the Republic unless elements of the Jakarta Charter (that is, 
the obligation to carry out Islamic Sharīʿah for its adherents, Islam as the state religion, and the 
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Assembly had only ten percent of the remaining draft of the constitution still to go 
through and there remained ten months before the deadline to resolve the 
remaining issues.635  
As many suspected, the return to the 1945 Constitution, with its presidential 
system, opened the road for the establishment of the authoritarian Guided 
Democracy regime which had been touted by Sukarno since 1957 and through 
which the role of the army in government would significantly increase.636 Indeed, a 
notion like Guided Democracy would never have been possible under the temporary 
Constitution of 1950 nor under the draft Constitution that had been being debated in 
parliament, since both followed a parliamentary system in which the president was 
a mere figurehead of the state.637 In the end, the Islamic parties relented. 
Recognising that the political situation as beyond their control, they decided to 
declare allegiance to the 1945 Constitution while also enjoining all parties—
including the president—to hold true to the Constitution. All this occurred despite 
former Vice President Mohammad Hatta’s assertion that the procedure to reinstate 
the 1945 Constitution was not legal.638  
While the Constituent Assembly debated the issue of the State’s constitution 
and as the presidential decree of July 5, 1959 neared, Sjafruddin was no longer 
active in party politics. Since December 1957, he had been living in Sumatra where 
he would eventually lead the PRRI movement until 1961. Furthermore, his most 
                                                                                                                                                                      
requirement for a Muslim president) were deleted. In these tense and critical moments of the 
new nation and with the imminent arrival of the Allied Forces, Hatta proposed certain 
modifications as a solution to ensure the unity of the nation. The Islamic leaders finally agreed 
upon Hatta’s suggestions to remove the aforementioned obligations. Now, Article 6 states only 
that “the president of the Republic of Indonesia should be a native-born Indonesian,” and Article 
29 came to read “the State based on Belief in the One and Only God”. As for the first principle of 
the state ideology, Pancasila, it became “Belief in the One and Only God” instead of “Belief in God 
with the obligation to carry out Islamic Sharīʿah for its adherents.” Effendy, Islam and the State, 
31-32; Ismail, Islam and Pancasila, 55-56.    
635 Mahendra, Modernisme, 215. 
636Lev, Transition, 191-192 and 278-289. 
637 Mahendra, Modernisme, 215. 
638 Mahendra, Modernisme, 219-221; Lev, Transition, 277. 
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recent cabinet position had been in 1951, having been appointed president of the De 
Javasche Bank. Following the nationalization of the bank, he assumed the role of 
governor of the Central Bank of Indonesia (BI) until 1957. Due in part to these 
factors, we are left with no documentation that would indicate Sjafruddin’s response 
to the developments in the Constituent Assembly. However, there are two known 
facts that may hint at where Sjafrudin might have stood in all this. The first was that 
the Masyumi Party he joined had as its mandate to carry out “the teachings and laws 
of Islam in the Republic of Indonesia.”639 The official interpretation of this mandate 
was that “the teachings and laws of Islam” must “consider the situation of time and 
place.”640  In accordance with the interpretation above, Sjafruddin stated in an 
interview with Mahendra in 1988 that the Islamic law that Masyumi intended to 
implement was “a modern Islamic law that is appropriate to the situation in 
Indonesia.”641 If such was indeed the case, then the shape of Islamic law championed 
by Masyumi—had they been successful in advocating the idea of “an Indonesian 
state based on the teachings of Islam”—would have been very different from the 
laws implemented during the time of the Prophet, those implemented during pre-
modern times, and even those currently in force in other Muslim countries.642 
Furthermore, as Mahendra notes, Sjafruddin’s view was still consistent with the 
draft of the Constitution formulated by Masyumi, of which he was one of the chief 
drafters. This draft stated that the highest source of law in the state was the laws of 
the Shariʿa.643 Mahendra notes that the notion of “source of law” is intended 
specifically to distinguish it from having the “Sharīʿah as law”. As a source of law, the 
Sharīʿah is not transposed directly onto state law but instead is used to derive 
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detailed legislation under a “certain justice system”.644 Furthermore, according to 
Mahendra, Masyumi’s draft of the constitution stated that “all legislations that are 
proposed must be approved by the legislative bodies.”645 
Mahendra’s explanation of Masyumi’s proposal for the shape and 
implementation of Islamic law was indeed consistent with Sjafruddin’s view 
concerning the role of Islam in the state and the establishment of Islamic law in 
Indonesia, which he wrote long before the constitutional debates in the Constituent 
Assembly from 1957 to 1959.646 However, it was never clear whether Masyumi’s 
interpretation would be accepted by other Islamic parties such as NU, which based 
their interpretation on the four most prominent Sunni legal schools of thought 
(madhāhib), or other traditionalist or fundamentalist groups both within and 
outside Masyumi itself. As Daniel S. Lev noted, “among the university-trained 
Masyumi leaders, especially some of the lawyers, there was considerable doubt 
about the usefulness of the Islamic law in a modern state, though it was not a doubt 
that could be expressed easily in public.”647 Lev did not specify who these “lawyers” 
were, but many Masyumi figures were graduates of law schools, and Sjafruddin was 
one of them. Indeed, from reading his works it is clear that he would be considered 
amongst those Masyumi figures that would have had such doubts. Because of this, 
we can understand why Sjafruddin’s statement to Mahendra regarding the question 
of Islamic law was very qualified. In the following we will further discuss 
Sjafruddin’s view on the relation between Islam and the state as well as other 
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political issues. However, it is not possible to separate his political views from his 
economic thinking, as part of his holistic religious-socialist ideology.  
Sjafruddin was the main speaker of the left-wing group within Masyumi 
termed “religious-socialist”. He wrote one of the clearest expositions of this ideology 
in a pamphlet, Politiek dan Revolution Kita (Politics and Our Revolution) in the 
middle of 1948. Some quotations from it below may help to highlight the viewpoint 
of that progressive faction of Masyumi: 
What is the aim of our national revolution? The aim is the unity of the 
Indonesian people and the realization of social justice and prosperity for our 
people. Therefore the abolition of the colonial system alone is not enough. 
We need an economic and political structure which can guarantee the 
realization of social justice, and this could not be realized in the Dutch time 
which was colonialistic and capitalistic in nature.  
Our constitution is also influenced by socialism, as is proved by 
Article 33. However, socialism in the constitution has no spiritual connection 
with Marxian socialism, because Article 29, Clause 1 stipulates that our state 
is based on religion. The followers of the constitution who are now following 
Marxian socialism unconsciously pursue a wrong path.  
Collectivism without individualism is like a flock of sheep which can 
be dispersed easily. It is fascism if a certain ideology would impose 
collectivism upon the people by forcibly eliminating a class of people. 
Islam forbids the forcible imposition of a certain ideology. 
Individualism is properly respected by Islam; each individual is responsible 
for himself to God. Islam calls for the reaching of agreement by means of 
discussion among the people. In our revolution many Moslems are forgetting 
the principles of Islam; they support Marxian socialism and participate in 
actions which merely create troubles and hamper the revolution. 
Our national revolution needs an ideology which can guarantee the 
realization of social justice. However, I believe that Marxism cannot fulfill the 
need; in addition, Marxism is contrary to the constitution. The ideology 
which is suitable to our society is religious socialism, an ideology which is in 
harmony with the constitution. Religious socialism does not abolish 
individualism, individual initiative, and individual responsibility. Thus, not 
only the freedom of the whole nation is guaranteed but also the freedom of 
the individual, without closing the door for possible nationalization or 
socialization of certain vital enterprises. This is the ideal of our national 
revolution. 
Therefore it is not correct to state that it is not yet the time to begin 
socialist revolution. On the contrary, our national revolution obviously 
indicates elements of socialism, which are similar to Marxian socialism. If the 
elements of socialism do not exist, the national revolution means nothing to 
us, as it does not give new hope. However, the basis of socialism in our 
revolution is not the historical materialism of Marx, but instead its basis is 
the duty of man towards man and the duty of man towards God.  
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Therefore the means of realizing socialism must be different from the 
means used by Marxian socialism with its class struggle. According to 
religious socialism, socialization is only a means to realize social justice and 
the people’s prosperity. Therefore to achieve socialization it is not necessary 
to eliminate a certain class or groups, and it is also not necessary to introduce 
an overall socialization; it is enough if socialization is introduced when 
necessary... 
Competition arising out of private initiative as such is not bad; in fact 
the contrary, because competition increases production and improves the 
quality of goods. We must not forget that the progress of production and 
economy in Europe and America was possible because of competition. Only 
at a certain stage does this liberal economy not increase production and is 
there a tendency to limit production. At that stage the government must 
intervene by nationalizing certain private enterprises or establishing 
enterprises itself. 
Generally speaking limitations on competition and/or socialization 
should not be introduced merely because of a desire to realize a certain 
theory; the time and circumstances must also be taken into consideration. If 
the government organs are not yet organized well enough to carry out and 
supervise the regulations made by the state because of the lack of capable 
personnel, and if home production is not yet sufficient to supply the needs of 
the people, we must think twice before we introduce socialization or limit 
competition. Otherwise merely for the sake of realizing a certain theory, we 
will cause our people to die.648  
 
This passage shows a number of important points. The first relates to the 
influence of a leftist socialist ideology on the economic and political thought of 
Sjafruddin and many other Indonesian leaders. Undoubtedly this came from the 
influence of literature circulating at the time and in reaction to colonial suppression 
and to the violent political developments resulting from Dutch insistence on re-
ruling Indonesia after the Second World War.649 The second point concerns 
flexibility in ideological matters.650   
Similar to other Indonesian nationalist leaders, Sjafruddin embraced socialist 
and anti-imperialist ideas. Before independence he was close to Sutan Sjahrir, the 
foremost leader of PSI, the Indonesian Socialist Party, although he did not consider 
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himself one of his followers.651 After independence, however, Sjafruddin joined the 
Masyumi Party instead of choosing PSI, probably because of his family’s devout 
Islamic background. Within Masyumi, Sjafruddin belonged to a group called the 
religious socialists that, according to Kahin, wielded tremendous influence—more so 
than any other party members combined—over Masyumi policy.652  
How did socialism fit within Sjafruddin’s ideology? His understanding of 
socialism involved an emphasis on principles of social justice in economic planning 
to achieve prosperity. However, for Sjafruddin, this emphasis should not at all 
compromise the role of private initiatives and the importance of individual 
responsibility. Furthermore, socialism was not to be implemented through class 
struggle but rather through sound economic programs and policies based upon the 
principles of efficiency and economic rationality and designed to cause the least 
amount of economic suffering to the lower classes.653 The religious aspect of the 
ideology was clear: moral and spiritual values should underlie efforts to realize 
social justice and prosperity. Belief in One God should be the moral foundation of 
socialism in order to achieve not only material prosperity but also spiritual 
happiness.654 
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Program” as follows: “(1) Realization of the Islamic ideology in matters concerning the state in 
order to be able to establish a state based on popular sovereignty and justice in harmony with 
teachings of Islam; (2) Enactment of laws which guarantee to workers minimum wages, 
maximum working hours, accident and old age allowances, protection as to security, health, and 
housing; and (3) Enactment of laws which guarantee for the peasant private ownership of land 
sufficient to support him and his family, protection in the sale of his products, and the general 
enhancement of his status.” With regard to the general organization of the economy, the program 
stated: “(1) The principal duty of the state must be to open the possibility to work and to have a 
job to all citizens; (2) The economy should be based upon collectivism in which individual 
initiative may not be detrimental to the general interests and should be directed towards the 
general prosperity; (3) The right of private ownership is recognized, limited by the provisions 
laid down in religion (taxes, charity, etc.); and (4) Capitalism which obviously consists of 
individual interest alone must be opposed [i.e., socially harmful capitalism is to be opposed].”  
653 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 310.  
654 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “Peranan Agama dan Moral dalam Pembangunan Masyarakat dan 
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We can further discern Sjafruddin’s thought on the relation between Islam 
and the state from an article he wrote in 1949 in which he discussed in brief his 
understanding of a famous legal term in Islamic Law, Dār al-Islām (the Abode of 
Islam). According to him, this concept was vague and was never satisfactorily 
explained by religious scholars, especially in light of the complexity of the modern 
state. For instance, various countries with majority-Muslim populations had 
different political and social systems. Which of these were to be considered part of 
Dār al-Islām? Some or all? And what were the criteria to allow us to make 
distinctions? For Sjafruddin, it was useless to try to outline the formal requirements 
of Dār al-Islām. Instead he argued that  
[…] it is not the theory of Dār al-Islām that is important, but rather the 
practice, which is the conduct and deeds of Muslims that are motivated by 
pure intentions towards God, such that these actions benefit the community, 
whether Muslims or non-Muslims. What is the benefit to make an issue out of 
Dār al-Islām if in practice a state allows Muslims the greatest freedom to 
practice their religion? […] Before we demand the establishment of Dār al-
Islām, whose shape and content is not yet clear to us, we should rather 
Islamicize ourselves through doing good deeds. We should not prioritize 
mere name.”655  
 
He concluded by saying that “as long as Muslims receive the opportunity to realize 
their aspirations and perform their duties, free from an oppressive regime, this is 
enough.656  
Sjafruddin also denounced the aspiration to establish a kind of ‘Pakistan’ in 
Indonesia, especially when those who advocated this also justified the use of 
violence. He called such an aspiration a delusion.657 He called upon Muslims to use 
legal and constructive means in their struggle to realize their aspirations: 
It is the obligation of each citizen with Islamic consciousness to continue 
his/her jihad through the correct channels and the ones justified by the law, 
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by not forgetting the situation of our country which is climbing the stairs of 
its development and growth toward a well-ordered and perfect level.658  
 
Sjafruddin was more concerned with the spiritual and moral substance of 
Islam than with its formal or outward appearance. He also emphasized the 
importance of meritocracy in state governance. He enjoined Muslims not to demand 
that all government positions be held by them. The most important thing, Sjafruddin 
emphasized, was that the officials who carried out state affairs be just, honest and 
capable. If Muslims demanded that fellow Muslims hold all government positions, 
this was no more than an imposition of Islam upon Indonesians of other religious 
traditions. That kind of attitude, for him, was contrary to the will of God, who 
decrees in the Qur’an that there is no compulsion in religion. In fact, it would 
damage Islam itself.659 
Sjafruddin was also critical of Islamic parties and organizations. As a result of 
colonialism the Indonesian people, especially Muslims, were mired in conservatism, 
disunity, personal cults, and superstition. All these were, in Sjafruddin’s opinion, 
forbidden by Islam.660 Opinions and ideas were often rejected not on the basis of 
their content, but because of the people who advocated them. Political parties were 
not administered through the participation of an informed and critical membership, 
but were run rather by their “gods or representatives” (wordplay on the similarity 
between dewa [Sanskrit: deva] and dewan [Arabic: dīwān]), who were concerned 
more with their personal interests than with the interests of the party. According to 
Sjafruddin, Islam was used by these leaders as an accessory, not a way of life. He 
therefore enjoined Muslims and Indonesians to focus on contributing positive and 
constructive ideas in an independent Indonesia. The period after independence 
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required not only the courage shown during the struggle for independence by both 
secular and religious leaders but also science and skills in state-building. Sjafrudin 
here was taking a jibe at the old guard of religious leaders who still insisted on being 
active in politics. He recognized, however, that many of them wanted out but stayed 
because they had been put on a pedestal by their supporters.661 Sjafruddin also 
criticised conservatism, such as suspicion of all things Western, for having prevented 
progress. However he appreciated a conservatism that functioned as a stabilizing 
force (zakelijkheid and nuchterheid), was capable of withstanding social upheaval, 
and which would prevent people from aspiring to things which could not be 
realized. Sjafruddin here seemed to be referring to communism and radical 
nationalism.662 
After the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands on December 1949, 
Sjafruddin became Minister of Finance in the third Hatta cabinet (December 1949-
September 1950) and in the Natsir cabinet (September 1950-April 1951). During 
that period he was preccupied by his immediate ministerial tasks and produced no 
writings related to politics; however, he published an article discussing political 
issues again after he was no longer a minister. In the article, entitled “Indonesia di 
Persimpangan Jalan” (“Indonesia at the Crossroads”),663 Sjafruddin took to task not 
only the government of Prime Minister Sukiman Wirjosandjojo—who like Sjafruddin 
also came from Masyumi—but also other national leaders who did not decisively 
reject the establishment of new ministries as part of the political horse-trading 
between political parties. In his opinion, this practice presented a heavy burden for 
the government budget.664 
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He consistently urged the government to follow the guidelines set down in 
the “right person in the right place” policy of Hatta and Natsir’s cabinets. In his 
opinion the policy required moral courage, as he saw that many political leaders in 
charge had a tendency to succumb to demands, in order to avoid conflict, especially 
when faced with bluster and threats. Sjafruddin argued that the slogans of “unity” 
and “peace” were often only used to hide weaknesses. In his opinion, many leaders 
tended to seek the easiest path, either to maintain popularity or to avoid the pains of 
making an unpopular decision. “People were encouraged to maintain unity, because 
those who suggest it,” Sjafruddin asserted, “had no courage to act and must look for 
reasons to hide their flaws.”665 
In Sjafruddin’s view, democracy required policies made by a responsible 
government and leaders. Policy needed courage, especially moral courage, and unity 
had true meaning if there were opportunity for difference of opinion and a readiness 
to make sacrifices. Sjafruddin detected, within the attitude of the leaders who lacked 
moral courage, the dangers that threatened Indonesia: "democracy drowned in a 
coalition and then coalition eaten by anarchy, and anarchy overcome by armed 
factions or groups who control the armed factions.”666 Sjafruddin’s advice failed to 
convince most other political leaders. They continued to be preoccupied with 
maintaining the interests of their respective powers, signified by frequent cabinet 
changes. They condoned corruption and cronyism rather than fostering responsible 
policy and efficiency. Sjafruddin’s prediction would prove true in the next few years 
later when the misuse of parliamentary democracy incited the army to begin 
intervening in political and civilian affairs. Military involvement culminated in the 
New Order period (1967-1998) in which the New Order regime exercised dual 
official functions, as political leaders as well as leaders of the armed forces. 
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In fact, Sjafruddin had long foreseen the possible instability of the system of 
parliamentary democracy that would disrupt the government program. After the 
dissolution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RIS) and the re-
inauguration of the unitary State (Republic of Indonesia) in the 1950, members of 
the RIS cabinet met to draft a Provisional Constitution.667 There was a prolonged and 
sharp debate on the system of state and government to be adopted in the 
constitution. As Hatta told us, two different opinions existed at the time. One was the 
proposal by the Masyumi to have a Presidential Cabinet, with Hatta as concurrently 
Vice President and Prime minister to ensure political stability and economic 
reconstruction. The other proposal came from the PNI, supported by the PSI and 
others, which suggested that Hatta should choose between being a Prime Minister 
and Vice President in a parliamentary system. Hatta and Masyumi maintained that 
the country needed a calm period to be able to develop. Sjafruddin, representing 
Masyumi, based his proposal on past experience when the country defended 
independence against the opposition and aggression of the Dutch. According to him, 
it was clear that under Hatta's leadership, with the support of Sukarno, the cabinet 
proved to be strong and able to withstand critical periods. Also when Sjahrir led the 
cabinets, the President and the Vice President protected them rather than the other 
way around, which was actually the original intention (of assigning Sjahrir to be 
Prime Minister). At this point, Sjafruddin argued, the State was still facing difficulties 
which required a direct role of Sukarno and Hatta in a presidential cabinet led by 
Hatta. In other words, Sjafruddin proposed that the President and Vice President 
have executive powers rather than merely a ceremonial function and be a symbol of 
the nation’s unity. However, representatives of other parties continued to reject 
Sjafruddin’s proposal. Eventually, after hours and days of lengthened debates, 
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Sjafruddin accepted other parties’ proposal that Hatta became Vice President but 
not Prime Minister. However, Sjafruddin demanded that the Constitution include “an 
escape clause” stating that if times should become difficult, then, at the right 
moment, Hatta would be asked to resume the post of Prime Minister, and would still 
be responsible to Parliament. His proposal was accepted by Wilopo of the PNI but 
not by other figures of the party and members of other parties except members of 
Sjafruddin’s party, Masyumi. After long deliberations and since the issue was not 
settled, Sukarno offered a solution, i.e. not to include Sjafruddin’s escape clause in 
the constitution and have Hatta become Vice President in a Parliamentary cabinet. 
But should difficulties arise later on, Sukarno promised implicitly, he would ask 
Hatta to be Prime Minister, as this happened in the past. According to Hatta, all those 
present at the time had the same interpretation.668 But as we know, the 
parliamentary system was used irresponsibly as Hatta and Sjafruddin predicted, and 
the statement was never implemented when the country was facing political crises 
and an emergency situation in the second half of the 1950s. In this case, Ajip Rosidi 
did not exaggerate when he wrote that had “Sjafruddin's escape clause” been 
accepted and included in the Constitution of 1950, perhaps the regional complexities 
and other political problems could have been solved and the PRRI tragedy could 
have been avoided.669 Moreover, it is probable that Indonesia would be a better 
country nowadays.  
Sjafruddin was primarily a person of rational character. Therefore, in 
formulating his economic policies, he based his assessment on a rational and 
realistic consideration of the Indonesia’s situation at the time. This pragmatic 
disposition was also apparent in his politics. At the beginning of the New Order 
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regime, Sjafruddin avoided participating in party politics when it became clear that 
efforts to rehabilitate the Masyumi Party670 were rejected by the regime.671 Rather, 
he chose to focus his energy on other, non-political activities. He did not allow his 
disappointment to last long, arguing that there were still many opportunities for 
Muslims to make significant contributions in the realms of economics, education, 
socio-cultural inititatives, and others.672 Hence, in accordance with his expertise in 
economics and finance, Sjafruddin established with his friends an organization 
named Husami (Himpunan Usahawan Muslim Indonesia, Association of Indonesian 
Muslim Entrepreneurs) on July 24, 1967 that aimed to “learn and develop doctrines 
and rules of Islam in the financial and economic fields, assist and strengthen the 
economic efforts of Indonesian Muslims, and serve and contribute to the economic 
development of the state and the people of Indonesia.”673 
Sjafruddin argued that religion and morality could not and should not be 
separated from political and economic activity.674 He also disagreed with those who 
understood religion narrowly. He wrote: “Until now there are still too many leaders 
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who think that our country can be prosperous only with the Qur’an and Hadith. On 
the other hand, there are a great number of leaders who think that to be prosperous 
Indonesia does not require the help of religion, although they claimed to be 
Pancasilaist (adherents of Pancasila)”.675 Sjafruddin here chided conservative 
Muslims who understood religion purely through textual and normative approaches, 
ignoring the need for religious teachings to be interpreted with respect to their real-
world socio-historical context. In his view, they only emphasized religious 
obligations and forgot to address how these should be implemented (with the help 
of modern sciences) in real life.676 However, he also implicated a certain number of 
secular Indonesian leaders who regarded religion as playing no role in the life of 
society and the state; whereas the first principle of Pancasila, the belief in One 
Infinite God, implied that religious teachings should be taken into consideration in 
formulating government policies, especially those related to ethical-moral issues 
and which carried social consequences. Sjafruddin criticized the group for arguing 
that religion should be separate from the state or have no public role, as suggested 
by some elements within the New Order government. Sjafruddin assumed that 
religion, particularly Islam, could and must provide moral and ethical foundations 
for social, political and economic development by way of consistently implementing 
Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945.677 He clearly espoused modernity without 
secularism. 
Although realistically Sjafruddin chose to focus on non-political fields, 
accepting the new political reality in which civilian leaders of political parties during 
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the 1950s were blamed for the political and economic disarray, he still maintained 
his critical stance towards various army involvements and regime policies which he 
considered to have deviated from the principles of justice, democracy and rule of 
law. After describing the political atmosphere in which Islamic and other civilian and 
political leaders were removed from political life, he made the following remarks:  
  
Such circumstances are not surprising. Since the "political leadership" is held 
by the Armed Forces, then finally all the state officials and members of the 
House of Representatives, in the central and local governments, are treated 
as they are members of the Armed Forces. ... If they are not asked their 
opinion by their superiors, then subordinates should shut up. ... Criticism 
against superiors is forbidden and viewed as evil. In short, if we see that 
democracy in Indonesia is not running, error [according to the Indonesian 
Armed Forces] should not be attributed to the Armed Forces, but to all 
political parties because their actions [in the past] were undemocratic, and 
have gradually led to the Armed Forces being charged with the task to lead 
the state and nation in the political field. Whereas the Armed Forces are the 
last organization worth being burdened to hold political leadership in a state. 
... Why are the Armed Forces not really the most suitable agent to hold the 
charge of the political leadership of the state? Because according to their role, 
the Armed Forces are an organization that is dictatorial. If the Armed Forces’ 
nature does not prevail and they do not maintain a strong, steel-like 
discipline, then they cannot carry out their duties: to defend and destroy the 
enemies’ forces from the outside, sometimes also from the inside. The 
issuance of orders by supervisors, and the hearing and obeying of these 
orders on the part of subordinates, is a natural tendency of every good armed 
force.678 
 
Sjafruddin next asserted that the situation in Indonesia could be called 
‘normal’ if the political leadership, namely the power of government, were returned 
from the hands of the Armed Forces to civilian leaders. But he also realized that the 
situation at that time (1970s) was not right for civilian groups to take back political 
power. However, according to him, the political leadership of the Armed Forces must 
be declared a state of emergency, implying that sooner or later it must end. 
Sjafruddin worried that if the leadership of the Armed Forces continued without a 
deadline, the creative power of the people would be weakened and they could be 
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easily colonized, politically, economically, and culturally, by more powerful nations. 
Likewise, if the Armed Forces themselves were constantly busy taking care of 
civilian affairs such as government, economy, industry, commerce, agriculture, and 
tourism, among others, their mental strength and strict discipline would lapse and 
their combat power would be reduced. Sjafruddin asserted that the conditions 
which would allow for the transfer of political power back into the hands of civilians 
must be cultivated in a systematic and programmatic way. Therefore, he argued, the 
New Order government's development plan should address not only the economy 
but also social, political, and educational fields.679 
4.2.3. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara’s Rational and Independent Character 
Although Sjafruddin was rational in dealing with religious belief, political and 
economic affairs, and life in general, he was not a rationalist in the sense of 
rationalism defined as “the principle or habit of accepting reason as the supreme 
authority in matters of opinion, belief, or conduct”, or in its philosophical or 
theological meanings. So although Sjafruddin believed in reason and humans’ ability 
to improve their lives, he was aware of the limitations of human reason and science 
in understanding phenomena in the universe and in controlling the course of 
history. This belief can be seen in his articles about the events of Isrā’ and Miʿrāj (the 
Prophet Muhammad’s night journey from the Holy Mosque in Mekkah to al-Masjid 
al-Aqṣā in Jerusalem and his ascension to heaven). Sjafruddin believed that the event 
could only be understood fully by those who had received revelation or inspiration, 
such as a prophet or mystic. Those who had never received a revelation or 
inspiration, in his view, inevitably could only take one of two attitudes, either to 
believe or reject it. For the believers, there were two approaches: to accept it 
without reserve or to do so with a dose of scepticism. A scientific attitude neither a 
                                                          
679 Prawiranegara, “Peranan Islam,” 261. 
188 
 
priori rejected the truth of Isrā’ and Miʿrāj, nor did it a priori accept it; rather, it 
would try to approach the question from a variety of perspectives. If, having 
completed this process, there were reasonable grounds to hold that such an event 
could conceivably have taken place, then the belief in the events of Isrā’ and Miʿrāj 
becomes more robust rather than if one were to accept it without reserve and 
questioning.680 Based on that proposition Sjafruddin carefully and systematically 
discussed the Isrā’ and Miʿrāj from the point of view of philosophy, psychology, and 
natural science.681  
An interesting aspect of Sjafruddin’s exploration of the topic from a scientific 
angle is his meticulous examination, practical, down-to-earth conclusions, and frank 
criticism of Muslims. This kind of discussion was rarely carried out by Islamic 
leaders in the 1950s and 1960s. Before raising his own opinion Sjafruddin first 
explained the views of Western scientists—including, for example, those who 
embraced Marxism—as well as those of Muslim scholars, whether he approved of 
them or not. Only then did he comment on and critique those opinions.682 The 
following excerpts from the conclusion of his description of Isra' and Miʿrāj show 
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University of Indonesia, Jakarta on November 10, 1966. 
681 In his exposition of the topic Sjafruddin quoted JWN Sullivan’s book entitled The Limitations 
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experiences, Sigmund Freud's dream and distorted picture of reality, Jose Ortega Y Gasset on 
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discussed the opinions of Ahmad Hasan and K. H. Munawar Chalil, two reformist ʿulamā’ in 
Indonesia. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “Akal dan Kepercayaan,” in Islam Sebagai Pedoman Hidup, 
vol. 1 of Kumpulan Karangan Terpilih, ed. Ajip Rosidi (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1986), 58-66. 
This article was originally a speech delivered in Jakata in May 1951. Prawiranegara, “Isrā’ dan 
Miʿrāj,” 118-149.  
682 Prawiranegara, “Akal dan Kepercayaan,” 58-66; Prawiranegara, “Isrā’ dan Miʿrāj,” 67-83. The 
latter article was originally was a speech delivered at the Bandung Institute of Technology on 
April 3, 1954 at an occasion held by HMI (Association of Islamic University Students). 
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that methodology: “The story of Isrā’ and Miʿrāj gives a broad space of fantasy and it 
has been widely used by religious scholars who, in their burning desire to show the 
greatness of Allah SWT (subhānahū wa taʿālā, may God be glorified and exalted) and 
the uniqueness of Prophet Muhammad SAW (sallā Allahu ʿalayhi wa sallama, may 
God bless him and bestow peace upon him), have added to the story of Isra’ and 
Miʿrāj an assortment of fairy tales, so it is very difficult to separate the original ones 
from the additions.” In Sjafruddin’s opinion, the story of Isrā’ and Miʿrāj sufficed to 
be a miracle even without the additions.683 Yet Sjafruddin also criticized the Muslim 
scholars who wanted to prove the truth of Isrā’ and Miʿrāj in a “scientific way”. 
According to him, having just received a basic or intermediate Western education 
but not its philosophy and methodology, they did not realize that many things were 
beyond the ability of the ordinary mind or scientific knowledge to comprehend. 
They forgot that human reason was limited in scope. No matter how advanced 
human knowledge, according to Sjafruddin, there still remained much terra 
incognita, areas that were not and would not be known through human reason.684 
Hence, although Sjafruddin discussed Isrā’ and Miʿrāj from the persepectives of 
various branches of science and philosophy as explained above, he did not intend to 
prove their truth by modern scientific methods based on human reason, sensory 
experiences, and physical experiments. Instead the discussion was intended to 
demonstrate the limitations of modern science in understanding such vast and 
incalculable natural phenomena: that even methods of modern science could not 
guarantee absolute truth.685 
Sjafruddin also discusses extensively the issue of epistemology in economics 
and religion. Economists viewed the desire for material or monetary profit at the 
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190 
 
least cost as a basic principle of economics, on which were founded the law of supply 
and demand (wet van vraag en aanbord), the theory of value (waardeleer), and so 
forth. To economists, therefore, economics was a science no different from natural 
sciences such as physics, chemistry, biology, etc., all of which presumed objective 
knowledge through posited laws. Sjafruddin disagreed with these claims, because in 
his view, economic laws could only make relative claims about reality. He 
acknowledged that there were economic motives to human endeavors, but held that 
the strength of their influence was very dependent on the situation at hand. At times 
the economic motives which formed the basis of human actions were affected by 
other considerations. Though possible motivators are numerous, he had in mind in 
this article those considerations that were unique to Indonesian Muslims, such as 
the notion of the Sunnah; that is, the emulation of the lives of the prophets, saints, 
and scholars, all of whom based their actions on spiritual and otherworldly purposes 
rather than the economic imperative. Moreover, according to Sjafruddin, despite 
economists’ claims that their field allowed for a rapprochement of views since it was 
based on universal laws, there has been no shortage of disagreements throughout 
the history of economics-as-science due to the ideological, philosophical, and 
historical circumstances of the various thinkers and experts in the field. Hence, these 
differences are caused not simply by a lack of data (as it is often claimed), but rather 
are due to the fact that the laws the economists posit as universal are not universal 
at all, but rather contextual. One of these contextual factors is ideology, based on a 
particular worldview. Yet unlike religious traditions that consciously engage a 
hermeneutic tradition to draw out meaning from their sources—recognizing 
thereby that aspects of religious doctrines and practice are not ‘objective’ in the 
scientific sense—the ideological impulse of some economists is to reject the 
uncertainty of hermeneutics and assert a scientific correspondence between theory 
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and reality. Sjafruddin maintained that even the acquisition of ‘facts’ is 
predetermined by our subjective dispositions and motives. All sciences were based 
on facts acquired by human beings who had feelings, desires, beliefs, and interests. 
Though these subjective factors could be minimized, they remained nonetheless, and 
any science, including economics, was still largely driven by them.686 Sjafruddin 
seemed to consider the physical/natural sciences to be relatively neutral,687 but as 
for social sciences like economics, especially political economics, he argued firmly 
that they involved subjectivity and personal interest and were value-oriented and 
therefore not neutral.688 His conclusion was in line with that of Gunnar Myrdal in his 
discussion of economists’ systematic endeavor to solve practical and political 
problems and their belief in objective scientific knowledge of the facts. He wrote: 
                                                          
686 Prawiranegara, “Motif,” 32-34 and 38. It is important to note that Sjafruddin’s opinion is 
similar to that of Gunnar Myrdal, who wrote: “Every economist is painfully aware that there 
exists widespread doubt about the supposed ‘scientific’ character of economics. The distrust is, 
indeed, well founded. A branch of knowledge which works with a whole set of premises missing 
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conforms with his own ways of thinking. But what he can notice, whether he is versed in modern 
scientific methods or not, is the conspicuous lack of agreement among the various writers on the 
economic aspects of practical and political problems.” See Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element 
in the Development of Economic Theory, trans. Paul Streeten (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1969), xiii.  
687 Prawiranegara, “Isrā’ dan Miʿrāj,” 77-78. Sjafruddin’s opinion is similar to that of Joan 
Robinson, who wrote: “I think Professor Popper is wrong in saying that the natural sciences are 
no better than the social sciences. They have in common the human weakness to develop 
patriotism for one’s own work […] But on top of that, in the social sciences, first, the subject-
matter has much greater political and ideological content, so that other loyalties are also 
involved; and secondly, because the appeal to “public experience” can never be decisive, as it is 
for the laboratory scientists who can repeat each other’s experiments under controlled 
conditions, the social scientists are always left with a loophole to escape through […]” Joan 
Robinson, Economic Philosophy  (Penguin Books: 1962/1976), 27.     
688 Concerning the inability of economists to agree and the difference between economics and the 
natural sciences Sjafruddin’s opinion is similar to those of Myrdal and Hjalmar Branting, the great 
Swedish socialist leader who had a background in astronomy. On this subject, Myrdal quotes the 
Branting’s assertion: “Economics is not like the natural sciences, in which what one investigator 
has demonstrated to be true cannot be questioned by another authority, since the critic would 
then simply show that he is ignorant of the facts. In the field of economic science we still see 
school ranged against school; while the number of authentically recognized general truths is, 
unfortunately, still very small”. In Myrdal opinion, although Branting’s last statement was grossly 
exaggerated if it was intended to include purely scientific economic research, his indictment was 
a perfectly accurate description of the political doctrines foisted onto economics. See Myrdal, The 
Political Element, xiii.   
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“[t]his implicit belief in the existence of a body of scientific knowledge acquired 
independently of all valuations I soon found to be naïve empiricism.”689  
For Sjafruddin, science was not the only way to understand nature. He wrote 
that the spiritual ‘heart’ (qalb)690 was an organ sensitive to intuition and revelation, 
which were other ways of experiencing reality.691 While Sjafruddin appreciated the 
relative truth of modern science as it was displayed by numerous technological 
advances,692 he also argued that the benefit of science and technology should be 
employed for the protection of human beings and their natural environment rather 
than for their destruction. We see here Sjafruddin’s emphasis on the importance of 
moral and ethical values in the application of science and technology.693  
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McCarthy, S.J., trans., “Appendix V: Kitāb Sharḥ ʿAjāib al-Qalb,” in Deliverance from Error: An 
Annotated Translation of al-Munqidh min al ḍalāl and Other Relevant Works of al-Ghazālī 
(Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 1980), 309. Chapter al-Aʿrāf 7:179 of the Qur’an reads: “And certainly 
We have many of the jinn and people who are destined for hell, with hearts they do not use for 
comprehension, eyes they do not use for sight, ears they do not use for hearing. They are like 
cattle, no, even further astray: these are the ones who entirely heedless.” In a hadith the Prophet 
said: “[…] Verily, every king has a sanctuary, and Allah’s sanctuary is His prohibition. In the body 
there is a piece of flesh which, if it is sound, all of the body is sound, and which, if it is diseased, all 
of the body is diseased. This part of the body is the heart” (Recorded by Bukhārī and Muslim).” 
See Al-Ḥāfiz Zayn al-Dīn ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī, Jāmiʿ ‘l-ʿulūm wa ‘l-Ḥikam: fī Sharḥ khamsīn Ḥadīth 
min Jawāmiʿ al-Kalim (Al-Qāhira: Dār al-Bayān al-ʿArabī, 2005), 89.   
691 Prawiranegara, “Isrā’ dan Miʿrāj,” 132-140. 
692 Prawiranegara, “Isrā’ dan Miʿrāj,” 80. 
693 Prawiranegara, “Isrā’ dan Miʿrāj,” 75-81; Prawiranegara, “Motif,” 32-39; Sjafruddin 
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The belief in science as an objective, neutral, and value-free enteprise has 
been questioned within and outside of the scientific community.694 In Islamic circles, 
the issue has been taken into consideration by Ziauddin Sardar, among others.695 He 
examined the epistemology of modern science as based on an assumption which 
“raises reason to a level where it became the sole arbitrator of all human thought 
and actions, values and norms.”696 Consequently, “knowledge and values are kept in 
isolated, watertight compartments. The pursuit of knowledge becomes the arch 
value to which all other values, including the sacredness of life itself, are 
sacrificed.”697 However, according to Sardar, objective epistemology was no longer 
tenable. As human beings, scientists were not able to “exclude their values, biases 
and preferences from what they do.”698  
In his research, Sardar also found Muslims scholars who, despite taking a 
more critical attitude toward science, still upheld claims of its neutrality and 
universality. These included Z.A. Hashmi of the Pakistan Academy of Sciences and 
Waqar Ahmed Husaini, a visiting scholar at Stanford University and the Founder-
President, Institute of Islamic Sciences, Technology, and Development.699 Another 
group of scholars including Sardar himself, Munawar Ahmad Anees, and Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr proposed the idea of an Islamic science that “seeks to serve and 
promote the values of the world-view and civilization of Islam.”700 They believed 
that Islamic science had a unique character that “stems from its all-embracing 
emphasis on the unity of religion and science, knowledge and values, physics and 
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metaphysics.”701 Islamic science, according to Sardar, “can be used as the framework 
of a critique of modern science—a critique that would highlight the fact that the 
inhuman rationality of modern science can be tamed, indeed synthesized, with a 
humane vision of knowledge to the benefit of all mankind.”702 Hashmi argued that 
“for Muslim scientists to be in a position to eradicate the unwanted elements of 
Western science and technology, they must be trained in history and philosophy of 
science and have awareness of the future developments of science and 
technology.”703 His goals for a science-oriented policy in an Islamic polity included, 
among others, ensuring that science and technology systems were “directed towards 
the achievement of socio-economic goals, in particular the welfare of the people, 
economic growth, national security and cultural development.”704 Similarly, Husaini 
asserted that “Islamic environmental engineering and its associated technology paid 
particular attention to the proper use of natural resources, fulfilling the rights of 
natural habitats and wildlife, and promotion of socially desirable activities and 
cultural flowering.”705 However, he suggested that “Muslims can and should borrow 
and adopt from contemporary developed non-Muslim nations the material and 
technological culture more thoroughly and with greater freedom from concern for 
compatibility with Islamic ideological culture.”706 Although Sjafruddin was very 
critical of claims of the ‘objectivity’ of science, he did not share the idea of a so-called 
Islamic science espoused by scholars like Husaini and Sardar. 
Sjafruddin’s rational character also extended to the way he conducted 
politics, the result of which was his reputation as an independent leader and thinker. 
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For example, although he was close to Sjahrir, the first Indonesian Prime Minister, 
and Hatta, he nonetheness did not hesitate to take issue with certain of their views 
with which he did not agree. He criticized Sjahrir’s opinion regarding efforts to 
remedy the trouble and turmoil affecting the Indonesian nation. In Sjahrir’s 
1957lecture at Bandung, he maintained that prosperity, justice, safety, and the 
eradication of poverty in Indonesian society could be achieved if the Indonesian 
people relied on reason and formed regular plans and organizations. While 
supporting Sjahrir’s goals of upholding justice by eradicating poverty, and 
recognizing them as noble ideals, Sjafruddin nonetheless considered Sjahrir’s 
opinions and recommendations to be incomplete. According to Sjafruddin, the 
eradication of poverty and the building of a just and prosperous society must be 
preceded by the development and purification of the inner soul. Those able to 
eradicate poverty were those who had first freed their inner selves from the 
temptations of material comforts. Thus, in order to eradicate poverty people must be 
able to carry the burden of poverty if necessary and be capable of giving and 
sacrifice. Prescriptions for how to develop and purify the soul could only be 
provided by religion. This, according to Sjafruddin, was not covered by Sjahrir’s 
recommendations as per his materialistic socialist ideology, and was rarely found in 
the nomenclatures of other intellectual leaders.707  
Sjafruddin’s criticism of Hatta, meanwhile, was not fundamental. Sjafruddin 
criticized the attitudes of Hatta and other Indonesian leaders, including Sukarno, 
who collaborated with Japan. He saw them as having been so indoctrinated by 
Japanese propaganda that they were confident that the Japanese, thanks to their 
resilience, bushido spirit, and kamikaze forces, would not be defeated by the Allies. 
When the Japanese lost the war, Hatta and other Indonesian leaders continued to 
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have confidence that Japan would uphold its promise to grant Indonesia its 
independence in accordance with their samurai spirit even when they were facing 
their collapse. Sjafruddin regarded this attitude as naive, and ultimately, as 
instructed by the Allies, the Japanese military authority forbade any change to the 
status quo, which meant forgoing efforts towards Indonesian independence and a 
planned meeting of the Committee for Preparation of Indonesian Independence 
(PPKI) formed by the Japanese authority.708 Sjafruddin also criticised Hatta for his 
overly-cautious attitude in making decisions. For example, Sjafruddin proposed to 
President Sukarno and Hatta that they issue a national Indonesian currency as a 
substitute for Japanese currency and Dutch-East Indies currency (issued by De 
Javasche Bank) to signify a new, independent nation-state. At first Hatta firmly 
rejected the proposal for the issuance of currency, though he eventually approved it 
after being swayed by Sjafruddin’s various sensible arguments.709 The above 
criticisms notwithstanding, Sjafruddin agreed with Hatta and Sjahrir on many points 
including Indonesian foreign policy, advocating maintaining a balance between the 
Soviet Union and Western democratic countries in the early years of 
independence.710 On the whole, Hatta and Sjahrir were two leaders who were highly 
respected by Sjafruddin.711 
Sjafruddin was also among the few politicians during the 1950s who were 
able to avoid parochialism in party politics. He criticized leaders and members of his 
own party, Masyumi, who suggested that a number of Masyumi’s entrepreneurs 
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should receive licenses from the government for the export and import of goods—
standard practice in other parties—the profits from which would be shared and 
used to finance the party’s activities. According to Sjafruddin, this would surely lead 
to corruption, collusion, and a client state, and would eventually split and ruin the 
party. He stressed that the party should be financed voluntarily by its members so 
that the party itself would become independent in performing its functions and 
achieving its ideals; it should not become a tool in the hands of a few rich 
contributors, something that Sjafruddin saw as a common occurrence in 
democracies. Finally, according to Sjafruddin, if the party could not survive on the 
contributions of its members and the party’s functionaries were looking for a 
solution that violated the law and ethics, then it was better to simply disband the 
party.712 What Sjafruddin feared in the year 1951 has been and continues to be a 
reality in many democratic countries, including Indonesia today. Most political 
parties are primarily a tool in the hands of a small group of their wealthy leaders by 
which to gain power and even more money. Most party financing is obtained from 
conglomerates and large companies, both foreign and domestic, or through 
corruption such as bribery. Contributions from members usually do not function so 
as to afford members a strong role in determining the direction and policies of the 
party.  
In addition, Sjafruddin often had differences of opinion with Natsir. 
Sjafruddin observed: 
I feel I now belong to the past, but nevertheless my ideas may be helpful in 
the future, especially my interpretation of Islam. Even with Natsir I often 
differ. He was brought up in an environment where the Dutch had come to be 
regarded as enemies not so much because of colonialism, but because of their 
religion. Sadly, most Muslims in Indonesia were taught to identify other 
religions, especially the Christian faith adhered to by the Dutch, with 
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oppression. In other parts of the world where Muslims were once colonized 
by a Western power, they are also affected by this misconception.713 
 
The differences between Sjafruddin and Natsir have been briefly described in Part 
One, but it is a point worth further emphasizing here. One of these differences was 
that Sjafruddin was able to sustain the cosmopolitan and inclusive characters of 
Western-educated leaders of Masyumi in the 1950s.714 Sjafruddin was also more 
willing to contribute his thoughts, not only in the form of criticism of the New Order 
regime policy, but also in the form of constructive and detailed suggestions, 
especially in economic development affairs. While Natsir was more concerned with 
the question of "Ummah Unity", moral condition of society, and as such was 
preoccupied with the spread of Christian activity, Sjafruddin talked more about the 
problems facing the nation in general and provided advice and criticism for the 
Muslim community. He suggested that Muslims needed to have a more rational view 
of religion and be practical in their social programs. Sjafruddin was also more sober 
in his response to the spread of Christianity from Catholic and Protestant churches 
in the aftermath of the 1965 communist purge. He suggested that Muslims should 
simply be running the same active mission (daʿwa) and needed to work harder. He 
also criticized the attitude of Muslims who only protested and complained of the 
vigorous missionary activities to spread Christianity in poor and isolated 
communities and former members or sympathizers of PKI, and condemned Muslims 
who took the law into their own hands by way of destroying churches. According to 
him, "protest without being accompanied by counter-missionary activity and real 
deeds, only to be interpreted as Muslim impotence and emptiness of teachings of 
Islam. Acts of violence without being based on a decision of a judge or another 
competent legal authority will be interpreted as the barbarity of Islam and its 
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people. Although their case was strong from a legal perspective, but vigilante actions 
will easily bring us to the limit which is prohibited by Islam. Taking their own 
actions will only increase the conviction of people who view Islam as an orthodox 
and destructive force ...".715  Such criticism is rarely leveled by the leaders of Islam 
openly. Similarly, his response to the renewal movement of understanding Islam 
brought up by the “young modernists” pioneered by Nurcholish Madjid was not 
critical, nor did he demonstrate a reactionary attitude toward it. He saw it as a 
normal affair.716  
Emphasizing his humanistic understanding of Islam, Sjafruddin said that he 
regretted that many Muslims still viewed Christianity as an enemy of Islam. Then he 
said: 'This attitude changed after independence, but still has its adherents. I think 
many mistakes in economics and politics are due to a lack of understanding by many 
Muslims about what Islam really stands for. I know, because of my religious 
education, that humanity is ultimately the purpose of all things.”717 
In conclusion, Sjafruddin’s pattern of political, social, economic, and religious 
thought could be understood in terms of modern values such as rationality, 
constitutionalism, rule of law, and human equality. He called on Muslims and 
Indonesians to pay more attention to matters with long-term benefit such as 
education, public goods investment, and other practical programs in accordance 
with existing conditions, needs, and available resources.718 This pragmatic, realistic 
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approach led him to eschew many of the romantic aspirations of the revolutionary 
period, such as the popular sentiment that Indonesian independence could be 
defended solely through armed resistance without requiring the politics of 
diplomacy or negotiations with international forces.719 Later, he called upon 
Muslims to resist grandiose longings for external or material pride, such as the 
desire to establish a Muslim country or to make Indonesia a great military power. 
Rather, he enjoined them to take Islam primarily as a spiritual and moral force.720 
There were in his writings a strong concern for humanity, an absence of xenophobic 
anti-foreign feelings, a deep tolerance of and sensitivity toward non-Muslims,721 and 
a persistent call to uphold social justice and freedom of opinion and to promote an 
open and critical attitude.722 
PART FIVE: SJAFRUDDIN PRAWIRANEGARA ON ISLAM, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND 
DEVELOPMENT  
The purpose of this part of the dissertation is to map out the nature, development 
and stages of Sjafruddin’s thoughts on Islam, social justice, and economic 
development. His engagement with the issues spanned his career in various 
government positions during the post-independence period. During his life in prison 
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as president of De Javasche Bank; Dr. A Oudt, general advisor in the Indonesian Ministry of 
Finance in 1950s; and Prof. Logemann, Sjafruddin’s teacher in RHS (Rechts Hoge School, High 
School of Law). Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 43-44, 171-174, and 183.    
722 Prawiranegara, “Kesulitan-kesulitan,” 71; Prawiranegara, “Dasar Politik Kemakmuran,” 104;  
Prawiranegara “Recollections,” 107. 
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and after his release on July 1966, he continued to address them as a widely-
respected public leader. This part consists of four chapters. Chapter one will discuss 
Sjafruddin’s view of social justice in the context of the debate between capitalism 
and socialism. Although with the demise of communist states in Eastern Europe this 
issue seems no longer relevant to contemporary developments, it was a popular 
ideological debate among Muslim leaders and thinkers during the twentieth century. 
They tended to believe that Islam occupied the middle position between, and was an 
alternative to, the two dominant ideologies, namely socialism and capitalism. 
Chapter two discusses Sjafruddin's view of the meaning of development. Here I 
explore how Sjafruddin argued for a concept of development that involved more 
than just the achievement of material prosperity. This chapter also addresses how 
the pursuit of freedom of opinion and the realization of social justice are often 
compromised for the sake of economic development. Chapter three discusses 
Sjafruddin’s view on ribā, usury, which is prohibited by the teachings of Islam. At 
issue is whether bank interest is ribā or not. To provide a clearer understanding of 
the issue, it also presents the opinion of Muslim scholars who have developed a 
conception of Islamic economics of which one of the pillars is the lack of use of 
interest in the financial and banking system. Chapter four discusses in greater detail 
Sjafruddin’s policies, proposals, and ideas concerning economic development from 
1946 to the 1980s. Was there a consistent pattern of ideas? Which of his policies and 
ideas on economic development were related to the issue of social justice, given the 
prominence of this discourse both before and after independence? Was there any 
notable change in his views on economic development when he was no longer a 
government official? Finally, what lessons can be drawn from Sjafruddin’s ideas 
about economic development and social justice for Indonesians and Muslims today?  
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5.1. Chapter One: Social Justice in Islam between Capitalism and Socialism 
Sjafruddin’s thinking on social justice in Islam, capitalism, and socialism was 
part of Muslim thinkers’ responses to the problems being faced by the newly-
independent Indonesia and the economic and political conditions of modern society. 
Many Muslim intellectuals and leaders during the Dutch colonial era, most of whom 
generally adhered to religious socialism, attempted to identify an Islamic position on 
socio-economic matters in a way that offered a viable alternative to both exploitative 
capitalism and materialistic socialism. This line of thought has been articulated in 
the writings of H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, H. Agoes Salim, and Mohammad Hatta.723 
Similarly, in post-independence Indonesia several writers such as Jusuf Wibisono, 
Kahruddin Yunus, and H. M. Rasjidi, as well as the later generation of Muslim 
intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid, M. Dawam Rahardjo, and Fachry Ali, 
produced notable studies on the issue.724 Not all of them were called or called 
                                                          
723 Tjokroaminoto, Islam dan Sosialisme. Salim was a prominent leader of Sarekat Islam (SI), 
beside H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, serving as vice president of the organization as well as its chief 
ideologue opposing communists in SI. He was also a mentor on Islam for many Indonesian 
nationalist leaders including Soekarno, Hatta, and Mohammad Roem. See Deliar Noer, The 
Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 
1973), 119, 122-124; Anwar Abbas, Bung Hatta dan Ekonomi Islam: Menangkap Makna 
Maqashid al Syariʿah (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010), 157; Mohammad Hatta wrote many articles on 
economic topics and their relationship with Islam and Indonesian economic development, 
including “Sosialisme Indonesia” [Indonesian Socialism], in Karya Lengkap Bung Hatta, Buku 3, 
Perdamaian Dunia dan Keadilan Sosial [Complete Works of Bung Hatta, Book 3, World Peace and 
Social Justice], ed. Emil Salim (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1998), 556-564, and “Islam dan Pembangunan 
Masyarakat” [Islam and Societal Development], in Kumpulan Pidato [Collected Speeches], vol. 2, 
ed. I. Wangsa Widjaja and Meutia F. Swasono (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 2002), 150-181.   
724 Jusuf Wibisono, Islam dan Sosialisme (Jakarta: Pustaka Islam, 1950); Rasjidi was the first 
Minister of Religious Affairs of the newly independent Indonesia (1945-1946). He obtained his 
Ph.D. from the Sorbonne University and became a professor at the Institute of Islamic Studies, 
McGill University, in the 1960s. After the aborted Communist coup in 1965 he wrote a pamphlet 
entitled Islam dan Socialisme (Jakarta: Jajasan Islam Studi Club Indonesia, 1966); Nurcholish 
Madjid (1940-2005) was Rector of University of Paramadina (1998-2005), Jakarta, and a well-
known Neo-Modernist thinker in Indonesia. He very much appreciated the idea of religious 
socialism. He asserted in 1974 that the organization he once led, HMI, was “growing in the 
direction of the pattern of thought within Masyumi in the year 1948; namely, socialism and 
religiousness in accord with Pantja Sila and the Constitution of 1945… as well as non-exclusivism 
in socio-political intercourse.” Madjid’s declaration, according to Hassan, was confirmation of 
religious socialism as the unproclaimed ideology of HMI in the near future and its (as well as 
Majid’s) commitment to social justice. See Hassan, “Contemporary,” 210-211. See also Madjid’s 
articles, “Cita-cita Keadilan Sosial dalam Islam” [The Ideals of Social Justice in Islam], “Prospek 
Sosialisme-Religius di Indonesia” [The Prospect of Religious Socialism in Indonesia]; and 
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themselves religious-socialists. However, the central concern of all these writings 
was the desire to improve the lives of Muslims through the realization of social 
justice based on the teachings of Islam, rather than submitting to what they 
considered to be an exploitative capitalism and a materialist socialism. The older 
generation of Muslim intellectuals, especially those who were active before 
independence and before the banning of PKI in 1966, also engaged with the issue of 
social justice in an attempt to fend off Communist influence and reclaim control 
through an Islamic framework.  
This context is particularly important to keep in mind when we examine one 
of Sjafruddin’s most important contributions during the early period of his 
engagement with the issue of social justice: an essay entitled “Islam dalam 
Pergolakan Dunia” [Islam in the World’s Turbulence]. He wrote the work under 
special circumstances, completing it on May 31, 1949 while presiding over the 
Emergency Government of Republic of Indonesia (PDRI) in the jungles of Sumatra. 
At that time, the Indonesian nation was struggling to defend its independence 
proclaimed in 1945. Many Republican leaders, including the president and vice 
president, were under the custody of the Nederlandsch Indië Civil Administratie 
(NICA), Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, the civil authority established by 
the Dutch government to regain control of Indonesia after Japanese capitulation to 
the Allied forces in 1945.725  
                                                                                                                                                                      
“Keprihatinan: Suatu Jalan Menuju Keadilan Sosial” [Concern: A Path to Social Justice], in Madjid, 
Islam, Kemodernan, dan Keindonesiaan, ed. Agus Edi Santoso (Bandung: Mizan, 1429/2008), 87-
108; M. Dawam Rahardjo is Chairman of Board Director of Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat 
(Institute for the Study of Religion and Philosophy, LSAF), Jakarta and Professor of Economics at 
Muhammadiyah University, Malang, in East-Java. See Rahardjo, “Ekonomi Islam: Mendayung di 
antara Dua Karang Sosialisme dan Kapitalisme,” in Perspektif Deklarasi Makkah: Menuju 
Ekonomi Islam (Bandung: Mizan, 1987), 121-129; Fachry Ali is director of the Institute for the 
Study and Development of Business Ethics. See Fachry Ali, Islam, Ideologi Dunia dan Dominasi 
Struktural (Bandung: Mizan, 1984). 
725 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 337-339 and 391-428; Ricklefs, A History, 265-269. 
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In addition, the essay was written in the midst of the turbulent international 
situation following the end of the Second World War. Renewed tensions between the 
Soviet Union, which controlled Eastern Europe, and the United States, with its allies 
in Western Europe, spread to various parts of the world including Asia, the Middle 
East and Africa. In China, the Communists had just won a war against Western-
backed Chinese nationalists in 1949. In 1950 the Korean War would break out, 
involving alliances and oppositions familiar from the Second World War. Many 
nations, including Muslim ones, were dragged into the ideological and military 
conflicts. In Indonesia, the global rivalry between the capitalist West and the 
communist Soviets also had an impact on the struggle for independence (1945-
1949). The Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir governments, backed by Islamic, socialist-
democrat and nationalist parties, adopted a strategy of diplomacy and negotiations 
with international forces and countries including the UN, the United States, Britain 
and Australia, to face the Dutch. In contrast, PKI and several other leftist groups 
rejected diplomacy and emphasized armed resistance with the help of Moscow. A 
rebellion spearheaded by PKI on September 18, 1948 took place less than two 
months after veteran Indonesian Communist leader Muso returned from Moscow 
with the intention of implementing the so-called Gottwald Plan: to duplicate in 
Indonesia what Czechoslovakian Communist leader Klement Gottwald had just 
accomplished in Czechoslovakia.726 The tumultous world situation inspired 
Sjafruddin to give his essay the title “Islam in the World’s Turbulence”. 
According to Sjafruddin himself, his writing was an expression of his sense of 
responsibility to the struggle, suffering, and sacrifices of the Indonesian people in 
their fight for independence. These writings included his reflections on Indonesia’s 
struggle for independence and were introspective and critical of Indonesians and 
                                                          
726 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 272-275 and 290-294. 
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Muslims.727 Hence his writings, as he himself revealed, “are not [intended] to show 
the greatness of Islam—[something] we don’t need to preach, because Islam does 
not require it—but this book was written primarily to show the insularity and 
conservatism of the Muslims which have degraded Islam. This book is not meant to 
exacerbate zelfgenoegzaamheid, a self-satisfied feeling [of smugness or superiority] 
that prevails in the Islamic ummah.”728 
In this article, Sjafruddin did not attempt to discern the fine theoretical 
differences between socialism, Marxism, and communism. Rather, his goal was to 
examine why these ideologies were embraced by many of his Muslim compatriots 
before independence as well as during the struggle to defend the newly-independent 
nation. Sjafrudin observed that adherents both of these ideologies and of Islam held 
in high esteem the ideals of social justice and the elevation of the poor, 
downtrodden, and oppressed classes of society. That the capitalist order was seen as 
largely responsible for these inequalities further brought together activists of both 
persuasions. Sjafruddin also reminded readers that in the national struggle against 
Dutch colonialism, communists and Muslims fought side by side, almost as one 
bloc.729 In the period from 1926 to 1927, communists and many Islamic scholars, 
ʿulamā’, joined the uprising together against the Dutch colonial government in 
western Sumatra and western Java, provoking the colonial government to impose 
regulations on religious instruction and to increase surveillance and repression of 
oppositions to Dutch rule in general.730 During that time the distinction between 
communist and Muslim was not clear, and most probably did not truly understand 
                                                          
727 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 1-3. 
728 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 3-4. 
729 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 7. 
730 Noer, Modernist Movement, 176-177; Lindblad, “The Late Colonial State,” 122. 
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the fundamental differences between the two.731 Therefore, Sjafruddin realized the 
importance of the initial growth of communism in Indonesia and that many 
Muslims—even at the time of the writing of this essay—were interested in and had 
even joined the communist ranks because of that lack of understanding.732 
Sjafruddin wrote this essay on May 1949, less than a year after PKI, the 
Indonesian Communist Party, and other leftist groups launched a rebellion to take 
over power and establish a Soviet state in September 1948. Many ʿulamā’ and 
landlords in the villages of East Java were massacred by the communists because 
they were considered to be part of the bourgeois class.733 Sjafruddin saw that 
Muslims were becoming victims at the hands of the increasingly-powerful 
communists. For many years the latter had been successful in recruiting many 
people to PKI through the propagation of revolutionary slogans, populist fervor, and 
the utopian promise of socio-economic equality.734 All these were exacerbated by 
the ignorance of many Islamic leaders regarding the teachings of communism. 
Sjafruddin thus felt the need to explain in detail the differences between Islam and 
Marxism/communism, in hopes that Muslims would be able to discern Islamic 
                                                          
731 Many of Sjafruddin’s relatives whom he knew to be religious people, including Islamic 
scholarsʿulamā’, involved in the uprising. They were arrested on the accusation that they were 
Communists and were banished to Boven Digoel (Upper Digul) in New Guinea/Papua. These 
events made him question the communist doctrine which had led him to study communism and 
socialism in a relatively young age. See Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 26-27.  
732 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 7. 
733 Ricklefs, A History, 459-461. 
734 Ricklefs, A History, 209; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 315. A similar tactic was also 
employed by the Murba Party, founded on November 7, 1948 by supporters of Tan Malaka 
(Datuk Ibrahim Gelar Sutan Malaka), a nationalist-communist group which was a bitter enemy of 
PKI. In an effort to attract the masses as much as possible, a number of formulas were prepared 
to make prospective members feel content with the party, either on religious ground or due to 
doctrinal ideological attitudes. Its secretary-general, Sjamsu Harja Udaja, stated that the party 
was “based upon religion, nationalism, and socialism, with the purpose of strengthening the 
independence of the Republic [and that] prior to the attainment of full Indonesian independence 
the party would not lay too much stress on ideology.”  
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teachings and principles from the secular Marxist and communist ideologies, and 
thereby become less susceptible to their influence.735  
Though this article addresses the political situation in Indonesia during the 
early period of independence, it also reveals some of Sjafruddin’s early thought on 
the issue of social justice. In what follows, I shall highlight some of the important 
discussions in the article and extract some basic ideas that would continue to 
characterize Sjafruddin’s thought in later works. Sjafruddin argued that the 
difference between Marxism and Islam on the issue of social justice originated from 
a more fundamental disagreement over human nature and worldview. Given this, 
they would necessarily differ regarding the sort of things that were achievable by 
human action in the world, the proper manner in which these were to be achieved, 
and, more importantly, for what purpose.736 
Three things become the target of Sjafruddin’s criticism of Marxism and 
communism: the failure of Marxism to justify the objective line it drew between the 
proletariat and the capitalist and its call for class struggle,737 communism’s 
simplistic view of human beings and society,738 and the utopian nature of 
                                                          
735 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 70-74; Ricklefs, A History, 206-209. The success of the 
Indonesian Communist Party, PKI, founded in 1924, in mobilizing the masses, was determined by 
the radicalism of its ideology, its infiltration of ISDV (Sociaal-Democratische Indies Vereeniging, 
the Indies Social-Democratic Association) which was the precursor to PKI, to Sarekat Islam, the 
largest nationalist mass organization at that time. Even PKI’s early leadership came from within 
the leadership of Sarekat Islam. For many ordinary people, differences between Islam and 
communism became blurred or unclear. Haji Misbach, "the red Haji", was the leader of the 
Islamic Communism movement which taught that Islam and communism were synonymous. 
736 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 8-9. 
737 According to Marxism, capitalists are the class of people who possess and control the means of 
production (capital) in the society. But according to Sjafruddin, this measure actually has no 
objective meaning because capital is every tool that can generate or add to necessities of human 
life. In this sense no one will escape being considered a capitalist. He concluded that Marxism 
failed to provide a theoretical basis to justify the class struggle for communists unless they abuse 
Marxism itself. Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 9-10. 
738 Sjafruddin asserted that communism ignored human individuality, whereas in reality each 
human being owned his or her own unique body, will, and feelings. However, human individuals 
also had a “feeling of unity” amongst themselves in the form of family, class, nation, or even the 
unity of humankind. The feeling of unity among all human beings was dismissed by the 
communists who only emphasized the conflict and difference between the two classes, the 
proletariat and the capitalist. Conflicts between other social collectives such as nation-states 
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Marxism.739 From these criticisms arose one fundamental difference between 
Marxism and Islam on the question of how social justice was to be achieved. For the 
latter, differences of class could not be entirely eradicated since these were 
preordained by God and were consequently part of the natural condition of the 
created order. Therefore, the Islamic approach to inequality would be one that did 
not encourage or intensify disparities, let alone justify class antagonism as a means 
to establish social justice.740 In Sjafruddin’s view, because of its determinist vision 
and simplistic understanding of human beings and society, Marxist socialism could 
not avoid adopting a utilitarian principle to achieve its goal of a classless society. 
Sjafruddin’s criticism was based on the writings of Alexander Miller, who wrote 
more extensively on the totalitarian structure of a Marxist utopia and its inherent 
incompatibility with religion—in his case, Christianity.741 Sjafruddin agreed with 
Miller’s argument that if the highest human, moral, or social end has an absolute, 
historically-immanent form as a classless society, all worldly means to achieve it can 
be justified.742 Marxist socialism did not consider individual human beings to be 
ends in themselves; humans were valued only insofar as was determined by the 
interests of their respective class structures. For Sjafruddin, the pattern of purges, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
were either disregarded or considered to be less compelling, despite the fact that, of the wars 
fought in the past centuries until modern times almost all of them were between nations. 
Sjafruddin concluded that communism overlooked many realities of human life. Prawiranegara, 
“Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 10-11. 
739 Sjafruddin explained of the utopian nature of Marxism as follows: “... [A]ccording to Marxism, 
ultimately, as a result of the proletarian revolution, classless society will rise in the world. A 
heilstaat, ‘paradise’ in which there will be no longer groups who oppress and groups who are 
oppressed. On the contrary, according to the Islamic teaching, as long as there are human 
[society] in this world, it will still be various groups, there will still be poor and wealthy classes. 
According to Islam ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ was just relatieve begrippen [relative terms], the words that 
indicate the circumstances are always changing, not fixed, do not have certain limits. Therefore, 
the way Islam tries to realize social justice, the Islamic way to improve the lot of the poor, are in 
principle different with the way that used by the communists”. Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam 
Pergolakan Dunia,” 8.  
740 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 8 and 10-11; Kahin, Nationalism and 
Revolution, 270. 
741 Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 91.  




violence, and intimidation (read: class struggle) in the pursuit of the Marxist utopia 
was a natural consequence of its inability to consider individual agency as separate 
from class and at times not conforming to expectations of the Marxist theory of class 
system. Sjafruddin was witness to such purges when, on September 1948, PKI and 
other leftist groups that were incorporated into the People’s Democratic Front 
(FDR) attempted to seize power. Many Muslims, including ʿulamā’, were massacred 
because they were considered to be part of the bourgeoisie. Sjafruddin wrote that 
PKI and its supporters attacked a category of people that existed only in the 
imagination, constructed out of a simplistic view of how human society was 
organized and how individual agency operated therein. In fact, those who suffered 
and became victims were not a “class” but were simply fellow human beings. The 
incident deeply affected Sjafruddin and prompted him to warn his audience away 
from the extreme consequences of Marxist-communist ideology.743 
Sjafruddin argued that unlike the structural utopia of communism that 
sought to abolish the suffering of the weak and oppressed classes, Islam focused on 
the more realistic goal of alleviating people’s burdens by way of redistribution of 
wealth from the well-off through the mechanism of the obligatory alms tax, the 
zakāt.744 Sjafruddin’s point was that whatever efforts were made to achieve social 
justice, inequality and poverty would never be completely eradicated, even in a 
society that has prospered. The idea, however, was not to focus on the fact of 
inequality per se, which was inescapable, but to address that problem by increasing 
prosperity, both material and spiritual. Although not exactly identical, Sjafruddin’s 
position was thus closer to the liberal model of social welfare where inequalities 
were tolerated if it meant the general elevation of people’s standard of living. The 
liberal model is described in Peter L. Berger’s observation that though it is true that 
                                                          
743 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 9-12. 
744 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 8. 
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industrial capitalism is not necessarily linked with equality, and that the rich have 
been the principle beneficiaries of this system, the working class in industrial 
countries nonetheless enjoy a greater standard of living than ever before and this 
has egalitarian consequences.745 Sjafruddin was, of course, less sure about the 
egalitarian possibilities based on a thoroughly material standard. He believed that 
spiritual intelligence was also required if the people were to be truly independent 
and prosperous, rather than being enslaved by the ideals of a materially-good life. In 
addition, Sjafruddin, as we shall see in his criticisms of New Order economic 
development, did not attempt to justify an extreme or increasing gap between the 
rich and the poor or among other segments of society. The important thing for 
Sjafruddin was that in the midst of material inequalities, efforts at distributive 
justice of personal income and wealth be made continually and systematically, in 
order to improve the living conditions of society and elevate people’s standards of 
living. This realization of social justice, according to Sjafruddin, was the way of 
Islam.746Another fundamental difference was that whereas Islam held that 
                                                          
745 Peter L. Berger, “Introduction: America and the Myth of Inequality,” in Modern Capitalism, vol. 
1 of Capitalism and Equality in America, ed. Peter L. Berger (Lanham, MD: Institute for 
Educational Affairs and Hamilton Press, 1987), 3-4.  
746 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 8-9. Sjafruddin did not elaborate further on 
this point due to his recently-acquired and limited knowledge of Islam as well as the fact that this 
tract was written in the midst of guerrilla warfare in the jungles of Sumatra. On the issue of 
distributive justice in Islam, see, for example, Munawar Iqbal, ‘Introduction’, in Distributive 
Justice and Need Fulfilment in an Islamic Economy, rev. ed., ed. Munawar Iqbal, (Islamabad: 
International Institute of Islamic Economics, International Islamic University and the Islamic 
Foundation, 1988), 16-17 and 22-23. Iqbal summarized distributive justice as consisting of three 
points: guaranteed fulfilment of the basic needs of all; equity but not equality in personal income; 
and elimination of extreme inequalities in personal income and wealth. All authors in this book 
agree on the following points, among others: that an Islamic view of justice permits interpersonal 
differences in income due to natural differences in human talent and capacity which would affect 
each person’s earning and contribution; that zakāt is one of permanent and compulsory schemes 
of distributive and redistributive measures; and that there are spiritual purposes of economic 
distribution such as mutual love and brotherhood. See also Ahmad H. Mustafa and Hossein G. 
Askari, “The Economic Implications of Land Ownership and Land Cultivation in Islam,” in 
Distributive Justice and Need Fulfilment in an Islamic Economy, rev. ed., ed. Munawar Iqbal 
(Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Economics, International Islamic University and the 
Islamic Foundation, 1988), 91- 95. The followings are several Qur’anic verses which highlight 
this idea: (Al-Naḥl 16:71): “God has given some of you more provision than others…” Another 
verse (Al-Anʿām 6:165): “It is He who made you successors on the earth and raises some of you 
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happiness was achieved through spiritual goods, Marxism as well as capitalism 
measured happiness through material criteria. He singled out Marxism from other 
materialist doctrines because it developed a normative system that fostered a 
feeling of hatred and resentment towards a class of people based on the structural 
imbalance of material possession.747 Sjafruddin did not deny that this imbalance was 
often unjustified, but maintained that the search for human happiness should be 
sought in spiritual or non-material deeds, such as the sincere practice of altruism 
and devotion to God.748 
For Sjafruddin, the Marxist normative system was a result of its doctrine of 
historical-materialism that viewed human beings as results of society’s means of 
production. Higher spiritual values, if any, were based solely on, and determined by, 
the state of the material. According to this understanding there was nothing outside 
the material world: no power, authority, geest (spirit), or God, and so forth. 
Knowledge, art, religion, and morality were rooted in and determined by material 
causation.749 For Sjafruddin, historical-materialism not only presented a limited 
understanding of human nature and the world, but was also internally inconsistent. 
According to him, “…if the ‘dialectical’ materialism is true, then historical 
materialism should lead to determinism, [the] belief that human beings have no will 
                                                                                                                                                                      
above others in rank, to test you through what He gives you. [Prophet], your Lord is swift in 
punishment, yet He is most forgiving and merciful.” Another verse, al-Hashr 59:7, reads: 
“Whatever gains God has turned over to His Messenger from the inhabitants of the villages 
belong to God, the Messenger, kinsfolk, orphans, the needy, the traveller in need—this is so that 
they (properties) do not just circulate among those of you who are rich…”  
747 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 9. 
748 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 9. Many verses of the Qur’an state this view, 
for example: Chapter al-Hashr 59:9: ‘Those who were already firmly established in their homes 
[in Medina], and firmly rooted  in faith, show love for those who migrated to them for refuge and 
harbor no desire in their hearts for what has been given to them. They give them preference over 
themselves, even if they too are poor; those who are saved from their own souls’ greed are truly 
successful’. Another verse in Chapter al-Insān 76:8-9 reads: “[T]hey give food to the poor, the 
orphan, and the captive, though they love it themselves, saying, ‘We feed you for the sake of God 
alone: We seek neither recompense nor thanks from you.’”    
 
 
749 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 12. 
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of their own; that all things, their actions, their fate, have been determined in 
advance according to a law that  cannot be avoided (nature or karma).”750 But in his 
view, contrary to the requirement of its consistency, “…historical materialism 
produces an ism and confidence in the ability and the power of the proletariat which 
gave a resolute élan to the followers of Marx, an ability to do (daadkracht) and 
activity that for long time have shaken and amazed the whole world! Strength of will 
to dismantle the old structure of society could only happen to human beings who are 
fully convinced of the sanctity and truth of their goal, an ability to sacrifice free from 
any affinity to material objects.”751 For Sjafruddin, a Marxist view of history did not 
make space for individual agency; yet the sort of individual agency that could affect 
historical and social structures seemed to be assumed in the call for a proletariat 
movement. Furthermore, he argued here that though ostensibly the proletariat was 
moved by the material, their assuredness and passion resembled a desire for 
transcendence beyond material determinations. Indeed, Sjafruddin observed that 
the ability of Marxism to evoke such a strong spirit of revolution and confidence 
among its followers was similar to the strength and conviction generated by the past 
prophets. The difference was that the starting point from which religions evoked the 
spirit of their followers was the worship of God and the feelings of love and affection 
towards fellow human beings. Marxism, on the other hand, aroused resentment and 
feelings of revenge against a particular class of people. 752 
This line of thought in refuting historical materialism has been echoed by 
many Muslim scholars such as Muṣṭafā Maḥmūd and Murtazā Mutahharī. Maḥmūd, 
for example, asserted that Marxism’s past successes—the fact that millions had 
adopted it—was by no means evidence of its validity. Marxism had managed to 
                                                          
750 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 13. 
751 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 13. 
 
752 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 13-14. 
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arouse the resentment of the lower class against their oppressors and offered the 
possibility to settle their grievances. They responded to an ideology that offered 
very concrete and material instruments with which to change their fate. In Maḥmūd 
own words: “As an idea, Marxism was purely an invitation to revenge.”753 Muṭahharī 
had a similar opinion when he explained why materialism became so attractive for 
many youth who aspired to participate in the struggle against colonialism, 
exploitation and despotism. The youth, he said, watched “the supporters of 
materialism […] lead uprisings, revolutions, battles and struggles, while theists or 
religious people are mostly static and neutral.”754 For him, the spread of materialism 
was not due to its logical or convincing arguments, but to the fact that its 
propagation employed new techniques that provided an ideology of resistance and 
struggle for the oppressed and lower classes.755 Clearly, Mutahhari’s primary 
concern was the spread of materialism among the Iranian youth in the 1960s and 
1970s which often resulted in their becoming atheists or leaving Islam.756   
Sjafruddin wrote that the deep conviction and confidence that inspired those 
who endeavored to realize Marxist ideology in society reminded him of the fervor 
often displayed by followers of religious movements.757 It was through these 
                                                          
753 Mustafa Mahmoud, Marxism and Islam, trans. M.M. Enani, 2nd ed. (Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia: Tihama, 1985), 39. Dr. Mahmoud is an Egyptian physician and public intellectual born on 
December 27, 1931. His weekly articles on science and philosophy, Midnight Journals, attract 
large sections of the reading public in the Arab world.  He is also the founder and Chairman of the 
Board of the Mahmoud Mosque Society, a charity organization in Egypt. See Mustafa Mahmoud, 
Understanding the Qur’an: A Contemporary Approach, trans. M. M. Enani (Beltsville, Maryland: 
Amana Publications, 2004/1425), 269. 
754 Davari, Political Thought, 64-65. 
755 Davari, Political Thought, 65. 
756 For more comprehensive discussions by Muṭahharī of Marxism, see Muṭahharī, Social and 
Historical Change.   
757 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 13-14. One example of a person filled with 
blazing passion for and deep conviction of Marxist ideology was the great Polish-born leader of 
the German and European revolution, Rosa Luxembourg. Miller described how “[s]he lived as an 
ascetic, was content to be without nationality, left her lover and married a man for whom she had 
no personal affection, all in the service of revolutionary strategy.” Lenin also showed the same 
traits in the course of his lifetime, such as selflessness and disinterestedness. Miller writes that 
Lenin’s life “was shortened by the ceaseless labour of Communist leadership and he died burnt-
out by the struggle to provide the necessary theoretical guidance for the Russian Revolution.” 
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analogical observations that he came to agree with the opinion that Marxism was a 
sort of religious movement. Similarly, the communists’ adoration of Marx was 
similar to the veneration shown by followers of religions towards their founders or 
past prophets. 758 A comparable assessment was presented by Robert L. Heilbroner, 
who observed that at least until the collapse of the Soviet Union, “… Marx was widely 
considered a religious leader to rank with Christ or Mohammed, and Engels thus 
became a sort of Saint Paul or John.”759 Heilbroner saw it as ironic how in the Marx-
Engels Institute in Moscow,”…scholars pored over their works with the idolatry they 
ridiculed in the antireligious museums down the street.”760 Marxism was being 
perceived as similar to religious doctrine, exemplified by their often uncritical 
understanding and acceptance of the teachings,. Hence Sjafruddin considers 
Marxism more a form of religious feeling (religieuse uitdrukkingsvorm) and belief 
(geloof) rather than wetenschappenlijk socialism (scientific socialism).761 
Sjafruddin’s conclusion that Marxism was more akin to religious belief than a 
scientific ideologywas not only a criticism against communist groups, but was also 
an admonition against Indonesian intellectuals and leaders from the non-communist 
Marxist-socialist groups who felt proud to embrace a “scientific ideology”. Indeed, 
even outside the communist group, many Indonesian leaders of the independence 
movement were influenced in one way or another by Marxism. This was the case 
with those who joined the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) led by Sutan Sjahrir or 
Murba Party led by Tan Malaka, a nationalist-communist (somewhat independent 
from the Moscow trajectory). Both of them were bitter opponents of PKI. Early on, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Miller, Christian Significance, 41-42. See also Roland Boer, Criticism of Religion: On Marxism and 
Theology, II (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 59-64. 
758 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 13-14. 
759 Robert L. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times, and Ideas of the Great 
Economic Thinkers, 7th ed. (New York: Touchstone, 1999), 139. 
760 Heilbroner, Worldly Philosophers, 139. 
761 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 14. 
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Sjafruddin considered Marxism an ideological competitor, as did Ali Shariʿati in Iran, 
rather than an “enemy”. But the ommunist’s attempt to take over power in 1948 and 
subsequent tragedies, such as the massacre of many ʿulamā’ by the communists in 
East Java, traumatized him. From that time on he seemed to consider Marxism to be 
a dangerous ideology for Indonesians,762 along the lines of the Iranian thinker 
Muṭahharī.763 Despite this, however, Sjafruddin expressed an appreciation for the 
success of Marxist movements in forcing European capitalists to enact social 
legislation protecting workers and other vulnerable groups.764  
 Sjafruddin was keen on reminding Indonesian intellectuals of what was 
at stake in embracing Marxist doctrines: that they must forgo all forms of religious 
and spiritual beliefs if they are to follow through earnestly. This was in response to 
the argument of a number of these intellectuals that Marxism was not against 
religion per se, but was simply against the hypocrisy of religious institutions. For 
Sjafruddin, this was a clear misunderstanding of Marxist historical materialism that 
rejected a priori any sort of non-material causation in history. He admitted that in 
many instances religious doctrine served and justified the structure of religious 
institutions, which in turn served the interests of the ruling classes as had happened 
at the time of the French revolution or when the socialist-communist movement 
arose in Europe.765 The hypocrisy and tyranny of these institutions was therefore, 
according to Marxism, inherent in all religious beliefs. Emancipation from this 
oppressive structure necessarily required the abolition of those beliefs that 
supported and justified it, and as such, for emancipation of the oppressed classes to 
                                                          
762 When commenting on Muslims who fought alongside Communists in China, Sjafruddin said: 
“The cooperation between the Communists and the Muslims was not surprising, because Islam is 
not hostile to communism, as long as the Communists want to cooperate honestly with the 
Islamic group. But alas, honesty usually is not present in the Communist group.” Prawiranegara, 
“Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 36. 
763 Davari, Political Thought, 63. 




take place, religion must be abolished. Therefore, Sjafruddin concluded, there was 
no way for a Muslim to embrace communism or historical materialism. His 
explanation was standard amongst Muslim intellectuals such as Mustafa Mahmoud, 
who likewise argued for the inherent incompatibility of Marxism and Islam.766 
 Having discussed Marxism, Sjafruddin then turned his attention to 
capitalism. He was inclined to think that capitalism was more natural economic 
system that could be applied by all human groups, but certain regulations were 
necessary to prevent the excesses of individual freedom in economy. He discussed 
past efforts to improve capitalism by such thinkers as John Maynard Keynes, who 
learned from the mistakes and shortcomings of the system and took advantage of 
the merits and faults of Marxism-socialism. The result was a new ideology that 
Sjafruddin identified as the neo-capitalism of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal 
politics and the British government's economic policy after the Second World 
War.767 Capitalism thus had developed into what he identified as the third phase of 
its history.768 He further explains: 
In this third phase, starting since the end of the First World War, capitalism 
in its nature and pattern is very similar to capitalism before the French 
Revolution. Only now it is more tailored to the circumstances and needs of 
the age (individual freedom in the economic field is limited; various 
monopolies deliberately held by state or private entities under state 
supervision; for the public interest, economy is "regulated" as in 
mercantilism era, only now for the interest of whole society).769 
 
Like many other Muslim writers such as Khurshid Ahmad, Maḥmūd Taliqānī, 
Muhammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, Murtaḍa Muṭahharī, Muhammad Abdul-Rauf, M. Umer 
Chapra, and others,770 Sjafruddin saw Islam as occupying a middle position between 
                                                          
766 Mahmoud, Marxism and Islam, 72-73.  
767 Cf. Stilwell, Political Economy, 261-268; James Fulcher, Capitalism: A Very Short Introduction 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 66-68. 
768 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 22-23.  
769 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 23. 
770 Khurshid Ahmad, “Islam and the Challenge of Economic Development,” in Islam in Transition: 
Muslim Perspectives, ed. John Donohue and John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 
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capitalism and socialism with regards to the concept of individual liberty. 
Furthermore, when the practice of capitalism in the West did not preclude a belief in 
God, and was also capable of integrating social justice and the renewal of Christian 
(religious) ethics, this was a sort of capitalism which could be consistent with 
Islamic ideals and values. Sjafruddin recognized that theoretically there were limits 
to individual liberty in capitalism. In Rousseau’s formulation of the Social Contract, 
these limits were the prescribed laws that were the expression of the "common will" 
of individuals in society. However, despite this, powerful groups of people in society 
could still enforce their will, as long as they used the mediation of law.771 The law 
became a blanket to oppress common citizens or weak groups who, according to 
Christianity, had to obey it.772 Thus, Sjafruddin concluded, liberal capitalism in 
practice did not help the poor and was not capable on its own of preventing 
oppression on the part of the privileged class and thus perpetuating a condition of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1982), 217-222; Seyyed Mahmood Taleqani, Islam and Ownership, trans. Ahmad Jabbārī and 
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Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979), 127-149; M. Umer Chapra, Islam and the Economic 
Challenge (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation and the International Institute of Islamic Thought, 
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771 With such a legal concept, according to Sjafruddin, the Dutch were opposing Indonesian 
independence and even attempting to re-colonize the territory through formal or legal methods. 
See Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 23-24. 
772 Sjafruddin here might simply show one interpretation embraced by certain Christians of 
Jesus’ words: “Then render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are 
God’s” (Matthew 22: 21) that was used by the Church to obey the government in power even 
though it was oppressive or wrong. It could be such an interpretation that was seen by Marx in 
Christian Europe: ‘The social principles of Christianity preach cowardice, self-contempt, 
abasement, submission, humility, in short, all the qualities of the canaille, while the proletariat, 
not wanting to be treated as canaille, needs its courage, pride, and sense of independence much 
more than its daily bread’. Quoted in Svetozar Stojanovic, “The Ethical Potential of Marx’s 
Thought,” in Modern Interpretations of Marx, ed. Tom Bottomore (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), 
173. See also Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 18-20 and 24. 
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tyranny which had always existed.773 On the contrary, Marxism paid no heed to the 
individual, emphasising only group or class.774  
 Sjafruddin then outlined Islam’s middle way between these two extremes:   
Islam does not encourage its followers to love our fellow human beings with 
no limits, nor does it tell them to hate fellow human beings and allow 
eradicating a faction with all the tools that can be obtained by human reason. 
Islam tells human beings to love, to honor and to respect their fellow human 
beings, but it does not require forgetting the interests and rights to live, to be 
valued and respected as well. Islam does not encourage hatred, but nor does 
it forbid its followers to fight and. if necessary, to kill fellow human beings 
who want to violate their rights and interests. In addition to giving rights, 
Islam has always put duties on its followers so that there is always a 
balance.775 
                                                          
773 Sjafruddin’s comment was directed at liberal capitalism before the New Deal of President 
Roosevelt in the US or before the Second World War in England/Great Britain. This type of 
capitalism was different from that of Keynesian economics. In the Keynesian view the state is a 
necessary and central player. “Government intervention is warranted, according to this 
perspective, because of the basic flaws of a free-market economy.” Stilwell, Political Economy, 59 
and 357. However, in a discussion on post-Keynesian economics, a body of theory that is used by 
economists to construct the workings of contemporary capitalism, Frederic S. Lee writes: “The 
state is not a neutral social organization but one that carries out the interests of the dominant 
political groups. Consequently, given the dominant political position the business community 
occupies in a capitalist economy, it is not possible for the state to adopt and maintain full 
employment economic policies, since to do so would fundamentally alter the relationship 
between the business community and the workers whom they control.” See Frederic S. Lee, “Post 
Keynesian Economics (1930-2000): An Emerging Heterodox Economic Theory of Capitalism,” in 
Understanding Capitalism: Critical Analysis from Karl Marx to Amartya Sen, ed. Douglas Dowd 
(London: Pluto Press, 2002), 109 and 129. Similarly, John Isbister writes on capitalism and social 
justice: “Democratic governments are the best source of power to face capitalist power and mold 
it in ways that can enhance rather than diminish justice, but capitalist power typically breaks 
through the boundaries of the political sphere, exerting influence that diminishes the power of 
democracy […] Voters are bombarded with messages from one side and find it hard to hear 
messages from the other; this hardly creates the conditions for unbiased decision making in a 
democracy.” See Isbister, Capitalism and Justice, 41 and 43.  
774 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 25. 
775 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 25. The theme of Islam as the middle 
position is often expressed by Muslims. Islam is believed to be a just witness bringing the light of 
reason to bear on extravagant claims. In the Qur’an the term for middle position is wasaṭ. For 
example, Chapter al-Baqarah 2:143 reads: “We have made you [believers] into a middle/justly 
balanced community, so that you may bear witness [to the truth] before others and so that the 
Messenger may bear witness [to it] before you […].” Wasaṭ also carries several other meanings: 
to be in the midst, to penetrate into the midst, good and exalted, to occupy the middle position, 
best, midmost, middle, justly balanced, most excellent. Omar, Dictionary of the Holy Qur’an: 608. 
On the meaning of word, Abdullah Yusuf Ali comments: “The essence of Islam is to avoid all 
extravagances on either side. It is a sober, practical religion…So the mission of Islam is to curb, 
for instance, the extreme formalism of the Mosaic law and the extreme ‘other-worldliness’ 
professed by Christianity”. Yusuf Ali, Holy Qur’ān, 57. Another word used to describe middle way 
is qisṭ. Similar to wasṭ, qisṭ also means ‘justly balanced’, ‘justice’ or ‘equitable’. Omar, Dictionary 
of the Holy Qur’an, 454. For example, Chapter al-Isrā’ 17:35 reads: “Give full measure when you 
measure, and weigh with a balance that is straight: that is better and fairer in the end.”  In the 
above quotation, Sjafruddin did not mean that anyone freely has the right to kill people who 




In discussing economic development, Muslim economists and thinkers often 
presented the balanced nature of the Islamic economic system as distinct from 
existing systems, notably capitalism and socialism. In Muhammad Abdul Mannan’s 
view, the balanced nature of the Islamic concept of economic development lay in its 
concern not only with one dimension of human life but with the totality of existence, 
both spiritual and material. Therefore, for theoreticians of Islamic economics, a 
fundamental goal was the well-being and happiness of human beings not only in this 
world but also in the hereafter.776 The concept required a concern for the 
comprehensive development of the human being in all its dimensions, i.e. “a balance 
between material developments on the one hand and moral and spiritual 
developments on the other.”777 It also demanded an investment of resources in a 
manner that harmonizes the relationship between human beings and their 
environment.778 In his discussion of the importance of religious and spiritual values 
to the formation of public policy, Muhammad Abdul-Rauf admits that “Islam has 
some affinities with both socialism and capitalism”779 But Islam also differed from 
the two ideologies in certain basic elements. Rauf showed Islam’s balanced 
intermediary position, writing that “the Islamic system […] aims at satisfying 
immediate material needs and maximizing production within the available means, 
as well as at meeting the spiritual needs of the individual.”780 This balance is also 
found in the equal emphasis between private ownership and common ownership, 
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between the role of state and human freedom, between individual liberty and 
entrepreneurial initiative. Thus it appears that the Islamic concept of development 
occupies a moderate, middle and balanced position between conceptions of 
economic development in capitalism on the one hand and socialism on the other.781  
Although Muslim leaders and scholars all claim that the Islamic doctrine of 
economics occupies such an intermediate position between capitalism and 
socialism, offering an alternative supposedly consistent with an Islamic outlook, 
they nonetheless differ from each other in the interpretation of the concept, some 
ending up closer to capitalism, others closer to socialism. Ali Rahnema and Farhad 
Nomani discuss these various interpretations among Shīite ‘ulamā’ and scholars in 
their book on religion, politics, and economic policy in Iran.782  
For Sjafruddin, there was already an inbuilt completeness to Islamic 
normative values and legal provisions for upholding social justice and equality. 
Meanwhile in capitalism, these provisions developed outside the system and against 
the will of its custodians, the capitalists. According to him, concern for these issues 
derived ultimately from Christian ethics. Furthermore, workers eventually 
organized themselves into strong unions and accepted the Marxist revolutionary 
principle of class struggle to achieve a better society.783 Yet in Islam, according to 
Sjafruddin, the basis of mandatory provisions for social justice and equality had 
already existed since the early period of the religion,784 found in the rules of the 
zakāt, alms, contribution which represents the minimum obligation of those in 
                                                          
781 Abdul-Rauf, “The Islamic Doctrine,” 146. 
782 Rahnema and Nomani, The Secular Miracle, 42 and 48-50. See also Nomani and Rahnema, 
Islamic Economic Systems, 72-73.  
783 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 25-26. 
784 Normatively, Sjafruddin was probably right. Historically, however, the principle has not been 
always applied by Muslim rulers such as the Umayyads (661-750) whose rule was denounced by 
other Muslim groups of the time as contrary to the Islamic message of egalitarianism and 
simplicity. See John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics, 4th ed. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1998), 16-17.  
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better and more stable economic conditions.785 The recognition and consecration of 
property rights in Islam did not preclude the idea of regulating its use to alleviate 
the burdens of the less fortunate. Absolute ownership lay only with God, while 
individual ownership was conditioned upon a whole set of normative values that the 
owner must perform to claim his stake, one of which included the upholding of 
social justice.786 
In the concluding parts of the article, Sjafruddin expressed his optimism for 
the future of Islam vis-à-vis capitalism and communism. Despite the ideological 
battle being waged during the period of his writing, and notwithstanding Muslims’ 
own shortcomings, Sjafruddin was optimistic that the future would bring better 
days. But his futuristic vision of Islam seemed to be more spiritual than material: 
Therefore, Islam, after such a long time of its “death” and has lived in an 
atmosphere of death, surely will rise again. After seeing the consecutive rise 
of Christian spirit in Hervorming [reformation], Humanism and the 
Renaissance and subsequent development in Western culture and capitalism, 
and after watching the rise of Israeli spirit in the Marx communism, then 
according to the rotation period, Islam will eventually "close" the history of 
capitalism and communism as a "final" religion... so also can be predicted that 
over the collapse of one and the victory of another would grow a new culture 
which is a synthesis between the two antitheses earlier: the synthesis 
between capitalism and communism. Islam will carry back what has been its 
historic task: to unite Christians and Jews in a single humanity who serves 
God the One ... Islam was born as a synthesis between Christianity with 
Judaism. [It is] not hostile, even [Islam] always looks for brotherhood with 
those groups.787 
Yet the sort of Islam that would be able to re-establish peace among the 
nations of the world was not Islam as it then stood, but another type of Islam: 
                                                          
785 Sjafruddin wrote this essay in the atmosphere of guerilla war against the Dutch in the jungles 
of Sumatra Island. For this reason, he did not list quotation from sources he used, including the 
verses of the Qur’an and Hadith: he wrote from his memory alone. Qur’anic verses referring to 
the charity he means are many. Two of them read: “Charity [zakāt] is only for the poor and the 
needy, and those employed to administer it, and those whose hearts are made to incline (to 
truth), and (to free) the captives, and those in debt, and in the way of Allah and for the 
wayfarer—an ordinance from Allah, and Allah is Knowing, Wise” (Al-Barā’ah 9:60). Also in al-
Bara’ah 9:103: “Take alms out of their property—thou wouldst cleanse them and purify them 
thereby—and pray for them. Surely thy prayer is a relief to them. And Allah is Hearing, Knowing”. 
Zakāt is obligatory charity, not voluntary alms. See Muhammad Ali, Holy Quran, 413 and 423.   
786 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 27. 
787 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 31-32.  
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“probably the new culture will not call itself Islam, but in its expression will reflect 
purely the soul of Islam”.788 Sjafruddin did not elaborate further upon his meaning. 
Perhaps what he intended was to remind Muslims to be more concerned with the 
spirit or substance of Islam rather than with its formalities or outward appearance. 
He mentioned in passing that Muslims themselves did not quite comprehend the 
renewal of Islam, nor did they completely understand the spirit or substance of their 
own religion. 789 It is interesting that Sjafruddin in 1987 launched a quite 
                                                          
788 McLeod, “Survey,” 183-184. Sjafruddin’s statement would have been controversial even if it 
were declared in the present time, now that Muslims have mixed and interacted with many 
pluralistic or multicultural societies which include adherents of other religions as well as those 
who do not profess any religion. It is possible that this statement could spark denunciations and 
protests, such as what happened recently to followers of the Ahmadiyya and Shīʿa. When 
Sjafruddin wrote this in 1949, Indonesians Muslims were involved in the struggle for 
independence and might not have regarded it as something to be questioned. There were more 
urgent issues to deal with in the struggle for independence in which all people suffered, and 
religious-theological issues were less important than the current situation. Today Indonesians 
are experiencing socio-political transition and dislocation. Since independence, the euphoria of 
democracy and freedom—often held back for more than thirty years—have been excessively 
released, violating boundaries of law and consequently eliminating their real meaning. The 
increasing socio-economic gap between different segments of society, globalization, and the 
spread of communication technology help information and ideas—including religious 
radicalism—to spread quickly and take root. American foreign policy in the Middle East has often 
been the flash point for acts of violence. Most Islamic organizations, including the moderate ones, 
demanded that the Indonesian government either dismantle the Ahmadiyya brand of Islam, 
which had the freedom to run its religious activities during the New Order period, or ask it to 
declare itself legally non-Muslim, as applied in Pakistan.  
789 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 28-32. Sjafruddin’s vision was that in the 
future, Islam would be represented in a culture which was a synthesis between capitalism and 
socialism. This could be compared to the concept of a future human society developed by 
Murtaḍa Muṭahharī, an Iranian Islamic jurist-scholar. Muṭahharī’s description of the future 
culture was as follows: “According to the theory of the substantive reality of the primordial 
nature— […--] societies, civilizations, and cultures are moving toward unification, uniformity, 
and fusion and the future of human societies is a single, evolved world society in which all of 
humanity’s potential values will be actualized and man will attain his real perfection, happiness, 
and, finally, genuine humanity”. See Muṭahharī, Social, 27. There are several key elements which 
suggest similarities between Sjafruddin and Muṭahharī’s visions of an ideal society. In 
Sjafruddin’s conception the imagined future culture was a synthesis of capitalism and socialism; 
it was based on peace and universal brotherhood; and it was a spiritual rather than a material 
condition (a single humanity that served the One God). Muṭahharī’s vision consisted of 
unification, uniformity, and fusion among different societies, cultures and civilizations; it was an 
ideal or perfect situation (happiness and genuine humanity); it signified a more spiritual than 
material state (victory of the Truth and the end will belong to piety and the pious). Sjafruddin 
seems to draw his vision of Islam in the future, as a synthesis of capitalism and socialism, from 
the Qur’anic notion of the “middle community” (al-Baqarah 2:143) which depicts the Muslims as 
people of the middle position, synthesizing Judaism and Christianity while not inclining to either 
extreme. It is also probably inspired by the Qur’an, Āli ʿImrān 3:140 which reads: “…And We deal 
out such days among people in turn[…].” Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s comments may highlight 
Sjafruddin’s conviction that Islam would emerge again after its long “death”, as he writes: 
“Success or failure in this world comes to all at varying times: we must not grumble, as we do not 
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controversial idea that may have provoked accusations of anti-nationalism or, at 
least, lack of nationalistic feeling in Indonesia. In his opinion, “…the sovereignty of 
nation states is out of date with the advance of science and technology. If we had one 
world stage consisting of autonomous, instead of the present sovereign states, much 
of the capital now wasted on arms could be used to improve living standards and 
boost education.”790 It seemed Sjafruddin was among those who were optimistic 
about “the globalization of the international economy and the growing economic 
interdependence among all nations.”791 However, for now this vision of the 
globalized world as one of great promise seems to be still too far away to be realized. 
As Todaro and Smith assert, “[p]oor nations are now and will remain considerably 
more vulnerable to the economic events and policies of rich nations than vice 
versa.”792 A less optimistic view of globalization has the more stable ground since 
many of the most advanced industrial countries, despite their understanding of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
see the whole of God’s plan.” See Yusuf Ali, Holy Qur’ān, 158. On this verse, the most important 
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will be the religion of the majority of the nations of the earth.” See Muhammad Ali, Holy Quran, 
1002. Muṭahharī’s concept of a single future society was based on the interpretations of several 
verses of the Qur’an such as al-Mā’ida 5:57, al-Nūr 24:55, and al-Anbiyā’ 21:105, by ‘Allāmah 
Muḥammad Husayn Ṭabaṭabāī, a great Qur’anic commentator from Iran, found in his translation, 
interpretation and commentary on the Qur’an, al-Mīzān. Ṭabaṭabāi comments on three verses 
that were quoted by Muṭahharī to support his notion that “the ultimate government will be that 
of the Truth, in which falsity will be altogether swept away, and the end will belong to piety and 
the pious”. Muṭahharī, Social, 27-28. Muṭahharī also quoted Ṭabaṭabāī’s exposition of the Chapter 
al-Rūm 30:30-41, arguing that the border of the Islamic nation consisted of belief, not 
geographical or treaty boundaries, and that the religion of the Truth would be in the end 
victorious. Muṭahharī, Social, 28-29. In principle, Muṭahharī’s vision of a single society in the 
future was based on the unique concept of Mahdī belief in Shīʿa Islam. Muṭahharī, Social, 34. 
However, we do not know precisely the sources of Sjafruddin’s conception of a future Islamic 
society. One can only conjecture.  
790 Prawiranegara, “Recollections,” 107. 
791 Michael P. Todaro and Stephen C. Smith, Economic Development, The Addison-Wesley Series 
in Economics, 9th ed. (Boston: Pearson, 2006), 801. 
792 Todaro and Smith, Economic Development, 801. 
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interconnectedness of all nations’ futures, persist in the belief that they need not 
cooperate with lesser-developed countries and still want to totally dominate the 
established international order.793 
As mentioned above, Sjafruddin’s discussion on social justice in Islam, 
capitalism and socialism was written within an environment of guerilla warfare and 
was motivated by the spirit of defending independence. Some expected that this 
tract, written in such circumstances, would contain many more exhortations to fight 
and to condemn the colonialist enemy who attempted to undo his nation’s 
independence. Although there did exist some affected rhetoric, in general 
Sjafruddin’s reasonable judgment was more dominant. He criticized Western 
capitalism that gave birth to colonialism and Marxism which called for class struggle, 
but he was also able to articulate his opinions dispassionately in criticising the 
attitudes of Muslim and Indonesian people and leaders.794 
  It appears that the primary purpose of Sjafruddin’s discussion of capitalism 
and socialism was political, in order to convince Indonesians to think realistically in 
their struggle for independence. In his view, Indonesians should take the 
opportunity to learn as much as possible from Cold War politics in their 
confrontation with the Netherlands.795 Though he was optimistic that Indonesians 
would eventually gain victory, he argued that independence could be achieved not 
only by Indonesia’s own strength but also through outside forces such as the 
                                                          
793 Todaro and Smith, Economic Development, 801. 
794Among the criticisms addressed to the Indonesian nation and to Muslims were that they were 
easily persuaded by empty slogans, suspicious of everything that came from the West (the 
Dutch), chauvinistic, conservative, superstitious, and infested by sectarianism, regionalism, and 
personal cults which were the results of colonialism. In his analysis of Indonesia's struggle for 
independence and the international constellation in the following paragraphs, Sjafruddin urged 
Indonesia to make concessions to the Dutch as the latter also made concessions, in order to reach 
an agreement as soon as possible and to achieve a lasting peace between the two sides. However, 
his position did not qualify him as a “pacifist” in the same vein as Mahatma Gandhi, who used 
non-violent resistance in India's independence struggle. Sjafruddin led a guerrilla war of armed 
resistance against Dutch military action. He could perhaps be called a “peace lover” or “humanist” 
instead of a pacifist. Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 37-46 and 53-55.  
795 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 49-54.   
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international community. Sjafruddin was convinced that without support from the 
international community, they would not achieve their goal. In fact, it was precisely 
the overconfidence in one’s own isolated strength that would be damaging and 
detrimental to independence. Hence Sjafruddin threw his full political support 
behind the Sjahrir and Hatta’s policy of compromise with the Netherlands which 
took into consideration the international community, especially the United States 
and Britain. Despite his strong criticism of the Dutch during the struggle for 
independence, he looked forward to peace between Indonesia and the Netherlands, 
an attitude which he consistently maintained and employed while serving in the 
government as an economic policy-maker in the 1950s.796  
However, Sjafruddin also emphasized that without God's will the struggle for 
independence would not succeed. He felt the need to emphasize the importance of 
recognizing that Indonesia’s independence was part of the divine plan and an 
expression of God’s grace. He also hoped that peace could be realized because 
Indonesian Muslims, following the example of the Prophet, were capable not only of 
accepting but also of giving. Here we see Sjafruddin’s concern for spirituality and his 
sense of connectedness with the Prophetic tradition. His realistic and pragmatic 
approach in the struggle for independence and formation of economic development 
policies was based on the belief that human effort was never detached from God’s 
decision and power.797  
For Sjafruddin, Indonesia and Islam were inextricably intertwined. There 
were no contradictory interests between the two, a standpoint that he maintained 
during his life as reflected in his political attitudes and writings. Sjafruddin wrote in 
                                                          
796 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 51-55. 
797 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 48-51 and 55. 
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his closing remarks in the article that “the victory of Indonesia is also the victory of 
Islam, the victory of pure determination and healthy minds”.798  
Sjafruddin wrote again on the dissimilarities and similarities between an 
Islamic economic system and socialist (Marxist) and liberal or capitalist economic 
systems in a number of articles after his release from prison in 1966. In general, his 
thoughts on the topic did not change significantly, but compared to the article above 
he articulated them in a more organized fashion. It is understandable given his 
different circumstances. During his stay in prison under the Sukarno regime he had 
considerable time in which to deepen his knowledge of Islam.799 His writings during 
this period incorporated more quotations of Qur’anic verses and Hadith than did his 
previous writings.  
With this new body of knowledge, Sjafruddin began substantiating his earlier 
arguments with references to the traditional sources. He asserted, for instance, his 
consistant line of thought that Islam admitted profit as a motive but limited and 
bound it to the virtues of moderation, temperance, and generosity in contributing to 
social welfare. These moral demands upon individuals would prevent the kind of 
extreme individualism that had little concern for society. On the other hand, Islam 
did not allow a situation in which an individual served just society or the state or 
worked under the leadership of the party/government, and was thus denied his own 
individual freedom.800 After discussing at length various aspects of the capitalist and 
the socialist economic systems, he concluded: “The economic system of Islam, if it is 
                                                          
798 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 49, 55-56. 
799 He read books such as: Kelengkapan tarich Nabi Muhammad s.a.w [A Complete History of 
Prophet Muhammad] by Munawar Chalil; The Eternal Message of Islam by Abd al-Rahman 
Azzam; The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature by William James; 
Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason by Immanuel Kant; and The 
Interpretation of Dreams by Sigmund Freud. See Rosidi, “Sjafruddin Prawiranegara,” 230-231; 
Prawiranegara, “Isrā’ dan Miʿrāj,” 132-143; Prawiranegara, “Masa Depan Islam,” 179.  
800 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 274-275. From his comment on the economic policy of 
the Old Order regime of Sukarno, it can be conjectured that the paper was published in the late 
1960s after his release from prison on July 1966. 
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followed and implemented, is a harmonious balance between individual interests 
and the collective interests of society.”801  
However, Sjafruddin did not believe that there was a special Islamic 
economic system different from mainstream economics as taught in modern 
universities. For him, economics everywhere was the same, in both Muslim and non-
Muslim countries. Sjafruddin even deemed interest—which many Muslim scholars 
consider the key differentiator between the Islamic economic system and the 
capitalist one—to be a reasonable and necessary stimulus for economic growth. 
Indeed, he underlined that the modern economic understanding accepted interest as 
a necessary part of the system.802  
Sjafruddin also stated that each era had its own “capitalism”. Every economic 
enterprise presumed the existence of capital.803 Furthermore, Muslims and other 
civilized nations and religious groups shared a common moral ground. For 
Sjafruddin there were no fundamental legal or moral differences between Islam, 
Christianity, and Judaism. The differences, for Sjafruddin, were more accidental than 
essential. 804 Thus, an “Islamic” economic system and a “capitalist” economic system 
could feature more similarities than differences.805 In fact, Sjafruddin questioned the 
categorical distinction between a particular Islamic economic system and the 
capitalism practiced in the West. Both recognized individual ownership and, equally 
important, the basic human drive to obtain maximum results with minimum 
exertion or cost. He quoted Luqmān/31:\20806 as scriptural proof for the recognition 
                                                          
801 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 274. 
802 Prawiranegara, “Adakah Konsep,” 338. This paper was presented in an international economic 
conference on The Muslim World and the Future Economic Order, London, July 1977.  
803 Prawiranegara, “Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia,” 23. 
804 Prawiranegara, “Persamaan,” 406 and 408. 
805 Prawiranegara, “Adakah Konsep,” 360-361. 
806 “[People], do you not see how God has made what is in the heavens and on the earth useful to 
you, and has lavished His blessings on you both outwardly and inwardly? Yet some people argue 
about God, without knowledge or guidance or an illuminating scripture”.    
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of this impulse. However, in economic practice Muslims were not free to arbitrarily 
use any means to meet their needs. They were constrained by various limitations of 
God (ḥudūd Allāh). Here Sjafruddin referred to the Qur'an, al-Baqarah 2:229807 
which ordered Muslims not to violate God’s limits. Muslims, for example, are 
prohibited to consume and carry on business involving pork, alcoholic beverages, 
gambling, prostitution, pornography, and illegal drugs such as narcotics.808 In 
general, the difference between Islam and capitalism became significant and 
fundamental if in practice, the capitalist economy were abstracted from its moral 
and ethical principles.  
Sjafruddin’s observation was in agreement with those of many parties in 
Western societies. Ideologues, political leaders, religious dignitaries and groups, 
scholars, and social activists have noted that technological advances and economic 
prosperity created by capitalism were also accompanied by poverty, inequalities in 
wealth and opportunity, alienation, and hopelessness.809 John Isbister, citing Milton 
Friedman’s defense of capitalism and the latter’s view of equality as the enemy of 
freedom, maintained that capitalism generated serious inequalities in people’s 
holdings, and consequently provided people with unequal degrees of freedom to 
pursue their goals.810 Frank Stilwell referred to a number of recent studies which 
                                                          
807 “[…]. These are the bounds set by God: do not overstep them. It is those who overstep God’s 
bounds who are doing wrong”.    
808 Prawiranegara, “Hakikat Ekonomi Islam,” 362-364; 370; Prawiranegara, “Persamaan,” 406-
407. 
809 Some data quoted by D. W. Haslett support the critiques that poverty and inequality are found 
in a typical capitalist country. For example in 1990, no less than one out of every ten US citizens, 
and one out of every five children, lived in poverty. D. W. Haslett, Capitalism with Morality 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 194. Family income in the United States is not very evenly 
distributed. The top fifth of American families receives approximately 44 per cent of all family 
income, while the bottom fifth receives approximately 4.4 per cent. One to two per cent of 
American families own from around 20 to 30 per cent of the (net) family wealth in the United 
States, and 5 to 10 per cent own from around 40 to 60 per cent. The top fifth owns almost 80 per 
cent of the wealth, while the bottom fifth owns only 0.2 per cent. So while the top fifth has about 
ten times the income of the bottom fifth, it has about 400 times the wealth. Haslett, Capitalism 
with Morality, 236. 
810 Isbister, Capitalism and Justice, 40-43. 
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showed that “despite significant growth in GDP and average incomes, people in 
wealthy nations are not getting happier. It seems that no matter how wealthy people 
are they usually believe they need more income to be happy.”811 In his explanation of 
the condition he points out that “what people believe they need in order to be happy 
is conditioned by their social environment.”812 Referring to Thorstein Veblen, he 
underlined that the extravagant consumption patterns of the rich class set the 
aspirational standard for other social groups, notwithstanding the latter’s lack of 
comparable economic means.813 He employs the term “affluenza” that is used by 
researchers at the Australia Institute to describe the pervasive “sickness of 
affluence” fuelled by economic inequalities. It consists of: 
[t]he bloated, sluggish, and unfulfilled feeling that results from efforts to keep 
up with the Joneses; an epidemic of stress, overwork, waste, and 
indebtedness caused by dogged pursuit of higher consumption levels; [and] 
an unsustainable addiction to economic growth.814 
 
In Peter Saunders’ opinion, capitalism was in some way responsible for the 
limitless and insatiable demands of the contemporary consumer experience. The 
multiplication of prosperity generated by capitalism intensified competition for 
relative advantage. A greater number of people were able to get access to desired 
goods and thus the satisfaction to be gained from possession of the goods. However, 
many individuals experienced mounting frustration and disappointment upon 
discovering that the items to which they aspired failed to deliver the advantages 
they had expected. This malady of infinite desire created unhappy individuals and a 
morbid society.815 The cause of the conditions described above could be attributed 
to the driving force of capitalism itself. In this issue Stilwell stated that “Capitalism, 
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broadly speaking, is the economic system in which financial considerations 
dominate.”816 Capitalism is based on an economic liberalism that “establishes a 
relationship between what is assumed to be people’s essential nature and their 
economic activities.” 817  What he meant was: individualism, hedonism, rationality 
and inertia.818 This subject was also highlighted by Irving Kristol, an American 
intellectual, who wrote that “[t]o increase wealth, production must be increased 
through the use of materialistic incentives. Without those materialistic incentives, 
there will be less and less to distribute and any redistribution will become less 
effective in bettering the material condition of human beings than was the capitalist 
system it replaced”.819 But in the same time, he observed that “modernity itself is 
undergoing a kind of spiritual collapse, [and] the secular gnostic impulse was 
already in the process of dissolution […] the rebellious, self-confident spirit of 
modernity was entering a major crisis and was moving towards its own 
discreditation”.820  
So when Sjafruddin stated that the Islamic concept of economics was 
different from capitalism, he was addressing the aspect of capitalism that influences 
an individual’s normative behavior and values, which are ultimately based on an 
excessive individualism that in turn gives rise to social injustice and neglect of moral 
values.821 He believed that though Islamic teachings allowed people to enjoy the life 
of this world in moderation, to conduct economic activity, and to gain material 
profit, they forbade people from being materialistic and hedonistic. Seeking pleasure 
                                                          
816 Stilwell, Political Economy, 48. 
817 Stilwell, Political Economy, 73. 
818 Stilwell, Political Economy, 73. 
819 Irving Kristol, “Spiritual Roots of Capitalism and Socialism,” in Capitalism and Socialism: A 
Theological Inquiry, ed. Michael Novak (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, 1979), 12. 
820 Kristol, “Spiritual Roots,” 13. 
821 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 274. 
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and gaining material profit should be put under spiritual and moral purposes.822 A 
concrete example of this, according to Sjafruddin, was the prohibition of the 
acquisition of excessive profit (isrāf) by manipulating those in weaker 
circumstances, an act that could give rise to the exploitation de l'homme par 
l'homme.823 To prevent such practices, Sjafruddin believed that the government 
could intervene, in accordance with the law, in the determination of prices, acting 
beyond the law of supply and demand.824 Moreover, Sjafruddin even considered 
pollution and the destruction of the natural environment (abus de la Nature par 
l'homme) as falling within the technical notion of ribā, as an effect of economic 
enterprises that sought material gain without any consideration of human safety in 
the long term.825  
 In conclusion, Sjafruddin’s views on the notion of social justice in Islam 
developed early on in his intellectual life through his critique of socialism and 
capitalism, not only as economic systems but as sources of normative values that 
influence an individual’s behavior and morality. He acknowledged some similarities 
between Islam and Marxism-communism, such as a common concern for social 
justice and a recognition of the existence of social classes. In addition, the 
emancipation of the downtrodden and oppressed classes from injustices committed 
                                                          
822 Cf. Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, Islam, Economics, and Socety (London: Keagan Paul 
International, 1994), 72-73 and 76-77. 
823 “Abolissez l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme et vous abolirez l'exploitation d'une nation 
par une autre nation.” This phrase is attributed to Karl Marx in his Communist Manifesto, but a 
similar phrase is also attributed to Mons Giraud, the Archbishop of Cambrai, who in his pastoral 
letter for Lent 1845 entitled “Labour Law”, denounced working conditions in factories, 
particularly for women and children, as well as to Frederic Ozanam, who in 1831 in Lyon 
published Reflections on the Doctrine of Saint-Simon. See Gérard Cholvy, “La société, c'est 
l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme,” Esprit & Vie: Revue Catholique de Formation 
Permanente no. 154 (August 2006): 26-27, accessed August 5, 2011,  http://www.esprit-et-
vie.com/article.php3?id_article=1604. 
824 Prawiranegara, “Persamaan,” 406-408. 
825 Prawiranegara, “Hakikat Ekonomi Islam,” 371. This article is one of the two articles without a 
date. Sjafruddin first raised the notion probably around 1977-1978. Sjafruddin’s idea of human 
abuse of nature or the natural environment as falling under the scope of ribā is, for the present 
writer, the first one so far; no one in Indonesia seems to have made previous mention of it.  
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by the wealthy and privileged are also issues addressed in Islamic teachings. 
Consequently, every Muslim, like a communist or socialist, feels obliged to assist the 
destitute, poor and oppressed people. For this reason, many Muslims were attracted 
to Socialist doctrines during the revolutionary period. However, as we have seen, 
there were many fundamental differences between the doctrines of Marxism and 
Islam, and Sjafruddin urged his readers to always bear in mind that whatever 
secondary similarities might exist between socialist doctrines and Islamic teachings, 
they posses diametrically (metaphysically) opposed views on the basic relationship 
between human beings and the world: Marxist historical materialism, and Islam and 
other religions’ beliefs in God and the Hereafter, respectively. This fundamental 
divergence led to different views of society: Marxism upheld that a classless society 
would rise as a result of the proletarian revolution; meanwhile Islam maintained 
that as long as there were humans in this world, the existence of variously-
privileged groups, including poor and wealthy classes, would endure. Hence Islamic 
efforts to realize social justice and improve the lot of the poor would be inherently 
different from those of the communists. Rather than overturning the structure of 
society, as advocated by communist doctrine, Islamic teachings would not seek to 
dichotomize groups of people, nor would they attempt to eradicate a whole group of 
people based on their economic class.826 Another difference was the source and 
measure of happiness. Unlike Marxism, Islam did not measure happiness by 
materialistic criteria. In Islam, a poorer but devout person could be happier than a 
rich one because happiness was measured by spiritual criteria, such as the extent of 
an individual’s satisfaction in carrying out the obligations required of him by God.  
                                                          
826 Cf. Maxime Rodinson’s observation of Christian socialism and Muslim socialism. According to 
him, “[t]heir choices were inevitably less radical because their religious and moral principles 
forbade them to assume an uncompromising and implacable virulence towards their brethren in 
the faith, even if these were exploiters and oppressors.” Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, 




On the other hand, as we have seen, Sjafruddin’s criticisms of capitalism were 
not as extensive as his critique of Marxism. This is because, unlike Marxism, the idea 
and practice of capitalism did not necessarily preclude belief in God; indeed, 
Sjafruddin saw that aspects of capitalism that were concerned with social justice 
arose from attempts to renew the Christian spirit. The recognition of private 
property and individual entrepreneurship was also an overlapping feature in both 
the Islamic economic system and the capitalist one. However, despite these 
similarities, Sjafruddin saw the difference between Islam and modern capitalismas 
not unlike the difference between Islam and the various forms of socialism. Islam, 
like other religions, was based on spiritual-moral principles, while the modern 
ideologies of capitalism and socialism were founded on thoroughly secular and 
materialistic principles. Sjafruddin’s synthesis consisted of appropriating 
overlapping economic principles between Islam and capitalism which were then 
delimitated by moral, ethical, and social injunctions contained in the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah of the Prophet. This was a capitalism, according to him, that was applicable 
to an Indonesian context.827 
5.2. Chapter Two: Social Justice and the Concept of Human Development: An Islamic 
Point of View  
This chapter will discuss Sjafruddin’s concept of development, which he termed a 
human development, and its relationship with social justice and economic 
development. His idea of human development and its purpose are not articulated in 
terms of material or economic prosperity, but rather involve the realization of an 
ethical human being. The basics of the concept of human development itself were 
                                                          
827 In the same vein as Sjafruddin’s assessment of capitalism, Haslett writes: “It is not capitalism 
per se that is immoral, but current capitalism. Capitalism with morality is possible”. That is, “[…] 
capitalism without extreme inequalities of wealth and opportunity, a capitalism without 
alienated workers, a capitalism with morality.” See Haslett, Capitalism with Morality, 264.   
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formulated in the 1970s and became prominent in the late 1980s. Mahbub ul-Haq, a 
Special Adviser to United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and former 
Pakistani Minister of Economics, is considered to be a pioneer of the concept of 
Human Development.828 He said that in the 1960s “it would have been heresy to 
challenge the economic growth’s school’s tacit assumption that the purpose of 
development is to increase national income.”829 In the 1970s, he was forced to 
challenge many of his own premises concerning the classical growth school.830 One 
of these premises was the equation of development with economic development, 
“conventionally measured by the increase in the gross national product (GNP) over 
time.”831 In addition, according to Geoffrey R. B. Currey, the concept “rejects the 
question of who is to receive the benefits,” assuming the question of “who is to pay 
the costs of development, as irrelevant,” and never asking the question of 
‘development for whom’.832 Haq argued that the growth strategy had failed to 
alleviate poverty and create prosperity in society, especially for those who settled in 
third world countries. In his opinion, “economic growth is being accompanied by 
rising disparities [and] the masses are complaining that development has not 
touched their ordinary lives. Very often, economic growth has meant very little 
social justice.”833  
As Paul Streeten argues, the concept of human development treats human 
beings as ends. Since its goal is to improve the human condition, the concept 
                                                          
828 Paul Streeten, “Foreword,” in Mahbub ul Haq, Reflections on Human Development (New York: 
Oxford Univerity Press, 1995), vii and ix. 
829 Mahbub ul-Haq, “Preface,” in Reflections on Human Development (New York: Oxford 
Univerity Press, 1995), xvii. 
830 Ul-Haq, “Preface,” xvii. See Mahbub ul-Haq, The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 5. 
831 Geoffrey R. B. Currey, “The Definition of Development,” in Show Case State: The Illusion of 
Indonesia’s ‘Accelerated Modernisation’, ed. Rex Mortimer (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1973), 
14. 
832 Currey, “Definition of Development,” 7-8. 
833 Ul-Haq, Poverty Curtain, 24. 
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emphasizes the importance of expanding people’s choices by creating “a well-
nourished, healthy educated, skilled, alert labour force as the most important 
productive asset” in order to attain higher productivity.834 Human development also 
gives priority to slowing down “human reproduction by lowering the desired family 
size” and calls attention to the improvement and preservation of physical 
environment.835 Other distinctions of human development, according to Streeten, 
are its focus both on poverty reduction, which “contributes to a healthy civil society, 
increased democracy and greater social stability,” as well as on political stability, by 
reducing civil disturbances.836 As we will see in the following discussion, 
Sjafruddin’s view of human development shares many similarities with that 
developed by Mahbub ul-Haq and Paul Streeten in the UNDP. 
At a very rudimentary but necessary level, Sjafruddin believed that any 
development plan in Indonesia must be preceded by mental omschakeling, a radical 
psychological-spiritual change in not only the Indonesian people but especially their 
leaders. If this did not happen then even the most promising development plan 
would not be successfully implemented. In Sjafruddin’s view, the Indonesian 
economic crisis during the 1950s could not be solved by conventional economics 
alone, but must be first overcome by an internal transformation of people’s ways of 
thinking or living.837  Before discussing Sjafruddin’s practical plan for achieving 
social justice and development, it is relevant to describe the economic and political 
context at the time in which he brought forth the topics of spirituality and socio-
economic development in Indonesia. 
On May 1957, Sjafruddin was invited to deliver a lecture at an event 
organized by the Indonesian Catholic University Students Association (PMKRI) in 
                                                          
834 Streeten, “Foreword,” ix. 
835 Streeten, “Foreword,” x. 
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837 Prawiranegara, “Peranan Agama,” 106-107.  
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Jakarta. The invitation to speak at this event reflected the general political public of 
the time’s recognition that Sjafruddin’s expertise in the field of economic 
development transcended political and religious boundaries. He had acquired a 
reputation as a public figure who emphasized economic rationality and pragmatism 
in solving the many problems of the contemporary Indonesian economy. There were 
sharp differences of opinion between political groups over priorities of the 
government’s programs and their consequences with the West, including the issue 
of foreign ownership over the national economy. There was widespread and deep 
disappointment among many people as prosperity failed to materialize, and 
disappointment mounted in the Outer Islands because of delayed development in 
the regions, affected by widespread anti-foreign sentiment in Java.838 The 
expropriation of Dutch property had destabilizing political effects. President 
Sukarno tried to resolve the troubles of the country by implementing in February 
1957 his concept of Demokrasi Terpimpin, or Guided Democracy, which Sjafruddin 
and other democratic political leaders such as Hatta (former Vice President), Sjahrir 
(PSI), and Natsir (Masyumi), and I.J Kasimo (Catholic party) strongly opposed.839 
For Sjafruddin the problem was more than just the differences between 
groups that promoted economic rationality and pragmatism on the one side—of 
which he was the main advocate—and radical nationalist and leftist groups on the 
other. His concern was also the philosophical foundation of economic development 
itself. He not only contended against President Sukarno and his supporters among 
radical nationalists and communists, but he was also vocal when disagreeing with 
those who shared similar views as him for an economic rationality, such as Sutan 
Sjahrir, a former prime minister and leader of the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party). 
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Yet it was the flamboyant President Sukarno who perhaps embodied the perfect 
contrast to Sjafruddin’s temperament. The latter criticized Sukarno for his tendency 
to embrace materialist ideology and subtle forms of dictatorship. This tendency was 
reflected in Sukarno’s assertion that “freedom from want is more important than 
freedom of expression”, or that “the constitution was made for man, not man made 
for the constitution”.840 According to Sjafruddin, these statements clearly illustrated 
the prominence of the materialist approach, the utilitarian ethic (utiliteitsbeginsel), 
and the opportunistic tendency that sacrifices morality in public life for political 
exigencies.841 However, Sjafruddin’s designation of Sukarno as an adherent of 
materialist ideology was a bit excessive. The allegation that Sukarno was willing to 
compromise the constitution for some greater human good—usually for the sake of 
his ideas and interests—and the acknowledgement of his dictatorial tendencies 
were more accurate. Indeed, rather than being a strict adherent of Marxism, Sukarno 
used Marxist analyses of capitalism as an interpretive tool to explain the dire 
condition of Indonesian society under the Dutch colonial rule.842 Sjafruddin’s 
criticism of Sjahrir, on the other hand, revealed a more fundamental disagreement 
between the two men, one that dealt with Sjahrir’s openly materialist worldview. 
Sjafruddin fully supported Sjahrir’s proposals to achieve social justice, prosperity, 
                                                          
840 Prawiranegara, “Peranan Agama,” 110. 
841 Prawiranegara, “Peranan Agama,” 109-111. 
842 In Sjafruddin’s opinion, the country’s leaders that have sworn allegiance to the constitution 
must defend it. If the constitution is deemed to require change, then amendments to it must be 
made through channels or procedures that have been specified in the constitution itself. It cannot 
be modified arbitrarily according to the wishes or interests of a person or group of people. If 
President Sukarno’s wish to change the constitution while ignoring legal procedures occured 
without penalty, not even political penalty, then people would lose control over their own 
government. In Sjafruddin’s opinion such acts are in violation of promises to the people and 
oaths of allegiance. He reminded his audience that in Islam, every human must keep his/her 
promises, citing the Qur’an, al-Naḥl 16:91-92: “And fulfill the covenant of Allah, when you have 
made a covenant, and break not the oaths after making them fast, and you have indeed made 
Allah your surety. Surely Allah knows what you do. And be not like her who unravels her yarn, 
after she has spun it strongly. You make your oaths to be means of deceit between you because 
(one) nation is more numerous than (another) nation. Allah only tries you by this. And He will 
certainly make clear to you on the day of Resurrection that wherein you differed”. Prawiranegara, 
“Peranan Agama,” 111-113. 
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and happiness through rationality and efficient organization. However, he did not 
agree with the complete absence of spiritual and moral foundations in Sjahrir’s 
ideas. In Sjafruddin’s view, the development of the soul and its purification (tazkiyat 
al-nafs) should precede the eradication of poverty and achievement of social justice. 
The liberation of the soul from the grip of material temptation and the method for its 
purification were revealed, according to Sjafruddin, only through the doctrines and 
spiritual practices of religion.843 The only people who could eradicate poverty were 
those who were free from the temptation and attachment of material goods. To 
eradicate poverty people first must be able to bear the burden of poverty, charity, 
and sacrifice.844 
Sjafruddin’s insistence on the importance of human development, based on 
spiritual and moral values, in alleviating poverty and upholding social justice bears 
certain similarities to Weber's thesis on Protestant ethics. Weber argued that a new 
type of religion, ascetic Protestantism—most famously in the form of Calvinism—, 
was a force that helped to fuel dynamic capitalism. According to him, “members of 
various ascetic Protestant sects inadvertently helped to bring about a new attitude 
towards economic affairs in their efforts to behave as good Christians.”845 He argued 
that “social evolution and economic progress were also influenced by the ideas, 
                                                          
843 Sjafruddin here refers to the Qur’an, al-Alaa 87:14-17, which states: “He indeed is successful 
who purifies himself, and remembers the name of his Lord, then prays. But, you prefer the life of 
this world, while the Hereafter is better and more lasting.” For him, economic development must 
begin first with human development. It interesting that in 1980 Khurshid Ahmad, one of the 
leading figures in Islamic economics theory, located tazkiyah (purification [of the soul]) as one of 
the basic concepts in the Islamic approach to development. He labels tazkiyah as purification plus 
growth. He further explains: “The Mission of all the prophets of God was to perform the tazkiyah 
of man in all his relationships—with God, with man, with the natural environment, and with 
society and the state.” See Khurshid Ahmad, “Economic Development in an Islamic Framework,” 
in Studies in Islamic Economies, ed. Khurshid Ahmad (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 
1980/1400), 179.  
844 Prawiranegara, “Peranan Agama,” 113-114. 
845 Victor Nee and Richard Swedberg, “Introduction,” in On Capitalism, ed. Victor Nee and Richard 
Swedberg (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 5. 
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ideals, and beliefs of individuals, not only determined by material conditions.”846 
Sjafruddin emphasizes that certain ways of thinking about the world and self 
(weltanschauung) could have penetrating social, political, and economic effects.847 
He and Weber, of course, lived and wrote in different historical contexts, affecting 
the particulars of their emphasis on the influence of spiritual-moral values on social, 
political, and economic development. However, both were convinced that normative 
behavior, derived from a spiritual worldview, was able to affect the course of 
conventional economics. Weber asserted this from an observer’s point of view, while 
Sjafruddin, from the perspective of a policy-maker and someone directly involved in 
the changes happening during his intellectual and political life. For the latter, moral 
and spiritual values could be sources of guidance, inspiration and motivation for 
people to become agents for the eradication of poverty, realization of social justice 
and prosperity, and other such ideals of Indonesian independence. But all these 
conditions were not the ultimate goals of development. The ultimate goal of 
development, in his view, was the realization of an ethical human being.848 
Sjafruddin also urged people to change their perception on poverty. The 
prevailing opinion among the common people was that poverty was a shameful 
affair. He argued that this mindset had unconsciously encouraged many Indonesian 
officials and leaders—whom he describes as “van huis uit arm”, inherently poor [in 
their origins], to commit acts of corruption regarding the public coffers to overcome 
their shame of poverty.849 This negative impression of poverty, according to 
                                                          
846 Barnaby Marsh, “The Role of Spiritual Capital,” in On Capitalism, ed. Victor Nee and Richard 
Swedberg (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 179. Weber’s thesis is not without 
problems, as R. H. Tawney noted in his foreword: “It is arguable, at least, that, instead of 
Calvinism producing the spirit of Capitalism, both would with equal plausibility be regarded as 
different effects of changes in economic organization and social structure”. Tawney, “Foreword,” 
6-9.     
847 Prawiranegara, “Peranan Agama,” 106-108; Marsh, “The Role of Spiritual Capital,” 124. 
848 Prawiranegara, “Peranan Agama,” 114-117.  
849 Prawiranegara, “Peranan Agama,” 107.  
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Sjafruddin, could be rectified by showing the difference between prosperity based 
on the material objects (stoffelijke welvaart) and spiritual prosperity (innerlijke or 
geestelijke welvaart). Someone may well be called rich in terms of material 
advantage, but could be poor in inner tranquility. Conversely, someone who was 
poor when measured by material criteria could be called well-off if said person did 
not feel or think himself/herself poor. 850  
Sjafruddin was convinced that changes in this perception would help 
Indonesians to tackle problems of poverty and social injustice more effectively and 
peacefully. Self-esteem and self-respect (eigenwaarde, zelfrespect) were character 
traits that ought to be socialized amongst the people in order to weaken the 
tendency to elevate material prosperity as the main purpose of life. Materialism 
destroyed the soul of society because it fostered the attitude that considered fellow 
human beings to be mere tools for some material end. And if this happened, there 
would be no underlying moral foundation of togetherness and friendship to prevent 
social injustices, major or minor, such as cheating, robbing, and even violence, to 
achieve the goal of material gain. These problems have already occurred through the 
pattern of confiscation of the rights of others, abandonment of the rule of law, 
deprivation of individual liberty, and the demand for higher wages but refusal to 
work in accordance with the contract.851 Corruption, bribery, and the misuse of law 
                                                          
850 Prawiranegara, “Peranan Agama,” 107. Sjafruddin’s opinions in the above paragraph seem to 
have a Sufi influence. Though Prawiranegara had never followed a Sufi religious order [tarīqa], he 
was known as a man who led a simple life. His life and appearance indeed were modest. 
Interestingly, he mostly always dressed in a Western collared suit with tie or tuxedo. He read 
Maulana Muhammad Ali and Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s commentaries of the Qur'an, which are popular 
among Dutch/Western educated Indonesian Muslim leaders. Both commentaries/interpretations 
have a spiritual and intellectual orientation. The description above refers, in my view, to the 
Qur’an, al-Hashr 59:9, which reads: “Those who were already firmly established in their homes 
[in Medina], and firmly rooted in faith, show love for those who migrated to them for refuge and 
harbour no desire in their hearts for what has been given to them. They give them preference 
over themselves, even if they too are poor. And those who are saved from their own soul’s greed 
are truly successful.”     
851 Prawiranegara, “Peranan Agama,” 107-108. With this statement Sjafruddin targeted ultra-
leftist and nationalist groups who pushed for the seizure of Dutch companies operating in 
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in Indonesia are common symptoms that are very difficult to eradicate even to the 
present day. During the 1950s, according to Sjafruddin, “immorality has infiltrated 
the state power apparatus and has seeped from top to bottom.”852 As a result, the 
institutions of state were no longer able to carry out their duties properly; there was 
no one to defend and uphold law and justice. Nor was there legal certainty, 
rechtszekerheid. The Law was in the favor of the ruling group and those who were 
clever and immoral enough to lie, cheat and bribe. 853  
When Sjafruddin asserted in this lecture that the absence of legal certainty in 
the country had made it impossible to implement real economic development, he 
had in mind President Sukarno's authoritarian tendencies and the growing influence 
of PKI. He compared the rule of law in a state based on human rights with the legal 
order of a totalitarian state. He said that in the former case, citizens were required to 
perform and uphold moral principles, based either on religious teachings or on the 
shared fundamental values of human rights. For Sjafruddin, these two sources of 
normative values were ultimately derived from God: in the case of the former, these 
were revealed through prophets, while in the latter case, these were the result of 
human understanding of “natural law”, Naturrecht, which, according to him, were 
also often given the epithet "from God”, goddelijk or divine. These moral principles 
taught people to love each other as in ties of kinship. He wished for the law to be 
accepted and agreed upon by those to whom it applies. Acceptance could occur if the 
legal basis contained timeless and universal values that could not be modified or 
eliminated without lowering the dignity of human beings themselves. For 
Sjafruddin, human rights were not a human invention, but instead were inherent to 
our nature and understanding. An orderly human society was a society based on 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Indonesia and launched ceaseless demands and strikes to ask for higher wages, incited by 
Communist and extreme nationalist union organizations. See Dick, “Formation,” 183-185. 
852 Prawiranegara, “Peranan Agama,” 108. 
853 Prawiranegara, “Peranan Agama,” 108.  
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human rights. Legal order by force in a totalitarian society that depended solely on 
the authority of the ruling class, on the other hand, was based on the principle of 
opportunity (opportuniteits) or usefulness (utiliteitsbeginsel).854  
Indeed, Sjafruddin’s concern with the rule of law, individual liberty and 
human rights was one of characteristics of the Indonesian Western-educated 
intelligentsia who had absorbed the traditions of European liberalism and socialism 
or derived similar values from Islamic modernism. They considered that “Western-
type democracy was an important article of belief.”855  
Although Sjafruddin emphasized that on a very basic level economic 
development should be initiated by an inward development of character and 
spiritual growth of human beings through religious normative values, he was aware 
of the problems with this approach. Firstly, given the many religions that exist, 
which religion was the best vessel for such a task? Moreover, why, he asked 
rhetorically, do injustices continue to exist despite the long history of religious 
institutions and doctrines in society? Regarding the first question, Sjafruddin wrote: 
It is up to each individual. What is important is: that each religion must not 
only talk, but must seep into the hearts so that God's teachings to love our 
fellow human beings as we love ourselves become a way of life that is held 
firm. No matter how different religions are, people who are truly religious 
will be able to live together in harmony and peace based on mutual respect, 
mutual love.856 
 
                                                          
854 Prawiranegara, “Peranan Agama,” 108-109. 
855 Feith, Decline, 45 and 114. Concerning them, Feith wrote: “They believed public liberties and 
the rule of law to be a great importance, and many of them saw parliamentary institutions as 
necessary safeguards against a possible development of authoritarianism, fascism, or demagogue 
rule. It is true that they produced no doctrine to justify Western-type procedures in terms of the 
images of democracy which had general currency at the time. But this was not because they, as 
individuals, lacked a strong value commitment to the ideas which these procedures embodied. It 
was probably in part because their own liberal-socialist views were difficult to reconcile with the 
populist nationalism which dominated the thinking of most members of the political public” (45). 
The opponents of the aforementioned political leaders, according to Feith, were those leaders 
who “claimed leadership positions […] on the grounds that they were close to the people and 
understood their wishes […] They continued to assuage men’s thirst for a mystique and sense of 
momentum in public affairs […] through ideological themes of a mutually antagonistic character” 
(114).     
856 Prawiranegara, “Peranan Agama,” 115.  
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As for the second question, he argued that:  
The objection that religions of the world have not been able to bring eternal 
peace and permanent justice, and that religion is often used only as a 
disguise to hide evil purposes, is undeniable. But it cannot be denied also, 
that since they were born in the world, human beings are always tried to 
contradict their God and violate His commands and teachings. But those who 
lose and suffer due to the objections and contradictions are human beings 
themselves. So, it cannot be blamed on religions, if human beings are still not 
able to regulate themselves properly. Religion simply gives a warning or 
guidance, but whether to follow the warning and the demand or not it is up 
to the human beings themselves.857 
 
Sjafruddin therefore clearly emphasized the importance of law, morality, and 
religion as foundations of the development of a just and prosperous society. Here he 
was talking about the importance of religion in general, not just Islam. This inclusive 
attitude not only resulted from his speaking at an event organized by the Catholic 
Student Association, nor was it due simply to the fact that Indonesia was a multi-
religious country, but also because Sjafruddin had the view that in terms of morality 
there was no fundamental difference between Islam and other religions, especially 
Judaism and Christianity.858 Furthermore, though justice was obviously an 
important part of any sort of national economic development, he conceived of it 
differently than would a historical materialist or communist. For him justice was a 
moral-religious category. For one, it would not entail the establishment of a classless 
society. According to Sjafruddin, personal character and individuality must be 
considered in the effort of upholding justice. The effort of realizing a just and 
prosperous nation should be based not only on sober economic rationality but also 
on moral and spiritual values. Economic and political crises that occurred in 
Indonesia at that time, according to Sjafruddin, were in essence a crisis of faith 
(geloofs) and moral crisis (morele crisis) that could only be solved by changing the 
orientation of the Indonesian people’s outlook on life: from a focus on wealth and 
                                                          
857 Prawiranegara, “Peranan Agama,” 115.  
858 Prawiranegara, “Persamaan,” 406.   
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social status to an focus on spiritual goods: God-consciousness and sacrifice for the 
interests of fellow human beings.859 Therefore, Sjafruddin’s primary concern was the 
spiritual and moral state of Indonesians, not their material condition. Economic 
prosperity was not the primary goal of his concept of development. The spiritual and 
moral well-being of Indonesians was the ultimate goal, of which economic 
prosperity was only a part and a consequence.  
Sjafruddin’s definition of development clearly could be accepted by all 
Indonesians including the adherents of different religions besides Islam. He 
developed this relationship between economic imperatives and spiritual 
imperatives in more detail in an earlier article entitled "The Motive or Principle of 
Economics According to Islamic Law," published in the magazine Suara Masyumi 
(Voice of Masyumi, 6th year, November-December 1951). In the essay Sjafruddin 
recommended that Muslims not base their actions solely on economic imperatives—
that is, trying to gain as much as possible with minimum exertion, monetary or 
otherwise. Rather he urged them to elevate the desire to follow God's 
commandments and to achieve a state of God-consciousness (taqwa) as the driving 
forces behind their actions. By doing this, in his opinion, the individual would be 
incapable of using the principle of utilitarianism when dealing with fellow human 
beings, an act that could otherwise lead to various forms of oppression.860 
It is worth noting that the article about economic motivation—viz. the ‘right 
intention’ in economic behavior—was the first of Sjafruddin’s writings that dealt 
with the topic of economics in Islam. Emphasis on this issue can be traced to a 
Prophetic Hadith which was very popular among Muslims: “The reward for deeds 
depends upon their intentions and every person will get a reward according to what 
                                                          
859 Prawiranegara, “Peranan Agama,” 115-117. 
860 Prawiranegara, “Motif,” 29-30. 
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he has intended” (Recorded by Bukhārī and Muslim).861 M. Umer Chapra, an expert 
in Islamic economics, discussed the subject rigorously. According to him, in 
capitalism, “self-interest is the only well-spring of human action.”862 A person’s sole 
social responsibility was to increase their profit. He admitted that self-interest has 
its role and was not necessarily bad, but it was only one driving force.863 Human 
beings were also social beings. According to him, there should be “restrictions on 
individual freedom to create harmony between individual and social interest [and 
formation of] an efficient and equitable allocation and distribution of resources, not 
brought about automatically by market forces”864. Furthermore, the concepts of 
tawḥīd (divine unity), khilāfah (vicegerency), andʿadālah (justice) in Islam “not only 
frame the Islamic worldview but also constitute the fountain-head of the maqāṣid 
[al-sharīʿah, the objectives of Islamic law] and the strategy.”865 Subsequently, there 
was a greater emphasis placed on duties than on rights in social and human 
relations. Therefore, as Chapra concludes, “[t]he fundamental wisdom behind this is 
that if duties are fulfilled by everyone, self-interest is automatically held within 
bounds and the rights of all are undoubtedly safeguarded.”866  This notion is also 
presented by Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr in his discussion of the concept of 
stewardship or vicegerency (khilāfah) which affirmed the capacity of human being 
and their energies and made them “the absolute master of the universe”867 on one 
hand, and on the other “gets to the bottom of the sense of responsibility concerning 
what one is made steward of.”868 Ṣadr emphasized that “[t]here is no responsibility 
                                                          
861 Al-Ḥanbalī, Jāmiʿ ‘l-ʿulūm wa ‘l-Ḥikam, 9. 
862 Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge, 28. 
863 Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge, 28-29. 
864 Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge, 205. 
865 Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge, 201. 
866 Chapra, Islam and the Economic Challenge, 205. 
867 Al-Ṣadr, “Psychological Role,” 258. 
868 Al-Ṣadr, “Psychological Role,” 258. 
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without liberty and a sense of choice and an ability to master circumstances.”869 
Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, in his discussion of ethics and rational behaviour, also 
rejected the equation of rationality in economics with self-interest. This equation 
deemed “all ethical behaviour, which is not necessarily in keeping with self-interest 
maximization”870 to be irrational. From the Islamic point of view, in his opinion, this 
line of reasoning was unacceptable because first,  
rationality in Islam is defined in a manner that ethical imperatives and 
economic exigencies get intermingled both at the philosophical level and the 
social level. Second […] the belief in Divine Presence impels a representative 
Muslim to act out of ethical compulsions […] Associated with this belief is the 
thought of Hereafter which influences economic behaviour. With such a 
perception, rational behaviour will have to be defined broadly enough to 
include the reward of the good deeds in the Hereafter. Third, the 
responsibility axiom, which makes it morally binding on the individual to act 
for the welfare of the society as well, also dampens relentless self-interest 
maximization.871  
 
Therefore, in an economy guided by Islamic principles self-interest was recognized 
as a motivating force behind behaviour, but it should be subordinate to moral-
ethical precepts.872 
Although Sjafruddin’s article was addressed to Muslims, especially 
supporters of the Islamic political party Masyumi, its background and historical 
context lay in Sjafruddin’s disapproval of government policies supporting the 
nationalization of foreign companies and the granting of protection and privileges to 
indigenous Indonesian entrepreneurs. During the early 1950s, the Indonesian 
government tried to alter the structure of the colonial economy by eliminating Dutch 
ownership and reducing their administrative staff.873 An industrial development 
plan and the Benteng (fortress) program were also designed to build up an 
indigenous Indonesian business class by, inter alia, giving special treatment to 
                                                          
869 Al-Ṣadr, “Psychological Role,” 258. 
870 Naqvi, Islam, Economics, and Society, 55. 
871 Naqvi, Islam, Economics, and Society, 55-56.    
872 Naqvi, Islam, Economics, and Society, 76. 
873 Glassburner, “Economic Policy-Making,” 94. 
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indigenous business people but excluding Chinese Indonesians. Both programs 
failed due to practices of graft and patronage among political parties which led to 
the suspension of the program in 1957.874 From the outset Sjafruddin did not agree 
with both of these programs because at that time, the Indonesian government did 
not have sufficient funds to compensate the nationalized companies and there was a 
scarcity of Indonesian human resources (experts and technical or administrative 
staff) to replace the Dutch employees. Detrimental effects of these policies were the 
deterioration in the economic life of people such as unemployment and reduced 
availability of goods due to lower production capacity of the nationalized 
companies.875 Licensed indigenous entrepreneurs were trying to collect profits as 
much as possible and were greedier than the Western capitalists who had controlled 
the companies before. Most of those indigenous entrepreneurs had no capital, skills 
or experience, but simply wanted to make a large profit in a short time. Another 
onerous consequence of the policy on the public was the rising prices of essential 
daily goods. Sjafruddin had anticipated all these negative effects.876  
In his analysis, Sjafruddin took into account not only that the policy was 
indeed unrealistic and had shortcomings, but also that among those who abused the 
government’s policies were Muslim entrepreneurs, who seemed to be driven purely 
by materialistic motives: 
Those who use licenses to satisfy their desire, sucking profits from the sweat 
of the poor, are not merely foreign merchants or persons who are not 
Muslims. Even among the capitalists there are a lot of our own merchants 
who call themselves Muslims, who are not in the least are aware and if they 
were aware, not the least they would be willing to meet the requirements 
prescribed by Islam in an attempt to make a living or to meet their 
obligations as Muslim tycoons.877 
  
                                                          
874 Dick, “Formation,” 177-178; Higgins with Higgins, Indonesia, 94.  
875 Dick, “Formation,” 185. 
876 Prawiranegara, “Motif,” 27-28. 
877 Prawiranegara, “Motif,” 31. 
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Sjafruddin expected more from Muslim entrepreneurs: that they be 
motivated not only by the desire for profit, but also primarily by their devotion to 
God and solidarity with their fellow citizens. Had these values been learned, they 
would not have abused the privilege they received. Sjafruddin quoted three verses of 
the Qur’an878 as references to assert that in Islam, wealth was a means for 
worshiping God in the form of assisting those who were needy. Here Sjafruddin 
showed once again how ideally, social justice was achieved through spirituality: faith 
in God and love of fellow human beings.  
This view of Sjafruddin’s can be compared to that of Adam Smith, who 
regarded himself as much a moral philosopher as a political economist. Smith firmly 
maintained the need for moral supervision on the quest to maximize self-interest.879 
Sjafruddin’s exposition above shows once again his conviction of the importance of 
moral and spiritual dimensions as foundations of economic development. He saw 
the danger in implementing a model of economic development that was based solely 
on economic imperatives that could only “give birth to capitalism, which alone does 
not recognize humanitarian solidarity as well as [giving birth to] various forms of 
oppression, whether colonialism, imperialism and communism.”880 However, 
Sjafruddin emphasized, this did not mean that economics or economic incentives 
were not important in development and in human life in general. Economic 
                                                          
878 “You cannot attain to righteousness unless you spend out of what you love…” (Ālu ʿImrān 
3:92); “Allah will blot out usury, and He causes charity to prosper…” (al-Baqarah 2:276); “And in 
whose wealth there is a known right for the beggar and the destitute” (al-Maʿārij 70:24-25).  
879 In Stilwell’s opinion, Smith was no simple proponent of laissez-faire economics and had 
expressed significant reservations about capitalist market relationships.  His advocacy for 
competition in the market was intended to limit “anti-social business behavior”, such as 
monopolies and the forming of private cartels by traders to fix prices against the interest of the 
public. Furthermore, underlying some of his proposals was a deep concern for “the moral 
dimensions of economic behavior”; the urgency of fostering individual stimulus should not lead 
to economic inequality. He also believed in the government's chief role in preserving justice, 
which would require the state to intervene in order to protect individual rights and property, and 
preserve good social relations. Stilwell, Political Economy, 73-74. Cf. Wilson, Economics, Ethics, 
and Religion, 3; Yildiz Atasoy, Islam’s Marriage with Neoliberalism: State Transformation in 
Turkey (Basingtoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 130.  
880 Prawiranegara, “Motif,” 36. 
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imperatives continue to be important as essential tools to achieve economic 
prosperity and material welfare. But to use these tools correctly human beings 
needed an inward knowledge of existential purpose and meaning that could only be 
found in religious traditions. In Sjafruddin’s own words: "Religion teaches us what is 
not taught by any material science: to love our fellow human beings as a sign of love 
for God, who created the entire universe.”881 He also placed much emphasis on a 
particular verse in the Qur’an that ordered humans not to use their wealth for 
satisfaction of their greed, but rather to distribute it for the public interest.882 Thus, 
the ultimate goal of economic development was not material wealth but rather a 
steadfast devotion to God that inspired love for fellow human beings. The ultimate 
expression of this love was to realize common weal, through both individual and 
collective sacrifice. This idea of social justice as the realization of loving others was 
one of the most important aspects of Sjafruddin’s concept of development.  
Sjafruddin was consistent in his approach to development even when he was 
no longer a high ranking official. In an article written in 1977, criticizing the New 
Order development program, he maintained that the spiritual and moral well-being 
of aindividuals would be reflected in “their sensitivity to sense of justice, strong 
respect and affection towards fellow human beings in particular and God's creation 
in general and willingness to defend justice and truth, and willingness to sacrifice 
wealth and life to defend human values as taught by God to them.”883 The article was 
published approximately ten years after the army-dominated New Order 
government began the process of development characterized by large injections of 
                                                          
881 Prawiranegara, “Motif,” 36; cf. Prawiranegara, “Peranan Agama,” 117. 
882 “…And those who hoard up gold and silver and spend it not in Allah’s way—announce to them 
a painful chastisement. On the day when it will be heated in the Fire of hell, then their foreheads 
and their sides and their backs will be branded with it: This is what you hoarded up for 
yourselves, so taste what you used to hoard” (Qur’an, al-Tawba 9:34-35); Prawiranegara, “Motif,” 
36-38. 
 
883 Prawiranegara, Human Development, 9. 
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foreign aid and investment, ‘pragmatic’ policies favouring foreign investors, 
industrialization, and large scale technological structuring. As it happened, the 
development policies also included the application of strict monetary and budget 
controls and the freest possible operation of market forces. Despite striking 
economic progress, such policies failed to bring about any redistribution of wealth, 
and instead resulted in a detrimental impact on values and the societal structure. 
Indonesia, then, was still encircled by grave problems of mass poverty, 
unemployment, and economic dependence. In addition, many forms of elitism in 
political, economic and socio-cultural life had emerged. Everywhere there were 
‘enclave’ lifestyles, the large gulf in lifestyle and wealth between the capital-centered 
modern enclaves and the regions, between an elite minority and an ordinary or low 
majority. Patriotism, morality, and religious values had eroded sharply with the 
growth of materialistic attitudes including consumerism and hedonism. Corruption, 
nepotism and inefficiency were widespread practices and were not considered 
deviant behaviors from the standard of public ethics. There was growing inequality 
and demoralization especially amongst government officials and other elites.884 In 
the article, Sjafruddin asked the government to pay attention to poverty reduction, 
elimination of unequal opportunities in education and improvement of poor health 
services for most people, and alleviation of general deep inequalities between the 
haves and the have-nots. He also criticized the materialistic and hedonistic 
behaviors of many of the elite, as well as practices of corruption, favoritism, and 
collusion between government officials and/or military officers and private 
companies or contractors to take maximum profit at the expense of public interest. 
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He therefore stressed the importance of moral development, changes on one’s 
outlook on life, rule of law, and political restructuring: that is, the change of political 
system to restore democracy and a system of checks and balances between the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government.885 In his view, the 
government should put more emphasis on human development by prioritising 
education as a primary program. For him, economic development was the second 
priority. In addition, the government should rely more on humans as the primary 
resource of development, rather than money earned from foreign aid and immoral 
tourism. He also stressed the importance of fulfilling people’s basic needs, such as 
food, clothing, and housing, rather than the construction of luxurious and costly 
mansions, hotels, and government offices that was not accompanied by the 
improvement of bureaucratic efficiency. Sjafruddin called his concept of 
development a “human development”, of which the purpose was the realization of 
an ethical/moral human being who in turn would be capable of realising a just and 
prosperous society.886 For Sjafruddin, realizing a just and prosperous society under 
the blessing of God was jihād, a religiously-mandated struggle, for Muslims.887 
5.3. Chapter Three: Social Justice and Islamic Economics  
As we have seen in chapter one, Sjafruddin saw Islamic teachings on 
development as occupying a middle ground between aspects of capitalism and 
socialism. Indeed, in the first article discussed above he claimed that in the future 
Islam would be able to synthesize the positive aspects of these two ideologies. 
However, unlike revivalist-modernist or neo-fundamentalist Muslim scholars and 
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activists who likewise criticized capitalism and socialism, Sjafruddin did not go on to 
conclude that Muslims should have their own economic system. He did not believe 
that it was necessary to establish a distinct totalizing system such as Islamic 
economics promoted by Muslim thinkers—one that was based, for instance, on the 
elimination of the interest-based banking system. I will first discuss the origins and 
development of the idea of Islamic economics and the growth of Islamic financial 
institutions in Indonesia today. Then I will examine the reasoning behind 
Sjafruddin’s disagreement with the idea of Islamic economics, and his views on the 
fundamental concepts of ribā and zakāt. 
I will not exhaustively describe the origins and historical context of the idea 
of Islamic economics. The issue has been sufficiently discussed in Part Three Chapter 
Two. Nevertheless there are some points that need to be briefly emphasized. First, 
the idea of Islamic economics originated in the nineteenth century as part of the 
manifestation and continuity of the Islamic revival, although the notion of cultivating 
an economic doctrine grounded on Islamic teachings was absent from speeches and 
writings of pioneers of Islamic modernism/reformism.888 Second, Sayyid Abū al-Aʿlā 
Mawdūdī—an Islamic ideologist from the Indian sub-continent and head of the 
powerful Jamaʿat-i Islami—played the most significant role in initiating and 
developing the idea of Islamic economics as a distinctly Islamic economic practice 
for Muslims.889 Other scholars, such as Muhammad Hifzur Rahman Seoharvi (1901-
1962) in India, and Shaykh Mahmud Ahmad (1918-1990) in Pakistan were also 
among the early contributors to the idea of Islamic economics. However, they were 
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889 According to Wilson, this considerable influence was due to his ability to attract a growing 
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not well-known outside their respective country.890 Two other important figures 
were Sayyid Quṭb of Egypt (1906-1966) and Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr (1933-1980), 
a Shiʿite scholar living in Najaf, Iraq whose book Iqtiṣādunā, Our Economics, argued 
for the incompatibility of both Marxism and capitalism with Islam.891 Third, a critical 
view of Islamic economics emphasizes its origin in the desire to tighten communal 
bonds among Muslims in British India and strengthen their communities, as part of a 
broader response to the threat posed by British rule.892 However, Mawdūdī was also 
driven, as Wilson argued, by concern for “[t]he economic injustices arising from 
inequitable land holding and the indebtedness of many poor Muslims. For Mawdūdī 
such injustices facing Muslims could only be solved in the context of an Islamic state 
where the Sharīʿah was enforced.”893  
The younger generation of Muslim economists who were followers of 
Mawdūdī would later become significant contributors to the development of the 
idea of Islamic economics, a term popularized by him. They cooperated with other 
scholars, published articles in journals and books, and organized various 
conferences.894 Significant support came from the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC): the countries that comprised it, especially the newly oil-rich 
states of the Persian Gulf, agreed to sponsor the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in 
1973. Wilson argued that the outcome of the 1973 conference marked, politically 
and ideologically, the victory of those rich oil-producing and pro-Western countries 
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over Arab socialist philosophy and nationalist secularism.895 Subsequently several 
conferences were held, among them the First International Conference on Islamic 
Economics in Mecca from February 21-26, 1976 under the auspices of King Abdul 
Aziz University of Jeddah; the International Economic Conference on The Muslim 
World and the Future Economic Order, London, July 1977 organized by the Islamic 
Council of Europe; and the Mecca Seminar on the Monetary and Fiscal Economics of 
Islam, October 7-12, 1978. They represented an important stage in the development 
of Islamic economics as a discipline.896  
Islamic economics, as Ghazanfar put it, was “[t]he knowledge and application 
of doctrines and injunctions of the Islamic Sharīʿah that, in addition to requiring the 
pursuit of economic activities through efficient use of scarce resources in order to 
provide satisfaction of material needs of individuals, calls for the promotion of social 
justice in the society.”897 According to Naqvi, there were four ethical axioms that 
represented the Islamic vision of humans’ relation to themselves and their social 
environment: unity (tawhīd), equilibrium (al-ʿadl wa ‘l iḥsān), free will (ikhtiyār), 
and responsibility (farḍ).898 In general all Islamic economists seemed to be in 
agreement with these axioms despite their different formulations.899 The central 
idea that defined Islamic economics, as articulated by Muhammad Abdul Mannan, 
Khurshid Ahmad, Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi and 
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Muhammad Umer Chapra, was the explicit inclusion of Islamic ethics in economic 
practice to pursue an ideal situation.900 In Islamic economics the normative and 
positive aspects are distinguishable but not separable. Mannan, for example, asserts 
that “[i]n Islamic economics, the normative and positive aspects of the science are so 
interlinked that any attempt to separate them could be misleading and counter-
productive.” 901 Islamic economics as a system was not static, since it always had to 
deal with economic, social, political, and technological changes which required fresh 
thinking (ijtihād).902 Similarly, as Naqvi underscored, Islamic economics was “not 
restricted to making factual judgments alone; it is free to use value judgments, 
especially those based on religion.”903 Naqvi believed that “economic doctrines are 
essentially an idealization of reality and relative to the nature of a society. They are 
not a collection of absolute, unchanging truths.”904 He emphasized “[t]he relativity 
and the changeability of the basic propositions of Islamic economics.”905 Naqvi had a 
different emphasis than Mannan. Naqvi underlined behavior of a real-life Muslim 
society,906 whereas Mannan focused on “a people imbued with the values of 
Islam.”907 Meanwhile Siddiqi emphasized three points. First, “the modern Islamic 
economy will be modern, utilising the best techniques of production and methods of 
organization available”908 and possessing a concern for “human relationships, the 
attitudes and the social policies that constitutes a system.”909 Second, “Islam’s 
economic system can be properly studied only in the context of the Islamic way of 
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life as a whole”910 in its broad sense to serve a spiritual end. Third, the Islamic 
economy “is capable of taking on different forms in different periods of history in 
different countries.”911 From all descriptions of Islamic economics by its proponents 
it could be concluded that Islamic economics was prescriptive by nature. In this 
understanding, Islamic economists are similar or comparable to the pre-classical 
economists and Scholastic philosophers who did not separate economic affairs from 
moral questions.912 
Concerning the differences between Islamic economics and the theory 
underlying the contemporary global economy, Mannan, Naqvi, and Chapra were in 
agreement on the main points, but each focused on different aspects. For Mannan, 
the difference between Islamic economics and the economic theory underlying the 
contemporary global economy lay in “the handling of the problem of choice [which 
comes from the fact that] resources are limited so that the satisfaction of a want is at 
the expense of some other want which must go unsatisfied. The eternal conflict 
between multiplicity of wants and scarcity of means forces [people] to make a choice 
between [their] wants.”913 In modern economics, according to Mannan, “this 
problem of choice is greatly dependent on the whims of individuals.”914 But in 
Islamic economics, they must, whether they like or not, act in accordance with the 
rules of Islamic teachings.915 Accordingly, Mannan emphasized that “Islamic 
economics is guided by the basic values of Islam [while] modern economics, based 
on a capitalist socio-economic framework, is greatly controlled by the self-interest of 
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the individual.”916 Chapra, on the other hand, pointed out the difference between the 
two in that the goals of Islam (maqāṣid al-sharīʿah) that “are not primarily 
materialist.”917  The Islamic goals were based on the concepts of “human well-being 
(falāḥ) and good life (ḥayāt ṭayyibah), which gave utmost importance to 
brotherhood, socio-economic justice, and a balanced satisfaction of both the material 
and spiritual needs of all human beings.”918 They differed from the goals of the 
predominantly secularist systems of the present-day world that were concerned 
only with material needs.919 For Naqvi, the difference between Islamic economics 
and the contemporary global economy lay in the former’s refusal to “equate rational 
behavior with self-interest maximization,”920 since it explicitly introduced “ethical 
values into the economic calculus.”921 Naqvi further noted that the belief in the 
Divine Presence and the thought of the Hereafter impel a representative Muslim to 
act out of ethical compulsions in his economic behaviour.922 “With such a perception, 
rational behaviour will have to be defined broadly enough to include the reward of 
the good deeds in the Hereafter.”923 Therefore, it was “morally binding on the 
individual to act for the welfare of the society as well” as a consequence of the belief 
in God’s presence and the Hereafter.924 Naqvi gave a more concrete example of 
differences between Islamic and capitalist economics, concerning the issue of the 
actual allocation of investment resources over time. Under capitalism, these 
functions are determined by the rate of interest. Meanwhile in Islam, the proposed 
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alternative of a profit-lost-sharing-based economy would require economic 
restructuring and the redistribution of income and wealth in society.925 However, he 
was more cautious than other scholars with regard to the exact manner in which the 
prohibition of interest would be inforced. The various implementations of the 
commandment, in his opinion, were legitimate.926        
In Indonesia, the attention paid to the idea of Islamic economics can be seen 
in the writings of Ahmad Muflih Saefuddin.927 But before him, during the 1950s, 
Kahruddin Yunus, a Ph.D. candidate at American University in Washington D.C., 
wrote a two-volume work on the Islamic economic system that he argued would be 
applicable to Indonesia. However his scholarly career seems to have stopped 
abruptly, with no known cause, and his voice was no longer heard in the field.928 In 
general, however, the writings of Indonesian scholars who support the idea of 
Islamic economics are similar to what has been put forward by the pioneers of the 
subject. However, they also discuss and conduct research specifically on cases that 
are unique to Indonesia. Saefuddin, for example, starts from the experience of 
economic development under the New Order regime that ruled Indonesia at the 
time. In his observation, though the regime’s economic program yielded positive 
results, it also created a culture of permissiveness, hedonism, individualism, 
materialism, consumerism, and secularism, all of which resulted in a great disparity 
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between the poor and the prosperous.929 According to him, normative values ought 
to form the basis of policies that in turn influenced individual behaviors, leading to 
social, economic and political development. Normative values derived from Islamic 
teachings were to be subsumed under the state ideology, Pancasila. These values 
could then be formulated into a model of development that would enhance human 
dignity and foster a peaceful and harmonious relationship between fellow citizens 
and between citizens and the natural environment. This would create economic 
prosperity for all people, not only a handful of them.930 Subsequently, Saefuddin 
proposed that Islamic economics be applied931 through the steps of establishing 
Islamic bank932, management of zakāt in terms of economic aspects,933 and 
development of a "cooperative investment service”.934 This cooperative institution 
actually operated in the same way as that of the Islamic Bank935 which had not been 
able to be established in the 1980s because the New Order government was still 
suspicious of Muslims’ activities, which it perceived as subversive to its rule.  
Yunus proposed a economic theoretical framework to solve various 
economic, political and social problems. He called this theory the ‘Islamic Economic 
System’, also known as the ‘Economic System of Common Prosperity or Common-
ism’. However, although the author addressed affairs within the Muslim world and 
Indonesia, he devoted much of his discussion to efforts to attain prosperity for all 
countries in the world and peace among nations. This is what he intended with the 
term ‘common-ism’ or ‘economic system of common prosperity’.936 In addition, 
much of the data and statistics that he used were obtained from countries in the 
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Middle East, Europe and the United States, because he lived and traveled for 
extensive periods in those countries. As a result his assessment of Indonesia's 
economic problems was very general and at times superficial.  
Yunus proposed, amongst other ideas, a regulated economy and a 
cooperative system to improve economic conditions and eliminate injustices in 
Indonesia. Thus the government played an important role in regulating the course of 
the economy. Meanwhile, the cooperative ought to be organized by people 
themselves937, and would become an institution for the development of the spirit of 
democracy, nationalism and brotherhood938, as it was envisioned by Mohammad 
Hatta.  This “guided economy,” as he called it, required not only democracy on a 
national level but also an international democracy in the sense of full equality of 
rights and obligations among all nations of the world.939  
Yunus also compared capitalism and the strands of socialism with Islamic 
teachings. His line of thought was similar to that of Sjafruddin in that he 
acknowledged that there was much overlap between Islam and these ideologies, 
though they were fundamentally incompatible given the spiritual underpinnings of 
the former and the materialist basis of the latter. Furthermore, he discussed the 
history and teachings of capitalism and socialism, gave advice to the government on 
what efforts should be made to prevent war and to bring peace and prosperity to the 
world, and described the general benefits of the theory of Common Prosperity which 
includes the application of Islamic, religious and social ethics in the practice of 
economy.940 
However, Yunus’ book is rarely used as a reference in the discussion about 
Islamic economics in an Indonesian context because he did not discuss the actual 
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issues that Indonesians were facing at the time. Indeed, he did not have adequate 
knowledge of the social, economic and political problems of Indonesia, nor was he 
involved in government, political parties, or civil society organizations in Indonesia. 
Therefore, he was unable to offer concrete or relevant solutions.  
The proponents of Islamic economics could be categorized as a revivalist 
modernist group “[that] espoused modern values […] but downplayed their 
modernity, privileging authenticity and divine mandates.”941 Those trained in 
modern educational institutions are able to identify the injustice underpinning 
capitalist economic practice and criticize it confidently.942 They see that the practice 
of the capitalist economy is based solely on materialistic principles and 
considerations that contradict Islamic moral and spiritual values. Although they 
acknowledge economic progress and the technological advancements that are 
produced by capitalism,943 they see in the interest-ridden practice of capitalist 
economic transactions the unfair exchange of goods and the materialistic impulse 
they consider detrimental to the moral and spiritual order of society.944 In a 
capitalist system they see that “[m]oney and the search for profit become the 
measures of all things, completing the circle of disembodied cash transactions in 
which ethical constraints are no longer considered part of the process, except 
prudentially.”945 They believe that Islam can offer a valid alternative to the modern, 
conventional, interest-based system of finance by drawing upon resources unique to 
Islamic schools of thought.946  
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In the following section, I will discuss the economic thought of the late 
Mohammad Hatta, first Vice President of Indonesia (1945-1956). Although he was 
often classified as a secular nationalist like Sukarno or a socialist like Sjahrir, his 
economic thinking can also be understood as part of the Muslim intellectual 
response. Indeed, I will argue that Hatta is more suitably classified within the 
religious socialist group. Hatta was one of the main drafters of the Indonesian 
Constitution, especially its economic sections, and his ideas on economics were very 
broad. However, I will narrow my discussion to the issue of ribā, usury. I will also 
address his thoughts on socialism and cooperatives, because Hatta’s writings on 
these issues were, as he said, a reflection of the teachings of Islam.  
As a devout Muslim, Hatta believed that “'Islam should inspire all things, 
become a leader and guide in all actions.”947 It is therefore not surprising that Hatta's 
personal life and his social, economic, and political ideas strongly reflected the 
teachings of Islam, as these were manifested in his ideas on Indonesian socialism 
and social justice. Regarding social ideals and the economic order, he wrote, “I want 
to point out now how to establish proper characteristic of an Islamic society that we 
should build…we must build a society which carries out divine justice, that is the 
highest justice, and this step may be regarded as leading to social justice.”948 Indeed, 
in the concept of Divine social justice, there exists a common value among the 
different religious traditions: “If we carry out divine justice, no other religion would 
reject it. If we organize society in order to attain a society based on divine justice, the 
highest justice, any religion in this world would agree. For this matter there is no 
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contradiction between Islam and Christianity.”949 In his view, divine justice 
transcended denominations and was achievable by the highest ideals of religious 
consciousness and tradition. Thus, the ideal society to which Hatta aspired was the 
one that upheld and enforced the values and presence of the sacred. Such a society 
was one where Divine justice in the form of social justice was realized, where every 
member of society or citizen of the state had equal status before the law and the 
same rights and obligations. For fellow Muslims to achieve this goal, “[o]ur souls 
must be nurtured by the spirit and ideals of the Islamic society. We should engrave 
in our psyche that we must build a society according to Islamic understanding on the 
basis of divine justice which guarantees the implementation of the peace. This is our 
duty, a positive duty.”950 
When formulating his ideas on Indonesian socialism and religious socialism, 
Hatta argued that it was the religious ethic described above, where Islamic teachings 
enjoin social justice and brotherhood among human beings as creatures of God, and 
not the foreign historical materialism of Marxism, that gave rise to these 
movements.951 In addition, Indonesian socialism was also an expression both of the 
rebellious spirit of the Indonesian people, who received unfair treatment from the 
colonizers, and of the pattern of collective living of indigenous rural communities. 
The third factor was the encounter between the social ideals of Western democracy 
and religious socialism (Islam), a process that produced a synthesis and also a 
rejection of Marxist materialism as a philosophy of life. Hatta defined socialism as 
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the demand for individual social consciousness that was the basis for equal 
prosperity and freedom from all oppression. Hatta also understood socialism as an 
institutional demand that arose from personal sincerity and wasbased on humanism 
and social justice.952 On another occasion, Hatta encouraged Islamic movements in 
Indonesia to participate in a socialism that was approved by God, the substance of 
and motive for which, according to Hatta, was contained in the Qur’an and applied in 
the context of Indonesian society.953 
The cooperative as a form of economic cooperation held a central place in the 
economic system proposed by Hatta. This importance is affirmed in Article 33 of the 
1945 Constitution. Hatta’s formulation of the cooperative was also intended to 
uphold an Islamic ideal of social welfare. He wrote that “cooperative organizations 
are true to the ideals of Islam, because Islam places the responsibility on individuals 
for the welfare of the entire society.”954 This conclusion asserted that in addition to 
requiring technical qualifications, a good cooperative also needs members who 
uphold moral values and ethics such as fairness, solidarity, mutual assistance, 
mutual trust, openness, hard work, and contribution to the advancement of other 
members.Hatta believed that all of these values could be found in Islamic teachings. 
However, he did not attempt to link his conception of cooperatives with the ideas of 
mushārakah955 or muḍārabah956 in Islamic economics, which are often regarded as 
cornerstones of a non-interest financial system. This occured not only because Hatta 
                                                          
952 Swasono, “Ekonomi Indonesia,” 1-3. See also Hatta’s discussion on social democracy in Hatta, 
“Past and Future,” 5-7.    
953 Mohammad Hatta, “Jiwa Islam dalam Membangun Negara dan Masyarakat,” in Kumpulan 
Pidato, vol. 3, 191. 
954 Mohammad Hatta, “Islam dan Masyarakat,” in Kumpulan Pidato, vol. 2, ed.  I. Wangsa Widjaja 
and Meutia F. Swasono (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1983), 61. 
955 Mushārakah is one of the basic profit and loss sharing (PLS) concepts in Islamic banking. 
Mannan explains: “Under Mushārakah, both the banks and the clients enter into partnership by 
contributing capital in varying degrees and agree upon a ratio of profit in advance for a limited 
period of time.” See Mannan, Islamic Economics, 165.  
956 Under Muḍārabah, another basic concept of PLS, banks provide the capital, clients contribute 
their expertise, and profits are shared according to an agreed ratio. See Mannan, Islamic 
Economics, 164.  
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was less oriented towards a technical or scholastic understanding of Islam,957 but 
also because he was more concerned with the spiritual and ethical dimensions of 
Islamic teachings.958  
Hatta’s position on usury was that it was unlawful. However, he did not 
consider bank interest to be usury. Therefore, it was permissible as long as interest 
rates were determined in advance, so that potential debtors could decide 
independently whether it would benefit them to borrow money. What were 
important to Hatta were clarity, openness, and willingness from both sides at the 
beginning of the transaction.959 Moreover, the difference between usury and interest 
for Hatta was that “the spirit of usury destroys [but] the spirit of interest in the case 
of bank is, instead, productive.”960  Thus in order to uphold social justice, create 
prosperity, and eliminate poverty, Hatta called for the economy to be organized as a 
mutual endeavor based upon the principle of brotherhood. This required economic 
and political democracy, as well as banks and cooperative systems that used interest 
as important elements therein. 
Sjafruddin’s views on usury and bank-interest were not much different from 
those of Hatta., but his argument was more detailed and convincing. He argued that 
interest was not usury, and that therefore banking interest was lawful for Muslims. 
He also believed that it was theoretically and practically impossible to have a 
uniquely Islamic economic system that was separate from the prevailing economic 
systems of the time. There was no need for a non-interest banking and financial 
system as long as the central bank and government were rigorous in their 
supervision and control, to prevent the abuse and misuse of banks as a means to 
                                                          
957 Mochtar Naim, “Hatta dan Pembangunan Ekonomi Koperasi di Indonesia,” in Pemikiran 
Pembangunan Bung Hatta, ed. LP3ES (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1995), 137.  
958 LP3ES, ed., Pemikiran Pembangunan Bung Hatta (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1995), 218-219. 
959 Abbas, Bung Hatta, 219; Noer, Mohammad Hatta: Biografi Politik (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1990) 170. 
960 Noer, Mohammad Hatta, 171. 
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perform manipulative and speculative business transactions for mere profit. 
However, Sjafruddin’s views overlapped with those of proponents of Islamic 
economics with regards to the normative values, including social justice, which 
should serve as guidelines in economic activity and development. In the following 
paragraphs I will present in more detail Sjafruddin’s views on issues related to 
Islamic economics. 
Although Sjafruddin’s first paper on the issue, entitled "The Motive or the 
Principle of Economics Measured According to Islamic Law", was published in late 
1951, his article that specifically addressed the question of Islamic economic system 
was written around 1968 and was entitled “What is meant by the Islamic Economic 
System?”961 In it Sjafruddin explicitly affirmed that:  
In fact, there does not exist an Islamic economic system which is 
fundamentally different from what may be called normal economic systems, 
or systems applied in non-Islamic countries or societies, if we recognise 
certain fundamentals or principles which then become the basis for an 
economic system applicable outside of an Islamic society.962 
 
Subsequently in the article, Sjafruddin discussed the common principles of all 
economic systems and the factors that differentiate the economic needs of an 
individual and society. He argued that basic economic systems consisted of two 
principles. First, all shared a common goal, namely to satisfy the various needs of the 
individual and of society as a whole. Second was the principle of economic motive, 
according to which any person or society would not want to work harder than 
necessary to meet its needs. In other words, everyone will try to achieve maximum 
results with minimum cost and exertion within the shortest possible time. Each 
economic system embraced these two principles, while the factors that 
distinguished the economic needs of an individual and society were related to 
natural circumstances such as climate, soil composition, water conditions and so 
                                                          
961 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 260-336.  
962 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 260. 
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forth, as well as cultural-historical contexts such as customs, religion, personal 
inclination, politics, etc. These different needs, in his view, led to differences in the 
implementation of these economic principles.963 
Sjafruddin described at length how these economic principles worked in real 
life.964 He found that the aforementioned principles could not be properly 
implemented because of underlying customs or beliefs preventing an individual or a 
society from achieving its pure economic objectives. In the case of Indonesia, 
Sjafruddin observed that government often inhibited economic progress, because it 
often ignored the principles of economic rationality when interfering in the activities 
of business owners. Government officials who were supposed to ensure economic 
security and order through the enforcement of the law were often their chief 
violators.965 Yet Sjafruddin noted that “[a]lthough many infringements and 
misappropriations of economic principles occur, they do not alter the fact that those 
economic principles, insofar human beings are rational, are in accordance with their 
disposition (nature).”966 However Sjafruddin also observed that homo economicus, 
the rational human being who always acts in accordance to economic principles, 
exists only in theory. In practice economic principles must be modified with respect 
to various factors mentioned above.967 On the basis of these observations, Sjafruddin 
asserted that the Islamic economic system was “an economic system that exists after 
the economic principles that guide its practice are influenced and delimited by the 
teachings of Islam.”968 In other words, in his interpretation, “the question of an 
Islamic economic system is a question about the influence that is exerted by the 
                                                          
963 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 260. 
964 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 261-264. 
965 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 264. 
966 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 264. 
967 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 264. 
968 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 264-265. 
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teachings of Islam on economic principles as guidance for every economic activity, 
which aims to create the tools to satisfy various human needs.” 969  
Thus Sjafruddin did not believe that an Islamic economic system was 
separate from the general prevailing system. As was the case in the West, where 
different countries arrived at different economic practices due to their unique 
historical and cultural circumstances,970 an Islamic economic system would likewise 
be uniquely formed by its cultural, moral and legal sources in Islamic teachings. Yet 
its general principles would remain the same as the economic systems prevailing in 
other countries or societies.971   
According to Sjafruddin’s understanding, the prohibition of ribā was in fact 
only one of the ethical principles of an Islamic economy. The other principles, 
according to him, were: first, the prohibition of prodigal expenditure or wastefulness 
implying a duty to conserve nature for human prosperity;972 and second, the 
distribution of wealth for the benefit of fellow human beings and the prohibition of 
amassing it. Sjafruddin had an interesting interpretation of this principle. He gave as 
                                                          
969 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 265. 
970 Stilwell’s comments highlight these different economic practices in the capitalist countries: 
“There are significant differences in the range of economic functions undertaken by the state. 
There are also differences in the range of economic functions undertaken by the state. There are 
also differences in the character of the economic institutions that shape the functioning of 
markets for labour, capital, and land, and in the prevailing ideologies in those countries. In the 
USA, for example, the state has been more concerned with supporting the interests of capital and 
the functioning of the capitalist market economy, whereas in Sweden the state has played a 
substantial role in the redistribution of income and in economic and social planning. On the other 
hand, the state in the USA is highly interventionist on a world scale, much more so than Sweden 
(or any other country), because of its role as self-appointed policeman of international 
capitalism”. Stilwell, Political Economy, 53.  
971 Prawiranegara, “Hakikat Ekonomi Islam,” 362-363. Likewise there was no Islamic economics 
separate from other non-Islamic economics. Here Sjafruddin quoted the Qur’an, Chapter Luqmān 
31:20: “[People], do you not see how God has made what is in the heavens and on the earth useful 
to you, and has lavished His blessings on you both outwardly and inwardly? Yet some people 
argue about God, without knowledge and guidance or an illuminating scripture,” in order to 
prove his point that economic motive was universal, in accordance with human nature, and 
applied to every human being including Muslims. Sjafruddin interpreted this verse as saying that 
natural wealth was available for all human beings, and they are induced to use it by economic 
motives in order to meet their natural needs in life. However, in accordance with Islamic 
teachings, their endeavor should be delimitated by moral values and ethics. So for Sjafruddin, 
economic differences between Islamic economics and non-Islamic economics lay in moral and 
ethical aspects. 
972 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 277-278. 
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an example the case that people who stored their excess money in a bona fide bank 
could not be said to hoard wealth. Quite the contrary, they gave benefit to many 
people, because the bank would lend the money to be used in productive economic 
enterprises.973 Here Sjafruddin provided a new understanding of infāq, which is 
usually defined only as spending wealth on education, such as building school, 
providing fees for teachers, and stipends for students; donating for the building of 
mosques; helping the destitute; funding religious institutions; sponsoring 
orphanages, etc. His new interpretation included people who saved their extra 
money in the bank; they also performed infāq, because then others could use their 
money via the bank to open businesses and provide jobs.974 I would argue that 
Sjafruddin’s understanding also applies to those who pool their money in ḥalāl 
(lawful) investments. One important part of the well-being of society is the 
fulfillment of people's basic needs, such as food, clothing, shelter and education. It 
seemed that Sjafruddin was inspired by the example of the Prophet: the best way to 
help the needy is to supply them the means to work or provide them jobs, not to 
continuously give charity that creates dependency and enfeebles their souls.975 
Opening economic enterprises that provided opportunities for people to work or 
having deposits in bank or financial institution created opportunities for 
entrepreneurs to do business that opens employment opportunities for many people 
and thereby contribute to the welfare of the needy. This method of distributing and 
circulating wealth to less privileged members of society fulfilled the Qur’an’s 
                                                          
973 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 278. 
974 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 278. The spending of wealth in the way of God was to 
spend it in the cause of truth and for the welfare of humanity, while hoarding of wealth was an 
act condemned by the Qur’an, Chapter al-Tawba 9:34: “And those who hoard up gold and silver 
and spend it not in God’s way—announce to them that they will have a grievous punishment.” 
See Muhammad Ali, Holy Qur’ān, 407. Cf. Yusuf Ali, Holy Qur’ān, 449; Abdel Haleem, Qur’an, 119. 
975 Narrated Zubayr bin al-ʿAwwām: ‘The Prophet said: ‘It is better for one of you to take his rope, 
bring a load of firewood on his back and sell it, Allah thereby preserving his self-respect, than 
begging people whether they give him or refuse him’.” (Reported by Bukhārī). See al-ʿAsqalānī, 
Bulūgh al-Marām, 222.   
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commandments. 976 The wealth owned by the rich was also enjoyed by many people 
without reducing theamount of wealth.977 This could be called as a productive 
spending of wealth in the way of God.  
 The third principle is the paying of zakāt (obligatory charity). Muslims who 
are financially well-off must pay zakāt for the needy.978 Sjafruddin, unexpectedly, did 
not further elaborate on this issue. He simply stated that zakāt was a cleansing tax. 
Only by the payment of zakāt did people have the right to enjoy the blessings that 
God gave them. Sjafruddin seemed to have a radical view of the form and practice of 
zakāt that was different from the conventional practice applied among Muslims 
today. He discussed this point in a lecture in 1975 which was published later in the 
same year. The Prophet’s rulings on zakāt, in Sjafruddin’s opinion, were only valid 
for the type of society in the seventh century CE. Similarly, the rulings on zakāt 
elaborated by the classical jurists were only valid for that type of past society. In 
other words, the application of zakāt at the present time must take a fundamentally 
different form in accordance with the complexity of modern society. In his opinion 
the stipulations of zakāt in the Qur'an should not be understood literally but were to 
be taken as principles. For Sjafruddin what really mattered was the spirit of the 
stipulation. 979   
The fourth principle stated that wealth should be acquired in lawful ways, 
not through seizing the rights of others. Sjafruddin explained that people’s wealth 
and property were basically obtained from two sources: a) from their own work, 
                                                          
976 The Qur’an, Chapter al-Hashr 59:7, reads: “Whatever gains God has turned over to His 
Messenger, kinsfolk, orphans, the needy, the traveller in need—this is so that they do not just 
circulate among those of you who are rich—so accept whatever the Messenger gives you, and 
abstain from whatever he forbids you. Be mindful of God: God is severe in punishment”;  verses 
in Chapter al-Maʿārij 70:24-25 read: “And who give a due share of their wealth to beggars and the 
deprived.”     
977 Narrated Abū Hurayra: “God’s messenger said: ‘Charity does not reduce wealth…’.” (Reported 
by Muslim). See al-ʿAsqalānī, Bulūgh al-Marām, 535. 
978 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 278-279. 
979 Prawiranegara, Islam dilihat, 14-15. 
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and b) from the exchange of goods (trade). In addition, he mentioned another 
source, gift, by which he probably meant hība, grant. But according to Sjafruddin this 
third source should be shunned since Islam forbids Muslims to depend on the gift of 
others, urging instead that they earn their keep by their own work and trade.980 
Sjafruddin did not mention inheritance, probably because it is not determined by a 
person’s choice.  
The fifth principle was the prohibition of ribā. Here Sjafruddin had a different 
interpretation of ribā from that of proponents of Islamic economics. From his 
reading of the Qur’an—Chapter al-Baqarah 2:275, which forbids usury; Chapter ‘Āli 
ʿImrān 3:130, which forbids Muslims to consume multiplied usury; and Chapter al-
Nisā' 4:29, which instructs believers to not wrongfully consume each other’s 
wealth—he determined that the issue of usury was complicated by the fact that the 
Qur’an contains no clear formula for or examples of it. In his view, a number of 
factors must be considered in order to understand the meaning of usury: first, that 
usury literally means an addition; and second, that the opposite of usury is clean, 
modest or fair profit obtained from buying and selling (trade) based on mutual 
consent between buyer and seller. He questioned why an addition from credit in the 
form of lending money should be forbidden, while an addition from credit arising 
from the sale of goods was allowed. It was not rational, he added, to forbid profit 
made from lending money as being usurious, while profit beyond reasonable limits 
in the form of credit obtained from the sale of goods was theoretically 
permissible.981  
In Sjafruddin’s understanding, usury was not synonymous with the benefits 
arising from a credit transaction, as articulated by a number of prophetic hadiths. 
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Sjafruddin also quoted from these hadiths to show the importance of the free market 
was to economic practice in Islamic teachings. One of these hadiths reads:  
Narrated by Ṭāwus bin Kisān al-Fārisī from IbnʿAbbās who said that the 
Messenger of God [Muhammad] said: ‘Do not go out to meet riders [to 
conduct business with them], and a city-dweller must not sell for a man from 
the desert’. I [Trāwus] asked IbnʿAbbās: ‘What did he [the Messenger of God] 
mean by ’A city-dweller must not sell for a man from the desert’? He 
[IbnʿAbbās] replied, ‘He should not act as a broker for him’. This ḥadīth was 
reported by al-Bukhari.”982  
 
Another hadith also told a similar version:  
 
Abu Hurayra narrated that the Messenger of God said: ‘Do not go out to meet 
what is being brought [to market for sale]. If anyone has met so and some of 
it is brought, when its owner comes to the market he has the choice [of 
cancelling the deal].’  This ḥadīth was reported by Muslim.983  
 
The third hadith reads: 
  
Narrated [Abu Hurayra]: ‘The Messenger of God forbade a city-dweller to sell 
on behalf of a bedouin [a man from the desert].’ This ḥadīth was reported by 
Bukhārī and Muslim.984 
 
In his commentary on these reports, Sjafruddin wrote: 
 If the pricing mechanism—that is, the interplay between demand and 
supply—runs well, because it is not disturbed by fraudulent and coercive 
action, then the production will be balanced with consumption, so there is no 
waste (overproduction) or shortage (underproduction) when compared 
with the demand. That is why Islam put great importance on unhampered 
and free market movement.985   
 
According to Sjafruddin, fraud or coercion that could disrupt the market 
could come from the government or the ruling party. He argued that Islam upholds 
the existence of free markets, while government intervention in pricing is an 
injustice. This opinion was based on a Prophetic Hadith, as narrated by Anas bin 
Malik, which reads: 
When prices were high in Madina in the time of Allah’s Messenger, the people 
said: “O Allah’s Messenger, prices have become high, so fix them for us.” 
Allah’s Messenger replied, “Allah is the One Who fixes prices, Who withholds, 
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984 Al-ʿAsqalānī, Bulūgh al-Marām, 283.  
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gives lavishly and provides, and I hope that when I meet Allah the Most High, 
none of you will have any claim on me for an injustice regarding blood and 
property”.986 
 
This hadith portrays the Prophet as clearly refusing to set the price and instead 
letting it move according to the market dynamics. Sjafruddin quoted Ahmad Hassan, 
a prominent Islamic teacher from Indonesia, who explained the hadith as follows:  
Most of the needs of the people of Medina and surrounding areas, especially 
food, were brought in from outside. The high price occurred not because it 
was raised by merchants of Medina from the usual price, but because their 
expenses [of taking food from the outside] were very high (the base price 
had risen). If the Messenger of Allah set a price, of course, it would be 
detrimental or not profitable for traders of Medina. If they lost or got no 
profit, they certainly would not want to bring in goods from outside; hence 
the situation would be increasingly grave. Setting prices to the detriment of 
merchants was what the Prophet saw as an injustice that he could not 
bear.987 
 
Sjafruddin himself gave the following interpretation:  
From the hadiths that I mentioned above, for Islam the actual existence of a 
market that is completely free from any pressure or interference from the 
ruling power and free from fraud of merchants who are only motivated by 
the desire to get big profits is far more important than the various 
government interventions, such as setting prices. [These might be] well-
intended, but if they are not based on the factors that are actually real, they 
could produce an ill-effect altogether. 
Helping people who are poor and needy is not to be achieved by 
intervening in the course of the market, but by giving out subsidies in the 
form of money or goods. But that relief should, if carried out by the 
government, avoid the creation of new money as much as possible, like we 
see in Indonesia. Because it is really an unfairness directed against the 
money owners (those who are better off), and can be considered as a hidden 
thief (imposed) by the government. That action could be called ribā (usury) 
if you look at the elements of coercion applied by the government against the 
people who should receive (inevitably) the new money[;] but it could also be 
considered as evil act, if it is viewed as fraud, that is a theft of the purchasing 
power of the people by the government.988 
 
These passages represent Sjafruddin’s core views on the relationship 
between Islam, social justice, and economic development. We can draw a tentative 
conclusion that in his interpretation of Islamic ethics, he was closer to the pattern of 
                                                          
986The hadith was reported by al-Khamsa, excluding An-Nasā’ī, and Ibn Ḥibbān graded it as ṣaḥīḥ, 
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987 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 288-289. 
988 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 289. 
274 
 
liberal-capitalist development than to the state-controlled socialist pattern. 
Sjafruddin believed strongly in economic rationality, including the necessity of free 
market mechanisms regulated only by minimal government intervention. His ideas 
and policies will be fully discussed in the next chapter. 
 A final piece of evidence which shows that Sjafruddin’s definition of usury 
was distinct from that of traditional Islamic scholars and, in particular, from that of 
modern proponents of Islamic economics, is his interpretation of a number of Hadith 
related to ribā al-faḍl (surplus usury).989 This type of ribā is one of two types 
forbidden by Islam according to Wahba Al Zuhayli, professor of Islamic Law at the 
University of Damascus. (The other type being credit ribā, which Al Zuhayli claims 
was the only type known to the pre-Islamic Arabs. He writes: “This type is taken 
against a delay in settlement of a due debt, regardless whether the debt be that of 
goods sold or of a loan.”990) Al Zuhayli defines surplus ribā as “the sale of similar 
items with a disparity in amount in the six canonically-forbidden categories of 
goods: gold, silver, wheat, barley, salt, and dry dates. This type of riba is forbidden in 
order that it not become a pretext for committing forbidden acts, that is, […] 
committing credit riba, such that a person sells gold, for example, on credit, then 
pays back in silver more than the equivalent of what he had taken in gold.”991  
Sjafruddin used the Hadith related to surplus ribā to prove that bank interest is not 
ribā, as explained above. According to him, the Hadith992 concerning cases where 
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ribā al-faḍl was clearly prohibited by the Prophet Muhammad were not related to “a 
loan agreement, but to sale and purchase transactions” which were carried out in a 
manipulative or coercive way. In other words, in the case that the buyer had to agree 
with the demands of the merchant because he was in a weaker position, the profit 
the merchant received was, on the basis of the Hadith above, usury. From this it is 
seen that the meaning of usury was not simply a form of interest from lending 
money.993 
Because Sjafruddin was not, by profession or background, accustomed to 
traditional methods of interpreting Islamic sources, he often resorted to plain 
common sense when offering his own interpretation. This rendered his arguments, 
usually directed to political leaders, practitioners in economic development, and 
scholars of Islamic economics, accessible and reasonable. The following 
demonstrates how Sjafruddin justified his position by bringing together a number of 
hadiths related to barter and trade. He began by citing two hadiths, the first narrated 
byʿUbāda bin Aṣ-Ṣāmit and the second by Abū Hurayra, as follows: 
Allah’s Messenger said, “Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, 
barley for barley, dates for dates, salt for salt, same quantity for same 
quantity and equal for equal, payment being on the spot. If these classes 
differ, sell as you wish if payment is made on the spot.” [Reported by 
Muslim].994 The Prophet said, “Gold is to be paid for with gold, both being of 
equal weight and of same quantities; silver is to be paid for with silver, both 
being of equal weight and of same quantities. If anyone gives more or asks 
for more of it, it is then usury.” [Reported by Muslim].995  
 
These hadiths deal with the issue of barter, and the kinds of barter that are 
allowed or prohibited by the Prophet. The usual interpretation of this hadith holds 
that when bartering like for like, the quality and quantity of the goods must be equal; 
if not, then it is considered to be usury. On the other hand, when two different goods 
are bartered, these may vary in quantity and quality, such as a certain weight of salt 
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for a certain weight of dates, and so forth. However, for Sjafruddin, this 
interpretation of the Prophet’s understanding of usury in such a case was, if taken 
straightforwardly, rather bizarre. He wrote:  
No one who is still sane would do something like that. Who wants to trade 
one kg of 24 carat gold for one kg of 24 carat gold? Or [who wants to trade] 
one ton of of number one quality wheat for one ton of wheat of the same 
quality? But what people prefer to do is, for example, to barter one ton of 
number one quality wheat for  two tons of number two quality wheat , either 
by mutual availability [in cash or on site] or not; [but] this kind of act is 
prohibited. This brings usury. Why?996\ 
 
Sjafruddin then moved to another hadith narrated by Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī and Abū 
Hurayra who said: 
Allah’s Messenger appointed a man [Bilāl] over Khaybar and he brought him 
dates of a very fine quality. Allah’s Messenger asked, “Are all the dates of 
Khaybar like this?”  He replied, “I swear by Allah that they are certainly not, O 
Allah’s Messenger. We take one Ṣāʿ [cubic measure of varying magnitude] of 
this kind for two, and even for three.” So Allah’s Messenger said, “Do not do 
so. Sell the mixed dates for dirhams [silver coins], then buy the very fine 
dates with the dirhams.” And he said that the same applies when things are 
sold by weight.’ [Reported by Bukhārī and Muslim]. Muslim has [additional 
words of what the prophet said]: “and so is the weight”.997  
 
The Prophet’s prohibition of the barter of dates is consistent with the hadith 
mentioned above. Sjafruddin believed that this was a measure intended to prevent 
any potential abuse on the part of the governor of Khaybar, because of a lack of 
common and measurable rules governing trade. Regarding the solution the Prophet 
offered to the governor, Sjafruddin wrote:  
If he were to sell his dates on a free and open market and with that money 
buy fine dates, also on a free and open market, then perhaps he would obtain 
a smaller number of fine dates than he would have received through barter 
with his people. Buying and selling on the free open market would provide 
better protection from usury to an economically-weak person than would a 
bartered exchange between the latter and an economically- or politically-
stronger partner.998\ 
                                                          
996 Prawiranegara, “Adakah Konsep,” 357. 
997 Al-ʿAsqalānī, Bulūgh al-Marām, 292. Another version of the hadith gives a more complete 
version of what the prophet said: “Oh no, this is exactly riba…” [Reported by Bukhārī and 
Muslim]. See Abdulkader Thomas, “What is Riba?” in Interest in Islamic Economics: 
Understanding Riba, ed. Abdulkader Thomas (London: Routledge, 2006), 129. 




Sjafruddin’s interpretation of these hadiths was an attempt to highlight the 
considerations of justice that arise within a free market mechanism. Furthermore, 
he argued that the Prophet’s preference for an open market could be carried over to 
conditions of modern transactions and trade:  
The most appropriate place to carry out such free trade transactions is on a 
free open market, where the undisturbed interplay of supply and demand 
will bring forth the most balanced prices. So, even monetary and borrowing 
transactions that can be extremely damaging to a weaker group will, if 
carried out in the open market through banks and other credit institutions, 
be very beneficial for the society. That is why our Prophet told his followers, 
both explicitly and implicitly ... to choose a free open market on which to 
conduct business transactions and not  barter relationships, in which there 
are very limited options for sellers or buyers in search of good trade 
match.999 
 
In other words, Sjafruddin stressed that fairness in transactions of money 
and trade is possible only when carried out in a market where negotiations can 
operate free of constraints or pressures. Sjafruddin’s argument was an innovative 
interpretation of the Hadith concerning ribā al-faḍl (surplus usury). 
On the basis of this analysis, Sjafruddin argued that the criterion for the 
existence of usury is not the gain from lending money or from another kind of credit 
per se. Accordingly, he defined ribā as “any advantage gained by a transaction or 
agreement whereby a party takes advantage of of its weak competitor by abusing its 
strong economic position.”1000 In his opinion, a transaction must be fair, voluntary 
and consensual. If one party was forced into an agreement because it did not see 
another alternative, the profits earned by the more economically-powerful party 
were usury.1001 Reaffirming his understanding of ribā, Sjafruddin stated: 
So, in my opinion, any addition or profit obtained by way of sale and 
purchase, which is ostensibly carried out by mutual consent but which is 
essentially based on inner compulsion because the aggrieved has no other 
alternatives, is usury. Ribā refers to all kinds of benefit that seem valid 
                                                          
999 Prawiranegara, “Adakah Konsep,” 359. 
1000 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 285. 
1001 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 285. 
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according to the law, but essentially constitute the "exploitation de l'homme 
par l'homme" in a subtle way, not through physical coercion.1002 
 
With this understanding, Sjafruddin asserted that bank interest was not usury since 
it was carried out by mutual consent.1003  
Sjafruddin’s understanding of the bank interest was similar to the views of 
other modernist Muslims such as Muhammad Asad1004 and Fazlur Rahman.1005 For 
them, the rationale of prohibition was “the exploitation of the needy, rather than the 
concept of the interest rate itself.”1006 In addition, Rahman argued, similarly to 
Sjafruddin, that the abolition of interest in the present state of economic 
development would be a serious error, because it did not satisfy the original intent 
behind its prohibition, which was to prevent the exploitation of the weak and to 
                                                          
1002 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 286. In another article Sjafruddin denoted ribā as 
encompassing all sorts of profit obtained through improper and inhuman ways, including 
cheating and the use of violence. See Prawiranegara, “Persamaan,” 406. 
1003 In providing the interpretation of usury Sjafruddin could actually have based it on a similar 
but longer version of the hadith than the one he quoted, but to which he did not have access due 
to his limited Arabic ability. The hadith relates: “Following the conquest of Khaybar, the Muslim 
soldiers exchanged gold coins for gold bullion with the departing Jews. It appeared that some 
soldiers took advantage of the Jews, extracting more bullion for the minted gold than the price of 
gold by its weight merited. The Prophet, we ask God’s peace and blessings for him, explicitly 
insisted that the exchange be weight for weight, saying, ‘Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for 
wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, salt for salt must be of equivalent weight, hand to hand. 
He who gives or take more incurs riba—the giver and the taker are equally [implicated].’ This 
was repeated more than once on other occasions” (Bukhari and Muslim). Thomas comments on 
the hadith as follows: “Foremost, the situation at Khaybar raised the problem of some of the 
Muslim soldiers being unfair, and the Jews uncomplaining because the victorious Muslims were 
armed and the Jews feeling obliged to accept what they knew to be unfair exchange. The Prophet, 
God’s grace is asked for him, was unequivocal in his condemnation of the idea that a stronger 
party might oblige, by might, a weaker party’s acceptance of a clearly unfair exchange […]” His 
comment is similar to Sjafrudin’s aforementioned definition of ribā. Thomas, “What is Riba?” 128.  
1004 This is the reason to not behave in an exploitative manner, the very act that the prohibition of 
ribā was intended to prevent. As Asad says: “Roughly speaking, the opprobrium of ribā (in the 
sense in which this term is used in the Qur’an and in many sayings of the Prophet) attaches to 
profits obtained through interest-bearing loans involving an exploitation of the economically 
weak by the strong and resourceful…With this definition in mind, we realize that the question as 
to what kinds of financial transaction fall within the category of ribā is, in the last resort, a moral 
one, closely connected with the socio-economic motivation underlying the mutual relationship of 
borrower and lender.” See Muhammad Asad, The Message of the Qurʼān: Translation and 
Explanation (Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980), 623.  
1005 Rahman comments on the issue as follow: “Thus, many well-meaning Muslims with very 
virtous consciences sincerely believe that the Qur’ān has banned all bank interest for all times, in 
woeful disregard of what ribā was historically, why the Qur’ān denounced it as a gross and cruel 
form of exploitation and banned it, and what the function of bank interest is today.” See Rahman, 
“Islam: Challenges and Opportunities,” 326.   
1006 Abdullah Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest: A Study of the Prohibition of Ribā and its 
Contemporary Interpretation (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 42. 
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guarantee justice in trade. Furthermore, the argument against interest was based on 
an insufficient understanding of the economic system.1007 Yet despite the similarities 
of their arguments, it was only Sjafruddin who argued for the importance of the 
function of the market in guaranteeing the fair value of traded goods.  
 Sjafruddin was much more detailed in his analysis of the subject from an 
economic point of view, arguing that banking interest was not only permitted under 
Islam but must be used by Muslims if they wanted to advance their economic 
condition. Prawiranegara’s caveat to this was that interest rates should be in 
accordance with the commonly-accepted free market rate\, as is the case when 
prices of goods are determined by the interplay between supply and demand.1008  
Sjafruddin’s interpretation of the usury-related hadiths and his rather 
unexpected vindication of the free market have recently been reiterated by 
contemporary Muslim scholars. Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, for example, in his article on 
economic wisdom (ḥikmah) in the prohibition of ribā, discusses a number of 
misconceptions which have become accepted “truths” about Islam and the Islamic 
model of finance. El-Gamal argues that not all cases of interest in the modern context 
can be considered to be unlawful ribā. He builds his argument on the opinions of 
classical scholars of Islamic jurisprudence, while observing that “a great revolution 
in financing forms [has taken place], wherein the boundaries between commercial 
banks (whose transactions are based on forbidden ribā through borrowing and 
lending with interest) and other financial institutions became blurred.”1009 El-Gamal 
also refuted another misconception—one already well-known by many scholars—
by noting that not all cases of unlawful ribā involve interest. Quoting a famous 
                                                          
1007 Fazlur Rahman, “Ribā and Interest,” Islamic Studies 3.1 (1964): 1-43.  
1008 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 286. 
1009 Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, “An Attempt to Understand the Economic Wisdom (ḥikmah) in the 
Prohibition of Riba,” in Interest in Islamic Economics: Understanding Riba, ed. Abdulkader 
Thomas (London: Routledge, 2006), 112-114. 
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hadith prohibiting ribā al-faḍl, discussed above, he points out that the transactions 
prohibited by the Prophet did not involve a temporal element, and therefore “the 
prohibition of this ribā is not necessarily related to debts, deferment, or time.”1010 
But his most interesting conclusion pertains to the role of market mechanisms as a 
means to guarantee the fair value of traded goods, thereby achieving the sole 
objective in the prohibition of usury—justice.1011 Sjafruddin had long advanced the 
potential of the self-regulating market to enable mechanisms for justice. Similarly, 
Rauf A. Azhar, in his discussion of ribā, interest and usury, notes that “the real 
purport of these reports [the aforementioned hadiths on ribā al-faḍl] lies in 
avoidance of unequal exchange, for the common thread that runs throughout all of 
them is to emphasize exchange of a good for money and then using the proceeds to 
purchase another—thus necessitating a reliance on the market determined 
evaluations (prices) of the goods under consideration. It is obvious that market 
determined evaluations are therefore considered to be fair […].”1012 Azhar further 
argues that “[t]he Prophet discouraged barter exchanges because of the inherent 
ambiguity (gharar) in the values being exchanged at a given time, since prices are 
subject to change at any time, and thus encouraged the use of money because of the 
inherent transparency of the values being exchanged. By removing the ambiguity, 
the use of money ensured an equitable exchange.”1013  Azhar concludes that, “[t]here 
is no escaping the fact that the purpose of these reports was to ensure equal value in 
exchange for the sake of justness.”1014   
Abdullah Saeed’s discussion of the same Hadith materials comes to a similar 
conclusion to Sjafruddin’s. However, Saeed put less of an emphasis on the 
                                                          
1010 El-Gamal, “Attempt,” 115. 
1011 El-Gamal, “Attempt,” 118. 
1012 Rauf A. Azhar, Economics of an Islamic Economy (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 326. 
1013 Azhar, Economics, 326. 
1014 Azhar, Economics, 328.  
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importance of market mechanisms in ensuring the fair value of traded goods, 
whereas for Sjafruddin this was crucial to recognizing the achievement of justice—
and the avoiding of injustice—as the sole objective of prohibiting usury.1015  
Sjafruddin’s arguments, however, did not end with his claim that the interest 
in the modern banking system is not the ribā prohibited by Islam. He also articulated 
the role of money and banks from an economic and a religious (Islamic) point of 
view, especially in light of the common focus on development. Sjafruddin’s wider 
goal was not simply to define terms, but rather to remind Indonesian Muslims that 
they could achieve economic prosperity and social justice through modern methods, 
including the use of bank services. Before discussing Sjafruddin’s views further, we 
need to explore the opinions of Indonesian Islamic organizations and scholars on 
bank interest.  
The issue of bank interest has to this day been controversial among 
Indonesian Muslims.1016 The dominant opinion among Indonesian clerics belonging 
to various Islamic organizations considers bank interest to be forbidden (ḥarām) or 
at least dubious or uncertain/vague (shubḥa or mutashābiḥa). The most recent case 
is that of Muhammadiyah, a reformist-modernist Islamic organization, which 
declared a fatwā (religious legal opinion) confirming that bank interest was harām. 
The decision was issued on April 3, 2010 in the 27th National Conference of its Legal 
and Reform Affairs Committee (Majelis Tarjīḥ dan Tajdīd), in order to strengthen an 
earlier judgment which was issued in 2006.1017 
                                                          
1015 Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest, 33-34. 
1016 Robert W. Hefner’s article cites a survey of 479 Jakarta residents conducted in 1990 which 
found that only 34 percent approved of bank interest. A full 25.9 percent were “inclined to 
disapprove” and almost 40 per cent “disagreed” or “strongly disagreed”. Robert W. Hefner, 
“Islamizing Capitalism: On the Founding of Indonesia’s First Islamic Bank,” in Shariʿa and Politics 
in Modern Indonesia, ed. Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2003), 152.  
1017 Hidayatullah, “Fatwa Muhammadiyah Soal Bunga Bermanfaat,” Hidayatullah.com: 
Mengabarkan kebenaran, April 6, 2010, accessed July 23, 2011, 
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This decision was somewhat surprising, considering the fact that 
Muhammadiyah, since its founding in 1911, has been very active not only in in 
educational and social activities but also in economic enterprise.  Muhammadiyah, 
which arguably conducts most of its activities in urban areas, is the Islamic 
organization most associated with studies of the banking system. In its universities, 
seven of which are in Java, much effort is devoted to teaching economics and 
conventional banking. Moreover, Muhammadiyah is supported in part by 
contributions from entrepreneurs who use conventional banking services for their 
businesses. The rapid growth of Sharīʿah-based banks since the establishment of the 
Bank Mu’amalat Indonesia (BMI) in 1990 seems to have encouraged 
Muhamaddiyah’s issuing of the fatwā. Islamic Banks are considered to offer a better 
alternative to conventional banks. These institutions have provided financial 
services for business enterprises, and are expected to provide solutions for many 
Muslims who have long felt uncomfortable using conventional banking services.1018  
Nahḍat al-ʿUlamā’ (NU, Revival of the ʿUlamā’) which represents the 
traditional Islamic group, most of whose followers live in the village, held a similar 
opinion. In 1957 the organization ruled against the borrowing of money by business 
firms from banks.1019 Some Islamic scholars within NU declared bank interest to be 
forbidden because there is an element of speculation; others argued that bank 
interest is ḥalāl (permissible) because it is conducted based on agreement and 
mutual consent between two parties; and others considered it to be unclear whether 




1018 In the 1960s Muhammadiyah’s position was more flexible, when its religious scholars 
declared that bank interest fell under the category of doubtful things (Arabic shubuhāt). Even 
Professsor Kasman Singodimedjo, a Muhammadiyah leader, held that the modern banking 
system was permissible and it was not necessary to establish an interest-free bank. See Hassan, 
“Contemporary,” 90-91.     
1019 Hassan, “Contemporary,” 87. 
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legally it is ḥalāl (permissible or lawful) or ḥarām (unlawful or forbidden). In 
general, the organization considered bank interest to be ḥarām by reason of iḥtiyāṭ 
(precaution): if the permissibility of an action was in doubt, it was safest to abstain 
from that action altogether.1020 K.H. Sahal Mahfudz, General Chairman of the 
Consultative Body (Shūriya) of NU, said that the fatwā on the lawfulness of bank 
interest was not final yet. However, all financial affairs and transactions which were 
already covered by Sharīʿah or Islamic banks would be declared ḥarām if they were 
carried out in conventional banks. Financial transactions or affairs which were not 
yet covered by Sharīʿah banks were allowed to be carried out by conventional 
banking; this constitutes an application of the principle of emergency (ḍarūrah).1021  
Meanwhile the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Assembly of Islamic 
Scholars, MUI), a federation of various Indonesian Islamic organizations, already 
declared in 2003 that conventional banking interest was ḥarām. This decision was 
confirmed by the Chairman of the MUI Fatwā Commission, K.H. Ma'ruf Amin. 
According to Ma'ruf, also a prominent NU leader, Islamic banks are the solution for 
those who want to keep their money safe while avoiding bank interest. Amin 
reasons that the prohibition against bank interest is not based merely on the 
reciprocal benefit received by the depositor of the money in the bank, but also on 
the use of this money by the bank to perform other financial activities that involve 
interest. In the past, before Islamic banks existed, depositing funds in a conventional 
bank was allowed for reasons of emergency. Now, with the existence of Islamic 
                                                          
1020 Jaih Mubarok, “Fatwa Tentang Bunga Bank di Indonesia,” Ikada Bandung, accessed August 6, 
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Opinion on unlawfulness of Bank Interest is not Final Yet”), NU Online, 21 December, 2003, 





banks, all financial or banking transactions should, according to him, be transferred 
to non-interest banks.1022 
Ustadz Ahmad Hassan, a teacher and an important figure in the moderate 
Islamic reformist-fundamentalist organization Persatuan Islam (Persis), the Union 
of Islam, is perhaps the firmest among the Indonesian ʿulamā’ in his opinion that 
bank interest is permissible (ḥalāl).1023 Sjafruddin used Hassan’s opinions to 
strengthen his argument that bank interest is not ribā or usury, and is therefore not 
prohibited by Islamic teachings.1024  
Maṭlaʿ al-Anwar (MA), a traditional Islamic organization based in Banten, 
western Java, specifies—although not as strongly as Ahmad Hassan—that the 
banking law is permissible by reason of the common good (al-maṣāliḥ al-ʿāmmah) 
and for the progress of the economy. Therefore, the plenary session of the Fatwā 
Committee of Maṭlā al-Anwār stipulated in 1985 that donating interest from money 
deposited in banks and giving money saved in banks as charity is permissible, 
provided they are perceived as gifts and on the basis of emergency (ḍarūrah). 
However, it remains implied that bank interest is basically unlawful.1025 
Sjafruddin deemed the opinion of many scholars and ordinary Muslims that 
bank interest per se was unlawful to be an obstacle to Indonesian economic 
progress. For this reason he discussed extensively, as we will examine below, the 
role of banks and financial institutions from both an economic and religious point of 
view. In a paper on the importance of money and banking in modern society, 
                                                          
1022 Hidayatullah, “Fatwa Muhhammadiyah Soal Bunga Bank Bermanfaat.” In 1990, Abdurrahman 
Wahid, General Chairman of NU, who instituted many reforms in his traditionalist organization, 
initiated the establishment of People’s Credit Banks in cooperation with Bank Summa, a 
conventional bank. However, this effort failed to make progress since the majority of NU 
members condemned all forms of bank interest. In addition, with the collapse of Bank Summa in 
1992, the program apparently ceased to continue, at least for the time being. See Hefner, 
“Islamizing Capitalism,” 152 and 163.   
1023 Mubarok, “Fatwa Tentang Bunga Bank di Indonesia.” 
1024 Prawiranegara, “Apa yang Dimaksud,” 290. 
1025 Mubarok, “Fatwa Tentang Bunga Bank di Indonesia.” 
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delivered on June 29, 1970,1026 Sjafruddin began by frankly addressing two possible 
reasons behind some Muslims’ having banned the selling, purchase or lease of 
money, however small the interest. The first was the religious prohibition of trading 
money based on economic motives; the second, the misinterpreting of ribā because 
of traditional Islamic scholars’ lack of understanding of economics and lack of 
knowledge of the history and function of money.1027 After explaining in detail the 
history and functions of money and banks in order to strengthen his argument that 
bank interest was not usurious, Sjafruddin concluded that money, like shovels and 
tractors, was simply a tool created by the human mind to facilitate and expand the 
production of the necessities of life.1028 At first money was only an ordinary item 
which could directly satisfy human needs. However, because of its liquidity and 
capacity to serve as a repository of wealth and a measure of value, it was eventually 
used as a medium of exchange and trade.1029 He argued that the claim that money 
should not be traded or loaned and that therefore any profit from the sale and or 
borrowing of money is unlawful was not acceptable.1030 All these developments in 
the use of money should be encouraged, since they were based on economic 
principles that save time, alleviate burden and cost, and minimize risks. Economic 
principles (eg. money as a tool to measure value) were expressions of human reason 
and human nature in general, that of tool-making and tool-perfecting animals. If this 
were the case, it would hardly make sense for God to prohibit these economic 
principles from being put into practice. Therefore, in Sjafruddin’s opinion, using 
money according to its various functions—including lending and buying—as a tool 
                                                          
1026 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “Uang dan Bank Ditinjau dari Segi Ekonomi dan Agama,” in 
Ekonomi dan Keuangan: Makna Ekonomi Islam, vol. 2 of Kumpulan Karangan Terpilih, ed. Ajip 
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1027 Prawiranegara, “Uang dan Bank,” 313. 
1028 Prawiranegara, “Uang dan Bank,” 326. 
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to obtain maximum benefits was not an unlawful act, so long as it was used in a way 
that did not compromise the just and equal relationship between fellow human 
beings.1031  
In articulating his arguments regarding usury and bank interest, Sjafruddin 
supported his position, as we have seen above, with two guiding principles: 
rationality and human nature. Sjafruddin articulated this practical aspect of 
development at length in a rigorous rebuttal to the writings of Sheikh Mahmud 
Ahmad of Pakistan.1032 Ahmad argued that bank interest restricts marginal efficiency 
of capital, in which case several productive resources would stop working. 
According to Ahmad, two kinds of consequences would then follow: on the one hand, 
the use of limited productive resources would reduce the amount of goods 
produced, leaving many workers unemployed; and on the other, given the 
application of interest, marginal production cost would go up, driving up prices. 
Hence, an economic system based on interest would always pose a risk for the 
producers of commodities. Conversely, were there no interest in the whole affair, 
products could be sold cheaper since production costs would thereby be cut. The 
unemployed would then be able to get jobs. All this would be possible if the brakes 
on the marginal efficiency of capital could be eliminated. Sjafruddin’s rebuttal was as 
follows. If capital is a factor of production—as stated by Ahmad— then the owner of 
the capital is entitled to receive one part of the outcome which he co-produced 
through an agreement with those who have borrowed the capital for production in 
order to protect his capital. The agreement would include provisions for paying the 
                                                          
1031 Prawiranegara, “Uang dan Bank,” 314. 
1032 Though I was not able to obtain this book, Rodney Wilson (Wilson, “Development of Islamic 
Economics,” 218) mentions it in an endnote of his article on the development of Islamic 
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interest which is relatively small compared to the profit that will be obtained. In 
Sjafruddin’s view, there is no provision in Islam forbidding people to lend money on 
such terms. What is prohibited by Islam is ribā, understood as the excessive levy of 
interest that is not limited to monetary yield but also encompasses other profitable 
gains, including commercial. This disproportionate profit can be characterized as a 
situation in which the stronger party obtains excessive value through an abuse of 
power.1033 Therefore the essence of the prohibition of usury, in Sjafruddin’s opinion, 
is a matter of justice or fairness in economic and financial transactions. In other 
words, any sort of unfair economic or financial transaction is ribā. 
Sjafruddin’s second contention was that there was no fundamental difference 
between the activity of a money lender, including a bank, and that of a trader or 
merchant. Sjafruddin could not understand the opinion of Ahmad and other 
scholars, which held that bank interest is forbidden by the Qur’an while trade profit 
is permissible on the basis that, they claimed, money lenders do not deal with the 
same products as compared to traders. In a long section of the article, he argued that 
fundamentally, a merchant does nothing more than move goods from one place (the 
manufacturer) to another (the consumer). Often this transfer activity is done by 
another party; but regardless, the principal activity of the merchant is to order and 
handle the transfer of goods. Hence the role of merchants, as well as money lenders, 
is not that of a producer in a true sense. Given this, Sjafruddin questioned why a 
merchant should be deemed ‘productive’ and therefore be entitled to lawful profit, 
                                                          
1033 Sjafruddin’s opinion is based also on the interpretation of Abdullah Yusuf Ali, who interprets 
usury as “undue profit made, not in the way of legitimate trade, out of loans of gold and silver, 
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comments on Chapter Āli ʿImrān 3:130: “Usury is the opposite extreme of charity, unselfishness, 
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expressed his agreement with Yusuf Ali’s translation of usury as “the profit obtained by cheating 
or deeds that deviate.” Prawiranegara, “Adakah Konsep,” 338 and 345.  
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while a money lender or a bank was not entitled to lawful profit because they were 
not considered to be productive. Arguing that banks behaved similarly to merchants, 
Sjafruddin thus invited his readers to revisit the criteria for ‘productivity’. Indeed, 
when we take the word in its strong sense, he wrote, even a farmer did not 
“produce” agricultural products, strictly speaking. Plants grew gradually by another 
power, God or nature, to yield their harvest. ‘Productivity’, then, was not a trivial 
concept and must be reexamined from a broader point of view, not simply based on 
the nature of the objects concerned, viz. money as opposed to commodities. 
Sjafruddin proposed that ‘production’ ought to be taken simply to mean “processing 
available [existing] goods in accordance with human needs.1034  He argued that:  
[T]his is an indirect way to make ourselves useful to others. We can also 
make ourselves useful to others directly, by providing services such as house 
helper, doctor, lawyer, etc.  
As long as we serve human needs, things that are not harām [unlawful] 
in God's eyes, Muslims are allowed to provide such service and demand 
advantages, benefits or wages for their services. Lending money for 
productive purposes is not unlawful. Therefore, the lender is allowed to earn 
interest.  
The bank employer and merchant fall into the second category of 
productive agents, namely those that serve human needs directly. Justifying 
the traders taking profit and prohibiting bank employers [from taking] 
interest will mean to employ discrimination against the latter, for which 
there is no reasonable basis.  
Next, to consider an excessive profit to be legally valid even at the 
expense and suffering of workers and consumers, simply because this profit 
is obtained by way of trade, while even the lowest rates were considered to 
be wrong, would make Islamic law a laughing stock in the eyes of outsiders.  
Both profits and interest, whether fixed or fluctuating, if they are based 
on clean and sincere agreement in the eyes of God, they are legitimate. While 
excessive profit, including interest, which comes from the dishonest trade of 
goods or money, is usury, and therefore a violation of the provisions of God: 
that human beings must do good, must not cheat, and must not oppress 
fellow servants [of God].1035 
 
Sjafruddin’s third argument challenged Ahmad’s position that the elimination 
of bank interest would reap benefits for the economy. According to Ahmad, banking 
without interest would increase consumers’ purchasing power and allow them to 
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invest directly in industry or trade or in ventures through banks that operate on 
profit sharing. On the whole, the increased demand for goods and business would 
encourage production. Furthermore, while emphasizing the benefits of interest-free 
banking, Ahmad also portrays the injustice of modern banking practices that gives 
out interest rewards to the bank's customers although their money, he said, may not 
be used in any productive process. In fact, the bank’s customers and their owners 
and executives do the most asocial work but continue to build wealth. According to 
Ahmad, banks invest most of their financial resources in unproductive practices 
such as government securities, loans for speculative and consumptive purposes, and 
bills of exchange. But if the bankers make loans to people who plan to build an 
industry in the long term, although they are very reluctant, they limit the marginal 
efficiency of lent capital with interest imposed on it. Efficiency measures undertaken 
by the entrepreneurs who borrow money from banks are by reducing labor and by 
selling production at a higher price. Thus an economic system based on the interest 
always brings a risk for the commodities’ producers and suffering for many 
people.1036  
Sjafruddin firmly rejected these arguments. If interest is eliminated, he 
wrote, not only would the national economy stagnate, it would be devastated. 
Capital that had been invested for productive businesses through banks and other 
credit institutions would be pulled back by their owners, since without interest they 
could not see the benefits of saving money, except for security. Furthermore, the 
elimination of interest by government regulation would encourage the withdrawal 
of deposits en masse, which would be followed by the cancellation of credit facilities 
in trade and industry. This would result in too many banks’ closures and many 
companies would be forced to reduce their activities or become altogether bankrupt, 
                                                          
1036 Prawiranegara, “Adakah Konsep,” 347-348. 
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because their credit would be withdrawn by their banks. All this would lead to mass 
unemployment, falling prices and production, and stagnating stocks of goods. The 
abolition of interest would not lead to prosperity as Ahmad envisioned, but rather 
widespread poverty.1037   
For Sjafruddin, many Muslim scholars’ idealized vision of creating wealth and 
eradicating poverty by eliminating bank interest was no different from the desire of 
the Communists to create a workers’ utopia through the abolition of private 
property. This is surely one of the harshest criticisms of the idea of a free-interest 
bank coming from a Muslim leader. The Muslims’ desire to create free-interest 
economic system would fail because, according to Sjafruddin, “they cannot eliminate 
human nature that aspires to own property as a tool to protect human life and 
aspires to earn income from labor and capital as a tool to prosper in life.”1038 He 
enjoined Muslims to adhere to the Qur’an’s description of believers as ummatan 
wasaṭan [middle community/nation].1039 They should not attempt to deny the 
                                                          
1037 Prawiranegara, “Adakah Konsep,” 348-349. Sjafruddin’s pioneering description of the 
dangerous consequences of abolition of interest was echoed in 1984by Syed Nawab Haider 
Naqvi, one of the most realistic proponents of Islamic economics. Naqvi wrote: “There is a real 
danger that if the abolition of interest and the introduction of zakat are overemphasized as 
initiators of the process of Islamization, then policy-making will concentrate on just these two 
elements to the exclusion of the fundamental structural elements of the Islamic reform…After all, 
it is not difficult to envisage situations where gross social injustice prevails in violation of the 
requirement of al-ʿAdl wal-Iḥsān (Justice and the doing good to others) even though zakat may be 
the only form of taxation and interest may have been abolished. In capital-scarce poor societies, 
where economic exploitation is rife, such tendencies will be still greater. In particular, the profit-
sharing system, which is advocated as the sole replacement of the interest-based system, may 
lead to a gross exploitation of the poor by the rich; and zakat, if interpreted only as a limited 
means of resource mobilization, may prove to be insufficient to end economic injustices in the 
society. What is worse, nothing can be done about this state of affairs when the failure to end 
exploitation results from the reforms introduced in the name of Islam.” See Naqvi et al, Principles 
of Islamic Economic Reform, 23; see also Naqvi, Islam, Economics, and Society, 8-9 and 110-135.           
1038 Prawiranegara, “Adakah Konsep,” 350. I would like to remind readers that this statement was 
included in his aforementioned paper presented at the International Economic Conference on 
The Muslim World and the Future Economic Order in London, July 1977. No wonder that 
Sjafruddin had never previously attended, and probably was never invited to attend again, 
successive international conferences on Islamic economics. 
1039 “Thus have We made of you an ummah [community, nation] justly balanced, that ye might be 
witnesses over the nations…” (Qur’an: al-Baqarah 2:142). In his commentary Yusuf Ali said: 
“Justly balanced: The essence of Islam is to avoid all extravagances on either side. It is a sober, 
practical religion. But the Arabic word of word (wasaṭ) also implies a touch of the literal meaning 
of intermediacy…” Yusuf Ali, Holy Qur’ān, 57. Wasaṭa (verb) means to be in the midst, penetrate 
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natural human desire for material gain. Rather, they should be confident to express 
such nature as well as limit it rationally. The desire to obtain wealth should not be 
allowed to become excessively greedy. By quoting verses of the Qur’an, among them 
al-Aʿrāf 7:31)1040 he enjoined Muslims to enjoy the pleasures of the world but 
without extravagance.1041  
Though Sjafruddin agreed with Ahmad’s argument that if bank interest was 
removed, the marginal efficiency of capital would go up, he argued that instead of 
more productivity and consumption, economic hardship would ensue. This was 
because capital for productive purposes would become scarcer than before the 
abolition of interest. Owners of capital would demand junior partners, who would 
perform managerial work and ask for modest profits or wages and at the same time 
cut spending on labor and material purchases. As a result, marginal production costs 
would actually go down and thus the marginal efficiency of capital would rise. 
However, this situation would not lower the prices of goods; instead the economic 
position of the owners of capital would become even more powerful, such that they 
would be capable of imposing high prices to get profit to compensate for the benefits 
they would have otherwise received from bank interest. Subsequently, Sjafruddin 
concluded, “the gap between the haves and the haves not would not be bridged or 
narrowed, but would become wider and deeper.”1042 In the long term, the removal of 
bank interest rates would cause a rise in marginal production costs, decrease in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
into the midst, be good and exalted, occupy the middle position. See Omar, Dictionary of the Holy 
Qur’an: Arabic Words – English Meanings (With Notes), (Hockessin, DE: Noor Foundation 
International, 2008), 608.   
1040 “O children of Adam, attend to your adornment at every time of prayer, and eat and drink and 
be not prodigal; surely He loves not the prodigals.” 
1041 Prawiranegara, “Adakah Konsep,” 350. 
1042 Prawiranegara, “Adakah Konsep,” 350-351. 
292 
 
production, and widespread unemployment and poverty, while the owners of capital 
would continue to get richer.1043 
Sjafruddin stressed that modern banking system he defended was a sound 
national banking system which he believed could bring the economic prosperity and 
social justice displayed by Western countries, drawing attention specifically to the 
Scandinavian and Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg) countries. What 
he meant by a healthy national banking system was when there was “monitoring 
and supervision by a central bank working under the political demands of a popular 
and elected government.”1044 These countries had become prosperous, practically 
abolishing poverty “not by eliminating interest, but on the contrary, with interest 
and with its wise use through the banking system.”1045 Sjafruddin even suggested 
the huge gap between the rich and poor prevalent in many Muslim countries before 
the "oil boom" was caused by, among other things, the prohibition of interest. He 
rejected the grim picture Ahmad painted of the perceived income gaps in Western 
countries. Furthermore, Sjafruddin added: “[i]n Western democracies that work 
with the tools of capitalism, including interest, modified by socialist principles or by 
the demands of social justice”, there was no serious gap between the rich and the 
poor as imagined by Ahmad.1046 
                                                          
1043 Prawiranegara, “Adakah Konsep,” 354. 
1044 Prawiranegara, “Adakah Konsep,” 351. 
1045 Prawiranegara, “Adakah Konsep,” 351. 
1046 Prawiranegara, “Adakah Konsep,” 352. However it is important to note that since the early 
1970s inequalities of income and wealth have risen again in the majority of developed societies, 
although not in all of the most industrial countries. As Anthony Giddens observes, “[t]he US 
appears as the most unequal of all industrial countries in terms of income distribution. The 
proportion of income taken by the top 1% has increased substantially over the past two or three 
decades, while those at the bottom have seen their average income stagnate or decline. Defined 
as 50% or less of median incomes, poverty in the US in the early 1990s was five times as great as 
in Norway or Sweden—20% for the US, as compared to 4% for the other two countries. The 
incidence of poverty in Canada and Australia is also high, at 14% and 13% respectively.” Giddens, 
Third Way and its Critics, 89-90. Notwithstanding, inequalities and poverty in many Muslim 
countries, especially oil-rich ones, are likely much higher, the more so in those countries ruled by 
royal families in an authoritarian system. One of the implications of this system is the lack of 
effective control on the part of an elected legislative body—if any exists—to control the wealth 
293 
 
He further showed that banking in modern society had very strategic 
functions that permitted members of society to increase production. Sjafruddin 
likened a banking system with the central bank at its center to the heart in the 
human body, whose veins and tendons are a network of vessels carrying food 
nutrients. The blood of the banking system is money.1047  
Sjafruddin strongly emphasized the importance of central banks in 
maintaining the balance between the currency and the amount of goods or 
production. With the increasing volume and value of production and trade, he said, 
the amount of money must also be increased. The additional money in circulation 
was meant both to increase production and offset the additional production. To 
maintain the stability of the currency, the amount and circulation of money should 
always be balanced with that of goods. However Sjafruddin also warned that credit 
agencies have high social functions. The purpose of their existence is to enable 
people to increase their productivity. If the bank is viewed solely as a tool to gain as 
much profit as possible, it will easily fall prey to speculation and manipulation of the 
money entrusted to it regardless of the security to their transactions. Sjafruddin felt 
the need to warn about this problem because, at the time he delivered this paper in 
1970, Indonesia had just recovered from the economic slump inherited from the 
Sukarno regime in which the central bank—deviating from its normal and 
fundamental function—was simply used as a tool of politics. Similarly, in the early 
days of the Suharto government following Sukarno, as well as at the near end of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
owned by the ruling elite, manage corruption, or establish a clear separation between private and 
public wealth. This condition of inequalities and poverty in oil-rich Muslim countries is much 
more reprehensible than in developed countries. One can understand Sjafruddin’s above 
conclusion in this light. 
1047 Prawiranegara, “Uang dan Bank,” 334. 
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Suharto’s regime in 1997, many banks were being liquidated because they were 
bankrupt.1048 
In addition, he stressed the important role of the government and central 
bank in stabilizing the currency. Sjafruddin described in detail how this was to be 
achieved. The government and central bank should draw up budget revenues and 
expenditures in such a way that did not cause high inflation or increase prices of 
goods which would in turn reduce the value of money. The central bank should 
guide and supervise the credit policies of all credit agencies so that the credit really 
did achieve its objective: namely, to increase production without causing inflation. If 
the government and central bank succeeded in maintaining the stability of monetary 
value, this would encourage people to save their money and invest. Furthermore, if 
money was stable, public confidence in it would grow and would further increase 
people’s willingness to save. Saving money provided a means to raise capital, since 
banks could collect money that had been idle and scattered and invest it in 
production and building projects. The difference between principal money being 
lent and put into productive ventures and the gross production output was the net 
profit for society. This net profit was then divided between the state or government 
that levied tax, the savers who received interest on savings, banks that earned 
interest and fees, entrepreneurs who got the net profit, and finally workers who had 
additional jobs or wages.1049 
In the aforementioned paragraphs, we have seen how Sjafruddin explained in 
some detail the function of money and banks in improving the economic condition of 
a country. Furthermore, we have seen how he articulated his defense of this aspect 
of economic development in response to Muslim thinkers of the period. I argue, 
                                                          
1048 Prawiranegara, “Uang dan Bank,” 334-335. See Priasmoro Prawiroardjo, “Perbankan 
Indonesia 40 Tahun,” in Teori Ekonomi dan Kebijaksanaan Pembangunan: Kumpulan Esei untuk 
Menghormati Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, ed. Hendra Esmara (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1987), 194-200.  
1049 Prawiranegara, “Uang dan Bank,” 335-336. 
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however, that these insights are still relevant to the contemporary debate on Islamic 
economics. In the following, we will discuss a recent contribution by a well-known 
proponent of Islamic economics, M. Umer Chapra. I will then show how Sjafruddin 
had anticipated some of Chapra’s concerns and offered alternative solutions to the 
problems he raises.  
M. Umer Chapra, an advisor to the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and the 
Islamic Development Bank (IDB), argues that the reasoning behind the prohibition 
of interest can only be understood if the maqāṣid al-sharīʿah, the goals of Islamic 
law, are taken into consideration. Moreover, the strategy to achieve them must be 
compatible with these goals.1050 By quoting verses of the Qur’an, Hadith, and the 
views of several past Islamic scholars, Chapra concludes that justice is one of the 
main objectives of the Sharīʿah.1051 Justice encompasses all aspects of human 
relationships. One of the most important implications of justice is that “the resources 
provided by God to mankind are a trust and must be utilized in such a manner that 
the well-being of all is ensured, irrespective of whether they are rich or poor, high-
class or lower-class, male or female, and Muslim or non-Muslim.”1052 
Chapra emphasizes that justice requires the equitable implementation of 
resources so that the universal “cherished humanitarian goals of general need-
fulfillment, optimum growth, employment, equitable distribution of income and 
wealth, and economic stability are realized.”1053 He contends that these goals, which 
are entailed by the moral values provided by most religions, cannot be realized 
without a humanitarian strategy that requires, among other things, “the injection of 
                                                          
1050 M. Umer Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest? Rationale behind the Prohibition of 
Interest,” in Interest in Islamic Economics: Understanding Riba, ed. Abdulkader Thomas (London: 
Routledge, 2006), 96. 
1051 Qur’ān, Chapter al-Ḥadīd 57:25; Al-Māida 5:8. A Prophetic hadith: “Beware of injustice, for 
injustice will lead to absolute darkness on the Day of Judgment.” 
1052 Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest?” 97. 
1053 Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest?” 98. 
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a moral dimension into economics in place of the materialist and self-indulgent 
orientation of capitalism. Abolition of interest is a part of the moral dimension.”1054 
On this point Chapra differs from Sjafruddin. Furthermore, the former criticizes 
Muslim scholars who—like Sjafruddin—do not consider bank interest as ribā which 
is prohibited by Islam. Indeed, he deems bank interest “not only factually wrong but 
unduly restrictive in terms of the concept of justice in Islam.”1055 He further argues 
that “Islam abolished the interest-based nature of the financier-entrepreneur 
relationship [in the time of the Prophet] and reorganized it on a profit-and-loss-
sharing basis. This enabled the financier to have a just share and the entrepreneur 
did not get crushed under adverse conditions, one of which was the caravan being 
waylaid on the journey.”1056 Emphasizing the benefit of financial intermediation on 
the basis of equity and profit-and-loss sharing, Chapra asserted that it “would make 
the financier share in the risks as well as rewards of business and thereby introduce 
a greater discipline in the use of financial resources.”1057 
Subsequently Chapra discusses the reason why an economy based on equity 
and profit-and-loss sharing has become more important in the context of a modern 
economic system. The disadvantages of financial intermediation based on interest 
are that, firstly, it “tends to promote living beyond means by both the private and 
public sectors.”1058 He points out the misuse of the borrowed funds for extravagant 
spending, speculation, military expenditure, and large useless projects, instead of for 
public welfare and useful economic projects.  All these would eventually lead to “a 
rapid expansion in claims on resources (partly for unproductive and wasteful 
                                                          
1054 Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest?” 98. 
1055 Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest?” 98. 
1056 Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest?” 98. 
1057 Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest?” 99. 
1058 Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest?” 99. 
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spending) and, besides accentuating macroeconomic and external imbalances, 
squeezes resources available for need-fulfillment and development.”1059  
The outcome about which Chapra is concerned—that readily-accessible 
loans can lead to conspicuous consumption and wasteful projects—has indeed 
occurred in many countries. Sjafruddin would have agreed with Chapra’s critical 
assessment of the practice. I have mentioned above how he criticized the 
irresponsible use of credit and the indiscriminate lending by many banks in 
Indonesia. In his view, loans should be used for productive projects, while the 
central bank should guide and supervise the credit policies of all financial 
institutions so that the credit effectively increases production without causing 
inflation. The difference between Sjafruddin and Chapra is that, while the former 
argued that loans ought to be used for productive goals and public welfare through 
prudent policy-making and rigorous supervision by a central bank in an interest-
based system, Chapra believes that the interest-based system itself must make way 
for a profit-and-loss-sharing system to ensure that credit not deviate from its 
intended use, i.e. public well-being and economic development. It seems therefore 
that for Chapra, the central bank and government’s rigorous supervision and control 
would not be effective enough to prevent irregularities and manipulation if the 
financial system continues to run on interest. However, the equity and profit-and-
loss-sharing system Chapra proposes would, he argues, ensure greater discipline in 
the use of financial resources and be more easily supervisable than would an 
interest-based banking system.1060 
Chapra highlights saving as one of the basic ingredients needed for sustained 
growth. Other basic ingredients are “investment, hard and conscientious work, 
technological progress and creative management, along with helpful social behavior 
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and government policies.”1061 He stresses two facts: first, that saving has a positive 
effect on growth and it “helps capital formation, which in turn helps an increase in 
output and employment”,1062 and second, that “high-saving countries have generally 
grown faster than low-saving countries.”1063 In his view, although the equity 
premium in the US, Germany, and Japan is high, it involves hugely unmanageable 
risks. Chapra presumes that “[s]ome people may prefer to have less risky modes”, 
and therefore proposes “the availability of, and easy access to, investment 
opportunities of varying risks and maturities to satisfy the different preferences of 
savers.”1064 He indicates that these kinds of investments are available within an 
Islamic framework. Moreover, Chapra notes that higher interest rates do not in fact 
help to promote saving. He shows that “[g]ross domestic saving as per cent of GDP 
has registered a worldwide decline over the last quarter century from 26.6 per cent 
in 1971 to 22.6 per cent in 1996.”1065 The decline occurred both in the advanced 
industrial countries and in developing countries. One of the reasons for the decline is 
“the rise in consumption by both the public and private sectors due to the easy 
availability of credit in a collateral-linked, interest-based financial system.”1066 Again 
Chapra proposes that profit-and-loss sharing can overcome the decline of 
investment. In his opinion, it employs “a fair ratio between the financier and the 
entrepreneur [which] should also help to promote a more efficient allocation of 
resources.”1067 Chapra believes that profit-and-loss sharing ensures fairness and will 
provide a positive outcome for the enterpreneur’s business plan. He explains that 
“the risks of business may be more equitably distributed, thereby improving the 
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investment climate.  Moreover, by making the savers and banks involved in the 
success of the entrepreneur’s business, greater experience may become available to 
the entrepreneurs, leading to an improvement in the availability of information, 
skills, efficiency, and profitability. More productive entrepreneurship may lead to 
increased investment.”1068     
Although Chapra emphasizes the significance of a number of Islamic values 
and institutions, including zakāt and the inheritance system, for social justice, he is 
mainly concerned with replacing the interest-based system with one of profit and 
loss sharing, which he believes could have a major equalizing effect on the 
distribution of income and wealth.1069 Citing the opinions of Lester Thurow, Arne 
Bigsten, and even Morgan Guarantee Trust Company, he argues that “the established 
practice of banks in the conventional banking system is to lend mainly to those 
individuals and firms who have the necessary collateral to offer large internal 
savings to service the debt.”1070 The system creates greater gaps of profit between 
smaller companies and the largest ones. Chapra identifies “the established practice 
of banks in the conventional banking system [… of lending] mainly to those 
individuals and firms who have the necessary collateral to offer large internal 
savings to service the debt” as an important factor leading to unequal distribution of 
wealth.1071 However, he believes that efforts to overcome the problem would be 
relatively more successful “in an equity-based system where the banks would be 
motivated to give at least as much attention to the profitability of the project as to 
the collateral and thereby enable small business also to compete.”1072 
                                                          
1068 Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest?” 102. 
1069 Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest?” 103. 
1070 Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest?” 103. 
1071 Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest?” 103. 
1072 Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest?” 103. 
300 
 
Another disadvantage of an interest-based system is economic instability, 
which Chapra finds to have increased, especially in the last twenty years, due to 
unpredictable fluctuations in “interest rates, exchange rates and commodity and 
stock prices”.”1073 In his assessment, “[s]uch crises tend to accentuate uncertainties, 
disrupt the smooth functioning of the financial system, create financial fragility, and 
hurt economic performance.”1074 Fluctuation in the financial markets has been 
occasioned by a number of internal and external factors that relate to each other 
which tends to cause a more severe impact. Chapra emphasizes the “rise in debt, and 
particularly short-term debt”, as a main contributor to economic instability in 
various situations, including overreliance on credit, a debt-friendly tax system, and 
ease of money transfer enabled by global technologies. The disastrous consequences 
of increasing debt were seen in the 1997 East Asia crisis, which was precipitated by 
an excess of short-term debt “diverted to speculation in the foreign exchange, stock, 
and commodity markets.” 1075  
In Chapra’s estimation, the economic crisis could have been avoided had 
there been an emphasis on risk-sharing (central to the profit-and-loss sharing 
system) where banks “would have been under a constraint to scrutinize the projects 
more carefully and would not have yielded even to political pressures if they 
considered the projects to be too risky.”1076 
 Chapra raises the arguments above to show that the equity and profit-and-
loss-sharing system employs greater discipline and better supervision in terms of 
use of financial resources than does the interest-based banking system. The former 
system provides a number of advantages in terms of wealth distribution and 
                                                          
1073 Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest?” 104. 
1074 Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest?” 104. 
1075 Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest?” 104. 
1076 Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited Interest?” 105. 
301 
 
economic stability, whereas the interest-based banking system would seem to 
promote excessive indebtedness, inequality, and instability.  
It is obvious that Chapra’s arguments against the interest-based system of 
financial intermediation are contrary to Sjafruddin’s conclusions, but Chapra’s 
analysis does not take into account the limitations that Sjafruddin imposed on 
monetary and interest transactions. The interest-based banking and finance that 
Sjafruddin proposed is one that applies strict discipline to and supervision of lent 
money so that it is used only for productive purposes that could stimulate positive 
economic growth. He also stressed the need to prevent the use of credit lent by 
banks for speculative businesses and emphasized the roles government and central 
banks to maintain currency stability to make public confidence in the money grows. 
Sjafruddin also differed from Chapra in his assessments of non-interest-
based banking and finance, or a profit-and-loss-sharing system. Chapra praises this 
system as promoting the equitable distribution and economic growth and stability. 
On the contrary, Sjafruddin believed that the profit-and-loss-sharing system would 
bring about negative effects on production, economic growth, and the realization of 
social justice.  
However, Sjafruddin’s observation could not have taken into account, if these 
high-risk practices were not happening during his lifetime.  As explored above, 
Chapra describes how short-term borrowing has injected “a substantial degree of 
instability into the international foreign exchange markets.”1077 In addition, the 
presence of hedge funds is “blamed for manipulating markets from Hong Kong to 
London and New York.”1078 A hedge fund, as described by former Chairman of the US 
Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan, is “structured to avoid regulation by limiting its 
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clientele to a small number of highly sophisticated, very wealthy individuals”,1079 
and, as such, can easily have a destabilizing effect on world economies.1080 Sjafrudin 
had warned against speculative financial transactions during the 1970s, although at 
that time the risks posed, amount of money involved, and magnitude of impact were 
nothing compared to what has evolved during the past two decades, given the rapid 
growth in bank credit. Sjafruddin undertook policies designed prevent speculative 
and manipulative financial transactions which were implemented under the 
supervision of the central bank, within the democratic political system according to 
laws enacted by parliament or legislative councils. Not the least Sjafruddin 
emphasized the significance of moral and spiritual values to restrain the impulsivity 
and greed of economic players. He repeated that the purpose of human life is to seek 
God’s pleasure (marḍāt Allah or riḍā Allah), not to acquire wealth in ways that 
ignore religious teachings, such as doing harm or injustice to fellow human 
beings.1081 At this point Sjafruddin introduced Islamic ethical values to restrict the 
possibility of unfair exchange in business practices and financial transactions. If 
there were no moral restrictions, the business and financial transactions would be 
carried out only for material gain and at the expense of an unprivileged majority 
which, in a globalized capitalist economy, would reach hundreds of millions of 
people. This is also a concern of Muslim scholars on the other side of the debate, 
such as Chapra. As Charles Tripp puts it: “[t]his is directly relevant to Muslim 
responses, since rulings on fair exchange are central to all the major juristic schools 
of Islam. In fact, one can argue that many contemporary Islamic responses to 
capitalism stem from anxieties about unlicensed or unfair exchange, leading to 
various strategies devised to ‘tame’ the process and to make it authentically yet also 
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productively part of an Islamic system, reinforcing, rather than undermining, the 
solidarities and trust of transactions.”1082  
However, Sjafruddin continued to advocate for an interest-based banking 
system, which he believed could bring economic prosperity and social justice. For 
him, efforts to establish Islamic banks that do not pay and collect interest are simply 
a waste of time–although he did not dismiss out of hand the possibility that the 
effort might succeed. 1083 In his opinion, as long as people create money to develop 
and facilitate the economy, interest cannot be eliminated. He believed that God has 
allowed human beings’ governance and use of property and collection of interest if 
this is done in a way that benefits the entire society, not just those who own capital. 
Bank interest accrued by lending money, he maintained, cannot be eliminated, 
because it would run contrary to human nature which expects to gain profit and 
benefits from economic relationships with other people. Objections to interest, 
according to him, are groundless, both from a religious and an economic 
standpoint.1084 On the contrary, as previously discussed, Chapra saw the 
replacement of interest-based financial intermediation with the profit-and-loss-
sharing system as a more effective way to overcome financial problems. 1085 The 
latter system would, in his view, be more conducive to fairer transactions, more 
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supportive to the welfare of society, ethically more compliant to Islamic injunctions, 
and more spiritually inspiring.1086  
The above discussion demonstrated the diversity of how justice is perceived 
and implemented in the economy. Islamic injunctions concerning the issues of ribā, 
zakāt, taxation, interest, rent, inheritance, private ownership and income 
distribution are directed to ensure justice (ʿadl) and to serve the public interest 
(maṣlaḥah), as aims of the Sharīʿah. Sjafruddin and proponents of Islamic economics 
came to different conclusions as to the meaning of justice and implications of the 
prohibition of ribā. For Sjafruddin, ribā was any unfair or exploitative economic 
transaction whereby a party takes advantage of its weaker competitor by abusing its 
strong economic position. Sjafruddin emphasized that the rationale behind the 
prohibition of ribā was to guarantee justice and fairness and to avoid exploitation in 
economic affairs. He also included an excessive or uncontrolled exploitation of 
natural resources as falling within the scope of ribā. Meanwhile Islamic economics 
emphasizes the legal formulations of ribā in Islamic law by centuries of Muslim 
jurists and scholars. Consequently, proponents of Islamic economics argue that 
interest which inflicts injustice is ribā, and offer the profit-and-loss-sharing system 
to replace the interest-based banking and financial system.  Unlike that opinion, 
                                                          
1086 DeLorenzo, “Introduction to Understanding Riba,” 2. However, the implementation of Islamic 
economics may experience problems due to its religious basis. As Ibrahim Warde explains, 
dishonesty on the part of a few customers or employees can bring serious difficulties to, and even 
destroy, a financial institution; and there exists some ambiguity of norms between religious and 
economic logics. Islamic financial institutions are torn between being profit-making enterprises 
and being bound by religious obligations to act on moral rather than economic considerations. 
The above have occurred in Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia with detrimental effects on the 
efficacy of the system. See Ibrahim Warde, “Corporate Governance and the Islamic Moral 
Hazard,” in Islamic Finance: Current Legal and Regulatory Issues, ed. S. Nazim Ali, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Islamic Finance Project, Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, 
2005), 23-24. Another aspect of the problem faced by Islamic banking and financial institutions is 
the reality of the capitalist global market. As described by Tripp: “As the Islamic financial sector 
grew, mobilizing substantial sums of capital, many of the original intentions faded from view, or 
declined in relation to the profit-seeking operations of the banks. The goal of reinforcing the 
bonds of community, and the therapeutic ambition of restoring unity between people’s material 
transactions and the spiritual dimension of their lives, gave way before the need for financial 
institutions to survive and to thrive.” See Tripp, Islam and the Moral Economy, 141-142. 
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Sjafruddin argued money, like shovels and tractors, as simply a tool to facilitate and 
expand the production of the necessities of life that was eventually used as a 
medium of exchange and trade. Therefore it can be traded or loaned, and any profit 
from the sale and or borrowing of money is lawful. For him there is no need to have 
a free-interest banking and financial system as an alternative to the current system. 
While admitting that many excesses and deviations of financial practices of the 
conventional banking and financial system, Sjafruddin believed that it constitutes an 
efficient system of production and distribution that would ensure economic 
prosperity. 1087 
Both Chapra and Sjafruddin show that Islamic thinking on economics is in 
many respects compatible with modern capitalism and economic development, such 
as profit through business ventures, financial returns on investments involving risk, 
and basic rights to private ownership. However, Islamic economics, as a religiously-
based response to modern capitalism, wants not only to infuse modern capitalism 
with moral and ethical values but also to offer a structural alternative that is 
believed to be capable of reducing the many injustices in present financial and 
economic practices. Sjafruddin did not offer a structural alternative, but was critical 
of what he saw as excessive individualism, and materialistic, hedonistic, and greedy 
tendencies in contemporary capitalist society which brought suffering and injustices 
upon disadvantaged groups. 1088  Therefore his economic thinking stressed the 
importance of moral and socio-ethical values in conducting economic affairs.  
                                                          
1087 In defending private enterprise as the backbone of Indonesian economy, Sjafruddin said, 
“Healthy individualism and self-respect are pummelled to bits with the words ‘capitalist-
bourgeois’ […] We should restore respect for the personality, individual initiative, and healthy 
individualism, which in addition to seeking profit, for oneself, also considers the interests of the 
community.” Higgins with Higgins, Indonesia, 90. 
1088 Criticism of capitalism comes not only among scholars or public figures in developing 
countries and left-wing groups or scholars in Western countries, but also from those who come 
from the establishment of capitalism such as Kenneth Rogoff. He said that while “in principle, 
none of capitalism’s problems is insurmountable, neverthelessas pollution, financial instability, 
health problems, and inequality continue to grow, and as political systems remain paralyzed, 
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That said, it would seem that both Sjafruddin and Islamic economists such as 
Chapra are not absolutist in their support of the banking and financial system that 
each defends. As mentioned above, Sjafruddin did not dismiss completely the 
possibility of the equity and profit-and-loss sharing system to succeed. Likewise, 
Chapra’s arguments in favour of this system are frequently presented in a 
comparative manner and not in black-and-white or zero-sum game terms. These 
possibilities are very much up in the air, since “[t]he foci and method that have been 
selected by Muslim economists for economic analysis is essentially of Keynesian and 
neoclassical economics.”1089  
Until now no single country which supports the development of Islamic 
economics has applied these theories on a national scale. In countries which host 
Islamic economics research institutions such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, 
implementation of Islamic economics is limited to the development of private 
financial establishments.1090 The interests of the rulers, political class and business 
elite of oil-rich Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, seem to compel them to 
avoid employing Islamic banking as the cornerstone of their national economies. 
Their lack of political legitimacy—their being in many cases part of unelected 
                                                                                                                                                                      
capitalism’s future might not seem so secure in a few decades as it seems now.” Kenneth Rogoff, 
“Is Modern Capitalism Sustainable.” Project Syndicate, December 2, 2011, accessed February 10, 
2011, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/rogoff87/English. For the destructive 
excesses of neo-liberalism, free-market capitalism or capitalist fundamentalism, such as growing 
problems of economic inequality and poverty, see Schroyer, Beyond Western Economics 
(London: Routledge, 2009); Thomas Frank, One Market Under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market 
Populism, and the End of Economic Democracy (New York: Doubleday, 2000); Stilwell, Political 
Economy, 22-23.  
1089 Syed Farid Alatas, “Islam and Counter Modernism: Towards Alternative Development 
Paradigms,” in Islamic Political Economy in Capitalist-Globalization: An Agenda for Change, ed. 
Masudul Alam Choudhury et al (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications & Distribution Sdn. Bhd. and 
International Project on Islamic Political Economy, 1997), 73. 
1090 Islamic banks now operate in more than sixty countries. Islamic banking systems (interest-
free banks) are well entrenched in the fabric of economic life in most countries of the Middle East 
(Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Dubai, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar), North Africa, Sudan, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, and are even present in South Korea, the UK, 
Switzerland, Denmark, the US, and New Zealand. See Kuran, Islam and Mammon, 9 and 146-147; 




governments—and their deep connections with global capitalist institutions present 
many political risks in undertaking such a radical policy. Most of the wealth of these 
countries is invested in transnational conventional banks and equity markets.1091 As 
a result, the effectiveness of the alternative system in national and global economies 
cannot be empirically tested. The only country that has fully implemented Islamic 
economic theory on a national scale to guide the state’s economic policy is Iran, 
whose banking and financial system has been running on an Islamic basis since 
1984.  But this step is not without problems.1092 The government of Pakistan in the 
time of Zia-ul-Haq attempted to abolish interest from the Pakistani economy, but it 
has still not yet fully transformed its economy into an interest-free system. Pakistan 
failed to be an example of how Muslim economies should have developed. 
Corruption and excessive borrowing squeezes resources that could otherwise be 
used for need fulfillment. This failure happens, according to Chapra, because the 
government of Pakistan has not taken the Islamic injunctions against interest 
seriously.1093 Sudan also attempted to abolish interest from its economy. However, 
international pressures such as IMF-dictated reforms forced the country to abandon 
the implementation of a free-interest banking system.1094  
As the sole country which employs Islamic banking as the foundation of its 
economy, more studies of Iran’s economic performance are needed to examine its 
successes and shortcomings in implementing Islamic economics on a national scale. 
The research could provide material for the further development of Islamic 
                                                          
1091 Tripp, Islam and the Moral Economy, 139-140; Robert W. Hefner, “Ambivalent Embrace: 
Islamic Economics and Global Capitalism,” in Markets, Morals & Religion, ed. Jonathan B. Imber 
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 151. 
1092 Tripp, Islam and the Moral Economy, 141; Karim Eslamloeyan, “Stock Market Operation and 
Equity Price Determination in an Economy with an Interest-Free Baking System: The Case of 
Iran,” in Islamic Perspectives on Wealth Creation, ed. Munawar Iqbal and Rodney Wilson 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 205-216; Wilson, Economics, Ethics and 
Religion, 146-149.  
1093 Wilson, “Development of Islamic Economics,” 208; Chapra, “Why has Islam Prohibited 
Interest?” 99; Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest, 14. 
1094 Tripp, Islam and the Moral Economy, 140-141; Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest, 14. 
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economic theory. But so far, Islamic economists and institutions supported by Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf Arab countries rarely refer to the case of Iran.1095 Political and 
ideological reasons seem to have become barriers for them to making Iran a case 
study of Islamic economics on a national scale.1096  
Indonesia, with the world’s largest Muslim population, came to Islamic or 
Sharīʿah banking fairly late in 1992. The Indonesian government eventually gave the 
green light to develop an Islamic bank after the political reconciliation between the 
New Order government and Islamic civil society, which had been estranged for 
years.1097 The formation of Bank Muamalat Islam (BMI), the first Islamic or Sharīʿah 
Bank in Indonesia, was initially opposed surreptitiously by the army and intelligence 
services as well as some secularist technocrats. However, the endeavor spearheaded 
by the Majelis ʿUlamā’ Indonesia (MUI), the Council of Indonesian Muslim Scholars, 
and the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI), the Association of Indonesian 
Muslim Intellectuals, with the support of President Soeharto, finally brought the 
proposal into existence.1098 After 20 years of the formation of BMI, there are six 
                                                          
1095 Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi is probably an exception, for he often mentions the practice of 
Islamic economics in Iran. See Naqvi, Islam, Economics, and Society, 135 and passim.    
1096 Papers by Heydar Pourian and Iraj Toutounchian discuss the experiences of the Islamic 
financial system in Iran. Pourian calls Iran’s current economic and financial system the market-
oriented Islamic system (MIS), replacing the socialist-oriented Islamic System (SIS) after the end 
of the eight-year war with Iraq in 1988 and with the start of the first five-year economic plan.  
Pourian suggests that the system itself works; however, he shows that the performance of 
economic indicators, especially savings and investments, was not encouraging. He offers a 
number of recommendations to improve the conditions. See Heydar Pourian, “Islamic Banking 
and Economic Development in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” in Islamic Political Economy in 
Capitalist-Globalization: An Agenda for Change, ed. Masudul Alam Choudhury, Abdad M.Z., and 
Muhammad Syukri Salleh (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications & Distributors Sdn Bhd and 
International Project on Islamic Political Economy, 1997), 301-318. Iraj Toutounchian’s paper 
offers a more optimistic view of Iran’s economic conditions. The abolition of financial interest, 
beside the integrated financial and fiscal policies, he says, has encouraged cooperation within and 
among economic agents. See Iraj Toutounchian, “Resource Mobilization for Partial Government 
Expenditures through Islamic Modes of Contract: The Case of Iran,” in Islamic Political Economy 
in Capitalist-Globalization: An Agenda for Change, ed. Masudul Alam Choudhury, Abdad M.Z., and 
Muhammad Syukri Salleh (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications & Distributors Sdn Bhd and 
International Project on Islamic Political Economy, 1997), 279-300.  
1097 Hefner, “Islamizing Capitalism,” 154. 
1098 MUI and ICMI teamed up to establish BMI,  chaired by Dr. M. Amin Aziz, director of Pusat 
Pengembangan Agribisnis (PPA, Center for Agribusiness Development), and professor of 
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Islamic (Sharīʿah) Banks operating in Indonesia to provide financial service to 
Muslims who want to develop enterprises but are reluctant to use conventional 
banks.1099 Except BMI, each of other five Islamic Banks operates along side a 
conventional bank as a sector of it. Although Islamic financial institutions have the 
enthusiastic support of many young people and intellectuals, the effect of Islamic 
banking on improving Muslim economic condition, redistribution and social justice 
so far has been modest.1100 It has been tension between between popular aspirations 
for social justice and the fiscal responsibility of Islamic Bank.1101 Although there has 
been growing demand for Islamic banking in particular parts of the country as data 
from the Sharīʿah Bureau of Bank Indonesia (Indonesian Central Bank) 
demonstrates, so far, however, Islamic banking has been able to absorb only around 
3% share of the banking sector in the country.1102 
5.4. Chapter Four: Economic Ideas, Proposals, and Policies  
Having discussed Sjafruddin Prawiranegara’s thought on the issues of social 
justice and economic development, I will address in the following section his 
reflections on the economic policies of successive Indonesian governments following 
                                                                                                                                                                      
economy at Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB, Bogor Institute of Agriculture). Hefner, “Islamizing 
Capitalism,” 155. 
1099 Hefner, “Islamizing Capitalism,” 157. 
1100 Robert W. Hefner, “Ambivalent Embrace,” 148; Amy Chew, “Indonesia’s Banking to Spur 
Growth,” The Star Online, June 25, 2010, accessed June 5, 2011, 
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/6/25/business/6541029&sec=business. 
1101 Hefner, “Islamizing Capitalism,” 159; Hefner, “Ambivalent Embrace,” 148-149. 
1102 Rhesa Yogaswara, “Indonesia Islamic Banking Market Assessment Q2-2011: Case Study: 
Islamic Commercial Bank and Islamic Business Unit),” Business Islamica, accessed May 6, 2011, 
http://www.islamica-me.com/article.asp?cntnt=772. Yogaswara shows that Third Party Funds 
(TPF) of Islamic banking contributed only 3% of the total 2,500 trillion IDR. In terms of financing, 
Islamic banking has only 4% market share from the total financing 1,800 trillion IDR. However, 
Indonesian Islamic banking has seen significant growth in recent years. The cumulative annual 
growth rate (CAGR) of TPF in the last 5 years (2005-2010) has increased by 37% with an 
estimated value of 76 trillion IDR in FY-2010. From the total TPF (conventional banking and 
Islamic banking), which was estimated by 2,500 trillion IDR, Islamic banking contributed only 
3.45%. This value can be estimated to reach 87 trillion IDR in Q2-2011. It has been estimated that 
the number of account holders reached 8 million in Q2-2011, which has experienced 18% growth 




the transfer of sovereignty in 1949. I will also discuss some of the economic policies 
that he initiated during his tenure as minister of finance in the Natsir cabinet (1950-
1951) and later as president of De Javasche Bank (1951-1953), which functioned as 
Indonesia’s central bank before the establishment of Indonesian Central Bank (BI) of 
which Sjafrudin became the first governor (1953-1957). In doing so we will 
highlight how some of his theoretical insights on the idea of social justice have 
translated into action through the state and market institutions. Sjafruddin, in his 
various writings on the subject, does not develop a theory of social justice from the 
ground up; rather he included social justice as one of the crucial elements in 
economic development. However, I argue that an examination of his policies and 
ideas on economic development reveals a consistent approach to the 
implementation of a modern concept of social justice. I will examine therefore 
whether a consistent pattern emerges in his implementation of economic and 
financial policies, one that clarifies not only his theoretical approach to the issue of 
social justice but also his practical methodology given the circumstances of the time. 
As we shall see, the consistent pattern of Sjafruddin’s economic policy centered 
around his persistent advocacy for decentralization of state institutions and regional 
autonomy; efficiency of the government bureaucracy; emphasis on how to increase 
domestic capital and production circulating inside the country not only on equal 
distribution of pre-existing resources; opposition to discriminatory economic 
policies that barred certain ethnic groups—namely the Chinese—from participating 
fully in economic activities; opposition to confiscation of foreign companies (forced 
and arbitrary nationalization); and opposition to the nepotism and corruption which 
infected Indonesian political culture. By examining these issues and Sjafruddin’s 
policies and proposals that reflect them, we will be in a better position to gain 
insight into his overall approach to the practical aspects of social justice.  
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Sjafruddin’s moderate and rational economic policy was the constant 
reference point of successive Indonesian governments between the transfer of 
sovereignty in 1949 and the first general elections in 1955.1103 He was Minister of 
Prosperity for the first Hatta cabinet, Deputy Prime Minister for the second Hatta 
cabinet (1949), and then Minister of Finance for both the United States of Indonesia 
government and the subsequent Natsir cabinet during the 1950-1951s term. 
Following the retirement of the Natsir cabinet, Sjafruddin became deputy president 
of De Javasche Bank, eventually taking the helm once it was nationalized as 
Indonesia’s Central Bank. During his years as head of the bank, he continued the 
tradition of using the annual report to express his general views on current 
problems of the economy as well as his reflections on past economic policies. His 
reports from 1952 and 1953 revealed a situation of polarity in the successive 
governments during the first two years following the transfer of sovereignty, 
between nationalists on the one hand and developmentalists on the other.1104 More 
than that, Sjafruddin also differed from other prominent policy makers within the 
developmentalist group who were less pragmatic than him but more nationalistic 
and socialistic in terms of economic policy such as Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, 
Djuanda Kartawidjaja, and Jusuf Wibisono .1105 This was a situation that led to the 
government’s failure to implement a consistent economic policy, let alone a proper 
                                                          
1103 Sutter, Indonesianisasi, 1189-1190; cf. Bruce Glassburner, “Economic Policy-Making,” 71-73 
and 81-83; Higgins with Higgins, Indonesia , 87-91. 
1104 Higgins with Higgins, Indonesia, 82-83; Sutter, Indonesianisasi, 1184-1190; Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara, “Nasionalisasi De Javasche Bank,” in Ekonomi dan Keuangan: Makna Ekonomi 
Islam, vol. 2 of Kumpulan Karangan Terpilih, ed. Ajip Rosidi (Jakarta: CV Haji Masagung, 1988), 
74-84; Prawiranegara, “Dasar Politik Kemakmuran,” 85-107; Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “The 
Causes of Our Falling Production,” in Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965, ed. Herbert Feith 
and Lance Castles (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 385-389.  
1105 Sumitro’s highly nationalistic Economic Urgency Program was designed in the period of 
Natsir’s cabinet (1950-1951). It included, among others, development of large industry, capital 
assistance to indigenous enterprise, and the restriction of certain markets to indigenous sellers. 
The latter two programs were implemented by Djuanda and other ministers in successive 
cabinets. Sjafruddin opposed development of large industry because it was not economically-
viable, and he considered the latter programs to be discriminatory. Glassburner, “Economic 
Policy-Making,” 85; Dick, “Formation,” 177.  
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economic policy as Sjafruddin would have it. A number of common themes emerged 
in his reflections on the problems of this period: aversion to foreign investment and 
businesses; to an imbalanced economic policy that focused on the development of 
large industries while ignoring middle-class and agricultural industries; and to the 
centralization of authority in Jakarta.1106  
Before discussing the economic policies, proposals, and ideas after the 
international recognition of Indonesian sovereignty in December 1949, there was an 
important occasion in the early months following the declaration of Indonesian 
independence in 1945. Sjafruddin became a spokesman of KNI (Indonesian National 
Committee), a provisional government agency of Priangan Recidency, West Java, 
when it proposed to the Vice President Hatta, in September 1945 that the 
government of Indonesia should issue its own currency as an important symbol of 
the new state. At that time Sjafruddin was not yet a national figure, but simply 
secretary of KNI of the region aforementioned. Interestingly, the proposal would 
only be realized a year later on October 30, 1946, when Sjafruddin himself served as 
Minister of Finance. He was with Vice President Hatta when the latter made an 
announcement via radio about the issue of the Republic currency. Until then the 
currencies being used by Indonesians were those of the Japanese and the NICA 
(Netherlands Indies Civil Administration). Hatta spoke with the passion of 
revolution by declaring that "[the circulation of currency of the Republic of 
Indonesia] put an end to a period in financial history of the Republic of Indonesia, 
the period that was full of suffering and hardship for our people".1107 In contrast, 
Sjafruddin invited people to respond to it realistically, stating that the issuance of 
the currency of the Republic of Indonesia did not mean that their suffering would 
disappear at once and prosperity would come by itself. When announcing the use of 
                                                          
1106 Prawiranegara, “Dasar Politik Kemakmuran,” 87-89; Prawiranegara, “The Causes,” 385-387. 
1107 Sudarjat, “Pemikiran Ekonomi,” 18. 
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the money, Sjafruddin’s pattern of thought that prioritized economic rationality was 
already clear. He emphasized the importance of increasing production and the 
procurement of goods; reducing all actions that impeded merchants and private 
entrepreneurs in their efforts (i.e. providing convenience and flexibility in business, 
trade, and enterprise activities); and ending corruption that had seeped deeply into 
the ranks of civil servants who neglected their duties given their insufficient salaries. 
Sjafruddin stressed that the money was only a means of transaction and payments 
(ruil and betaal middle) and of measuring price (waarde meters); money did not 
necessarily increase prosperity. Money became valuable when accompanied by an 
increase in high production and availability of goods. Sjafruddin called upon all 
parties to work hard to create prosperity through regular and systematic ways.1108  
Another of Sjafruddin’s policies as Minister of Finance was the improvement 
of balance of payments with the use of foreign exchange certificate system on March 
11, 1950 which managed to boost exports and suppress imports, giving benefit to 
the export producers—the majority of whom were small farmers—and bringing 
prices down.1109 Another policy was even more dramatic: that of NICA’s money cut 
implemented on March 19, 1950, which became known as “Sjafruddin's cut”, to 
reduce money supply, control inflation, and collect public funds (government bond). 
Each bill was cut into two pieces. The left part could be exchanged at the bank to get 
new money whose value was only half of the value written on the bill, while the right 
side of the bill could be exchanged for bonds with benefits (interest) at as much as 
3% a year. For bank deposits higher than 400.00 guilders, only half of the amount 
                                                          
1108 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “Pidato Radio Sehubungan dengan diberlakukan Oeang Repoeblik 
Indonesia (ORI),” in Ekonomi dan Keuangan: Makna Ekonomi Islam, vol. 2 of Kumpulan 
Karangan Terpilih, ed. Ajip Rosidi (Jakarta: CV Haji Masagung, 1988), 2-3. 
1109 Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 156-157. 
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could be taken in cash. The other half was borrowed by government.1110 It is worth 
noting that Sjafruddin made an exception for bank notes and coins worth lower than 
2.50.00 in order to protect the lower class and to keep the prices low.1111 The money 
cut was accompanied by other measures aimed at promoting production and trade 
and improving the lot of civil servants. That goal had been achieved with the 
increase of production and export and the decrease of import consumer goods, as 
well as the relative stability of the currency for several years.1112 Sjafruddin’s 
controversial policy, which was initially criticized for fear that it would further 
damage the economy, was finally welcomed by the public because in general it 
produced positive impacts.1113 Sjafruddin’s action recently received appreciation 
from the current Indonesian Vice President, Professor Boediono, as the bold but 
                                                          
1110 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “Kita Tidak Boleh Jemu-jemu Berjuang, Bekerja, Berikhtiar,” in 
Ekonomi dan Keuangan: Makna Ekonomi Islam, vol. 2 of Kumpulan Karangan Terpilih, ed. Ajip 
Rosidi (Jakarta: CV Haji Masagung, 1988), 6-7; Glassburner, “Economic Policy-Making,” 83. 
1111 Prawiranegara, “Kita Tidak Boleh Jemu-jemu,”7; Glassburner, “Economic Policy-Making,” 83; 
Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 161. 
1112 Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 161; Prawiranegara, “Membangun Kembali,” 199. 
1113 There are differences in assesments of the success of this money cut policy. Rosidi quoted 
Star Weekly, a magazine published by the Chinese community, which had initially doubted the 
policy but then praised it, because “Sjafruddin’s cut” in fact strengthened the Republic currency 
and made the price of the goods cheaper. News from Star Weekly magazine was reliable because 
it gave special attention to financial and trade issues, both areas in which the Chinese community 
was predominant. The news asesment was based on direct observation of what happened in the 
market. Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 161-162. Similarly, Dr. Houwink, President of De 
Javasche Bank, praised the action claiming that the purge (money cut) had reduced the money 
supply by 1.6 billion guilders—41 percent of the money supply. However, Bruce Glassburner, an 
American economic lecturer at University of Indonesia, deemed the results of the reform 
disappointing. He concluded that money circulation reduced to only 170 million guilders, and 
according to him, prices of food and textiles actually rose over the period. Glassburner, 
“Economic Policy-Making,” 83-84. Regardless of those different interpretations, it was 
indisputable that the foreign exchange certificate system and money cut managed to increase the 
country's revenue to four times the original estimate, successfully combat money counterfeiting, 
curbing the chaos caused by the presence of various currencies prevailing at the time, and 
stopping strikes incited by leftist groups for a while. Similarly, although the exact amount of 
money being reduced became subject to different interpretations, what was clear was the fact 
that the amount of money in circulation was being reduced significantly, and Indonesian 
economic and financial conditions were clearly improved by both actions than if the policy had 
never been carried out. Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 162-163. Sjafruddin himself admitted 
that the changes and political pressures resulted in economic and monetary developments which 
further deviated from the line that he had drawn. Political conflicts among civilian politicians and 
within the military, such as disputes over rationalization in the government bureaucracy and 
military, were outside the scope of policies implemented by Sjafruddin, but did reduce their 




rational action and at the time was urgently needed.1114 Boediono is an economist 
and served as Governor of the Central Bank of Indonesia (2008-2009) and Minister 
of Finance (2001-2004).  
Another of Sjafruddin’s economic and financial policy that stood out was his 
tight fiscal and monetary policy. He emphasized efficiency and “held the purse 
strings with all the tightness which his Puritan moral seriousness demanded.”1115 
Funds were used by Sjafruddin “for a variety of new economic projects, but rarely 
for directly political purposes.”1116 Sjafruddin was very strict in his control of 
disbursements and budgetary allocations. The Natsir cabinet (1950-1951), with 
Sjafruddin as Minister of Finance, sent a delegation of only five to the UN General 
Assembly Meeting whereas the Sukiman cabinet, its successor, sent a delegation of 
24 members.1117 He consistently practiced the policy of rejection of patronage 
requests, in which he was supported by Hatta and Natsir.  This policy made persons 
like him, Hatta, and Natsir highly unpopular with the political elite. In addition, 
“Sjafruddin drew widespread hostility towards himself by the fact that he left great 
power to Dutch high officials in his ministry, including power to deal with requests 
for funds for other ministries.”1118 Later when Sjafruddin was no longer a member of 
cabinet, he criticized the spendthrift policy of the successive governments’ 
squandering the windfall from the Korean War boom, which he had used efficiently, 
“on too many imported consumer goods, including durables such as cars, rather than 
spending the surplus on productive purposes.”1119  
                                                          
1114 Kompas, “Boediono Tak Sebut Perlawanan Mr. Sjafruddin,” Kompas.com, 1 March 2011, 
accessed August 1, 2011, 
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/03/01/0351213/Boediono.Tak.Sebut. 
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1115 Feith, Decline, 169. 
1116 Feith, Decline, 169. 
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1118 Feith, Decline, 170. 
1119 Wie, “Debate on Economic Policy,” 8. 
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Following his tenure as cabinet minister, Sjafruddin was appointed in 1952 
as President of De Javasche Bank. In his annual report as president for the financial 
year of 1952-1953, Sjafruddin criticized the aversion to foreign capital, still alive 
amongst Indonesian politicians, which had led to economic policies that, in his 
assessment, impeded production. According to him, this attitude depended on a 
strict structural separation between “national” capital and “foreign” capital, one that 
was motivated by nationalist sentiments following the revolution of the late 1940s 
rather than by a correct understanding of how capital is distributed in the economy. 
According to this view, the revolution was not yet complete and prosperity would 
not come unless the Indonesian people ridded themselves of all foreign influence in 
the economy: “The Dutch lion is dead, but his claws are still embedded in the body of 
Indonesia.”1120 This is of course an understatement of the huge political problem of 
the presence of foreign capital imposed upon the new republic. During the Round 
Table Conference on December 1949, the Indonesian delegation reluctantly agreed 
that Dutch business interest in Indonesia would continue following the transfer of 
sovereignty. Nationalization of Dutch enterprises would be allowed only if it was in 
Indonesia’s national interest and if the right compensation was paid. The other 
terms of this agreement, stipulated in the Financial and Economic Agreement, Finec, 
would further guarantee that Dutch economic interests in Indonesia would continue 
to prosper.1121 Many nationalist leaders were understandably critical of this 
concession. Though a sovereign nation, Indonesia was denied full control over its 
economic operations under the terms of the Finec agreement, being subject, once 
again, to Dutch interest. By 1952, fifty-two percent of consumer imports were still 
handled by four Dutch firms, sixty percent of exports by eight Dutch firms, while 
private banking were under the control of seven foreign banks, three of them Dutch-
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owned.1122 No wonder then, that even the most moderate of Indonesian nationalist 
leaders would argue that the economic phase of national sovereignty had not yet 
arrived.1123  
Sjafruddin was aware of the complexity of the issue and its political 
consequences, but nonetheless argued that for the time being foreign capital must 
be allowed to operate. He represented, along with other economists such as Sumitro, 
the pragmatist camp that tolerated the presence of Dutch capital, whilst arguing at 
the same time for the gradual development of human resources and economic 
conditions that would allow greater participation of national capital in the market in 
the future. According to Sjafruddin, impatience on the part of politicians who desired 
an immediate and large-scale economic planning through national funds had led to a 
number of problems, causing inefficiency and a slowdown in production due to 
prohibitive taxes and unrealistic schemes of nationalization. Indonesia did not yet 
have the knowledge and ability to replace foreign management of big and complex 
industries, while the climate of distrust surrounding foreign capital fed into a 
turbulent relationship between foreign management and its workers, which resulted 
in a number of strikes and acts of vandalism.1124 The slowdown in production, 
according to Sjafruddin, detracted from what he thought to be the government’s 
primary aim, which was to maximize production and increase the flow of capital in 
the country.1125 It was not enough that there be policies of fair or equal distribution 
of income; rather the overall capital of the country must also increase in order for 
prosperity to take hold and further develop at a sustainable and substantial rate. If 
nationalization and regulatory schemes caused production to fall, leading instead to 
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inefficiency of management lacking the requisite skills, these uses of national funds 
“would be needless prodigality.”1126  
The alternative Sjafruddin advocated was one where foreign capital should 
be free to operate in the country as a means to achieving increased production. This 
goal was, in turn, sought after for the sake of the larger purpose of establishing an 
educated population who would be skilled enough to take direct ownership of their 
own industries in the future. Here we see Sjafruddin’s insistence of the importance 
of development of human capability and the security of enterprise as in Rawls’ 
theory of the basic structure.  The basis of this view was Sjafruddin’s claim that the 
strict separation between “foreign” and “national” capital has been overstated. He 
wrote in his 1952 annual report that:  
All working personnel and industries actually carrying on any trade or 
business in Indonesia must be regarded as national capital and national 
productive wealth, whilst as regards capital, this can be considered to have 
been produced in Indonesia, even if such capital is the product of activities 
exercised by means of capital of foreign origin. The only criterion for the 
definition as to the difference between “national” and “foreign” should be the 
possibility of effecting transfer overseas […] Persons and trading concerns 
for which the government regulations allow no transfer must be regarded as 
“national”, even if the relative owners of enterprises or persons, to whom no 
right of transfer is permitted, are foreigners according to the provisions of 
the nationality of the law.1127  
 
Sjafruddin thus freed the concept of ownership from ideology—namely 
Marxism.1128 Instead, ownership of capital embraced a social function whose scope 
was much wider and consequential than considerations of class interest. Since 
Sjafruddin was able to do away with structural-ideological demands of state 
ownership he was free instead to emphasize how an arrangement of regulatory 
authority and realistic nationalizing schemes of the state would be sufficient to 
achieve the welfare of the people.  
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The ideological appeal to structure, namely state-ownership, as a guarantee 
of equitable income distribution was not based on the reality on the ground and was 
subject to contingencies of the time, such as lack of domestic capital, unskilled 
management and insufficient know-how, and the colonial legacy of an inefficient and 
centralized bureaucracy. Sjafruddin argued that equal distribution of wealth could 
be achieved through fiscal and social regulations.1129 Furthermore, state-ownership 
was also a viable option, but only if 1) by doing so production would be raised, 2) 
there were enough Indonesian skilled management, 3) the government could 
exercise effective control over management and production standards, 4) the 
government had enough resources to undertake the enterprise, whether 
nationalization or establishing a new industry, and 5) the government was able to 
invest in enterprises that either increased production in a particular industry or set 
up other vital and otherwise neglected industries.1130 If these conditions were not 
met, nationalizing schemes would lead to nothing more than a waste of national 
funds and a decrease in production, jeopardizing the overall economic health of the 
country.1131  
Sjafruddin was aware of the monopolistic nature of foreign enterprises that 
were not organically rooted in Indonesian society. His argument was not an 
ideological defence of free enterprise—his writings consistently showed that he was 
not an ideologue of the free market—but was rather an attempt to invite 
countrymen to overcome a narrow and sentimental perspective with regards to 
foreign ownership. To deny the development of important industries otherwise 
outside the reach of state-management would mean depriving many Indonesians of 
potential income and wealth distribution for the short-term, but also of the long-
                                                          
1129 Prawiranegara, “Dasar Politik Kemakmuran,” 96-98; Sutter, Indonesianisasi, 1187. 
1130 Prawiranegara, “Dasar Politik Kemakmuran,” 97-98; Sutter, Indonesianisasi, 1186-1187. 
1131 Prawiranegara, “Dasar Politik Kemakmuran,” 98. 
320 
 
term development of their skills in managing these industries.1132 According to 
Sjafruddin, the danger that threatened the welfare of the Indonesian people “[i]s not 
the risk of too much capital, but too little, not in surplus production but in 
underproduction, not in an excess of economic activity but a lack of 
productivity.”1133  
The second issue that Sjafruddin identified as the cause of Indonesia’s 
economic problems was the government’s unbalanced economic policy that focused 
on the development of heavy and “secondary” industries (i.e. transportation) at the 
expense of agricultural and medium-sized industries.1134 Sjafruddin argued that 
since large enterprises and industries yielded large profits and since many of them 
were in the hands of foreign ownership, successive Indonesian governments wanted 
to replace them as soon as possible by Indonesian industries.1135 I have mentioned 
above some of the problems that Sjafruddin believed were found in the 
government’s premature takeover of large industries, including unskilled 
management and a lack of technological know-how. Here he pointed out that an 
emphasis on this top-down approach to economic development ignored the basis 
upon which heavy industries operated, namely the existence of medium-size 
industries that either provided support for the running of the big enterprises or 
were subsidiaries of their activities. These medium-businesses were still in the 
hands of foreign ownership, and if position-changing was to occur at a viable rate, 
these should be the first to be supported by the government. Furthermore, these 
businesses sustained the middle-class and educated them in the fundamentals of 
management, risk-taking, and other entrepreneurial skills.1136  
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Indeed, Sjafruddin identified the government’s investment in medium-sized 
businesses as primarily an exercise in human development, rather than simply 
economic development. Investment in medium-sized businesses resulted in the 
training of a class of Indonesian entrepreneurs in good organization, efficient and 
effective management, professional knowledge, and experience in controlling 
entrepreneurial ventures.1137 He wrote in his memoir that “capital is a creation of 
human beings and so we must first develop human beings rather than developing an 
economy based on capital. Capital is a dead thing; it doesn’t work without people 
who can handle it.”1138 From such experience, Sjafruddin believed that Indonesian 
entrepreneurs would learn the non-quantitative attributes of reliability, zeal, 
responsibility, risk-taking, and stability, among others, all of which had a decisive 
influence on the success of a business venture. These skills, he believed, could not be 
learned in an environment where all risks were borne solely by the government.1139  
Sjafruddin also criticized the government’s neglect of agricultural industries. 
The top-down approach that relied on heavy investment in big industries did not 
reflect the economic reality on the ground: that Indonesia lacked a professional 
middle-class and could not yet supply its own food to a rapidly growing population 
with an agricultural industry that had been impaired by years of social upheavals 
and war. Without meeting the basic needs of the population, the government was 
constructing an economy on very brittle ground, building on huge capital without 
the human skill to sustain and control it. Sjafruddin argued against Western-trained 
Indonesian economists like Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, who insisted on adopting 
the economic models of industrialized countries: in this case, Keynes monetary 
policies. Sjafruddin wrote that:  
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[Y]ou cannot apply these theories in Indonesia because Indonesia is not an 
industrial country. Keynes’s theories can only be applied in a country where 
production can be changed overnight, according to demand. But we are an 
agricultural economy so deficit spending seemed to me basically wrong. 
Inevitably it entailed inflation. I feel that since independence we have been 
suffering from people who do not clearly understand the relation between 
human beings and economic development.1140  
 
For Sjafruddin, Indonesia’s economic model should not only begin by 
rehabilitating agricultural industries, but should be based on agriculture.1141 
Sumitro, on the other hand, believed that though rehabilitation of the agricultural 
sector was necessary, industrial development should take place side by side with 
agriculture, rather than being based upon it.1142 Emphasizing on the latter would 
simply delay Indonesia’s industrial development given the already-existing gap 
between foreign-owned enterprises and national initiatives.1143  
There seems to be good case to suggest that Sjafruddin’s emphasis on 
agriculture was overstated and that Sumitro conceptualized the balance of the two 
more clearly.1144 In his analysis of Sjafruddin and Sumitro’s approach to 
development, Wie argues that Sumitro’s brand of pragmatism, that more readily 
embraced efforts at nationalizing large industrial projects, was more sensitive to the 
“monopolistic” and “oligopolistic” powers of foreign enterprise that would 
jeopardize Indonesia’s economic sovereignty in the future.1145 Sjafruddin’s counsel 
for patience seems to be a conservatism that Indonesia could not afford to undertake 
at the time. In 1989, however, Sumitro acknowledged that much of the economic 
policy of nationalization he espoused was dictated no less by sentiment than by 
                                                          
1140 Prawiranegara, “Recollections,” 106-107. 
1141 Prawiranegara, “Recollections,” 106. 
1142 Wie, “Debate on Economic Policy,” 15. 
1143 Wie, “Debate on Economic Policy,” 15. 
1144 Wie, “Debate on Economic Policy,” 15-16. 
1145 Wie, “Debate on Economic Policy,” 17-18. 
323 
 
good economic calculations, and that Sjafruddin’s call for patience and gradual 
development of national industries proved providential:  
I admit with sincerity that if we look back to the development and realities of 
these past decades, then Sjafruddin’s position during the ‘50s contained 
much that is correct. Indeed, during that time I was driven by a great desire 
to accelerate the fundamental rearrangement of the colonial economic 
structure ... I did not realize that this fundamental rearrangement of a 
colonial economy that weighs heavily on agriculture toward a more balanced 
economic structure is a process that requires its own stages [of 
development]; that development in terms of a structural change requires 
time that spans for generations.1146  
 
Indeed, the larger point Sjafruddin made was not that Indonesia should 
remain irrevocably tied to an agrarian economy, but that the development of 
agriculture must go hand in hand with that of medium-sized businesses, in that both 
are primarily an investment in human development that would ensure sustainable 
economic development and nurture a population that could withstand potential 
economic turbulence in the future. The key point was the last sentence in the above 
quotation: human development must come first, even if this entailed relinquishing, 
at the moment, domestic control over big capital or large industries. The priority of 
human development before capital was the basis of Sjafruddin’s economic 
rationality. The theme of human development and the need to increase the capacity 
or capability of Indonesians was a theme that Sjafruddin had consistently voiced, 
until he passed away in 1989.1147  
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Sjafruddin’s third concern was the “unwieldy” policy of the centralization of 
authority and economic activity in Jakarta.1148 Following the dissolution of the 
Republic of the United States of Indonesia in 1950, the measure of regional 
autonomy was not as fully fleshed-out as was originally intended. The government 
did not address the immediate problems of the regions outside of Java and did not 
share fiscal and administrative powers with local governments.1149 According to 
Sjafruddin, the central government still held almost all official authority. As a result, 
provincial governors had to consult the central government by coming in person to 
Jakarta on all important matters. Furthermore, the concentration of authority was 
met with neither an efficient bureaucracy nor a stable central government and 
parliament. The potential development of these regions was therefore stunted, even 
when relative political stability and an abundance of natural resources were readily 
had.1150 All foreign exchanges, for instance, were channelled to Jakarta, even though 
close to three-fourths were earned in the regions.1151 All this led to the view amongst 
leaders of the regions that the Dutch colonizers had been replaced by the Javanese, 
feeding into strong secessionist sentiments. When Sjafruddin became prime 
minister of the PRRI counter-government in 1958, a major part of his government 
program was the extensive delegation of power to the regions. The central 
government’s authority was limited to external defence, foreign affairs, finance, 
inter-island traffic, justice, education, and coordination of regional activities.1152 His 
economic program gave high priority to the development of regional economies. 
Sjafruddin’s main concern was to develop an efficient government, one that allowed 
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freedom for productive enterprises and which decreased the possible channels for 
corruption.1153  
The issue of corruption preoccupied Sjafruddin throughout his career, from 
his involvement in various government positions during the 1950s to the New Order 
period. Corruption hindered economic development because it usually festered 
around a large state bureaucracy that operated on inefficient administrative and 
legal procedures. The cycle of state inefficiency, corruption, and the resulting 
underdevelopment of production in various economic sectors and poverty fed upon 
each other to the detriment of the economic health of the nation.1154  
The remedy, according to Sjafruddin, was to reduce state bureaucracy and 
introduce simpler regulations. Reducing public sector workers was not a measure to 
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reduce costs, but to address the problems of inefficient working habits—a well-
known phenomenon to all Indonesians up to this day—and to increase 
professionalism of those workers whose services were retained.1155 Sjafruddin 
suggested a concrete scheme for downsizing state bureaucracy. The public sector 
workers who were laid off should nonetheless remain on the government payroll, in 
accordance with their current rate and benefits. If within a period of two to three 
years it was deemed that they were no longer needed on hire, they would be 
dismissed definitively by getting pension. Those whose services were retained 
would have their rates increased to minimize the temptation to pocket bribes or 
pursue other means of corruption. The government should then form an inspection 
body to oversee this transition. Simplification of administrative and legal procedures 
was meant to cut down on possible channels for corruption.1156 Sjafruddin argued 
that the current system was too complex for both citizens and public functionaries. 
The latter could be more easily bribed if they are unable to fully grasp their 
administrative obligations, while the public would be inclined to give these bribes 
when the procedure proved convoluted.1157 Furthermore, the more complex the 
procedures, the more workers were required to administer them and the more 
money the government would spend to retain their services. Laws and procedures 
were meant to empower citizens to exercise their rights and obligations; but if the 
bureaucracy was prohibitively complicated, this would serve only to further alienate 
them from the state. Those who suffered most from this were the less-privileged of 
society who were most vulnerable to being caught in bureaucratic red-tape, being 
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the most dependent upon government programs for their daily needs and having no 
means to initiate those extra-procedural manoeuvres that sped up the process, i.e. 
bribes. 1158  
Sjafruddin’s rational approach to economic policies also explained his 
opposition to government programs that were proposed less on economic viability 
than on nationalistic sentiments, especially if those sentiments trumped what he 
considers to be basic moral standards. Such were the reasons for his opposition to a 
number of economic policies pursued by the government during the 1950s that 
discriminated based on ethnic lines, even if those policies were provisional, intended 
to empower indigenous participation in the economy. Part of Sumitro’s Economic 
Urgency Program during the 1951 Natsir Cabinet was the continuation of the 
Benteng (fortress) program that reserved certain categories of goods for indigenous 
importers, who in turn received trade credits through the Bank Negara Indonesia 
(Indonesian State Bank, BNI).1159 This program began during the Hatta cabinet in 
1950 and came to an end in 1957 when knowledge of its abuse by both importers 
and officials became a national scandal.1160  
Sjafruddin ran against strong popular opinion amongst the public and its 
leaders when he vehemently opposed the provisions of the Benteng program during 
his tenure as Minister of Finance in the Natsir government. There was of course a 
utilitarian principle that Sumitro, Djuanda, and others held in advocating for 
‘discriminatory’ policies such as the Benteng program. There existed extreme 
income disparity between Indonesians and those of Chinese descents on the one 
hand and the Dutch on the other. While the gap between the latter two groups had 
narrowed since the 1930s, the income average of Indonesians had more or less 
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stagnated into the post-independence era.1161 To establish a true national economy 
required more participation of Indonesian entrepreneurs in vital industries that 
were under the control of Chinese and Dutch businesses. The Benteng program was 
intended to allow Indonesian businesses to gain capital and catch up. Sjafruddin’s 
position on the issue stemmed not only from his natural suspicion of policies that 
seem to feed into nationalistic sentiments than economic viability, but was also, 
more importantly, derived from a stern moral ground. He argued that the state 
should not compromise its duty to serve and benefit all its citizens, regardless of 
ethnicity and other distinctions of class, religion, and political persuasion, if it 
wanted to maintain the highest standard of justice.1162 He wrote that:  
The authority and regulations of the state will benefit the people who would 
in turn abide by them if that authority is executed with consideration of the 
interest of each individuals and not only in the interest of a few people or a 
party. In other words, the regulations of the state will only be accepted by the 
people if those regulations do not transgress the regulations and teachings of 
any religion. And since the one command of all religions is that all human 
beings should love and respect one another, then it follows that state 
regulations and laws should always fulfill that command. Only in this case 
will the state be considered just.1163 
  
Furthermore, the application of such a principle to property laws was 
enshrined in the constitution of the country. Sjafruddin reminded his colleagues that 
Chinese Indonesians were:  
[c]itizens of Indonesia, though they are of Chinese descent. And is it not the 
case that this restriction in property rights against the guarantees stipulated 
by the constitution, which does not discriminate between the property rights 
of natives and immigrants? Furthermore, is it not the case that our 
constitution does not at all make a distinction between property rights of 
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citizens and foreigners? I ask you then to read the constitution. There is 
nothing there that distinguishes between the properties rights of citizens and 
non-citizens. In practice we keep our constitution in some cabinet and are 
wary to open it!1164  
 
Sjafruddin’s objection to such policies thus extended not only to distinctions 
made between citizens of different ethnic groups but also, more controversially, to 
those made between citizens and non-citizens. The latter point extended to his 
objection to what he considered to be the premature nationalization of Dutch 
enterprises, efforts which he believed to be motivated more by “narrow” 
nationalistic sentiments than by careful economic considerations, as we have 
discussed above.  
For Sjafruddin, therefore, structural schemes enacted by the state under 
utilitarian principles should never be allowed to compromise individual rights that 
were guaranteed by the constitution. They were against the principle of justice. For 
many, this was a tall order that denied the economic condition of the time with the 
great inequality separating Indonesian enterprises from their Chinese or Dutch 
counterparts. Sjafruddin’s position, however, was not to ignore this reality nor to 
turn a blind eye to the economic structure that maintained it; rather, he felt that the 
discriminatory policies of successive Indonesian governments derived more from 
nationalistic sentiments and resentment against foreigners that were not sufficiently 
justified by economic factors.1165 Here we see again Sjafruddin’s ideas resembling 
the notion of the basic structure, especially that of “the political constitution with an 
independent judiciary, legally recognized forms of property, and [ … ] a system of 
competitive markets with private property in the means of production…”1166 
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Sjafruddin’s emphasis on justice and the prioritization of human 
development over economic growth also informed his criticism of the New Order’s 
monetary liberalism and the massive influx of foreign capital that flooded Indonesia 
during the first decade of Suharto’s rule. The New Order moved away from the 
economic approach of the Guided Economy with its monetary control, protectionist 
taxation, and nationalization schemes, embracing the free market in order to attract 
as much foreign investment as possible to increase production. According to 
Sjafruddin, the attitude that motivated this policy was that Indonesia needed a 
bigger “public pie” with the assumption of the trickle down effect:  
[According to the New Order] we must first make a bigger pie that is possible 
only through the help of foreign capital. The more foreign capital is invested 
in Indonesia, the bigger the ‘public pie’ and the greater portion of this would 
our people receive. Because of this, the freer foreign money can go to and 
from Indonesia, the more attractive this area will be for foreign capital to do 
their ventures and trade.1167  
 
With this mindset, then, the New Order rearranged the Guided Economy of 
the Old Order into a liberal economic and monetary regime and in less than three 
years, through the aid of foreign loans, was able to improve the general economic 
condition and state finances. According to Sjafruddin, the fundamental difference 
between the two economic systems was that the Guided Economy prioritized the 
development of the indigenous Indonesian people, while the Liberal Economy of 
Suharto prioritized the tool of development: money. The first was meant to protect 
and strengthen the national economy and improve the conditions of the poor in 
society in extreme ways, whereas the second was meant to do away with inflation 
and maintain the stability of monetary value without attention given to who owned 
                                                          
1167 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “Kenop 15,” in Ekonomi dan Keuangan: Makna Ekonomi Islam, vol. 
2 of Kumpulan Karangan Terpilih, ed. Ajip Rosidi (Jakarta: CV Haji Masagung, 1988), 393. Kenop 
15 is an acronym that stands for “Kebijakan 15 November” [Policy of November 15]: that is, the 
Indonesian government monetary policy of November 15, 1978 unpegging the rupiah 
(Indonesian currency) from the U.S. dollar along with the devaluation of the rupiah.  
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that money. Money, according to the New Order regime, was the main factor that 
would bring prosperity.1168 
We have seen above that Sjafruddin’s advocacy for foreign capital was in the 
context of a nationalistic and ideological fervour that pervaded the successive 
governments of the 1950s. Economics during this period was subject to the 
determinations of the ideological communist and radical nationalist politics 
encouraged by Sukarno. For Sjafruddin, it was important for Indonesia’s young 
national economy to boost production as much as it could and this was possible only 
through the investment of foreign capital in Indonesian industries.1169 During the 
New Order, Sjafruddin found himself in another extreme, one that turned a blind eye 
to the human development of Indonesians and the national economy in favour of 
foreign credit and capital for the sake of mostly production of consumptive goods 
and monetary circulation.1170 The result of this policy was that Indonesia 
accumulated a large foreign debt in offshore loans that were used to finance the 
economy. Furthermore, national businesses (private or state-owned) were 
overwhelmed by the influx of foreign enterprises with whom they were unable to 
compete for lack of capital and knowledge. The Indonesian government did very 
little to encourage the development of a national industry that could compete with 
foreign imports. Foreign capital systematically replaced and eventually gained 
control over domestic, medium-sized capital, leaving Indonesian entrepreneurs with 
                                                          
1168 Prawiranegara, “Kenop 15,” 393.  
1169 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “Herorientasi di Lapangan Pembangunan Ekonomi” in Ekonomi 
dan Keuangan: Makna Ekonomi Islam, vol. 2 of Kumpulan Karangan Terpilih, ed. Ajip Rosidi 
(Jakarta: CV Haji Masagung, 1988), 55-60. 
1170 What is meant here by Sjafruddin is the New Order government invited foreign capital in 
order to produce many of the luxury consumption goods that were not needed by most people of 
Indonesia and an excessively free flow of foreign capital that could cause problems such as 
capital flight. Prawiranegara, “Kenop 15,” 393. 
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little participation and control over their own economy. Indonesians, according to 
Sjafruddin, had become the servants in their own land.1171  
Though Sjafruddin was nonetheless inclined towards the idea of free 
enterprise, he argued that the government must complement this by mobilizing the 
creative and entrepreneurial potential of Indonesians. This required public 
investments in domestic industries as well as regulations on the flow of foreign 
capital, especially on imported goods. It also required the selective appropriation of 
foreign knowledge, so that development could be implemented in accordance with 
natural condition and the needs of Indonesians in general.1172 The ideal of social 
justice in the Pancasila should be the main reference point for all economic policies:  
It is not that we should not appropriate the outside world; rather, we must 
do this selectively. We should differentiate between [imported] goods that 
we can appropriate for ourselves and those that we should not appropriate. 
The good are those that would unite our nation and increase the people’s 
quality of life without increasing the gap between the rich and poor. The 
good is what actualizes Pancasila. Prioritizing capital is clearly in opposition 
to Pancasila, which prioritizes the human condition without denying its 
material needs that ought to be enjoyed by the people for the realization of 
social justice.1173  
 
Sjafruddin thus proposed a ‘middle-way’ between the priority of money—the 
instrument of economic development—and the priority of the human condition—
the purpose of economic development. He proposed for the New Order government 
to be truthful to and consistent with its own promises, eradicating or reducing 
budget deficit, delimitating freedom of foreign exchange flows,1174 and raising 
                                                          
1171 Prawiranegara, “Kenop 15,” 395-396. 
1172 Prawiranegara, “Kenop 15,” 394-397. 
1173 Prawiranegara, “Kenop 15,” 397. 
1174 Sjafruddin’s proposal for restrictions and oversight of the flow of foreign exchange and 
private loans or credit proved prescient. One of the main causes of the economic and financial 
crisis that hit Indonesia in 1997-1998 and put the country on the brink of bankruptcy, as 
discussed by Prof. Mohammad Sadli in Part Two of this thesis, was overborrowing on the part of 
the private sector. According to Sadli, the debt overhang of the private sector was U.S. $ 80 
billion, and government indebtedness stood around U.S. $ 50 billion. See Sadli, “Indonesian 
Crisis,” 18-19. Already in 1978 Sjafruddin warned, "[t]his free foreign exchange has effected that 
Indonesia today, beside government debt which amounted to U.S. $ 14.5 billion, also reportedly is 
facing a so-called off-shore-loans, [i.e] the private enterprises’ debts to foreign parties for U.S. $ 
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society’s productivity, rule of law, public order and safety.  His ideological 
commitments did not pertain to structures, whether capitalistic or socialistic, but 
rather to the potential for citizens to meaningfully participate in the economy and 
improve their conditions.1175  
When arguing for his economic policies and opinions, Sjafruddin would often 
marshal religious and moral reasoning. This was consistent with his belief that 
morality should also form the basis for policy-making, rather than simply relying on 
purely utilitarian principles whose formal features could often (conveniently) mask 
the immoral or oppressive effects it brought to bear upon the people. One case in 
point was his criticism of the Benteng Program and his defence of Dutch ownership 
of enterprises that many in the country wanted nationalized through coercive 
means. He wrote:  
State regulation cannot be based upon hate for a certain group of people or 
nation. In this case, Islam is very strict. The sort of justice that Muslims must 
consider and implement is one that does not discriminate based on social 
groups, as the Qur’an and Hadith have shown. As we have shown above, state 
regulations and laws can not change people’s character but can only 
regulate/organize the relationship between individuals ... From the 
perspective of Islamic law, good state legislation and regulation are those 
which concretize the guidance and signs that God gives to human beings, and 
which does not run against the letter and spirit of those guidance and signs.1176  
 
Chief amongst these “guidance and signs” was the concept of promise and 
agreement. He cited a number of Qur’anic verses that stated the importance of 
holding true to an agreement and avoiding subterfuge and betrayal for material 
ends. Sjafruddin brought up three verses: An-Naḥl 16:91; Yūsuf 12:52; and al-Anfāl 
8:58, commanding the honouring of agreements including in dealings with non-
                                                                                                                                                                      
10 billion, so that the payback would put the state at a very difficult position.” Prawiranegara, 
“Kenop 15,” 395-396.   
1175 Prawiranegara, “Kenop 15,” 399-401. 
1176 Prawiranegara, Ekonomi Terpimpin,” 131.  
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Muslims.1177 Hence the Qur’an enjoins the believer towards fair dealings with others, 
regardless of religion or social groupings. Furthermore, it also affirms the moral 
imperative of holding true to agreements. Sjafruddin’s criticism against the Benteng 
program related to the first principle, while his criticism against the coercive means 
of nationalization related to the second.1178 On this point we discern the expression 
of religious humanism in Sjafruddin’s ideas of economic development and social 
justice.1179  
In addition, Sjafruddin showed a strong spirituality, a sense of human beings’ 
dependence on God’s will in dealing with problems in all fields of life, including 
economic development issues. For him there was no conflict between religious 
beliefs and economic rationality. He said:  
If we truly want to find the right, which can lead us out of the difficulties we 
are experiencing now, then first we have to disassociate from all remarks 
which are mostly diatribes rather than rational reasons, which is based on 
healthy mind ... Economic progress, for example, is only one aspect of a 
deeper problem, namely our drang and levensbeschouwing (passion and 
outlook on life). [I think we have to] put emphasis firstly on human volition, 
whether individual or collective, in an effort to improve the lot, but the final 
emphasis is rested on God’s power.1180 
 
Therefore, according to Sjafruddin, Indonesia's development and economic 
policy should not only be based on requirements of the ability to work and to take 
into account short-term and long-term factors, but should also be based on the 
                                                          
1177 Chapter An-Naḥl 16:91: “Fulfil any pledge you make in God’s name and do not break oaths 
after you have sworn them, for you have made God your surety; God knows everything you do.” 
Chapter Yūsuf 12: 52: “... God does not guide the mischief of the treacherous.” Chapter Al-Anfāl 
8:58: “And if you learn of treachery on the part of any people, throw their treaty back at them, for 
God does not love the treacherous.”   
1178 Prawiranegara, Ekonomi Terpimpin,” 131-132. 
1179 Prawiranegara, “Membangun Kembali,” 219. Sjafrudddin consistently defendended this view 
almost two decades later during the New Order period. He wrote that “economic development 
essentially requires peaceful and friendly circumstance. Peace and friendship among us, peace 
and friendship between us and other nations. If we yearn for peace and friendship, it is easy for 
us to get help.”  
1180 Prawiranegara, “Kesulitan-kesulitan,” 70-71. As the basis for his opinion Sjafruddin quoted 
the Qur’an, ar-Raʿd 13:11: “Surely God does not change the condition of a people, until they 
change what is in themselves. And when God wills harm on a people, there is no averting it, and 
apart from Him, they have no protector.”  
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ability to be grateful and to pray. Thus, he says, "we can carry out development in 
earnest, with a quiet mind, open heart and firm faith."1181  
In conclusion, a consistent pattern emerges in his proposal of economic and 
financial policies, one that clarifies not only his theoretical approach to the issue of 
social justice, but also his practical methodology given the circumstances of the time. 
Sjafruddin was the main driving force behind a policy that attached high priority to 
the economic and social development of the country, the strengthening of law and 
order, an intense concern with the administrative regularization and consolidation, 
the maximization of production, and planned economic development in cooperation 
with the West and compatible with Western lines in large measure. The pattern of 
Sjafruddin’s economic proposals centered consistently around his persistent 
advocacy for decentralization of state institutions and regional autonomy; efficiency 
of government bureaucracy; increasing domestic capital and production circulating 
inside the country, not only the equal distribution of pre-existing resources; fair 
treatment to all participants in economic activities; friendly and reasonable policies 
towards foreign capital; and promoting the rule of law.   
Given his pragmatic approach and the long-term reach of his proposals, 
Sjafruddin seemed in the eyes of many to have been in favor of the interests of 
foreign capitalists and those who were economically stronger. To his political 
opponents, his nationalistic credentials were not convincing. But in the long term, 
Sjafruddin’s ideas proved to be more pertinent in defending the interests of 
Indonesian people who, during the 1950s, mostly lived in poverty and 
underdevelopment in terms of both education and social skills. As we have seen 
above, anti-foreign political groups and policymakers of nationalistic economic 
planning were motivated by the desire to realize equality and economic 
                                                          
1181 Prawiranegara, “Herorientasi,” 60-61. 
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inependence as soon as possible. There is no doubt that there was a deep social 
economic gap in Indonesian society during the 1950s. However, forced 
nationalization and affirmative action policies, meant to undo the injustice in the 
past, only served to widen this gap, putting the objective of social justice further out 
of reach and worsening the economic condition of the people. Sjafruddin’s pragmatic 
and long-term proposals were made in view of increasing production (of medium-
sized agricultural industries) on the one hand, and planting the seeds of a more 
skilled and knowledgeable working, intellectual, and managerial class through 
universal education on the other. Thus, Sjafruddin’s economic development ideas to 
realize social justice put priority on wealth creation, investment in education, and 
poverty alleviation, rather than on equal distribution of wealth and (immediate) 
economic independence from foreign influence, both of which Sjafruddin deemed to 
be unattainable at the time. These persistent emphases on increasing production 
and on efforts to develop skills, knowledge, and independence through education 
reminds us of modern concepts of social justice as advanced by Leonard Hobhouse, 
Anthony Giddens, and Amartya Sen. These thinker give preference to equality of 
opportunities and underline the capability to use them effectively, rather than 
focusing on equality of the availability of social and material goods.1182 However, the 
patience required in carrying out this approach was not shared by many other 
Indonesian political leaders, not only those from radical nationalist and communist 
groups but also by other policymakers whom Sutter calls “the hesitaters among the 
                                                          
1182 Anthony Giddens, “The Question of Inequality,” in The Global Third Way Debate, ed. Anthony 
Giddens (Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Blabckwell Publishers, 2001), 178-179; 
Miller, Principles of Social Justice, 3-4 and 270-271. The theories of social justice developed by 
scholars such as Westel Willoughby, L. T. Hobhouse, and T. N. Carver as well as Pope Pius XI’s 
encyclical Divini Redemptoris contended, in Miller’s assessment, that social justice does not only 
guarantee fair treatment for individuals, but also encourages strong economic activities as a 
whole, pursued in a safe and orderly atmosphere that contribute to the prosperity and progress 
of a society through the cooperation of all elements. 
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moderate nationalists and socialists”1183 such as Sumitro and Djuanda, whose 
governments spearheaded the nationalistic policies of the Benteng Program, 
nationalization schemes, and heavy industry projects. However, despite his 
opposition to a politically-driven socialist economy, Sjafruddin was not an ideologue 
of the free market. As we have seen above, during the New Order regime, when the 
government reversed the earlier trend of nationalistic economic policies and 
emphasized a pragmatic approach to economic development, Sjafruddin still 
remained a foremost critique of the government. According to him, the New Order’s 
excessive liberalization of the market and indiscriminate habit of taking out loans 
would result in Indonesia’s economic dependency upon foreign powers at the 
expense of Indonesia’s development.  
Sjafruddin’s realism and non-ideological approach to economic development 
does not cast him off as a pragmatist. Rather, as we have seen, he took an approach 
that was at once practical, sober, and holistic, very unlike the revolutionary fervour 
that influenced even the most moderate leaders of the time. This was because he had 
an integrated worldview that did not compromise the primacy of the individual over 
the state, nor, most importantly for him, the spiritual over the material. The 
fundamental consideration in his approach to economic development was not the 
interest of the state in the context of nationalism or independence, but rather the 
livelihoods of the people who must bear the full consequences of any economic 
policies. This approach also explains his willingness to adopt Western ideas and 
expertise in economics at a time when such expertise amongst Indonesians was rare. 
Again, perhaps John Sutter best summarized Sjafruddin’s proposals and policies of 
economic development: 
                                                          
1183 Sutter, Indonesianisasi, 1189. 
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Sjafruddin was a humanitarian, who sought the maximum prosperity for all 
the people in the most efficient manner, and who combined the “democracy” 
and “social justice” principles of the Pantja Sila with its “humanity” principle 
or “internationalism”—the one most neglected by Indonesian political 
parties. His ideas were directed perhaps more towards the hesitaters among 
the moderate nationalists and socialists than towards the more incorrigible 
xenophobes and “neo-caste-ists” (especially those of the Marxist orthodoxy). 
Since Indonesia was still a very young nation-state, however, Sjafruddin may 
have been too far ahead of his time.1184   
 
I would like to add to this assessment that Sjafruddin’ humanitarian 
economic ideas and policies were inspired, as we have seen, by Islamic moral 
teachings and modern ideas of social justice.  
 
                                                          




PART SIX: CONCLUSION 
Sjafruddin’s concern for and idea of social justice, like those of Indonesian 
nationalist leaders and intellectuals, were rooted historically in the Indonesian 
experience of oppressive Dutch colonial policies driven by exploitation and racial 
discrimination which resulted in socio-economic discrepancies and 
impoverishment. Consequently, the principle of social justice continues to deeply 
influence the socio-economic thought of Indonesian intellectuals and to shape 
consecutive Indonesian governments’ development policies. Sjafruddin’s conception 
of social justice contained ideas and practices implemented by Western social-
democratic countries as well as moral-ethical foundations he derived from Islamic 
teachings. Sjafruddin’s religious, socio-economic, and political thought was 
influenced by his upbringing in an aristocratic and devoutly Muslim family of 
Bantam/Banten, his personal rational character, his Dutch Western education, and 
his penchant for exploring philosophical issues, including Marxist literature. 
Sjafruddin referred to his ideology as religious socialism, a term used for the 
first time by Mohammad Hatta, one of the two most prominent leaders of Indonesian 
independence and former vice president (1945-1956). Sjafruddin’s religious 
understanding could be classified as liberal-modernist, signified by an emphasis on 
ijtihād, reason-based interpretation, and the integration of modern ideas and 
institutions with the moral and social orientation of the Qur’an.1185 When discussing 
Qur’anic teachings concerning justice and equality, he argued that the government 
must be democratic in form and must treat all citizens as equal without distinctions 
based on religion, ethnicity, or gender. Similarly, in defending freedom of speech and 
                                                          




thought as important elements in democracy, Sjafruddin tied the issue to the 
Qur’anic obligations of shūrā, mutual consultation, and ijmāʿ, consensus, in Islamic 
tradition. He defended democracy and freedom of expression throughout his life 
with little regard to the consequences this brought upon his personal life. In the 
democratic system, especially the checks and balances between the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches of government, he saw a mechanism to prevent 
politicians and the state from becoming authoritarian. In addition, he also used the 
argument of fundamental human rights derived from natural rights to defend 
freedom of expression. Sjafruddin’s concern for the rule of law, individual liberty 
and human rights situates him as an Indonesian intellectual who had deeply 
absorbed the traditions of European social democracy and integrated them with the 
religious and moral values of Islamic modernism.   
As was the case with modernists in other Muslim countries, Sjafruddin responded to 
the realities of colonialism and tried to resolve the problems that arose from modern 
developments in science, capitalism, and statehood over aspects of Islamic tradition 
These issues ranged from the relationship of faith to reason, politics, economics, and 
society to the reinterpretation of religious teachings according to the dynamics of 
modern society. On matters regarding the relationship of faith to reason, Sjafruddin 
deployed two different methods to conceptualize the issues and resolve some of 
their difficulties. With respect to beliefs that had nothing to do with the worldly 
arrangements of human life and which were considered instead to be purely 
spiritual concerns (ghayb, unseen), such as the Isrā’ and Miʿrāj, he chose to believe 
them at face value. Sjafruddin did not see this as a concession to blind faith or a 
compromise of rationality. The epistemology of modern science, especially the social 
sciences, was not neutral or value-free, for the natural sciences would continue to 
evolve and theories of various phenomena of nature were constantly changing. For 
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Sjafruddin, this reflected both the capabilities and the limitations of the human 
intellect. To accept matters of the unseen at face value was to recognise that some 
realities of the world are beyond the reach of human knowledge. As for the issue of 
legal injunctions in the Qur’an and Hadith texts related to the regulation of social life, 
Sjafruddin adopted an approach that re-interpreted these sources in light of the 
contemporary situation, which was manifestly different from the social and 
historical conditions at the time of the Prophet. These injunctions were therefore not 
always relevant and applicable to modern times.  
This rational approach is displayed in a number of Sjafruddin’s 
interpretations of Islamic teachings related to social issues. Here we see how 
Sjafruddin was an independent-minded and at times idiosyncratic thinker. In many 
of his writings he presented his opinion on Islamic subjects and socio-political and 
economic issues not on behalf of a certain organization but as an individual. 
Although he joined and led several Islamic social organizations during the New 
Order period and was a member of the Masyumi leadership from 1945 through the 
1950s, Sjafruddin always displayed his own individual character and independence 
in expressing his views. Of course he wrote and spoke on behalf of the Masyumi on 
several occasions, especially on economic matters, and he had maintained his status 
as the official spokesperson of Masyumi on economic policies during 1950s. But he 
often differed in opinion from other Masyumi leaders or from popular opinions 
among Muslims. He was known to be adverse to gestures of populism, never trying 
to draw the sympathy of Masyumi members for the sake of his popularity as a 
politician and party leader. For instance, he chose to defend the operation of foreign 
companies and investments in Indonesia against the strong current of popular 




Most of his writings related to Islamic law concerned the problem of usury. 
Although he mentioned the need for a reinterpretation of zakāt and inheritance, he 
did not elaborate further on these subjects, perhaps because of his limited ability in 
accessing the sources of classical Islamic tradition. Though he was never 
antagonistic towards traditional scholarship as such, he was critical of the ʿulamā’, 
who for him were too conservative in their interpretation of the religious sources 
and too tolerant of the unscrupulous political attitudes of many Indonesian leaders, 
who often showed blatant disregard for public ethics once they came to hold office. 
Sjafruddin sometimes showed an apologetic bent on certain issues, especially during 
the late period of his life. However, he still maintained his liberal and rational 
attitude towards interpreting Islam. Sjafruddin’s rational understanding of religion 
was also coupled with a sense of deep spirituality. He believed that behind all human 
endeavours was the active role of the will of God, who ultimately determined the 
outcomes of human action. He also mentioned that his belief that he would face God 
in the Hereafter to account for his deeds—an article of faith in Islam—was his 
motivation for criticising Sukarno and Suharto openly and fearlessly. The same 
motivation also led him to be an honest critic of certain popular opinions of Muslims 
and Indonesians of which he did not approve. This conviction was the source of 
Sjafruddin’s moral integrity in his political and intellectual career. Throughout his 
life he was never tainted by corruption.  
His intellectual activity focused primarily on economic development and 
politics. His secular Western educational background enabled him to understand the 
socio-cultural problems resulting from economic change. He insisted that religion 
was not only relevant to the modernization of Indonesian society, but moreover 
should play a role in social and political life. In his view, the fact that the first 
principle of Pancasila, the state ideology, was belief in One God meant that religious 
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teachings should be taken into consideration in formulating government policies, 
especially those related to ethical or moral issues with deep social consequences. 
Sjafruddin believed that religion, particularly Islam, could and must provide a moral 
and ethical foundation in the public sphere. The incorporation of religion into the 
process of political and economic development should be carried out through the 
sincere and consistent implementation of the Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945. 
It is clear that Sjafruddin, along with other Muslim leaders and groups in Indonesia, 
aspired to modernity without secularism.  
Sjafruddin’s liberal-modernist orientation informed his conception of social 
justice. His approach to economic development was not only determined by 
rationality and efficiency in stimulating economic growth and material welfare, but 
was also concerned with the principle that the fair distribution of wealth must 
involve the participation of society through a democratic political system. During the 
period of the New Order he voiced the need for political restructuring in order to 
restore the institutions of democracy and the system of checks and balances 
between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. He further 
held that on a more microcosmic scale, economic development must begin by 
purifying the moral being of individuals from worldly attachments and fostering 
virtues based on religious and spiritual teachings. Through this, humans were to be 
liberated from undue attachment to material goods and gain control over their 
desires. The elevation of an ethical and moral human being was the purpose of 
development, for development was intended to achieve not only material prosperity 
but also spiritual happiness. Sjafruddin therefore stressed the importance of moral 
development in changing one’s fundamental outlook on life. He believed that only 
those human beings who were in control of their desires could work to eliminate 
poverty, improve the material welfare of society, and establish social justice. He also 
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stressed the need to reduce poverty, establish equal opportunities in education, 
improve health services, and close the inequality gap between the haves and the 
have-nots. The first priority of socio-economic development was education, on the 
basis that investment in human development would ensure the sustainability of 
economic development and nurture a population that could withstand potential 
economic turbulence in the future. The prioritization of human development before 
capital was the basis of Sjafruddin’s economic rationality.  
Sjafruddin’s emphasis on the importance of moral instruction, scientific and 
technological education, and development of vocational training in the curriculum of 
the education system was prescient. He also argued that Indonesia needed a 
genuinely democratic educational system accessible to all Indonesians. Both these 
proposals were aimed at finding a long-term solution to fundamental problems in 
Indonesian society: poverty, underdevelopment, inequality, and patrimonial/neo-
patrimonial culture. Instead, however, the New Order strategy of advancing crude 
economic growth and development has shaped Indonesia into a consumptive, 
hedonistic, and materialistic society and widened social-economic inequalities. 
Though foreign economic aid provided by Western countries was partially used for 
productive purposes, a large chunk of it was spent on imported goods to support the 
consumptive lifestyle of the upper class and thus did not advance or improve the 
living standard of ordinary people. This consumptive lifestyle instigated further 
corruption among many government officials and military officers. Foreign 
economic loans eventually became a burdensome debt, putting pressure on the 
state’s finances and bringing misery to people as social services were compromised. 
Furthermore, massive agricultural, plantation, and textile industries, which 
outmuscled smaller-scale enterprises, as well as the capital-intensive and labour-
saving techniques of foreign economic activities, had created unemployment, unfair 
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competition and conflicts of interest. These eventually brought about the economic 
and political crises that resulted in millions of lost jobs, riots, and social strife. 
Sjafruddin had criticized the New Order’s development strategy long before the 
crisis hit. His proposed alternative was not simply to return to the principle of 
equality—emphasized strongly during the days of the Guided Democracy, of which 
the ideologically-driven economic program led to much bloodshed and suffering—
but also to prioritize the need for efficiency (economic rationality) and freedom 
(democracy).   
Although Sjafruddin was actively involved in governmental economic and 
monetary policies during the parliamentary democracy era (1949-1957), he was 
critical of what he believed to be the irresponsible political attitudes of many 
politicians, government officials, and military officers. During this period there were 
sincere attempts to bring together the principles of equality, liberty and efficient 
economic development in the government’s economic program. Yet many leaders, 
political parties, and groups abused the freedom and were not patient enough to 
solve the existing problems in a gradual and realistic manner. Sjafruddin was among 
the few who insisted on a reasonable and moderate response. This period ended 
with the loss of freedom and the neglect of efficient development under the 
authoritarian Guided Democracy system. Sjafruddin was among the many victims of 
the policy of “continuing revolution”. 
Sjafruddin’s conception of social justice also required a political system that 
ensured three components of social justice: equality, freedom, and efficiency. In 
many cases in developing countries, either the principles of liberty and equality 
were put aside to make way for economic development, or equality was emphasized 
by sacrificing economic development and freedom. Sjafruddin’s works show how it 
is possible to simultaneously and harmoniously realize a just and prosperous society 
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as aspired to by the Indonesian constitution. The key to this approach is moderate, 
gradual, reasonable, and pragmatic policies in solving economic and social problems. 
Sjafruddin’s manner of presenting the concept was distinctive: he did not simply 
propose a general concept in an idealistic or normative way but also showed in 
detail how the concept could be implemented in a comprehensive policy of 
development. Because Sjafruddin was involved intensively in the Indonesian 
government’s economic policymaking during the 1950s, his proposals for social 
justice always assumed and required that the government would carry out certain 
programs and implement certain policies. Not surprisingly, his conception of social 
justice also emphasized and pointed to practical and efficient ways to achieve 
economic prosperity. His conception of social justice is in line with John Rawls’ two 
principles of justice and his idea of the basic structure. Sjafruddin formulated 
economic policies where the economically-disadvantaged in society should not be 
asked to make sacrifices; or, if an economic policy required sacrifice, the burden 
must be borne by all segments of society with an attempt to secure the least amount 
of sacrifice for the least privileged in society. In contrast, the upper class was the 
group of people who had to make the most sacrifice. He implemented this kind of 
strategy, among others, in the monetary policy known as “Sjafruddin’s cut” in 1950.  
Sjafruddin’s persistent emphasis on increasing production, willingness to 
work, and efforts to develop skills, knowledge and independence through education 
is reminiscent of modern conceptions of social justice as advanced by Westel 
Willoughby, LT Hobhouse, TN Carver, and Pope Pius XI. They argued for a society 
where the principles of social justice were implemented in a way that ensured the 
fair treatment of individuals and fostered the growth of economic activities. This 
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was to be achieved through the cooperation of all elements of society, which would 
in turn contribute to the prosperity and progress of the whole.1186  
Although Sjafruddin’s concept of social justice was based on his observations 
and practical experience as an economic expert and policymaker, he integrated his 
approach with the principle of faith in the One God (tawhīd). According to his 
interpretation, this principle guarantees the equality of all human beings before the 
Divine. Upholding this primordial state of equality, especially in a way that is just 
and that leads to mutual prosperity, is an obligation for Muslims. Like other Muslim 
intellectuals, Sjafruddin embraced tawhīd as signifying the unity and integrity of all 
human experiences and the normative consequences this brings to the realm of 
human action. In his conception of social justice, therefore, Sjafruddin constantly 
reminds us of the essential relationship between the teachings and moral principles 
of Islam and political, economic, and social issues.  
However, unlike proponents of Islamic economics, Sjafruddin’s integrated 
approach in conceiving of the aforementioned issues did not lead him to propose an 
alternative economic system. Nor did he argue for the necessity of an Islamic state. 
For him, commitment to Islam was better expressed through fostering universal 
humanitarian solidarity to achieve peace and cooperation with other nations for the 
realization of justice and prosperity. But it is important to note that for Sjafruddin, 
the goal of socio-economic development did not end at this point. As a Muslim he 
believed that all human action should be undertaken for the sake of the pleasure of 
God (marḍāt Allāh) to whom all human beings will return and account for their 
deeds.  
Sjafruddin was also an independently-minded Muslim economist. He derived 
the spirit and ethics of social justice from the teachings of the Qur’an and the 
                                                          
1186  Miller, Principles of Social Justice, 3-4 and 270-271. An organic conception of society and 
social justice is discussed in Part 3 Chapter 1. 
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traditions of the Prophet. However, at variance with many Islamic scholars, he used 
the scriptures not to advance a normative-legalistic approach but as a source of 
legitimacy. His references to the verses of the Qur’an and the Hadith invigorated his 
ideas and proposals for the repair and development of the Indonesian economy, 
including economic policies such as an increase in production, efficiency in the 
management of governmental affairs, especially in economic execution, and 
promotion of prosperity and just distribution. His proposals were accompanied by 
frequent references to the experiences of development in Western nations and 
societies.  
Sjafruddin’s ideas of development are consistently located within the 
framework of social justice since the late 1940s to the 1980s. During that time, a 
number of his ideas and proposals underwent changes. He was known as an 
advocate of economic liberalism during the late 1940s and 1950s for his proposal 
and defense of foreign aid and investment and his encouragement of the role of the 
private sector and market mechanisms. However, he did not agree with the 
excessive liberalism applied by the New Order government, such as allowing private 
firms to borrow money from foreign financial institutions with minimum 
government regulation, the removal of controls on the flow of capital and foreign 
exchange in and out of the country, and the importation of luxury goods that the 
Indonesian public did not need. He also opposed the New Order government’s 
utilitarian approach in promoting sex tourism as a source of government income. 
Furthermore, he was against the expansion of big foreign capital into small 
industries owned by Indonesians.  
For Sjafruddin, the pragmatism of the New Order regime was excessive and 
unprincipled. His pragmatic policies during the 1950s were intended to cultivate 
efficiency and maintain economic stability so that people’s economic condition did 
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not become worse but instead slowly improved. They were not intended to prolong 
Indonesia’s dependence upon foreign influence or to maintain the status quo. 
Sjafruddin stressed, for example, the importance of education and training in 
specialized industrial and technological areas for Indonesian workers who would 
eventually replace foreigners. This was quite different from the pragmatic policy of 
the New Order. The New Order government, in order to accumulate economic gains 
derived from trade, finance, and other economic activities, turned a blind eye to 
corruption and under-the-table commissions (taken from private or state 
companies) by government officials and military officers. The prevalence of these 
practices caused much resentment among the less-privileged classes. Under this 
regime, Indonesia had become a haven for crony capitalism and corruption in the 
region. Worse still, many private companies borrowed money to finance bubble 
projects and were not able to pay out their creditors. The government often stepped 
in to bail out these companies. This practice was one of the chief causes of the 
economic crisis of 1998 which finally toppled the New Order regime.    
Successive post-New Order governments were expected to bring about social 
justice that would ensure equality, prosperity, and freedom for the people. But while 
people have gained political freedom within a democratic system after nearly forty 
years under two authoritarian regimes—a situation that intensified expections and 
promises of prosperity and equality—it turned out that inequality, corruption and 
inefficiency, as the embodiments of injustice, have taken a definite turn for the 
worse. Similarly, excessive liberal (neo-liberal) economic policy has allowed the 
expansion of foreign capital, through privatization, into public sectors that touch the 
basic livelihoods of ordinary people. These sectors, such as drinking water, 
electricity, schools, oil and gas, hospitals, and toll roads, are even in Western 
countries very often restricted from private ownership, given their importance as 
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essential public goods. Yet currently in Indonesia these industries are controlled by 
foreign companies. Sjafruddin’s liberal development policy was very different from 
the neo-liberal policies adopted by the New Order and post-New Order 
governments. 
Sjafruddin was against the idea of a non-interest banking system, which is 
the cornerstone of Islamic economics. For him, proponents of this theory were more 
preoccupied by form than by substance. It is very rare to find, in the works of 
proponents of Islamic economics, even a mention of the issues of free speech or 
constitutional forms of government with democratic institutions run by elected 
representatives of the people. In modern social justice theory, however, freedom of 
speech and democratic political freedom are very important components. As we 
have already discussed, social justice is a broader concept than economic justice. An 
absolute monarchy in the Middle East may carry out economic justice: that is, the 
distribution of economic benefits and burdens. But the absolute monarchy and other 
systems of authoritarian and autocratic rule clearly do not fulfill the modern concept 
of social justice. The problem that stands out, aside from the lack of freedom of 
expression, is the issue of whether the clear separation between private/individual 
ownership and public wealth and property emphasized in the teachings of Islam can 
exist under such a system of government. Nevertheless, these issues are rarely 
discussed by proponents of Islamic economics. Islamic injunctions on wealth 
distribution have never been brought to terms with the realities of poverty and 
inequality in those very countries where support for Islamic economics is most 
outspoken, almost all of which are characterized by varieties of absolute monarchy 
or autocracy. In those countries the concentration of wealth and power in the hands 
of the ruling families contradicts, and has become a major barrier to, the 
achievement of justice as a goal of the teachings of Islam, as stated by proponents of 
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Islamic economics. In the view of liberal-progressive Muslim groups, all forms of 
autocratic rule, including systems of of absolute monarchy or military or civilian 
dictatorships, are illegitimate. It can be said the standard of justice in most absolute 
monarchical and semi-autocratic or autocratic rules in Arab countries still operates 
within the context of a pre-modern political culture or dynastic system. Although 
modern European ideas and Islamic reformist-modernist ideas have attempted to 
force fundamental change since the nineteenth century, the old paradigm of justice 
has not changed significantly. Similarly, the absence of freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, free press and media, and an independent judiciary as an 
important cornerstone of a trustworthy and ethical administration, is an obstacle for 
the realization of a modern Islamic-oriented social justice. Moreover, the realization 
of social justice in many Arab countries has been hampered not only by the rulers 
who want to perpetuate their power and live indulgently with luxurious 
possessions, but also by Western democracies seeking to maintain their economic 
interests by providing military and political support to the unelected Arab rulers. 
The emergence of social justice and democratic movements in the Arab world is 
always a source of worry for repressive and corrupt Arab monarchies and military 
and civilian dictatorships as well as for Western governments.1187  
For Muslims involved in stuggle to realize social justice, their efforts are 
aimed fundamentally at establishing one of Islam’s most important injunctions for 
the believers.1188 However, the concept of social justice in Islam should be 
reinterpreted within the paradigm of modern society and not based on patrimonial-
                                                          
1187 See John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics, 320-321; Chandra Muzaffar, “Islam, Justice, & 
Politics,” in The New Voices of Islam: Reforming Politics and Modernity; A Reader, ed. Mehran 
Kamrava (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 226.  
1188 Farid Esack, “In Search of Progressive Islam: Beyond 9/11,” in Progressive Muslims: On 
Justice, Gender and Pluralism, ed. Omid Safi (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 81—82, 84-85 and 92; 
Farid Esack, On Being a Muslim: Finding a Religious Path in the World Today (1999; reprint, 
Oxford: Oneworld, 2000), 23-27 and 89-93. 
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traditional concepts and institutions.1189 Through this, the concept of equality in 
Islamic teachings can be extended to non-Muslims and ensure that equal rights are 
given to all citizens irrespective of gender or class. This reinterpretation should also 
include the establishment of democratic governance and representative elections 
and the protection of freedoms of speech, assembly and association. All this should 
replace the current authoritarian governments that rule much of the Muslim world.  
Lastly, the ownership of property and natural wealth should be administered by an 
elected government whose mandate is to use these resources for the public interest. 
These considerations above are very close to Sjafruddin’s modernist interpretation 
of Islam: one that is inclusive, rational, and progressive, presenting Islam as a truly 
universal message intended for the modern world based on justice and humanity. 
Sjafruddin’s concept of social justice is a model to be continued and 
improved by the younger generations of Indonesians for the well-being of the 
nation. For Indonesian Muslims he is a model of deep and sincere commitment to 
Islam, the nation, and humanity, possessing superb expertise in his field. He was also 
a person of courage and integrity, who was firm and steadfast in his principles, but 
tolerant of different opinions and ready to discuss them thoughtfully.  
Sjafruddin’s concept of social justice is all the more relevant now as a 
response to the challenges posed by neo-liberalism which, while promising the 
efficient production of economic activity and wealth, has resulted instead in 
economic inequalities on the domestic and international levels, environmental 
destruction and deterioration, unevenness of employment between social classes, 
                                                          
1189 Cf. Rodinson’s instigation of the way which should be taken by believing Muslims “... who 
would fight against reactionary interpretations of Islam… [to draw from the scriptures] ... valid 
precepts of social morality, [and to accomplish] within the religious framework an organic 
synthesis (and not a juxtaposition) between traditional religious values and the humanist values 
which exalt (inter alia) economic construction, …” According to him, this is “. . . the only way to 




and a widening wage gap.1190 Muslims can fight injustice by building coalitions with 
others based on common causes and regardless of religious affiliation. They should 
be inclusive. Muslims and non-Muslims’ solidarity and cooperation against injustices 
engendered by corrupt and authoritarian regimes and global fundamentalist 
economic capitalism are crucial to creating a just and peaceful world.1191 
Finally, in the figure of Sjafruddin and his conception of social justice we have 
the model of a person who responded to the situations and problems he faced 
reasonably and rationally, and who fought to realize the common good and ideals of 
humanity on the basis of a common ground that could be shared by all groups of 
people regardless of their religion, ethnicity, and nation. All this he based on the 
conviction that the struggle was not only for the benefit and happiness of human 




                                                          
1190 Stilwell, Political Economy, 22. 
1191 Farid Esack, Qur’ān, Liberation & Pluralism: An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious 
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APPENDIX: Highlights of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara's Life 
Born on February 28, 1911 in Anyar Kidul, Banten, West Java. 
1917-1930: elementary schooling at an Europeesche Lagere School (ELS, European 
Primary School) in Serang, Banten, West Java, and Ngawi, East Java, and a Meer 
Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs (MULO, Advanced Primary Education) in Madiun, East 
Java.  
1931: Finished his secondary education at an Algemene Middelbare School (AMS, 
General Middle School) in Bandung, West Java.  
1939: Graduated from RHS (Rechts Hogeschool) in Jakarta with the degree of Mr. 
(Meester in de rechten, Master of Law). 
1939-1940: Worked in a private radio-broadcast and became editor of its 
publication, Soeara Timur (Voice of the East).  
1940-1942: Worked as an employee in the Department of Finance and was posted at 
the tax office in Kediri, East Java.  
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1942-1945: Head of the Kediri tax office and was then moved to become head of the 
tax office in Bandung. 
1945: Secretary of the Indonesian National Committee (KNI) of the Priangan 
Residency in Bandung.  
1945-1946: Member of the Working Body of the Central Indonesian National 
Committee (KNIP) in Jakarta with Sjahrir as its chairman. 
1945: Joined Masyumi Islamic Political Party. 
March to October 1946: Junior Minister of Finance in the second Sjahrir's cabinet. 
October 1946-June 1947: Minister of Finance in the third Sjahrir's cabinet. 
1947: Chairman of Indonesian delegation to ECAFE (UN's Economic Commission for 
Asia and the Far-East) meeting in Manila, the Philippine. 
January to December 1948: Minister of Prosperity/Economic Affairs in Hatta's 
cabinet. 
December 1948-July 1949: Chairman of the Emergency Government of Republic of 
Indonesia (PDRI) in Sumatera. 
August to December 1949: Vice Prime Minister in the second Hatta cabinet. 
December 1949-September 1950: Minister of Finance in the Hatta cabinet of 
Republic of United States of Indonesia. 
September 1950-March 1951: Minister of Finance in the first Unitary State of 
Republic of Indonesia's cabinet under Prime Minister Mohammad Natsir. 
July 1951-July 1953: President of De Javasche Bank. 
July 1953-January 1958: First Governor of Central Bank of Indonesia (BI). 
February 1958-August 1961: Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government of 
Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) and Republic of United States of Indonesia (RPI), the 
counter government to the central government of Republic of Indonesia.   
August to December1961: Free Citizen in North Sumatera. 
March 1962-July1966: Political Prisoner under the President Sukarno's Guided 
Democracy regime in several places in West Java, Central Java, and Jakarta. 
July 1966-1989: Founder and member of boards of various social, religious, and 
economic organizations; a leading critic the New Order regime. 
February 15, 1989: Passed away and buried in Jakarta. 
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